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ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS.

VOL. II.

ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS,

COMPRISING HIS

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F. R. S. and S. A. LONDON; F. R. S. EDINBURGH; and
Hiſtoriographer to his Majeſty for SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda eſt in explicando Ariſtotele.
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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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220. — 21. *for* ofter *read* open.
222. — 8 of the note, *for* συσασεως *read* συσασεως
247. — 15. *for* rites *read* rights
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401. in note, *for* ϛαλειτικα *read* ϛαλειτικα

THE

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK I.

THIS Book embraces three ſubjects, the nobleſt and moſt intereſting that civil ſcience can boaſt: the origin of ſociety and government; the diſtinction of ranks in a commonwealth; and a compariſon of the beſt plans of political economy. On each of theſe topics I ſhall offer a few remarks, not with the preſumption of interpoſing my own judgment, but with the hope of juſtifying or illuſtrating the deciſions of my Author.

In explaining the origin of political ſociety, Ariſtotle writes neither the ſatire nor the panegyric of human nature; which, by writers of leſs wiſdom than fancy, have been alternately ſubſtituted for plain hiſtory. In this, as in all other inquiries, his firſt queſtion is, what are the phænomena? His ſecond, what is the analogy of nature? Building on theſe foundations,

BOOK I.

he concludes that both ſociety and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to ſcatter its ſeeds. Neither the cunning cowardly principles aſſerted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections eſpouſed by Shafteſbury and Hutcheſon, ought, according to our author's notions, to be involved in the ſolution of the preſent queſtion: ſince the firſt political ſocieties are as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of moral determination [a], as the inſtinctive actions of plants and inſects, tending to the preſervation of their reſpective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own [b], even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the moſt conſummate wiſdom.

Government, then, is cöeval with ſociety, and ſociety with men. Both are the works of nature; and therefore, in explaining their origin, there cannot be the ſmalleſt ground for the fanciful ſuppoſition of engagements and contracts, independently of which the great modern antagoniſt of Ariſtotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding: "The original compact, which begins and actually conſtitutes any political ſociety, is nothing but the conſent of any number of freemen capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into ſuch a ſociety. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world [c]." From this maxim, which is perpetually inculcated in Locke's two treatiſes on government, is fairly deducible the unalienable right of mankind to be *ſelf-governed*; that is, to be their own legiſlators, and their own directors; or, if they find it inconvenient to aſſume the adminiſtration of

[a] See vol. i. p. 109. & ſeq.; and p. 285. & ſeq. [b] Ibid.

[c] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185. Edit. of 1714.

affairs in their own perſons, to appoint repreſentatives who may exerciſe a delegated ſovereignty, eſſentially and unalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence reſults the new unalienable right of all mankind to be fairly repreſented, a right with which each individual was inveſted from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the leaſt notion of the thing [d]. From this right to fair repreſentation, there follows, by neceſſary conſequence, the right of univerſal ſuffrage, univerſal eligibility, and the univerſal and juſt preponderancy of majorities in all caſes whatever.

Such is the boaſted and ſpecious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux [e], continued in thoſe of our Price [f] and our Prieſtley [g], and carried to the utmoſt extravagance in thoſe of (I wiſh not to ſay our) Rouſſeau [h], Paine [i], and the innumerable pamphleteers whoſe writings occaſioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions.

[d] According to the ſyſtem of Locke and his followers, repreſentatives are appointed by the people to exerciſe in their ſtead, political functions which the people have a right to exerciſe in their own perſons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the people; and to the people, their conſtituents, they always are reſponſible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the firſt or principal author. But repreſentatives, in the uſual and legal acceptation of the word in the Engliſh conſtitution, meant, and ſtill means, perſons in virtue of their election exerciſing political functions, which the people had not a right to exerciſe in their own perſons, and ſo little reſponſible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their inſtructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with repreſentation in the uſual and only practical ſenſe of the word will be ſhewn hereafter.

[e] See his Caſe of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113, and again p. 169. "I have no other notion of ſlavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not conſent."

[f] Obſervations on Civil Liberty, &c.

[g] Eſſay on the firſt Principles of Government.

[h] Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique.

[i] Rights of Man, &c.

BOOK I.

Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumſtances of the times, have produced, and are ſtill producing, the moſt extraordinary effects; by arming the paſſions of the multitude with principle, fortifying them by argument, and thereby ſtirring into action thoſe diſcordant elements which naturally lurk in the boſom of every community. It is not conſiſtent with my deſign, in defending the tenets of my author, to anſwer his political adverſaries with declamation and obloquy, (a raſh and dangerous attempt! ſince the voice of the multitude will always be the loudeſt and the ſtrongeſt,) but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great maſter Locke be itſelf founded in truth. To prove that government is merely a matter of conſent, he aſſumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy; what he calls a ſtate of nature, which he defines to be "men living together according to reaſon, without a common ſuperior on earth with authority to judge between them [k]." But he himſelf ſeems aware that this ſuppoſed natural ſtate of man is a ſtate in which man never yet was found; and in which, if by violence thruſt, he could not for a ſingle day remain. Locke, I ſay, ſaw the difficulty, which, inſtead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. "Where are there," he aſks, "or ever were there, any men in ſuch a ſtate of nature [l]?" He anſwers, "that ſince all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in a ſtate of nature, 'tis plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that ſtate [m]." But this, I affirm, is not to anſwer the propoſed queſtion; for princes and rulers of independent ſtates do not live together, nor aſſociate and "herd," as he himſelf expreſſes it, in the ſame ſociety. If they did ſo,

[k] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164. [l] Ibid. p. 162. [m] Ibid.

they

they could not ſubſiſt without government: for government and ſociety are things abſolutely inſeparable; they commence together; they grow up together; they are both of them equally natural; and ſo indiſſolubly united, that the deſtruction of the one is neceſſarily accompanied by the deſtruction of the other. This is the true ſenſe of Ariſtotle as underſtood and expreſſed by an illuſtrious defender of juſt government and genuine liberty. "As we uſe and exerciſe our bodily members, before we underſtand the ends and purpoſes of this exerciſe, ſo it is by Nature herſelf, that we are united and aſſociated into political ſociety [n]."

Locke, who ſo ſeverely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, ſo unjuſtly arraigns what is called Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, appears to have equally miſtaken his Politics. Had he underſtood [o] that invaluable work, this idol of modern philoſophers, and eſpecially of modern politicians, would not, probably, (ſince he was a man of great worth as well as of great wiſdom,) have produced a theory of government totally impoſſible in practice; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and

[n] Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priuſquam dedicimus cujus ea utilitatis cauſſa habeamus, ſic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem conjuncti & conſociati ſumus. De Fin. Bon. & Mal. l. iii. c. xx. Conf. de Officiis, l. i. c. xvi. & ſeq. Cicero does not ſay "communitatem" ſimply, but "civilem communitatem," which agrees with Ariſtotle's definition of man, ζωον πολιτικον, not merely a herding, but a political animal. See the ſame doctrine in Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh.

[o] Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had aſked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. "To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke obſerves, "the foundation ſhould be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil ſociety, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the ſeveral ſpecies of it. Ariſtotle is allowed a maſter in this ſcience, and few enter into this conſideration of government without reading his Politics." How honourable a teſtimony!

ſedition,

BOOK I.

ſedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all hiſtory, no political fabric ever yet was reared; or if it were to be reared, could ever poſſibly be preſerved[p]. The neglect or miſapprehenſion of ſome of the moſt important parts of the Stagirite's writings is indeed moſt deeply to be lamented. Of the many thouſand authors who have copied or commented his logic, the far greater number omit his intereſting chapters on language; deeming the conſideration of words below the dignity of philoſophers. His profound obſervations concerning the nature and conſtitution of a family have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analyſis of language has been proved in the preſent work to be the ſole foundation of logic, ſo his analyſis of a family, and his explanation of the cauſes through which its elements naturally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to diſcern the analagous principles (principles continually inſiſted on by himſelf) which have raiſed and upheld the great edifice of civil ſociety; "which is not a maſs but a ſyſtem, and which, like every ſyſtem, implies a diſtinction of parts; with many moral as well as phyſical differences, relative and reciprocal; the powers and perfections of one part ſupplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dignity, is an attempt not leſs abſurd than that of compoſing a piece of muſic from one and the ſame note[q].

A difficult queſtion follows, how far ſocial inequality, whether civil or domeſtic, may be allowed to extend? It is with a trembling hand that I touch the delicate ſubject of ſlavery; an undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmoſt confidence in the humanity as well as in the judgment of

[p] Ariſtot. Polit. paſſim. [q] Ibid.

my

my author. Firſt of all, Ariſtotle expreſsly condemns the cruel practice prevalent in his own days of enſlaving priſoners of war[r]: ſecondly, he declares, in the moſt explicit terms, all ſlaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are ſitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he obſerves, muſt in all caſes be limited by their capacities for receiving them; and theſe capacities are themſelves limited by the exigencies and neceſſities of our preſent imperfect condition. The helpleſſneſs of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and the urgencies attending mankind in every ſtage of their exiſtence on earth, render it indiſpenſably neceſſary that a great proportion of the ſpecies ſhould be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the ſtrenuous exertions of productive induſtry, and the petty taſks of domeſtic drudgery. Nature, therefore, in whoſe plan and intention the ſyſtem of ſociety precedes and takes place of the parts of which it is compoſed, has variouſly organiſed and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without ſetting other bounds to this variety, than are impoſed by the good of the whole ſyſtem, of which individuals are not independent units, but conſtituent elements. According to this plan or intention, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the wideſt of all diſcriminations, and the loweſt of all occu-

[r] Locke ſays on this ſubject, "There is another ſort of ſervants, which by a peculiar name we call ſlaves, who, being captives taken in a juſt war, are by the rights of nature ſubjected to the abſolute dominion and arbitrary power of their maſters. Theſe men, having, as I ſay, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and loſt their eſtates, and being in a ſtate of ſlavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that ſtate be conſidered as any part of civil ſociety." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 181.—We ſhould imagine that the *liberal* Locke and the *ſlaviſh* Ariſtotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and principles.

pations,

BOOK I.

pations, domeſtic ſervitude, " a ſpecies of labour not employed in production, but totally conſumed in uſe;" becauſe ſolely but not unprofitably ſpent in promoting the eaſe and accommodation of life. In the relation of maſter and ſervant, the good of the maſter may indeed be the primary object; but the benefit of the ſervant or ſlave is alſo a neceſſary reſult; ſince he only is naturally and juſtly a ſlave, whoſe powers are competent to mere bodily labour; who is capable of liſtening to reaſon, but incapable of exerciſing that ſovereign faculty; and whoſe weakneſs and ſhort-ſightedneſs are ſo great, that it is ſafer for him to be guided or governed through life by the prudence of another. But, let it always be remembered—" that one claſs of men ought to have the qualifications requiſite for maſters, before another can either fitly or uſefully be employed as ſlaves." Government, then, not only civil but domeſtic, is a moſt ſerious duty, a moſt ſacred truſt; a truſt, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the ſuppoſed unalienable rights of all men to be ſelf-governed [s]. Thoſe rights, and

[s] Politics would not be a ſcience, unleſs it contained truths, abſolute, univerſal, and unalterable. One of theſe is that in the text; becauſe eſſentially ſpringing from the nature of ſociety and of man. Another univerſal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From theſe two premiſes, it neceſſarily follows, that this main end never can be effectuated on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without ſuppoſing all ſovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to ſhare) may, under many given circumſtances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large a controul in the government. This controul in all large communities can only be conveniently exerciſed either by particular magiſtrates, or by repreſentative aſſemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any neceſſary connection with the origin of government (ſo far from being its *only juſt principle*) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be ſhewn hereafter that aſſemblies elected by the people to provide for their intereſts, and thence called their repreſentatives,

and thoſe only, are unalienable, which it is impoſſible for one perſon to exerciſe for another: and to maintain thoſe to be natural and unalienable rights, which the perſons ſuppoſed to be inveſted with them, can never poſſibly exerciſe, conſiſtently either with their own ſafety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature; of which it is the primary and unalterable law, that forecaſt ſhould direct improvidence, reaſon controul paſſion, wiſdom command folly. I now proceed to examine Ariſtotle's reflections on political economy, which are not leſs adverſe than his miſunderſtood and misſtated vindication of ſlavery itſelf, both to the theories long prevalent, and to others which have begun recently to prevail among the civiliſed nations of modern Europe.

The northern conquerors, who invaded and deſolated the Roman empire, long diſdained to produce by ſlow induſtry, what they gloried in raviſhing by ſudden violence. War was their delight and their trade. They ſubſiſted by rapine; and therefore cared not how far they were excelled by others in peaceful and productive arts; while gold, and all that it can purchaſe, might be conquered by iron. But the ſpoils of rapacity having ſupplied them with the inſtruments of luxury, they began to reliſh the pleaſures of repoſe; and inſtead of courting new dangers abroad, to imitate at home thoſe objects and conveniencies which, though they had not the genius to

tives, are not ſo new in the world as is commonly imagined. In ſome republics we ſhall ſee a double row of delegates, repreſentatives of repreſentatives; in others, we ſhall find repreſentation and taxation regarded as correlatives; and even in ſome democracies, we ſhall meet with perſons elected by the people, and repreſenting them in the moſt uſeful ſenſe of the word, "that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wiſe and good, would act for themſelves."

BOOK I.

invent, they gradually acquired the taſte to approve, the vanity to diſplay, and the deſire to accumulate. Manufactures then were eſtabliſhed: navigation was exerciſed for the purpoſe not only of war but of traffic: an extenſive commerce was introduced; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpoſe of all thoſe operations, was to augment in each country the quantity of gold and ſilver; ſince, with thoſe precious metals, all other coveted objects might uſually be procured. The buſineſs of each individual merchant is to get money; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reaſonably have any other end in view. This falſe principle was regarded as the baſis of all ſound political arithmetic; and the moſt concluſive reaſoning of Ariſtotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have ſufficed to prove, that national wealth conſiſted not in gold and ſilver, had not the ruined ſtate of Spain confirmed experimentally the ſame important truth.

For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations conſiſts in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknowledge alſo, with him, that the precious metals, in contradiſtinction to other uſeful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of ſerving as the fitteſt inſtruments of exchange, and the moſt accurate meaſures of value; but that the quantity or number in which they ought to be deſired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other meaſures or inſtruments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and operations which they are employed to anſwer or effect [1]. Yet, while they

[1] It is worthy of remark that Locke is one of the moſt ſtrenuous aſſerters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he conſiders "as the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial

they reaſon thus juſtly reſpecting gold and ſilver, the ſame writers have not ſufficient enlargement of mind to generaliſe the theorem, and to perceive with our author, that property itſelf is as much an inſtrument as money, though ſerving for a far more complicated purpoſe; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpoſe requires, the ſurplus will be at beſt uſeleſs, moſt commonly pernicious; will inflame deſire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and produce that long train of diſorders, which made our philoſopher declare, "that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Iſles, unleſs their virtue kept pace with their external proſperity, muſt inevitably become the moſt miſerable of all mankind." In the faſhionable ſyſtems of modern politicians, national wealth is conſidered as ſynonimous with national proſperity. To the increaſe of productive induſtry, and the augmentation of public revenue, health, education, and morals, are ſacrificed without apology and without remorſe; ſince that trade is univerſally held to be the beſt, which produces moſt money with the leaſt labour. But according to Ariſtotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the ſtateſman's care, but the effect which the producing of that work naturally operates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praiſes of agriculture and a country life, our author's ſentiments, and even expreſſions, have been faithfully and generally copied by the moſt judicious writers of antiquity; many of whom mark, with as much reprobation as Ariſtotle himſelf,

ſtantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy." See the paſſage quoted and refuted in Smith's Wealth of Nations, v. ii. p. 140. 8vo. edit. It is time that, with regard to ſubjects ſtill more important, men ſhould return from the ſchool of Locke to that of Ariſtotle.

BOOK I.

himſelf, that ſpecies of traffic cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain; ſince ſuch a traffic, univerſally diffuſed among a people, has a tendency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their principles, to make them value as ends, things only uſeful as means; and to debaſe and corrupt every part of their character; becauſe wherever wealth is the primary object of purſuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal ſource of enjoyment. In agriculture and paſturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the induſtry of man. They are, of all occupations, the moſt beneficial and moſt neceſſary, as well as the moſt agreeable and moſt ſalutary; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmeſt and happieſt temperament of the mind and body: and the property acquired by them is intrinſically more valuable, becauſe eſſentially more uſeful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewiſe maintains, that thoſe natural and primeval purſuits are of all the leaſt likely to engender ſloth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices; and that nations of huſbandmen, in particular, afford materials ſuſceptible of the beſt political form, and the leaſt diſpoſed to diſturb, by ſedition, any moderately good government under which it is their lot to live. In conſideration of ſo many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the moſt favoured branch of national induſtry; an opinion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by falſe ſyſtem, could venture to contradict. Yet, how far other methods of accumulating ſtock, beſide thoſe propoſed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or diſcouraged and rejected, muſt depend on circumſtances and events, the force of which the philoſopher's experience could not ſupply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From the

the artifices and ſhifts which he explains, (and he is the only writer that explains them,) as practiſed by the republics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpoſe of raiſing money, it was impoſſible for him to conjecture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical government ſhould attain ſuch ſtability as rendered the public revenues a ſafe mortgage to creditors; that the immenſe debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by intereſting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of conſtituted authorities, to augment that facility itſelf, and thereby ſtill farther to accumulate the national debt; for diſcharging the intereſt of which, heavy taxes muſt neceſſarily, but not altogether unprofitably be levied, ſince they would, in ſome meaſure, repay, in public ſecurity, the burdens which they impoſe on perſonal labour, or rather the ſums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot poſſibly be raiſed, except in countries flouriſhing in ſuch reſources as agriculture and paſturage alone were never yet able to afford; reſources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained, on the other, by the powers of national induſtry, aſſiſted and multiplied by the moſt complicated machinery, and an endleſs ſubdiviſion of allotted taſks; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterouſly, becauſe each has but one, and that a ſmall part, to perform; while the diligence of all is perpetually ſtimulated by the bait of gain, ſupplied from the exhauſtleſs fund of an enlightened commercial ſpirit, as extenſive as the world, and as enterpriſing as thoſe renowned adventurers who diſcovered and explored its remoteſt regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy propoſed by Ariſtotle be in itſelf

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itſelf preferable to that which ſome modern nations purſue. Nations, circumſtanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but muſt principally depend for ſupplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better ſyſtem is now no longer in their power: the queſtion of expediency has ceaſed: they muſt obey neceſſity [a].

This ſeems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial ſyſtem of economy; a ſyſtem which has often been defended by very inconcluſive arguments. "Public wealth and proſperity," Mr. Hume obſerves, "is the end of all our wiſhes;" and this wealth or proſperity, both he and his follower, Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful induſtry; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may

[a] It is not difficult to explain why the doctrines of ſpeculative politicians reſpecting the wealth and economy of nations, ſhould alſo differ ſo materially from the theory propoſed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who ſubdued the Roman empire, every thing moſt valuable and moſt intereſting is connected with the improvement of arts, and conſequent extenſion of commerce; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engroſſed whole provinces, diſſipated the ſuperfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle ſervants and worthleſs dependants, ever ready to gratify the wildeſt and wickedeſt of their paſſions; to abet their inſolence, to uphold their haughtineſs, to encourage and ſecond their violence and rapacity; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed ariſtocracies, formed the worſt ſpecies of oligarchy; an oligarchy conſiſting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of each individual lord over his reſpective vaſſals and retainers. In ſuch a condition of ſociety the expenſive allurements of luxury, produced by what Ariſtotle condemns as over-refinement in arts and manufactures, had the moſt direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themſelves; to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to beſtow conſideration on the many. This particular caſe has been, by a very uſual fallacy in reaſoning, converted into a general political theorem.

may produce as much food as will maintain many [x]. But this aſſertion is not true in the acceptation in which it muſt be taken, in order to recommend the commercial ſyſtem above the agricultural. In agriculture, as we above obſerved, nature operates in concert with man; and though one family co-operating with nature, may, in a given piece of ground, produce as much food as will ſerve ſix, yet ſix families labouring the ſame ground, will not reap a proportional increaſe; and twenty families labouring the ſame ground, may find it barely ſufficient to ſupply their own nouriſhment. The more that the land is laboured, it will be the more productive; and the more fitly and fairly it is divided [y], it will (other circumſtances remaining the ſame) be the more laboured; and the ſame country or iſland will thus maintain the greater proportion of inhabitants employed in that kind of work, which, according to Ariſtotle, is the moſt favourable to health, morals, good government, the unfolding of intellectual as well as corporeal powers, and the attainment of that meaſure of happineſs which the general maſs of mankind can ever hope to reach.

[x] Hume's Eſſays, vol. i. Refinement of Arts; and Smith's Wealth of Nations, paſſim.

[y] Does our author, therefore, propoſe an Agrarian law? No; he knew better. The ſecond book of his Politics is, of all works ever written, the beſt adapted to prove to levellers themſelves, that the meaſures from which they expect ſo much good, would, if carried into execution, infallibly terminate in their own ruin and that of the community.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Nature and end of a Commonwealth.—Analyſis thereof.—Monarchy the firſt form of government.—Domeſtic œconomy.—Slavery.—Accumulation of ſtock.—Riches, real and artificial.—Commerce.—Money.—Manufactures.—Monopolies.—Women.—Children.—Slaves.—Connection between domeſtic and political œconomy.

Nature and end of a commonwealth.

EVERY political ſociety forms, it is plain, a ſort of community or partnerſhip, inſtituted for the benefit of the partners. Utility [z] is the end and aim of every ſuch inſtitution; and the greateſt and moſt extenſive utility is the aim of that great aſſociation,

[z] The firſt ſentence of the Politics may be tranſlated literally thus: "Since we ſee that every commonwealth is a partnerſhip, and that every partnerſhip is eſtabliſhed for the ſake of ſome good, (good, real or apparent, being the cauſe of all human action,) it is plain that all partnerſhips have good for their end and aim; and eſpecially, that the ſovereign good muſt be the aim of that ſovereign partnerſhip, which comprehends all the reſt, and which is known by the name of a commonwealth, or of political ſociety." The word utility in the text is therefore taken in its moſt extenſive ſignification; utility in the ſtrict ſenſe, conſtituting but one branch, and that the loweſt of το αγαθον. See the Ethics, l. i. & x. paſſim. Plato uſes the word utility nearly in the modern ſenſe. καλλιστα γαρ δη τουτο και λεγεται και λελεξεται, ὁτι το μεν ὠφελιμον καλον, το δε βλαβερον αισχρον, Plato de Repub. l. v. p. 655. Edit. Ficin. "This is moſt excellently ſaid, and will ever continue to be ſaid, that whatever is uſeful is honourable, and whatever is hurtful is ſhameful." In the Gorgias, p. 324. το καλον is analyſed into pleaſure and utility; a ſyſtem revived by Mr. Hume in his Inquiry into the Principles of Morals. In both theſe ſignifications "utility" is different from το χρησιμον, denoting what is good or deſirable, not in itſelf, but as uſeful or ſubſervient to ſome deſirable purpoſe.

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ciation, comprehending all the reſt, and known by the name of a commonwealth [a].

A commonwealth is not to be confounded with a family, as if a large family were nothing different from a ſmall commonwealth; nor ought we, as too many do, to confound the functions of kings and magiſtrates with thoſe of ſuperintendants [b] or maſters. Magiſtrates rule by an eſtabliſhed rotation; kings reign for life [c]; and conſidered in reference to the number of thoſe

[a] As I ſhall frequently have occaſion to uſe the words republic and commonwealth, the ſignification of which has been of late years ſtrangely altered, I cannot better explain Ariſtotle's meaning of thoſe terms than in the words of Cicero. "Reſpublica res eſt populi, cum bene et juſte geritur," &c. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people, when it is well and rightly adminiſtered, whether by a ſingle prince, by a ſmall body of nobles, or by the people at large. But injuſtice converts the nobles into a faction; the prince, into a tyrant; the people, into tyrants. In all theſe caſes alike, the republic is not only corrupted, but annihilated; ſince that cannot be called the wealth of the people which is adminiſtered by a faction or a tyrant; nor can that multitude be called the people, which is not aſſociated on principles of juſtice and public utility." Fragm. de Republic. l. iii. Alluding to the ſenſe above given to the word "commonwealth," James I. ſaid to his Parliament in 1603, "I will ever prefer the weal of the public and of the whole *commonwealth* to any particular and private ends of mine."

[b] The οικονομος was a perſon appointed by rich men to manage their domeſtic concerns, and particularly to ſuperintend and direct the labour of their ſlaves. When the δεσποτης, or maſter, was a poor man, he performed the office of οικονομος himſelf; for this reaſon Ariſtotle ſays, διον, αν μεν ολιγων δεσποτην· αν δε πλειονων, οικονομον. "As if there were no other diſtinction between a maſter and a ſuperintendant, but that the former had the government of a few, and the latter of more."

[c] The original ſays, οταν μεν αυτος εφεστηκη, βασιλικον· οταν δε κατα λογους της επιστημης της τοιαυτης, κατα μερος αρχων και αρχομενος, πολιτικον. The Latin tranſlators all miſtake the paſſage, "Eſſe quidem regem, ſi ipſe præſit," &c. But Ariſtotle ſays, "when the ſame perſon perpetually preſides, the government is regal; it is, on the other hand, republican when power changes from one hand to another, and the citizens rule by vicarious ſucceſſion, according to the eſtabliſhed principles of ſocial arrangement." What theſe principles

thoſe ſubject to their authority, the juriſdiction of ſuperintendants is commonly more extenſive than that of maſters or fathers, and always more limited than that of magiſtrates and kings. Theſe, however, are but accidental diſtinctions; others, more invariable and more ſcientific, will reſult from analyſing (according to our uſual mode of inveſtigation) that complex object, a commonwealth, into its conſtituent elements; thoſe ſimple and ultimate principles, that admit not of farther reſolution.

Analyſis of political ſociety.

In this analyſis, we ſhall proceed moſt ſatisfactorily[d] by viewing ſociety in its growth. Thoſe parts or elements, then, will naturally force themſelves into union, which cannot continue ſeparately to exiſt. The neceſſity of perpetuating the ſpecies, forms the combining principle between males and females; a principle independent of choice or deſign, and alike incident to animals and to plants, which are all naturally[e] impelled to propagate their reſpective kinds. The ſame imperious neceſſity which compels aſſociation, naturally[f] produces government. Communities could not ſubſiſt without foreſight to diſcern,

ciples are, we ſhall afterwards ſee. It is ſufficient at preſent to obſerve that they are totally incompatible with the new-fangled doctrines concerning univerſal ſuffrage and the right of majorities. The learned reader will perceive that I have here changed the order of the words, the better to expreſs the ſenſe. The ſignificant brevity of the Greek particles knit firmly together diſtant clauſes and ſentences. But their force could only be expreſſed in other languages by tireſome circumlocutions.

[d] Ariſtotle ſays, "in this, as in other inquiries, we ſhould ſpeculate moſt ſucceſſfully, could we contemplate ſociety in its formation or geneſis." This is that comprehenſive and ſublime analyſis which Ariſtotle has applied with ſuch unremitting patience to the moſt important ſubjects of philoſophy; and which is well illuſtrated in mathematics by the learned Barrow in his Geometrical Lectures; the principles of which probably laid the foundation of Newton's great diſcoveries.

[e] See Analyſis, p. 109. [f] Ibid.

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diſcern, as well as exertion to effectuate the meaſures requiſite for their ſafety. Men capable of diſcerning thoſe meaſures, are made for authority; and men merely capable of effectuating them by bodily labour, are made for obedience; but if ſafety be their common concern, the good of the governors muſt correſpond with the good of the governed, and the intereſt of the ſervant muſt coincide with the intereſt of the maſter.

Why women and ſlaves are confounded by barbarians.

It is found by experience, that thoſe inſtruments are the moſt perfect, which are each of them contrived for its ſpecific uſe. Slaves and women, though confounded in one maſs by barbarians, are therefore naturally different; for nature works not after the niggardly faſhion of Delphic cutlers [g], who ſhape the ſame knife for various and often diſſimilar offices; and if women are by barbarians reduced to the level of ſlaves, it is becauſe barbarians themſelves have never yet riſen to the rank of men, that is, of men fit to govern; wherefore the poets ſay, "'Tis right the Greeks ſhould govern the barbarians."

Origin and progreſs of ſociety.

Of the aſſociations abovementioned, that of a family is the firſt in its origin. "A houſe, a wife, and a labouring ox," theſe, together with the huſband or maſter, form the elements of the firſt community; for a poor man muſt be contented with a labouring ox inſtead of a ſlave. This primary aſſociation founded on daily exigency, Charondas [h] diſtinguiſhes by a word denoting thoſe fed from the ſame board, and Epimenides [i] deſcribes

[g] Delphi, as the ſeat of the oracle, being continually frequented by ſtrangers, exhibited a perpetual fair or market, where each cuſtomer might be ſupplied with wares agreeable to his taſte, and ſuitable to his purſe. Hiſtory of Greece, vol. i. c. v.

[h] Commonly reputed the legiſlator of Thurii, anciently Sybaris. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 485. Edit. Weſſeling. He is mentioned afterwards by Ariſtotle. The ſublime preface to his laws is contained in Stobæus. Serm. 42. p. 289.

[i] Probably in that work of his mentioned by Laertius, and entitled Περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας.

deſcribes it by a word denoting thoſe warmed at the ſame hearth.

Next in order follows the aſſociation of a canton or village, founded indeed on utility, but not on daily exigency, and moſt naturally formed by colonization from the firſt houſe or family. Such a community therefore is juſtly expreſſed by a word denoting thoſe nouriſhed from the ſame milk. It is the aſſociation of kinſmen under the authority of their common progenitor, whoſe juriſdiction ſlowly extends with the gradual multiplication of his family [k]. Cities therefore were firſt ſubject to kings; and to ſome kind of monarchy, many nations have invariably adhered; for all of them have grown to their preſent magnitude from feeble colonies or ſcattered tribes, originally ſubſiſting under patriarchal government, in which (according to the poet),

Why monarchy was the firſt form of government.

"Each ruled his race, his neighbour not his care [l]."

That

πολιτειας. On the government of Crete. Apuleius ſays he was Pythagoras's maſter, and Plato relates that he came to Athens ten years before the battle of Marathon, or five hundred years before Chriſt. (Plato de Legibus, l. i.) According to Plutarch (in Solon.), Cicero (de Divin. i. 18.), Pauſanias (Attic.), Epimenides had made a journey from Crete to Athens near a century before that period, and had prepared the way, by his expiations and predictions, for Solon's legiſlation. He is believed to have lived above 150 years (Corſin. Faſt. Attic.). The catalogue of the works aſcribed to him, particularly of his theological and myſtical poems, is given by Fabricius, t. i. p. 37. & ſeq.

[k] The judicious Polybius agrees with Ariſtotle in maintaining that government is the work of nature, and that monarchy is the firſt kind of government. πρωτη μεν ακατασκευως και φυσικως συνισταται μοναρχια. "Firſt of all comes monarchy, which is eſtabliſhed by the bare work of nature, independently of any preparation or deſign." Polyb. l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh. It is worthy of remark, that in the age of Polybius, Ariſtotle's opinions were only known by tradition; his works, as we have had occaſion to relate, ſtill remained unpubliſhed. Polybius therefore was not acquainted with Ariſtotle's Politics, the peruſal of which would have enabled him to avoid ſeveral errors into which he has fallen in his ſixth book.

[l] Odyſſey, ix. 115.

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That this is not a fiction, but an hiſtorical fact, is atteſted by that univerſal conſent which has tranſferred monarchy from earth to heaven. All nations believe the gods to be governed by a king; for men who have made the gods after their own image [m], are ever haſty in aſcribing to theſe celeſtial beings, human manners and human inſtitutions.

Chap. 2.

A commonwealth congenial to the ſocial nature of man;

The union of various villages forms, at length, a city or commonwealth, that finiſhed fabric of ſociety reaching, as near as may be, the bound of perfectneſs; ſelf-ſufficient and complete, conſtituted for ſafety, and productive of happineſs. A commonwealth is not leſs congenial to human nature than the aſſociation of a family or village. It is the goal to which all preceding aſſociations tend; their natural reſult, and their higheſt maturity; and the perfection of civil ſociety, being the matured ſtate of man, is like the perfection of every other progreſſive object, that ſtage of his exiſtence which peculiarly aſcertains, characterizes, and eſſentiates his nature [n]. Whoever, therefore, is unfit to live in a commonwealth, is above or below humanity.

" Curſed is the man and void of law and right,
" Unworthy property, unworthy light [o]."

Such

[m] Εν ανδρων, εν θεων γενος
Εκ μιας δε πνεομεν μητρος αμφοτεροι.

" The ſame is the race of men and gods; both of us received animation from the ſame mother." Pind. Nem. Ode i. v. 1. The ſame doctrine had prevailed, at leaſt, from the time of Heſiod's Theogonia.

[n] The word is ſometimes uſed in the ſame ſenſe by the Roman writers. Thus Tacitus alluding to the dark and livid colour of the Britiſh pearls, which rendered them a leſs tempting prize to the avarice of the Romans (Vid. Sueton. in Jul. Cæſar, c. xlvii.), ſays, " Ego facilius crediderim, naturam margaritis deeſſe quam nobis avariciam." Tacit. in Agricol. c. 12.

[o] Iliad ix. v. 64.

Such a wretch can only delight in carnage, a ſolitary and ravenous vulture; but man delights in ſociety far more than do bees or herds[p]; ſince nature, which never works in vain, diſtinguiſhes him by the power of ſpeech, not merely to ſignify his pains and pleaſures, a purpoſe limiting the vocal communications of other animals, but to deſcribe his advantages and inconveniences, to explain his rights and wrongs.

A participation in rights and advantages forms the bond of political ſociety; an inſtitution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from whom it is conſtituted[q]. What

and the cauſe of his virtues and perfections.

[p] While tranſlating this chapter I happened to look into an agreeable compilement, intitled, The Philoſophy of Natural Hiſtory, and read the following paſſage: "Some writers, as Ariſtotle and a few moderns, implicit followers of his opinions, deny that man is naturally a gregarious or aſſociating animal. To render this notion conſiſtent with the actual and univerſal ſtate of human nature, theſe authors have recourſe to puerile conceits and queſtionable facts, which it would be fruitleſs to relate." Smellie's Philoſophy of Natural Hiſtory, c. xvi. p. 415. Who thoſe followers of Ariſtotle are, I know not; but if any ſuch there be, how unworthily has that philoſopher been treated by his diſciples as well as by his detractors!

[q] Ariſtotle's words are, ὁτε μεν ουν ἡ πολις φυσει προτερον η εκαστος, δηλον· ει γαρ μη αυταρκης ἑκαστος χωρισθεις, ὡμοιως τοις αλλοις μερεσι ἐξει προς το ὁλον. "That a commonwealth is prior by nature to each individual citizen, is plain; for if each individual, when ſeparated, is incapable of ſupplying his own wants, it is evident that he muſt bear the ſame relation to the community, as other parts bear to the whole or ſyſtem to which they appertain." Nature, our author obſerves, has always ſome end in view, and always employs the beſt means for attaining it. "This end or purpoſe is the firſt thing in the intention of Nature, though ſhe is often obliged to effect it by a long ſucceſſion of intermediate operations, each of which, except the laſt of all, is both means and end, means with regard to that which follows, and end with regard to that which precedes it. Thus Nature, or rather the God of nature, willed the exiſtence of ſuch a creature as man, whoſe characteriſtic diſtinction ſhould conſiſt in his perfectibility, or his capacity of being diſciplined from a mere animal or ſavage, into a moral and intellectual being. But man is only to be diſciplined by civil ſociety; and civil ſociety requires, for its materials, the ſmaller

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What members are to the body, citizens are to the commonwealth. The hand or foot, when ſeparated from the body, retains indeed its name, but totally changes its nature, becauſe it is completely diveſted of its uſes and of its powers. In the ſame manner a citizen is a conſtituent part of a whole or ſyſtem [r], which inveſts him with powers and qualifies him for functions for which, in his individual capacity, he is totally unfit; and independently of which ſyſtem, he might ſubſiſt indeed as a ſolitary

aſſociations of tribes and families. Theſe laſt again reſolve themſelves into individuals, diſtinguiſhed by the relative appellations of huſband and wife, father and ſon, maſter and ſervant, and conſtituting the elements of families." Ariſtotle here ſpeaks as if civil ſociety itſelf, conſidered as a whole or ſyſtem, complete in all its parts or members, perfect, happy, and ſelf-ſufficient, formed the end for which man was created. But in the twelfth book of his Metaphyſics, in the ſeven laſt chapters of the third book of his Treatiſe De Anima, and even in his Ethics to Nichomachus, l. x. c. viii. he intimates that man has a ſtill higher deſtination than that of acting his part well in political ſociety. Plato, in his Thæatetus, had ſaid, "That the main object of human purſuit ought to be ὁμοιωσις τῳ θεω κατα το δυνατον. ὁμοιωσις δε, δικαιον και ὁσιον μετα φρονησεως γενεσθαι. "a reſembling God as much as poſſible; and to reſemble God is to imitate his juſtice, his holineſs, and wiſdom." Ariſtotle holds the ſame doctrine in the paſſages above alluded to; maintaining, however, that the moral virtues may be ultimately reſolved into the intellectual; or, in other words, that wiſdom and goodneſs, though they do not keep pace in every ſtep of their progreſs, yet finally coincide.

[r] The maxim that citizens are parts of the community had long been conſidered as a practical principle, and had become a fruitful ſource of laws in the republics of Greece. The wretch guilty of ſuicide was puniſhed with infamy, as robbing the ſtate of a member [1]. The ſtate reſented injuries done to individuals, as inflicted on itſelf. Inſults offered to women, children, or even to ſlaves, might be reſented, proſecuted, and puniſhed by every citizen [2]: admirable inſtitutions, Plutarch obſerves, for preventing wrongs; the whole community warmly ſympathiſing with the indignant feelings of the ſufferers [3]. Turpitude, or baſeneſs, alone diſſolved the connection between a citizen and his country. He who committed actions unworthy of a man, was diveſted of his political rights, and ſevered from the community, as a gangrened member which might infect and deſtroy the ſyſtem [4].

1 Ariſtot. Ethic. paſſim. 2 Demoſthen. in Mid. p. 610. 3 Plutarch in Solon, p. 88. 4 Idem ibid.

ſolitary ſavage, but could never attain that improved and happy ſtate to which his progreſſive nature invariably tends. He, therefore, who firſt collected ſocieties, was the greateſt benefactor to mankind. Perfected by the offices and duties of ſocial life, man is the beſt, but rude and undiſciplined, he is the very worſt of animals. For nothing is more deteſtable than armed improbity; and man is armed with craft and courage, which, untamed by juſtice, he will moſt wickedly pervert, and become at once the moſt impious and the fierceſt of monſters; the moſt abominable in gluttony, the moſt ſhameleſs in venery. But juſtice is the fundamental virtue of political ſociety, ſince the order of ſociety cannot be maintained without law, and laws are inſtituted to declare what is juſt.

Chap. 3.

The nature and branches of domeſtic œconomy.

Cities or commonwealths are compoſed of families; and the management of a family is properly termed œconomy. A family, to be complete, muſt conſiſt of freemen and ſlaves [s]; and as every complex object naturally reſolves itſelf into ſimple elements, we muſt conſider the elements of a family:—the maſter and ſervant, the huſband and wife, the father and children; what all of theſe are in themſelves, and what are the relations which they naturally and properly bear to each other [t]. We ſhall then conſider the acquiſition of property and the accumulation of ſtock, which

[s] This ſounds harſh; but hear him to the end.

[t] The relations of authority and ſubjection ſubſiſting between the maſter and ſervant were expreſſed in the Greek by the ſubſtantives δεσποτεια and δουλεια. But the analogous relations ſubſiſting between the huſband and wife, the father and children, had not in Greek, Ariſtotle obſerves, any appropriate names. He therefore denotes them by the adjectives ἡ γαμικη (conjugalis ſocietas) and ἡ τεκνοποιητη; which latter, in chapter twelfth of this Book, he calls πατρικη, to which joining ἀρχη, we ſhall have the patria poteſtas of the Romans.

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which by ſome is treated as a branch, and by others as the moſt important branch, of œconomy. Let us begin then by examining the relation of maſter and ſervant; and by inveſtigating the nature of ſervitude itſelf, endeavour to form more ſalutary and more correct notions on this ſubject than thoſe which generally prevail. By ſome writers, that part of œconomy employed in the management of ſlaves has been dignified with the name of ſcience; by others, ſlavery is conſidered as an inſtitution altogether unnatural, reſulting from the cruel maxims of war. Liberty, they aſſert, is the great law of nature[1], which acknowledges not any difference between the ſlave and the maſter; ſlavery therefore is unjuſt, being founded on violence.

The nature of domeſtic ſlavery.

It is the buſineſs, then, of œconomy to procure the comfortable ſubſiſtence of a family; and all arts and employments require proper inſtruments for effecting their reſpective ends. Of theſe inſtruments, ſome are inanimate, and others are endowed with life. The ſailor, as well as the helm, are inſtruments of navigation; ſince they are moved and impelled by the will of the pilate, for effecting the purpoſe of his art. Under this aſpect, any piece of property may be conſidered in relation to the art of œconomy. It is an inſtrument to be moved and employed for the purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence. Property at large, therefore, is merely an accumulation of many ſuch inſtruments; and even a ſlave is, in this view, a moveable inſtrument, endowed with life, which, impelled by the will of another, communicates motion to other inſtruments leſs excellent

[1] The Scholiaſt on Ariſtotle's Rhetoric has preſerved a ſaying to this purpoſe of Alcidamas, the ſcholar of Gorgias of Leontium (See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 337.): Ελευθερους αφηκε παντας θεος· ουδενα δουλον η φυσις πεποιηκε. "All come free from the hands of God; Nature has made no man a ſlave."

lent than himſelf. The ſtatues of Dedalus, and the tripods of Vulcan, moved, we are told, ſpontaneouſly.

" Wondrous to tell, inſtinct with ſpirit roll'd
" From place to place, around the bleſt abodes,
" Self-moved, obedient to the beck of Gods [u]."

Did this uſually happen, did the ſhuttle thus weave, and the ſtrings of the harp thus play, the artiſt would not need the aſſiſtance of workmen, nor the maſter require the labour of ſlaves.

Among the various inſtruments ſubſervient to the comfort of human life, there is this material diſtinction; that the work performed by one claſs, conſiſts in production; and the work performed by another, is totally conſumed in uſe. A ſhuttle produces a web; a couch, or a ſuit of clothes, produce nothing; they reſpectively afford, however, the convenience of wearing the one, and of repoſing on the other. As uſe and production are things ſpecifically different, the objects or inſtruments that are relative to the one muſt, with reſpect to their ends and purpoſes, be eſſentially different from thoſe relative to the other. A domeſtic ſlave is relative to uſe; his labour is totally conſumed in promoting the eaſe of his maſter. He is merely the poſſeſſion and property, or, as it were, the ſeparable part of that maſter; and every part, whether ſeparable or inſeparable, is to be uſed and employed, not according to its own intereſt or caprice, but in ſubſerviency to the general good, and ſuitably to reaſon. It is to be regarded merely in relation to that whole or ſyſtem to which it appertains. A ſlave is ſimply the property of his maſter; but the maſter ſtands in many other relations beſide

[u] Iliad viii.

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beſide that of proprietor of his ſlave. Such is the nature and the function of ſervitude. We proceed to examine whether this inſtitution be wiſe and juſt.

The analogy of nature evinces ſlavery to be juſt and uſeful.

To determine this queſtion, it will be ſufficient to contemplate the ordinary courſe of nature, and to deduce from our obſervations clear inferences of reaſon. Government and ſubjection, then, are things uſeful and neceſſary; they prevail every where, in animated as well as in brute matter; from their firſt origin, ſome natures are formed to command, and others to obey; the kinds of government and ſubjection varying with the differences of their objects, but all equally uſeful for their reſpective ends; and thoſe kinds the beſt and moſt excellent, from which the beſt and moſt excellent conſequences reſult. In every compoſition whoſe parts are harmoniſed into any regular whole, the neceſſity of government and ſubjection evidently appears, whether this whole or ſyſtem be continuous or diſcrete, animated or lifeleſs; for even in muſic, there is a certain principle of rule and ſubordination: but ſuch ſpeculations are perhaps foreign to the preſent ſubject. In compoſitions endowed with life, it is the province of mind to command, and the province of matter to obey. Man conſiſts of ſoul and body, and in all men rightly conſtituted, the ſoul commands the body; although ſome men are ſo groſsly depraved, that in them the body ſeems to command the ſoul. But here the order of nature is perverted.

In the human conſtitution, therefore, mind governs matter abſolutely and deſpotically; but reaſon governs appetite with a far more limited ſway; ſtill, however, it governs like a juſt and lawful prince, and the little community of man is thus held together and ſuſtained; whereas, were the ſubordinate parts to

uſurp

uſurp authority, or even to aſſert equality, all would ſpeedily be undone, and the ſyſtem would fall in ruins.

The ſame obſervations apply to the various tribes of animals, which riſe above each other in excellence, in proportion to their tameneſs and docility; and which are all of them benefited by their ſubjection to man, becauſe this is conducive to their ſafety. In the different ſexes alſo, we ſee the male formed for government, and the female for ſubmiſſion; and a principle prevailing thus univerſally in every region of nature, cannot but apply to an inſtitution ſo natural as is that of political ſociety.

What are the requiſites which fit men for ſervitude.

Thoſe men, therefore, whoſe powers are chiefly confined to the body, and whoſe principal excellence conſiſts in affording bodily ſervice; thoſe, I ſay, are naturally ſlaves, becauſe it is their intereſt to be ſo. They can obey reaſon, though they are unable to exerciſe it; and though different from tame animals, who are diſciplined by means merely of their ſenſations and appetites, they perform nearly the ſame taſks, and become the property of other men, becauſe their own ſafety requires it.

In conformity with theſe obſervations, Nature, we ſee, has variouſly moulded the human frame: ſome are ſtrongly built, and firmly compacted; others erect and graceful, unfit for toil and drudgery, but capable of ſuſtaining honourably the offices of war and peace. This, however, holds not univerſally; for a ſervile mind is often lodged in a graceful perſon; and we have often found bodies formed for ſervitude, animated by the ſouls of freemen. Yet the diſtinction itſelf is not frivolous; for were part of the human race to be arrayed in that ſplendor of beauty which beams from the ſtatues of the gods, univerſal conſent would acknowledge the reſt of mankind naturally formed to be their ſlaves.

The

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The difference of minds, though leſs obvious, is far more characteriſtic and more important; whence we may conclude that ſlavery is founded both on utility and juſtice [x].

Chap. 4.

The miſtakes on this ſubject cauſed by

This deciſion, however, has been arraigned with conſiderable plauſibility: for ſlavery may be taken in two ſenſes, in one of which he is a ſlave who ſubmits to the law of war, commanding the vanquiſhed to become the property of the victors [y]. This

[x] Ariſtotle founds ſlavery on different principles from thoſe aſſigned by Juſtinian, which have been univerſally followed by one party, and univerſally controverted by another, ſince the time of that Emperor, or rather ſince the Roman juriſprudence became a faſhionable ſtudy. Servi aut fiunt aut naſcuntur; fiunt jure gentium aut jure civili; naſcuntur ex ancillis noſtris. Inſt. i. 3. 4. According to Juſtinian, therefore, there are three origins of the right of ſlavery: The law of nations; the civil law; and birth, that is, deſcent from ſervile parents. By the law of nations, a conqueror was thought entitled to kill his enemy, and having ſpared his life, might afterwards deal with him as he pleaſed, and therefore reduce him into ſlavery. This, indeed, was the practice of ancient nations; but the practice, how univerſal ſoever among them, was abuſively termed a law, ſince irreconcileable with juſtice. In war the victor has not any right to kill his enemy but in caſes of abſolute neceſſity, for ſelf-defence; and there is a clear proof that this neceſſity did not exiſt, when, inſtead of killing him, he made him priſoner. Even the right of killing would not infer the right of enſlaving; ſince to many ſlavery may be worſe than death. Juſtinian ſays, ſecondly, that ſlavery may begin "jure civili," when one man ſells himſelf to another. But every ſale implies a price, a quid pro quo; whereas in the caſe of ſtrict ſlavery, the ſeller gives every thing; life, liberty, property; and the buyer gives nothing. Of what validity then, ſays Judge Blackſtone, can a ſale be which deſtroys the principles on which all ſales are founded? Laſtly, as to ſlaves by birth, it is plain that this foundation of ſlavery reſts on the two former, and muſt fall with them. If neither captivity nor ſale can enſlave the parent, much leſs can they enſlave the offſpring. See Blackſtone's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 424. Ariſtotle, as we ſhall ſee, might, conſiſtently with his principles, have ſubſcribed to the liberal concluſions of this excellent author.

[y] Ariſtotle ſays, ὁ γαρ νομος ὁμολογια τις εστι εν ᾧ τα κατα πολεμον κρατουμενα των κρατουντων ειναι. "That law is a certain agreement, according to which all belonging to the vanquiſhed becomes the property of the victors." This was univerſally the law of nations in Ariſtotle's time; a law which his humanity abhorred, and his courage arraigned. Inſtead

confounding the kinds of ſlavery.

This is acknowledged to be law; but the law itſelf is accuſed of iniquity[z], and impeached, like the orators of Athens who have perſuaded the aſſembly to paſs unjuſt decrees. On this ſubject, wiſe men hold different opinions, proceeding from the different views which they take of the queſtion. Some conſider ſuperiority as the proof of virtue, becauſe it is its natural effect; and aſſert that it is juſt, the victors ſhould be maſters of the vanquiſhed, as being their ſuperiors, and therefore their betters; while others deny the force of this argument, maintaining that nothing can be truly juſt, which is inconſiſtent with humanity [a]. Superiority in war, they ſay, cannot ſurely be a proof of juſtice, ſince wars are often unjuſtly undertaken, and ſucceſsfully, though wickedly, carried on and concluded. It is harſh, beſides, to aſſert that he ought to be a ſlave who is unfit for ſervitude; and that perſons of illuſtrious birth or illuſtrious merit are rendered ſlaves by falling into the hands of an enemy. To avoid this conſequence, the advocates for ſubjecting the vanquiſhed to the victors, propoſe limiting this law to the caſe of Barbarians vanquiſhed by Greeks; for the nobility of Barbarians is confined to their reſpective countries, but the nobility of Greece is as extenſive as the world. But in this mode of reaſoning, they abandon their own doctrine, and acknowledge the principle which we have above eſtabliſhed, that ſlavery adheres to the character itſelf, is independent of accident, and that ſome

Inſtead of being accuſed of abetting the harſh law of ſlavery, he ought rather to be reſpected for deſtroying the falſe foundations on which this law was eſtabliſhed.

[z] The orator, who had perſuaded the Athenian aſſembly to paſs an unjuſt or a bad law, was impeached by the γραφη παρανομων. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. 32.

[a] The text is corrupt. The word is ευνοια; and on the margin ευνομια. I conjecture the true reading is επιεικια, equity; that is, humanity moderating ſtrict juſtice, the juſtice founded on law.

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ſome are every where ſlaves, and others, like the Helen of Theodectes [b], are every where free;

"Sprung from the immortal gods, on either ſide,
"Who dares reproach me with the name of ſlave?"

Such, indeed, ſeems to be the intention of Nature, who, as ſhe produces man from man, and beaſt from beaſt, wiſhes likewiſe to generate illuſtrious deſcendants from illuſtrious anceſtors; but here Nature often fails in accompliſhing her own purpoſes [c].

Differences of the two kinds of ſlavery.

There are, thus, two kinds of ſlavery, the one founded on nature, the other eſtabliſhed by law, or rather produced by violence. The firſt kind can only take place when the maſter is as fit to command as the ſlave to obey. It is then profitable both to the ſlave and the maſter; whoſe intereſts, rightly underſtood, become as inſeparable as the intereſts of ſoul and body. This communion of intereſts naturally engenders mutual goodwill [d]; but in the ſlavery contrary to nature, occaſioned by war, and

[b] A native of Phaſelis in Lycia, the ſcholar of Plato and Iſocrates, author of fifty tragedies, and of the Art of Rhetoric in verſe. See Fabricius, l. ii. c. 19. & l. iii. c. 10. Cicero, Athenæus, and Suidas ſay, that he was a ſcholar of Ariſtotle's. The remains of his works conſiſt in a few ſhort fragments.

[c] See Analyſis, vol. i. p. 110.

[d] The author adviſes maſters to ſecure the fidelity of ſlaves by the pledges of wives and children, and to indulge them with the enjoyment of feſtivals and diverſions, of which their condition ſtands more in need than that of freemen. De Cura Rei Familiaris, l. i. c. v. p. 494. In moſt countries of Greece, ſlaves, indeed, were merely the loweſt claſs of inhabitants, a ſort of ſervants for life, and not always for life, ſince they were entitled on many particular grounds to demand their freedom, and even to recover it by purchaſe, if frugal in the management of their peculium, or ſeparate property. Comp. Plato de Legibus, l. vi. Ariſtoph. in Ran. v. 706. Terent. Phorm. act i. ſc. 1. Xenoph. de Repub. Athen. The Athenian ſlaves, when harſhly treated by their maſters, found an aſylum from cruelty in the temple of Theſeus, and were allowed to paſs into the ſervice of another

and created by force, ſlaves and maſters muſt always be hoſtile to each other.

Different kinds of ſubordination founded in nature.

The principles above eſtabliſhed ſhew, that a diverſity in the nature and relations of things neceſſarily occaſions various kinds of ſubordination. According to the differences of thoſe ſubjected to its authority, government, therefore, is found to vary, to be more or leſs abſolute, and, as it were, to fluctuate between monarchy and liberty; monarchy, where one man rules always, and ſometimes abſolutely; liberty, where different men hold the offices of magiſtracy by vicarious ſucceſſion: but the management of a houſehold muſt always be of the firſt kind, and entruſted to one only, if we wiſh it to be well regulated.

Peculiarity of the relation between maſter and ſlave.

A maſter poſſeſſes a property in his ſlaves, and a right to employ their induſtry; yet it is not from his particular ſkill in directing this induſtry that he derives his authority. This authority is founded on the general ſuperiority of his character; ſince it is their reſpective qualities and characters that claſs mankind under the different denominations of freemen or ſlaves. Did the government of a houſehold conſiſt, as ſome writers have imagined, in any particular ſkill or craft, this ſkill or craft muſt evidently be relative to the labour required, and the

another maſter leſs tyrannical. Demoſth. in Mid. Plutarch de Superſtit. Demoſthenes having cited a law which forbade the ſtriking of a ſlave, proceeds thus: "You hear, Athenians, the humanity of the law, which prevents the offering inſult even to a ſlave. What, in the name of the Gods! do you think would be the ſentiments of thoſe nations, from whom ſlaves are purchaſed into Greece, ſhould they be told that there were certain Greeks, men ſo gentle and humane, that notwithſtanding the accumulated injuries received from Barbarians, and a natural and hereditary enmity to their race, yet did not allow their countrymen to be ill-treated even in ſervitude, but had enacted a law expreſsly prohibiting inſults to ſlaves, and had puniſhed the violators of this law by death? Demoſth. Adverſ. Mideam. p. 392.

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the ſervices exacted. At Syracuſe there lived a man who exerciſed for hire the trade of teaching the various branches of domeſtic ſervitude; which are recommended by different degrees of neceſſity or utility, but which are all of them too mean and ſordid to be underſtood by maſters of families; whoſe proper function contains in it nothing very deep or myſterious, ſince its ſole requiſite is, that the maſter know how to command, what the ſlave knows how to perform. Maſters unwilling to ſtoop to ſuch petty cares employ a ſuperintendant, who manages their houſehold, while they themſelves cultivate the liberal arts; plunge into politics, or purſue philoſophy.

Chap. 5.

Of the accumulation of ſtock in general.

Slaves form the moſt valuable, indeed, but not the only kind of ſtock. Of the accumulation of ſtock in general, we proceed now to treat. Firſt of all, is the art of accumulation the ſame thing with œconomics, or merely ſomething ſubſervient to this ſcience; and if merely ſubſervient, is it in the manner that the trade of ſhuttle-making is ſubſervient to that of weaving, or as the art of founding braſs is ſubſervient to the art of ſculpture? for ſhuttles are the *inſtruments* of weaving, but braſs ſupplies the *materials* of ſculpture. To accumulate ſtock, is to provide whatever is thought neceſſary for the purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence; but œconomy conſiſts in employing or managing the neceſſaries thus provided, in the manner beſt adapted to the attainment of the end in view. As the arts of accumulation and of œconomy cannot therefore be the ſame, let us conſider whether the former be a branch of the latter; and there being many kinds of ſtock or riches, let us begin with examining the ſtock ſupplied by agriculture, or, in general, the art of providing food, the great and principal want of all mankind.

The different modes of procuring the neceſſaries of life.

It is chiefly this want, and the various means employed for ſupplying it, that produces the wide variety of manners and modes of life, in men and animals. By the conſtitution of nature, different animals delight in different kinds of food; ſome delight in herbs, others in fleſh, while a third claſs ſeek nouriſhment from both; and in ſubſervience to the facility of acquiring ſuch food as is agreeable to their reſpective natures, ſome animals are ſolitary, and others are gregarious. The life of man is wonderfully diverſified by the ſame circumſtance, and of all *his* modes of life, the paſtoral is the moſt ſimple, the moſt eaſy, and the moſt indolent. Poſſeſſing a ſort of living farm ſpontaneouſly productive, the ſhepherd roams at large with his herds, which ſupply him with all the neceſſaries of ſubſiſtence, independently of any labour on his part, but the pleaſing care of conducting them to freſh paſtures. Another part of the human ſpecies reſembles, in its mode of life, the various animals of prey, and ſubſiſts by hunting and fiſhing, by war and robbery; but far the greateſt proportion of mankind derives ſubſiſtence from the earth, and its cultivated fruits. Such, then, are the different forms of human life, all reſulting from the different contrivances for procuring or producing food. Commerce, indeed, produces nothing; but it exchanges and diſtributes, as conveniency requires, the objects and commodities already produced and accumulated. A commercial ſtate of ſociety, therefore, preſuppoſes a ſuperabundance of productive induſtry. It is founded on the primary modes of acquiring the neceſſaries of life, which we have above enumerated; and which, ſeldom exiſting apart, are variouſly combined and blended, hunting and war often ſupplying the deficiencies of paſturage and agriculture.

BOOK I.

Diſtinction between real and artificial riches. The right of property founded in nature.

One kind of property, a property in the proviſions neceſſary for life, is viſibly eſtabliſhed by Nature herſelf, who ſupplies all animals, at their birth, with neceſſary food, and afterwards furniſhes them with the means of procuring it. When the young are ſeparated from the parent in the form of eggs or worms, theſe organized germs contain in themſelves the materials of their firſt nouriſhment; in viviparous animals, theſe materials are ſupplied by the teeming breaſts of the mother. In their advancement to maturity, none of the living tribes are abandoned by the kind care of Nature. Herbs and plants are copiouſly furniſhed for the uſe of animals; and animals themſelves for the various exigencies of man; almoſt all of them ſupplying him with food, while the tame ſerves him as inſtruments of induſtry, and the wild furniſh him with uſeful articles of clothing, and innumerable other conveniencies.

A property in things neceſſary for ſubſiſtence being eſtabliſhed by Nature, the means of acquiring this property muſt be natural and juſt. Hunting, therefore, is entitled to theſe epithets; and war, which is a ſpecies of hunting, and which may be juſtly employed againſt wild animals, and ſavage men, who ſpurn ſervitude, though incapable of freedom. The arts of acquiring this property are eſſential to every community, whether civil or domeſtic. They ſupply that genuine wealth, the accumulation of which ſerves as the inſtrument productive of comfortable ſubſiſtence, not that factitious riches ſtigmatized by Solon—

"No bounds to riches ever were aſſigned."

To real and natural riches bounds have always been aſſigned; ſince, like all other inſtruments, they are limited, both in magnitude and number, by the ends for which they ſerve, and the effects

effects which they are intended to produce. But that factitious wealth which is often confounded with them, is indeed boundleſs, and will appear neceſſarily to be ſo, when we have inveſtigated its nature.

Chap. 6.

The nature of commerce, its different kinds.

Firſt of all, then, it is to be obſerved that every piece of property may be employed for two diſtinct purpoſes, the purpoſe of uſe, and the purpoſe of exchange. A pair of ſhoes may be worn, or they may be ſold. This ſecond purpoſe, though it is not the original and proper end for which ſhoes were made, is founded on a principle both natural and neceſſary, the diſpoſition to truck and barter, by which men part with their ſuperfluities, in order to ſupply their deficiencies. In the community of a family, there is not any room even for barter, becauſe this community is ſo cloſe and ſo intimate, that all kinds of property are conſidered as common ſtock. But when men ſeparate, at a diſtance, in ſcattered families, the varieties of local ſituation, and innumerable other circumſtances, muſt introduce that kind of exchange or barter, which we ſtill ſee practiſed among primitive and ſimple nations, who truck wine for corn, and any one commodity of which they have too much, for another of which they are in want. This firſt and natural mode of exchange gave occaſion to a ſecond far more refined and more artificial. The goods neceſſary to man, as the inſtruments of comfortable ſubſiſtence, were found not to be (many of them at leaſt) either of eaſy conveyance, or of conſtant uſe. The beſt, perhaps the only, markets, however, often lay at a diſtance. It became neceſſary, therefore, to think of certain commodities, eaſily manageable and ſafely tranſportable, and of which the uſes are ſo general and ſo numerous, that they enſured the certainty of always obtaining for them the articles wanted in exchange.

The uſe of money, on what principles founded.

BOOK I.

change. The metals, particularly iron and ſilver and ſeveral others, exactly correſpond to this deſcription. They were employed, therefore, by general agreement as the ordinary ſtandard of value[c], and the common meaſure of exchange; being

[c] The ſubject of money is treated above, vol. i. p. 269. & ſeq. In that paſſage compared with the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 165, we find the fundamental principles of the modern œconomiſts. In both chapters the author is treating of commutative juſtice; which, as he clearly ſhews, always depends on the equality of ratios, and therefore implies four terms; namely, two perſons and two things, or two works; in the exchange of which, "he who has laboured much, receives much; and he who has laboured little, receives but little:" τον μεν πολλα πεπονηκοτα παλλα λαμβανειν, τον δε ολιγα πεπονηκοτα, ολιγα λαμβανειν. But different quantities of labour are, like other cauſes, beſt known and aſcertained by their effects; that is, by the works which they produce; works ſo complex and ſo diſſimilar that their relative values to each other can only be appreciated by the means of a common meaſure. The circumſtances mentioned in the text as belonging excluſively to the precious metals, point them out as the fitteſt of all objects for ſupplying this function, and meaſuring the exchangeable value of all other commodities, which being all commenſurable with money, are thus rendered commenſurate with each other. But even the metals are not correct meaſures, (γινεται ΠΩΣ μειζον,) ſince they themſelves vary in value in proportion to their plenty or ſcarcity, the more or leſs labour requiſite for procuring them, compared with that requiſite for procuring other objects of deſire, and a variety of other circumſtances, all expreſſed by the word χρεια; the deſire of poſſeſſing, and the difficulty of acquiring them. It is this varying relation which regulates the price or exchangeable value of things; and beſide this, no other ſtandard can ever poſſibly be diſcovered. Had Monteſquieu (Eſprit des Loix, b. xxii. c. i. & ſeq.) and Hume (Eſſay on the Balance of Trade) paid due attention to our author's principles concerning money, they would not have fallen into the error of maintaining that the introduction of paper currency diminiſhed the exchangeable value of gold and ſilver exactly in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. Dr. Smith, who has ably refuted this doctrine (Wealth of Nations, v. i. b. ii. c. ii.), falls into the contrary error, when he aſſerts (p. 298.) that paper currency has not any effect in lowering the value of gold and ſilver: which value, he thinks, depends entirely "upon the proportion between the quantity of labour neceſſary to bring a certain quantity of gold and ſilver to market, and that neceſſary to bring thither a certain quantity of any other ſort of commodities." It may be anſwered, that the introduction of paper currency ſupplying, or at leaſt

being themſelves eſtimated, at firſt, by their bulk and weight; and afterwards ſtamped, in order to ſave the trouble of meaſuring and weighing them.

The

diminiſhing one of the uſes of gold and ſilver, namely, that of circulating commodities, renders thoſe metals leſs requiſite for that ſpecific purpoſe, leſs objects of deſire, and therefore cheaper. In other words, it muſt diminiſh the exchangeable value of all the precious metals which have been accumulated by the labour of hundreds of ages. This, I ſay, it muſt do, other circumſtances remaining the ſame, preciſely for the ſame reaſon that the introduction of glaſs veſſels and of paſtes has diminiſhed the exchangeable value of gems and diamonds. But as the precious metals have many and various uſes, none of which, beſides that of ſerving as a meaſure, can be ſupplied by paper currency, their exchangeable value will not be diminiſhed in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. One uſe of an object may be totally deſtroyed; and, notwithſtanding this, the other uſes for which it ſerves, may ſtill entitle it to great value in exchange. Paper currency, indeed, lowers the precious metals on the whole, but lowers them on the whole by diminiſhing one only of their uſes. Were this adventitious uſe of them, as Ariſtotle obſerves, entirely ſet aſide by that kind of tacit convention which eſtabliſhed it, they would ſtill bear a great price on account of their many natural excellencies. The agreeable and uſeful properties of the metals, their brilliancy, durability, diviſibility, &c. which recommend them peculiarly as a *meaſure*, render them alſo a *pledge*; and their exchangeable value is, according to Ariſtotle, more invariable than that of any other commodity (ſee above, vol. i. p. 271.). Dr. Smith, b. i. c. v. p. 51. on the contrary, maintains "that the exchangeable value of corn varies leſs, from century to century, than that of gold and ſilver." *Ibid.* The diſcovery, indeed, of the New World lowered exceedingly the exchangeable value of the precious metals in much leſs than a century; but this particular caſe ought not to be converted into a general theorem. In purſuance of his notion of the greater ſtability in the exchangeable value of corn, than in that of gold and ſilver, Dr. Smith obſerves, "that every other commodity will at any particular time purchaſe a greater or ſmaller quantity of labour, in proportion to the quantity of ſubſiſtence which it can purchaſe at that time. A rent, therefore, reſerved in corn, is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchaſe. But a rent reſerved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchaſe, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchaſed by any particular quantity of that commodity." *Ibid.* p 53. The variations in the quantity of corn that can be purchaſed by

gold

BOOK I.

Their abuſe introduces artificial traffic; not for accommodation, but for gain.

The metals thus ſtamped are called money; and the invention of money neceſſarily precedes that artificial traffic, of which the main object is not comfort, but gain. To get money is the buſineſs of the merchant; with him wealth and money are ſynonymous; and to heap up money is in his mind to acquire all worldly advantages. By ſeveral œconomical writers, this opinion of the merchant is treated with contempt, and conſidered as mere dotage. They deride the notion of that being the moſt ſubſtantial or only wealth which, to him who ſhould accumulate it in the greateſt quantity, would only realize the fable of Midas, and thereby expoſe him to the danger of periſhing through hunger. Money, properly ſo called, they obſerve, is founded merely on convention; its currency and value depending on the mutable wills of men, which may with inconſtancy aboliſh what they have capriciouſly eſtabliſhed. Such reaſoners, therefore, recommend the acquiſition of a wealth more abſolute and independent; and think the productive arts by which ſuch wealth is accumulated[r], far more deſerving of attention than

gold or ſilver, are occaſioned by the plenty or ſcarcity of corn, or by the plenty or ſcarcity of the precious metals; but far more frequently by the former circumſtances than by the latter. The plenty of corn, or the little labour with which corn may be brought to market, diminiſhes its exchangeable value with regard to all other commodities, as well as with regard to gold and ſilver. When the rent is reſerved in the precious metals, its exchangeable value, therefore, at different times, that is, the quantity of other commodities, or of the labour producing them, which this rent can at thoſe different times purchaſe or command, will not be at all affected by the variation in the money prices of corn; becauſe this variation, reſulting from the plenty or ſcarcity of corn, enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of all other commodities preciſely in the ſame proportion as it enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of gold and ſilver. The money price of corn was higher in the laſt century than in the preſent; yet the money price of labour was lower in that century than in the preſent.

[r] On the ſubject of political œconomy, and particularly on this ſubject of money, Ariſtotle's

than exchange or traffic, eſpecially than that kind of traffic of which money is the end and object as well as the element and principle; a traffic ultimately centering in the augmentation of factitious riches, applicable to no other uſe than that of indefinitely multiplying themſelves.

Of traffic.

Of ſuch factitious riches, the deſire, as Solon ſaid, muſt neceſſarily be boundleſs; the blindneſs of avarice miſtaking for an object agreeable in itſelf, and as ſuch indefinitely deſireable, that which is barely an inſtrument, and of which the deſire ought to be ſtrictly limited by the purpoſes which it is fitted to ſerve. There is a limit, therefore, to accumulation for proviſion, but none to accumulation for gain.

Its abuſe.

Yet the providence of a good maſter of a family, as well as the avarice of a merchant, is often ſtrenuouſly employed in the purſuit of getting money; and when their activity has acquired it,

The confuſion thereby occaſioned.

Ariſtotle's opinions are totally different from thoſe of Child, Mun, and particularly of Locke, who is by many regarded as his greateſt metaphyſical rival. Locke, as quoted by Doctor Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 140. remarks a diſtinction between money and other moveable goods. "All other moveable goods," he ſays, "are of ſo conſumable a nature, that the wealth which conſiſts in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year, may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waſte and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a ſteady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be waſted or conſumed." Gold and ſilver are, therefore, according to him, the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply thoſe metals ought, he thinks, upon that account to be the great object of its political œconomy. The poverty and miſery of Spain and Portugal notwithſtanding all their gold and ſilver, and the riches and happineſs of England, a commercial country, without mines, as well as the riches and happineſs of Switzerland, an agricultural and paſtoral country, which diſdains working its mines, more ſtrongly fortify Ariſtotle's concluſions, than a thouſand fineſpun arguments of the French œconomiſts.

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it, their ſimilar exigencies frequently compel them to uſe and employ it exactly in the ſame manner. But the merchant, if faithful to his principles, always employs his money reluctantly for any other purpoſe than that of augmenting itſelf. Yet, political writers, deceived by an agreement in accidental purſuit and occaſional application, confound the endleſs drudgery of commerce with the ſalutary duties of œconomy, and regard the accumulation of wealth as the main buſineſs of both. At the name of money, they recall all thoſe deceitful enjoyments of pride and voluptuouſneſs which it is fitted to procure, and in which, wiſhing for ever immoderately to indulge, they cannot fail inordinately to deſire that which promiſes to gratify their inordinate paſſions. If money is not to be obtained by traffic, the purpoſe for which it was firſt inſtituted, men thus minded will have recourſe for obtaining it, to other arts and other contrivances; proſtituting even ſkill and courage in this mean and mercenary ſervice. Victory over the enemies of his country forms the proper ambition of a general; the health of his patients ought to be the main purſuit of a phyſician; yet how many military and how many medical men have no other end in view but that of gratifying their ſenſeleſs, becauſe unbounded, rapacity?

We thus ſee that there are two modes of accumulating ſtock; the one natural, productive, and ſtrictly pertaining to œconomy, becauſe eſſential to the purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence; the other neither natural nor productive, and nowiſe pertaining to œconomy; and as juſtly blameable as the other is highly laudable. When we ſpeak, however, of any kind of human induſtry as productive, we mean not that in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word it really produces any thing, but only that it

ſelects and arranges the gifts of Nature, ſuitably to the exigencies and demands of human life. The manufacturer makes not the wool, but the cloth; and for the food of animals, Nature, at their firſt formation, provides a ſuperabundance of thoſe elements from which they are conſtituted, and with the ſame bounty copiouſly furniſhes the materials of their future ſubſiſtence.

The function of the ſtateſman reſpecting health.

A queſtion here ariſes, why the art of procuring ſubſiſtence and accommodation, any more than the art of procuring health, ſhould be regarded as a branch of œconomy? We ſay, that both of them appertain to œconomy, political as well as domeſtic. The ſtateſman and the phyſician, however, do not exerciſe the ſame talents, the one in providing for the health of his fellow-citizens, the other in providing for the health of his patients. The buſineſs of the former conſiſts in general ſuperintendance; that of the latter in minute and particular detail; and in the ſame manner the function of the ſtateſman, reſpecting the proviſion for comfortable ſubſiſtence and accommodation, is totally different from the ſubſervient offices of the labourer and manufacturer.

Uſury.

We have reprobated that ſpecies of artificial traffic which adds nothing to the common ſtock, but only enriches one man or one nation at the expence of another; and which, being ſubſervient to no uſeful purpoſe, terminates in no definite end. But of all modes of accumulation, the worſt, and moſt unnatural, is uſury. This is the utmoſt corruption of artificial degeneracy, ſtanding in the ſame relation to commerce, that commerce does to œconomy. By commerce, money is perverted from the purpoſe of exchange to that of gain; ſtill, however, this gain is obtained by the mutual transfer of different

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objects; but uſury by transferring merely the ſame object from one hand to another, generates money from money; and the intereſt thus generated is therefore called "offſpring," as being preciſely of the ſame nature, and of the ſame ſpecific ſubſtance with that from which it proceeds.

The theory of œconomy applied to practice. The chief branches of huſbandry.

Having thus explained the theory of œconomy, we now proceed to the practice; obſerving that, as the theory is a liberal ſtudy, the practice is a neceſſary occupation. Whoever, therefore, would ſurely and honourably augment his ſubſtance, muſt acquire an experimental knowledge, firſt, of the various kinds of cattle, particularly horſes, oxen, and ſheep; he muſt examine their many and excellent qualities and uſes, all ſubſervient to the purpoſes of human life; he muſt conſider and compare their reſpective advantages in their relations to each other, as well as to the local circumſtances in which he happens to be placed. Having provided himſelf with cattle, which are the living inſtruments of agriculture, he will next direct his attention to this moſt uſeful art; diſtributing the labour of his houſehold as circumſtances require, among the various branches of tillage and plantation; without neglecting thoſe advantages which offer themſelves ſpontaneouſly from bees, birds, and fiſhes.

Other modes of accumulation.

Such are the firſt and moſt natural contrivances for augmenting our ſubſtance. Exchange or traffic follows next. Of this the moſt conſpicuous kind is that carried on by means of ſhips or waggons, by adventurous navigators, or ſtationary ſtorekeepers; whoſe employments differ greatly in this, that ſome yield moſt profit, and others afford moſt ſecurity. To commerce, ſtrictly ſo called, we have already referred that mode of accumulation named uſury; and under the ſame head may be claſſed

claſſed the letting to hire that labour or that ſkill of which we have the command; from which, blended with that mode of accumulation firſt mentioned, reſult many mixed modes, as the various kinds of mining and quarrying; in all which human labour is exchanged for things fruitleſs and lifeleſs, yet many of them highly uſeful. To enter into a more minute detail of the various modes of productive induſtry might indeed be uſeful, but certainly would be tireſome. It may be obſerved in general, that all ſuch occupations partake the more of art, the leſs they are dependent on fortune. Thoſe of them are vile and ſordid, which hurt the health or deform the body; thoſe are truly ſervile, which may be exerciſed by the corporeal powers alone; and thoſe are the meaneſt and moſt contemptible, which require not any vigorous exertion of either mind or body. Chares of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have exhauſted the ſubject of agriculture, having treated both of planting and tillage. Other arts have been explained by other authors, to whoſe writings thoſe curious after ſuch knowledge may have recourſe.

Perſons eager for wealth may collect likewiſe and imitate, with much advantage to themſelves, the dextrous contrivances by which other men have obtained great and ſudden opulence[g]. Such, for inſtance, is the honeſt artifice aſcribed to the Monopolies.

[g] In a copious, but corrupt and mutilated fragment of Ariſtotle's, intitled οἰκονομικῶν τὸ β', "the Second Book of Oeconomics," we find intermixed with the juſt principles of political œconomy, the greateſt part of thoſe financial tricks which have been revived, and ſo often repeated in modern times: the debaſement of the coin; not paper, indeed, but iron currency and credit; venality of juſtice; mortgaging the revenues; and innumerable contrivances, by which the republics and petty princes of Lower Aſia impoveriſhed and ruined their ſubjects. Ariſtotle does not explain theſe dangerous artifices with a view to recommend them (for he begins by declaring the only fair and certain means

BOOK I.

Exemplified by Thales of Miletus.

the invention of Thales the Mileſian. The poverty of this great philoſoper was thought to upbraid his ſtudies, as ſerving no gainful, and therefore no uſeful purpoſe. But Thales, by his ſkill in meteorology, contrived to wipe off the reproach; for as this ſcience enabled him to foreſee that next ſeaſon there would be an extraordinary crop of olives, he hired in the winter all the oil preſſes in Chios and Miletus, employing his little fortune in giving earneſt to their reſpective proprietors. When the gathering ſeaſon approached, and the olives were ſeen loading the branches, all men wiſhed to provide oil preſſes at the ſame time, and ſuddenly. But Thales, being maſter of the whole number, let them ſeparately at a high price, and thereby accumulating vaſt wealth, proved that philoſophers might be rich if they pleaſed, but that riches were not the object of their purſuit.

The contrivance of Thales conſiſted in procuring for himſelf a monopoly; which, in general, is a gainful project, and as ſuch has ſometimes been employed by ſovereign ſtates, when diſtreſſed for want of money.

By a Syracuſan banker.

In the time of Dionyſius, a banker in Sicily bought up all the corn, and without greatly raiſing the price of that article, ſold it to foreign merchants at the profit of fifty talents. Dionyſius, when appriſed of this tranſaction, allowed the monopoliſt to retain his profit, but baniſhed him from Syracuſe, as employing

means of augmenting domeſtic and national wealth, "produce much and conſume little"); neither does he deſcribe ſuch unwarrantable political ſleights (as has been ſuſpected of Machiavel) with a deſign to ſatirize and diſgrace thoſe concerned in them. He treats the matter merely as an abſtract queſtion of political ſcience. You wiſh to get wealth—Thus, and thus, may it be obtained: but take care; you will acquire it at too dear a rate (as I have proved in innumerable parts of my works) if you purchaſe it by any kind of diſhoneſty.

employing a mode of accumulation inconſiſtent with the public intereſt. Yet the knowledge of this, and ſuch like contrivances, may often prove uſeful both to families and to ſtates, particularly to the latter; wherefore ſome ſtateſmen conſider the art of improving the public revenues as the only object worthy of their ſtudy.

Chap. 8.

Analogy between the three branches of œconomics and the three forms of government.

The three branches of œconomics, or domeſtic œconomy, may be illuſtrated by the three forms of government. A maſter commands his ſlaves like an abſolute monarch; a father rules his children like a king; a huſband governs his wife like a republican magiſtrate. The principle on which the maſter's authority is founded, has been explained above: that of the huſband reſults from the natural pre-eminence of males; and that of the father, from the natural ſuperiority of manly age to unripe youth. In republics, indeed, which aim at equality, the citizens govern by vicarious ſucceſſion: yet thoſe who happen to be in office wear a peculiar dreſs; the language uſed to them is reſpectful; they are diſtinguiſhed by appropriate honours; honours paid, indeed, not to themſelves, but (as happened to the laver of Amaſis [h]) to the ſituation which they hold, and to the functions which they perform. The authority of a huſband,

[h] Amaſis was a man of low extraction, but diſtinguiſhed merit, who having gained the favour of Apries king of Egypt, found means to ſucceed to his maſter's throne. The meanneſs of his birth expoſing him to the contempt of his ſubjects, he converted a golden baſon in which he uſed to waſh his feet, into the ſtatue of a divinity, which he erected in one of the moſt conſpicuous places of his capital. The ſuperſtitious Egyptians flocked to worſhip the image. Amaſis told them that the object of their veneration had once been nothing better than a vile utenſil. It is the ſame caſe with myſelf; I was once a plebeian, but am now your king; take care, therefore, to yield to me the reſpect due to the ſituation which I now hold. Comp. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. 68. Athen. Deipnoſoph. l. xv. p. 680.

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husband, therefore, over his wife, is precisely that of a magistrate over his fellow-citizens, but of a magistrate always remaining in office. The authority of fathers, founded on seniority and cemented by affection, resembles that of kings; and Homer justly characterizes the regal dignity of Jupiter, in addressing him as the father of gods and men. For kings ought to differ from their subjects, not in kind, but in perfection; and this is precisely the difference between the father and his children.

Relative importance of these branches.

It is manifest, from the observations already made, that the objects of political œconomy rise above each other in dignity; that men are more important than mere property; that the statesman ought to bestow more attention in exciting the virtues of the former, than in augmenting the mass of the latter; but that the discipline and improvement of freemen chiefly merits his most serious regard. And here a doubt occurs, whether a slave can be said to partake of any other virture than merely the power of performing bodily service. If he is endowed with temperance, courage, and justice, wherein does he differ from a freeman? If he is entirely incapable of such excellencies, how can he be called a man? The same difficulty presents itself respecting women and children, whether the several virtues can be fairly ascribed to them or not? Can a woman be dignified with the epithets of temperate, courageous, or just? Can such virtues, or their contrary vices, belong to a boy? In one word, can that which is formed for subjection, exercise virtue in the same sense with that which is formed for government; or if we admit the affirmative, why is the one entitled to command, and the other bound to obey?

Difficulties respecting the virtues and duties of slaves, children, and women.

General solution of these difficulties.

This difficulty cannot be solved by saying, that both of them partake of virtue, but partake of it in different measures; for

command

command and obedience are things *ſpecifically* different, not merely different in degree or in quantity. And yet it ſounds harſh, to allow virtue to one claſs of mankind, and to deny it to another. If he, who is unadorned by wiſdom and juſtice, cannot poſſibly be a good maſter, is it poſſible for him, who is debaſed by profligacy and cowardice, to be a good ſervant? It is manifeſt, therefore, that certain virtues muſt be aſcribed to both, but virtues as eſſentially different, as are the natures and perfections of thoſe by whom they are reſpectively cultivated. Steadily to purſue a virtuous courſe of life, implies the habitual preference of this kind of life to every other. But every act of preference implies deſire and compariſon; and every act of virtuous preference implies propriety in the deſire, and accuracy in the compariſon[h]. Both circumſtances muſt concur to produce virtuous determinations; and this concurrence cannot uniformly or ſteadily take place but in minds duly exerciſed, and highly perfected. In ſlaves, the faculties of deliberation and reſolution may be conſidered as little better than null; in women they are weak and dependent; in children they are unripe and defective.

Reſpecting women.

Of each claſs of mankind the virtues muſt be relative to their powers, and ought to be competent to their offices. The man fit to command may be compared with the architect, who adjuſts the plan and directs its execution. *His* ſkill muſt extend to every part of the work; *that* of his workmen is limited by their reſpective taſks. In the work of government, reaſon is the architect; it is the part of reaſon to command, and the duty of weakneſs and of paſſion to obey. Thus the various diſtinctions of mankind neceſſarily diſcriminate

[h] See vol. i. p. 289.

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minate their virtues. Self-command in a woman is not the ſame thing with ſelf-command in a man. The juſtice and courage of the two ſexes do not, as Socrates[1] thought, coincide; and were we to enumerate, after the example of Gorgias, each particular excellence, inſtead of contenting ourſelves with vague definitions of virtue in general, we ſhould clearly perceive that what the poet ſays concerning ſilence, is univerſally applicable to all qualities whatever.

> "In woman, ſilence is an ornament,
> But the ſame ſilence adds no grace to man."

There is not any quality ornamental in the one ſex, which, if exhibited preciſely in the ſame degree, would be graceful in the other.

Children. Children, we have obſerved, are unripe and imperfect; their virtues, therefore, are to be conſidered not merely as relative to their actual ſtate, but principally in reference to that maturity and perfection to which nature has deſtined them. They are diligently and modeſtly to hearken to their teachers, and obſequiouſly to obey their directors; the premature affectation of manhood would diſqualify them from ever acquiring manly virtues.

Slaves. From the deſcription that we have given of ſlaves, it is plain that the catalogue of their perſonal excellencies is not extenſive. Extreme timidity, or exceſſive profligacy, is totally incompatible with their duties. To theſe duties they muſt carefully be trained by the maſter himſelf, and not by the overſeer who aſſigns to them their reſpective taſks, and who teaches them ſkilfully to perform their ſervile employments. It is falſe that ſlaves are to be governed merely by fear. They are capable of liſtening to reaſon, though naturally unable to exerciſe its energies.

Our

[1] Apud. Platon. in Republ.

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Our ſlaves, therefore, are to be admoniſhed, inſtructed, and diſciplined not leſs than our children. A doubt here occurs, whether the virtues of artiſans ought to coincide with thoſe of ſlaves? The ſame vices of idleneſs and intemperance often prove alike ruinous to both theſe claſſes of men. Yet there ſubſiſts between them this material difference. He who is properly a ſlave, is ſuch habitually and permanently through the imbecility of his nature. His ſervitude is perpetual and complete. The mean mechanic, on the contrary, ſubmits to the tireſome drudgery of diſtorting, painful, and unwholeſome labour; but he encounters theſe hardſhips for the ſake of performing a particular taſk, which is accompliſhed in a limited time. His virtues, therefore, ought to coincide with thoſe of ſlaves, in as far only as he partakes of a ſervile condition.

Difference between mechanics and ſlaves.

In every treatiſe of Politics, it is neceſſary carefully to examine the relative duties of huſbands and wives, fathers and children [k]. Theſe, we have ſaid, are the elements of families, and families are the elements of ſtates; and, as in every ſyſtem the parts ought to conſpire by their reſpective excellencies to promote the perfection and harmony of the whole, ſo the principles and habits of women and children muſt be faſhioned by

The connection between domeſtic and political œconomy.

[k] There remains but imperfect fragments of Ariſtotle's Firſt Book of Œconomics; in which he treats of women, children, and ſlaves. See Ariſtotle, edit. Du Vall. p. 492. & ſeq. The defect may be partly ſupplied by the remains of the Pythagoreans preſerved in Stobæus, and by the fifth book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, intitled, De Adminiſtratione Domeſtica. Ariſtotle, doubtleſs, treated the ſubject more ſcientifically than his predeceſſors; ſince he made the rules of domeſtic œconomy depend on the nature and object of the national policy. Such were his juſt and extenſive views, that, as Strabo obſerves (l. xiii. p. 608.), his works, even when imperfect, taught profound and practical knowledge, in oppoſition to ſhadowy embelliſhments and ſcholaſtic trifling.

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by the intereſt of that government, to the ſafety and happineſs of which they are alike eſſential; women forming the one half of the preſent, and children affording the ſole hope of the future generation. In conformity to the plan of the community, individuals, we ſay, are to be educated; and in ſubſerviency to this great and general object, all their particular virtues muſt be moulded [l]. The nature of political ſociety and the forms of civil government muſt, therefore, be clearly underſtood, before we can explain and aſcertain the fluctuating and dependent rules of domeſtic diſcipline [m]. We now enter on this vaſt ſubject, beginning with the important queſtion, which form of government is the beſt.

[l] Ariſtotle gives the reaſon, την δε του μερους προς την του ὁλου δει βλεπειν αρετην. "The virtue of the part muſt always bear a reference to the virtue of the whole." The continual referring of particular truths to general maxims has an air of pedantry in modern languages. It certainly is uſeleſs, where the particular truth is as evident as the general one. But the diſlike or diſguſt which it excites ariſes from this, that the ſchoolmen adopted many maxims that were falſe or obſcure, and the pedantry of theſe ſcholaſtics has been long held in juſt contempt.

[m] The relation between government and education, and the ſubſerviency of the latter to the former, were ſtrongly expreſſed by Pythagoras. Being aſked by a certain Xenophilus, How he might beſt educate his ſon, he replied, Send him to live in a well regulated ſtate. Diogen. Laert. viii. 16.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Second Book, we ſee the intellectual exertions of the deepeſt thinker of antiquity ſtrenuouſly exerted in ſolving the moſt important political queſtion that can poſſibly be agitated. With affectionate reſpect for his maſter Plato, but with ſtill greater veneration for truth, our author examines and refutes his ingenious, but fanciful opinions concerning the beſt form of government; and in detecting the errors of that admired philoſopher, as well as in expoſing the dangerous ſyſtems of polity recommended by Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus, he arraigns by anticipation the extravagancies that have been propoſed, approved, and many of them in our own days carried into execution. From the ſpeculations of mere theory, he paſſes to thoſe plans of legiſlation which have actually been eſtabliſhed in the world; collected from the deſcription of upwards of two hundred commonwealths; and preſenting, when his work was entire, the moſt valuable ſeries of political experiments that ever was exhibited. But concerning the republics of Aſia and Magna Græcia, as well as thoſe of Africa and Gaul, we muſt now be contented to gather our information from mutilated or doubtful fragments.

Yet

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Yet let us rather congratulate ourſelves on the riches which remain, than peeviſhly regret loſſes which cannot poſſibly be repaired [a]. In the Book before us, we have the reſult and general concluſion of all our author's compariſons and reflections; which is, that the inſtitutions of Crete, Sparta, and Carthage, though far from being perfect in theory, were the beſt and wiſeſt that ever were carried into practice. In theſe governments, therefore, we may contemplate the term and limit of the civil wiſdom of antiquity. With them, each nation may compare its domeſtic polity; and each individual may be contented, if the conſtitution under which he lives, can ſtand in honourable competition with thoſe boaſted models [b]. To ſatisfy his mind completely, the reader muſt himſelf make the compariſon: and the Engliſh reader will finiſh this uſeful taſk, cheriſhing his country, and bleſſing the memory of his anceſtors.

Ariſtotle is the only writer that deſcribes with fulneſs and accuracy the commonwealth of Carthage. He does more; he predicts her melancholy fate, and points out the lurking ſeeds of her decay and ruin, even during the moſt vigorous period of her health and proſperity. But beſides the malignant poiſon which deſtroyed that republic, there was a deep and radical error in the conſtitution of all thoſe denominated the *free ſtates* of antiquity; an error which our author in ſome paſſages hints

[a] Fabricius, vol. ii. p. 196. & ſeq. gives a copious liſt of the commonwealths deſcribed by Ariſtotle. Cicero ſays, that this indefatigable author "explained the inſtitutions, manners, and diſcipline of almoſt all the republics of Greeks and Barbarians." Omnium fere civitatum non Græciæ ſolum, ſed etiam Barbariæ mores inſtituta ac diſciplinas expoſuerat. De Fin. l. v. c. 4.

[b] The objection ariſing from the ſuppoſed ignorance of the ancients with reſpect to repreſentative government, will be anſwered in the ſequel. It will be ſhewn that the Greeks were acquainted with repreſentation in the uſual and practical ſenſe of that word.

hints at, but which he no where completely explains. This evil conſiſted in the faulty conſtruction of what is now called the executive power; which, inſtead of being ſovereign, permanent, and indiviſible, was exerciſed by aſſemblies and ſenates, or by them delegated to an almoſt indefinite number of mutually independent miniſters and generals. The deplorable effects of this arrangement, with regard to liberty as well as juſtice, I endeavoured twenty years ago fully to illuſtrate from ancient hiſtory; and as the obſervations then made could not be influenced by the events which have ſince happened in Europe, and the actually ſubſiſting ſtate of public affairs, I think it better to tranſcribe a few paſſages from the work alluded to, than to repeat the ſame opinions in other words. "In conſidering the nature and tendency of any government, there are two principal queſtions to be reſolved; how far it protects the lives and liberties and properties of individuals, and what duties it requires them to perform in return for this protection? Both queſtions are eaſily anſwered with regard to the ſtates of Greece; they required every thing, and they performed almoſt nothing. Such a political arrangement gave extraordinary energy to their military enterpriſes[c]; and this, if it may be conſidered as a good effect, was the principal advantage with which their plan of

[c] "Such nations," Ariſtotle obſerves, "ſhine in war; in peace they ruſt with their ſwords." This truth ſtrongly impreſſed the author's mind, while it was yet a queſtion of political expediency, what means ſhould be uſed for avoiding a deſperate conflict with a people, whoſe ambition under deſpotiſm, firſt ſubjected their neighbours to the neceſſity of keeping on foot mercenary ſtanding armies; and whoſe more dangerous ambition under democracy, was likely to ſubject them to the ſtill harder neceſſity of becoming armed nations. The lively and profound ſenſe which he thought it his duty to expreſs of the military energy of democracy, was ſtrangely miſtaken and groſsly miſrepreſented, by *ſome perſons* or *perſon*, who, at the time alluded to, affected to treat all thoſe as enemies to peace at home, who were anxiouſly zealous for peace abroad.

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of policy was attended. The ſtate enjoyed an abſolute command over the perſonal ſervices and the wealth of its ſubjects; and could on every occaſion call forth their moſt ſtrenuous exertions. The authority exerciſed over the rich and the poor was equally unlimited. But the condition of the former ſeemed peculiarly unhappy, becauſe their eſtates, as well as their perſonal ſervices, might always be required of them; and, without danger of inevitable deſtruction to their owners, could not poſſibly be withheld. They not only ſupplied the whole expence of the navy, but furniſhed ſuch extraordinary contributions as any ſudden emergency demanded. In all the following pleadings, there is ſcarcely one example of a rich man venturing to appear at the bar of the public, without being able to prove that he had expended the beſt part of his fortune in the ſervice of the community. But this was a matter of neceſſity, not of choice. For the Greeks were tyrants in one capacity, and ſlaves in another; and that impervious line which ought to be drawn between the exerciſe of power in the ſovereign, and the enjoyment of liberty in the people, was a ſecret undiſcovered in Greece, and is ſtill concealed from every country but our own [d]."

"But the Athenian inſtitutions, diſtreſſing as they were to individuals, who loudly complained of their injuſtice, yet enabled the republic to exert itſelf with vigour againſt its foreign and domeſtic enemies. The exorbitant and uncontrolled juriſdiction, aſſumed by the Grecian ſtates over their colonies and allies, tended ſtill farther to promote the ſame end. The enormous exactions of the Athenians from their tributary iſles, as well as the heavy taxes which they impoſed on their Aſiatic

[d] Introduction to the Orations of Lyſias, &c. p. 17.

Aſiatic colonies, have been already deſcribed. Sparta exerciſed, in this reſpect, an authority equally tremendous. In the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, that republic demanded from her colonies in Italy and Sicily, five hundred ſhips, and large contributions in money; and during the courſe of the ſame war, ſhe made many ſimilar applications, which were ſeldom ineffectual. But it is not from particular acts of extreme rigour and ſeverity, that we muſt appreciate the intolerable ſervitude of the countries which had the misfortune to become ſubject to thoſe ambitious republics. While human nature continues the ſame, the right to exerciſe power will always be attended with a ſtrong propenſity to abuſe it. Unleſs this dangerous prerogative, on the one hand, be balanced by the invaluable privilege of defending liberty on the other; unleſs the line of ſeparation between theſe two be boldly marked and accurately defined; unleſs the intereſts of that part of the conſtitution which tends to corruption, be invariably reſiſted by thoſe of the generous portion which ſuſtains its political life; it is of little conſequence, whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thouſand. In both caſes alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law [c]. It ſhall be proved that the inſtitutions of thoſe ancient republics, as well as

[c] To ſee clearly the cauſe of the peculiar evils inherent in all kinds of popular aſſemblies veſted with government, we muſt have recourſe to the trite proverb, "Set a beggar on horſeback," &c. Men not uſed to power are the moſt likely to abuſe it; and when this power centers in one aſſembly, however conſtituted, it is found by univerſal experience, that the majority will for ever tyrannize over the minority; and will execute its unjuſt and wild reſolutions more zealouſly and more ardently, exactly in proportion to the oppoſition which it has encountered. In its ungovernable career, the obſtacles which could not check and reſiſt, will wonderfully encreaſe and accelerate its headlong impetuoſity.

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as the manners reſulting from them, both of which have been injudiciouſly extolled by many learned men, approach nearer to Oriental deſpotiſm and the manners reſulting from it, than can well be imagined. The principal difference between the citizens of the one and the ſlaves of the other is, that a greater number of the former might expect at ſome future time to inflict the ſame calamities which they had previouſly ſuffered. But between the foreign dependancies of republican and deſpotic ſtates, there is no diſtinction whatever. The moſt rapacious Turkiſh governor, armed with all the tremendous power of his maſter, never acted with more cruelty and injuſtice, than did the magiſtrates of the Athenian republic under the ſanction of popular decrees [f]."

Theſe obſervations are confirmed by the juſt theory of political arrangements, and illuſtrated by the moſt extenſive ſurvey of thoſe denominated free ſtates, both ancient and modern. In every well-regulated community, the people ought to have a control in the government, but ought not to adminiſter it; for power veſted in the people at large, or in an aſſembly delegated by them, muſt, in nations ordinarily circumſtanced [g], neceſſarily degenerate into the tyranny of a faction. Diſcontent, ſedition, conſpiracy, and revolution, form the miſerable train of conſequences; pourtrayed in characters of blood in the melancholy annals of republican hiſtory [h].

The

[f] Introduction to Lyſias, p. 18.

[g] What the *extraordinary* circumſtances are which alter the nature of republicaniſm, will appear in the progreſs of this work.

[h] I atteſt not only the republics of Greece, but the Italian republics of the middle age, whoſe tumultuary tranſactions and ſanguinary revolutions crowd the deſultory pages of Machiavel, Guicchiardin, Nerli, Varqui, Malavolti, Ghirardacci, Fioravanti,

The evil is not accidental, it ſprings from a perennial ſource. With the conſtituent elements of every commonwealth, naturally grow up two parties, diſtinguiſhed by different names in different countries, but whoſe eſſential characteriſtics are uniform and unalterable. The nobles and the people, the rich and the poor, will always reſpectively entertain many particular views, and always allow themſelves to be governed by many ſeemingly incompatible intereſts. When theſe jarring orders are united in one ſovereign aſſembly, whichever party prevails, the majority will tyrannize over the minority, and tyrannize the more outrageouſly, becauſe the ſame perſons who have made unjuſt decrees, are inveſted with the aweful power of carrying them cruelly into execution. Even in the wildeſt democracies ſuch a monſtrous arrangement never was durable[i]. But its continuance, however ſhort, was long enough to be feared and deteſted; ſince to whichever ſide the balance inclined, either the weight of authority degenerated into deſpotiſm[k], or the flame of liberty blazed into conflagration[l]. As

vanti, Portenarli, &c. As a modern Italian writer obſerves, "Theſe republics were all of them expoſed to almoſt daily revolutions, and ſeldom did the ſyſtem of adminiſtration continue a whole year the ſame." Denina's Revolutions, &c. c. v. ſect. 10.

[i] It ſeldom happened, in the republics either of ancient Greece or of modern Italy, that the whole exerciſe of government was veſted in one council, in one aſſembly, or in the committees of either; but as the legiſlative body, whether ſenate or people, itſelf governed by the capricious will of a tyrannical majority, directed and controlled the exerciſe of all executive and judiciary functions, the matter was not much mended; ſince all power proceeded from one centre, and flowed from one ſource, a power unbalanced and unreſponſible, and therefore, as Ariſtotle obſerves, not made for man.

[k] The moſt prominent examples are the tyranny of the four hundred, and afterwards of the thirty, at Athens. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxi. & xxiv. Likewiſe the tyranny of the Decemvirs at Rome. T. Liv. l. iii. c. 32. & ſeq.

[l] All republican hiſtories abound with examples of this kind. Thoſe of Athens and Florence contain little elſe for near a century preceding what is called the extinction of their liberties.

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As by univerſal conſent, therefore, all legiſlators or reformers of free ſtates divided the ſovereignty between the two orders, convened in diſtinct chambers; the one forming a ſenate to deliberate and propoſe; the other, an aſſembly of the people to approve and confirm. This, doubtleſs, is one great point gained: the two ſovereign chambers ſerve to check each other; the one divides and the other chooſes [m]; and while each reſts ſatisfied with its preſcribed ſhare of power, their meaſures will be harmonious, and their government will be happy. But the paſſions of men, as our author frequently obſerves, are indefinite and inſatiable; and ſcarcely a ſingle example occurs in hiſtory, of either a ſovereign ſenate or a ſovereign aſſembly, which did not frequently abuſe its power, and continually endeavour to aggrandize it. How is this evil to be remedied? What authority is to be interpoſed between contending factions? What hand is fit to hold the balance, and to render the energy of law ſuperior to the violence of party rage? Ariſtotle will tell us "that the middle ranks muſt be encreaſed and magnified; that veneration for the conſtitutional laws muſt be inſpired; in fine, that a king muſt be eſtabliſhed, whoſe office is a pledge and ſecurity, that the few ſhall not be plundered and oppreſſed, nor the many inſulted and enſlaved." In proportion to the degree in which theſe advices have been complied with, free ſtates have flouriſhed. Even the republican Machiavel will vouch, that the commonwealths of the middle age never enjoyed

[m] In this, according to Harrington, conſiſts the whole myſtery of government; "a myſtery brought unto light by two ſilly girls. For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them; Divide, ſays one unto the other, and I will chooſe; or let me divide, and you ſhall chooſe." Oceana, p. 13. edit. 1656.

joyed any tolerable meaſure of proſperity or tranquillity, when the factions of the nobles and the people were not reſtrained by the authority of ſome virtuous, prudent, and powerful citizen [n]. Into this form, of two deliberative aſſemblies with an executive magiſtrate at their head, all the moſt renowned republics, both of ancient and modern times, have ſhewn a continual tendency to throw themſelves; and that independently of contrivance and theory, or rather in oppoſition to them; ſo true it is, that "government," to uſe the words of Ariſtotle, "is the work of nature; and all good government, the reſult of time and experience."

But innumerable obſtacles, both without and within, prevented free ſtates from attaining the juſt perfection of political arrangement. The republics of antiquity were too jealous of liberty to entruſt the executive magiſtracy with ſuch a ſhare in the legiſlature as is eſſential to its own defence. The archon, the conſul, the ſuffetes, the king, or by whatever other name

[n] L. iv. ſub. init. Machiavel has branded with indelible impreſſions of indignation and contempt, the inſtitutions and governments of modern Italy. Their hiſtory is not, however, he obſerves, without its uſe. "E ſe nel deſcribere le coſe ſeguite in queſto guaſto mondo, non ſi narrera, ò fortezza di ſoldato, ò virtu di capitano, ò amore verſo la patria di cittadino, ſi vedra con quali inganni, con quali aſtutie et arti, i principi, i ſoldati, i capi delle republiche per mantenerſi quella riputatione che non havevano meritata, ſi governavano. Il que ſara forſe non meno utile che ſi ſiano l'antiche coſe a conoſcere; perche ſe quelli i liberali animi a ſequitarle accendono, queſte a fuggirle & ſpegnerle accenderanno." L. v. Delle Hiſtorie, ſub init. "In deſcribing the tranſactions of this degenerate country, I ſhall not have to ſpeak of the bravery of ſoldiers, the ſkill of generals, the patriotiſm of citizens; but there will be frequent occaſion to recount the ſlights and artifices by which thoſe who were at the head of civil and military affairs, kept poſſeſſion of that conſideration to which they were by no means entitled. The exploits of antiquity fire noble minds with the deſire of imitating them; the tranſactions of a recent date, will fire the noble minded among poſterity with a deſire to avoid and ſpurn ſuch ignominious examples."

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name the firſt magiſtrate was diſtinguiſhed, judged cauſes in perſon, and commanded armies in perſon; his power did not conſiſt in appointing thoſe by whom cauſes were judged or armies commanded. In conſequence of theſe unfavourable arrangements, the wiſe and equitable adminiſtration of the laws depended on the inſtability of perſonal character, not on the ſoundneſs of the conſtitution; and diſcontent with the adminiſtration, naturally produced a revolution in the government. Among the modern nations which conquered and divided the weſtern provinces of the Roman empire, the nature of the kingly office came to be better underſtood; but as their kings were entruſted with the uncontrolled command of armies continually augmented through the fear or jealouſy of ambitious, and often hoſtile neighbours, it was eaſy for ſucceſſions of ſuch kings to overawe both nobles and people by the right of the ſword, and to unite in their own perſons the ſupreme legiſlative with the executive power. In Great Britain alone, whoſe inſular ſituation rendered the public ſafety dependent on that kind of national force which is moſt formidable to enemies abroad, but which can never be conveniently employed as an inſtrument for deſtroying liberty at home, the progreſs towards the higheſt perfection of political arrangement was left free and unincumbered; unchecked by the timid jealouſies of the people, unobſtructed by the overwhelming power of the prince °. Two legiſlative aſſemblies, the one popular, the other ariſto-

° In populous countries, the encroachments of power cannot be regularly reſiſted by the people collectively. The people, therefore, muſt act by their delegates. But theſe delegates will uniformly and heartily unite with the general maſs of the community, in maintaining equal laws and public liberty, when they are thoroughly convinced that the power which they reſtrain can never become their own. Hence the ſingular advantage of an indiviſible and ſovereign executive, whoſe functions can be legally

ariſtocratical; the former entruſted with the control of the national purſe and the inqueſt of public grievances; the latter judges in matters of impeachment by the Commons; but both orders or aſſemblies totally deprived of all conſtitutional means of hurting each other, ſince the exerciſe of government centers in one ſovereign magiſtrate, defended by a negative on the paſſing of laws, and inveſted with the whole prerogative of naming thoſe by whom they are carried into execution.—This diſtribution of power, the reſult of experience operating on fortunate circumſtances, is the nobleſt contrivance that ever was deviſed for killing thoſe ſeeds of ſedition which lurk in the boſom of every commonwealth; for enſuring the continuance of equal and uſeful laws; and for rendering the juſt authority of thoſe laws prevalent over the blind fury of contending factions. Other modes of polity have ſucceeded in countries peculiarly circumſtanced; but this applies univerſally; and free ſtates have flouriſhed in peace and proſperity, exactly in proportion[p] to their approximation to this perfect model.

It

legally exerciſed only by reſponſible miniſters; and hence the wonderful ſtability of the Britiſh conſtitution; a ſtability (humanly ſpeaking) unalterable, becauſe founded on the indelible and beſt underſtood intereſts of men, the cleareſt dictates of reaſon, and the warmeſt paſſions of the heart.

[p] *Other circumſtances being the ſame*; words which ought always to be underſtood in ſuch general propoſitions. The nature of the country, exacting induſtry and frugality, conſpiried with the authority of the Stadtholder in giving proſperity to the Netherlands. The United States of America owe their happineſs, under their preſent executive, not merely to the great perſonal weight of their preſident, but to their extenſive poſſeſſions, offering the ſtrongeſt incitements to agriculture, to the enjoyments and virtues of domeſtic life, and to the improvement of their private fortunes; all which circumſtances have a tendency to render men eaſily governable. Theſe republics, as well as the Swiſs Cantons and their allies, preſent, doubtleſs (I ſhould ſpeak of Holland in the paſt tenſe), a picture of more tranquillity and ſtability than did moſt ſtates of ancient Greece, or the Italian republics of the middle age; and that not merely in conſequence of their political arrangements, but of many other cauſes, both moral and phyſical.

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It has been the faſhion, however, of late years to maintain that the misfortunes of the Greek commonwealths did not originate in the ſource above explained, but in the general ignorance of all the free ſtates of antiquity with regard to repreſentative government, the higheſt improvement of republicaniſm. As this doctrine is very ſeduloufly inculcated on both ſides of the Atlantic, by thoſe who having overturned their own hereditary conſtitutions, are deſirous of encouraging other nations to imitate their example, it may not be improper to examine how far ſuch aſſertions are warranted by hiſtory; eſpecially as the examination will ſerve to illuſtrate ſeveral of our author's remarks in the following Books of his Politics. That the Greeks were totally unacquainted with repreſentative government, can not be maintained by any who have the leaſt tincture of learning. I need not mention the Amphictyonic council[q], and the Achæan league[r], both of which repreſentative bodies I have deſcribed in another place. But I may obſerve, as a fact leſs generally attended to, that in the commonwealth of Mantinæa, perſons choſen from the people at large[s] were inveſted with the power of naming the magiſtrates. In this Arcadian republic, there was not only repreſentation ſimply, but a double row of repreſentatives; delegates of delegates; and it is not reaſonable to conjecture that an arrangement ſo obvious ſhould have remained undiſcovered among a cluſter of free ſtates, where all ſorts of propoſitions

[q] Compare the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. p. 107. & ſeq. and vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 467.

[r] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 14.

[s] Ariſtot. Polit. l. vi. c. iv. The author mentions other republics on the ſame plan, particularly that of Telecles the Mileſian; and in his Fourth Book, where he treats of the ſovereignty in a ſtate, maintains that elective, as well as deliberative aſſemblies, ſhould conſiſt of only a part of the citizens, acting for the whole by an eſtabliſhed rotation.

ſitions were made, and all kinds of experiments were tried; where nothing was rejected which had not been previouſly refuted; and where inſtitutions, ſeemingly the moſt unpromiſing, were condemned or approved in proportion only to the miſchief or benefit viſibly manifeſt in their effects. This is ſo true, that the ſuppoſed modern maxims, reſpecting repreſentation and taxation, were held and practiſed by the Lycians; a people not obſcure nor inconſiderable, but eminently illuſtrious both in war and peace, from the earlieſt to the lateſt period of their hiſtory. The Lycians inhabited the ſouthern coaſt of the Aſiatic peninſula, and were ſurrounded by the territories of Carian, Pamphylian, and Cilician pirates; wretches who deformed thoſe ſeas by their rapacity and cruelty, and whoſe cities were marts of booty and ſlavery, particularly of captives, born free, reduced into inextricable bondage[t]. The Lycians alone diſdained this abominable traffic; and though they often commanded the ſea even to the coaſt of Italy, yet they never were convicted or even accuſed of ſacrificing honour to gain[u]. Their equity and innocence protected them againſt the juſt vengeance which often fell on their neighbours from the Syrian and the Roman power. From the age of Homer to that of Brutus[x] and Caſſius, they continued to flouriſh under their hereditary inſtitutions in domeſtic tranquillity and national independence. Within a circular peninſula, nearly an hundred miles in diameter, and with upwards of one hundred and ſeventy miles

[t] Strabo, l. xiv. p. 664 & 665. from which this account of the Lycians is almoſt wholly copied.

[u] Idem ibid.

[x] See in Plutarch's life of Brutus, and in Appian (De Bell. Civil. l. iv. p. 633, & ſeq.), the memorable reſiſtance of Xanthus and Patara to Brutus.

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miles of ſea-coaſt, Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, with three equal, and ſeventeen inferior cities, formed from time immemorial a federal and repreſentative government. The national convention or congreſs conſiſted of deputies from the ſeveral members of the union; the greateſt cities having three votes; the middling, two; and the ſmalleſt only one vote in the election of magiſtrates and all public concerns. In the ſame proportion they paid taxes and incurred other public burdens; their taxation and repreſentation being regarded by them as correlatives[y]. They had one common archon or ſtadtholder[z], whoſe office became in later times elective, but which may be conjectured, from the analogy of their hiſtory with that of their European brethren, to have been anciently hereditary[a].

In

[y] αναλογον δε και τας εισφορας εισφερεσι, και τας αλλας λειτεργιας. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 665.

[z] λυκιαρχης. Ibid.

[a] The Lycians were a happy people. Did they owe their happineſs to their repreſentative government? Hiſtory will ſhew us that they owed it to their virtuous manners, which could alone render that government either beneficial or permanent. In confirmation of this, the following ſtatement of facts may be given. Among the Gothic conquerors of the Roman empire, elective princes having gradually raiſed themſelves to the rank of hereditary kings, their jealouſy of the nobility naturally led them to protect, encourage, and inſenſibly to exalt to power, the induſtrious and peaceful inhabitants of towns and cities; of whoſe participation in the legiſlature, the firſt clear evidence that occurs in the hiſtory of France is the reign of Philip le Bel in 1301. In 1484, Charles VIII. ſummoned deputies from the country, from which time the States General, conſiſting of three independent chambers, each of which had a negative on the proceedings of the other two, were appointed in the manner ſeemingly the beſt adapted to unite the whole wiſdom and patriotiſm, as well as to collect the real ſenſe of the nation. The inhabitants of each pariſh ſent deputies to the juriſdictions; and theſe deputies again ſent the perſons deemed beſt qualified to repreſent them in the States General. There were thus two orders of deputies; or deputies of deputies, an inſtitution which Mr. Hume (Idea of a perfect Commonwealth) propoſes as the higheſt improvement in repreſentative government; and which, Dr. Price (ſee Appendix to his Sermon on the French Revolution) greatly extols the *French republic* for being

In examining the other Greek republics, we ſhall find that power exerciſed by delegation formed a leading feature in every one of them. Athens itſelf, which became the moſt democratical of them all, was in its beſt times a government of repreſentation as well as of rotation; and in reading its laws, we ſhall be often tempted to believe that we are peruſing the code of a certain modern repreſentative democracy. In the former commonwealth, which from the time of Theſeus breathed a peculiar ſpirit of freedom, the comitia or ordinary aſſemblies of the people were not ſummoned as at Rome by a conſul, nor by any analogous magiſtrate, as in many neighbouring Greek ſtates. At Athens the political machine moved, as it were, ſpontaneouſly, with the revolution of the ſeaſons. The aſtronomer Meton, who reformed the calendar ten years before the Peloponneſian war, regulated the commencement of the Athenian year by the firſt new moon after the ſummer ſolſtice [b]. The year was divided into twelve months, conſiſting of twenty-nine, and of thirty days, alternately; and each month was divided into three decades [c]. On the days immediately preceding the firſt decade of

being *the firſt ſtate* to carry into execution. Notwithſtanding all this, the States General of France contributed nothing to the benefit of that country. The aſſembly of 1484 was diſgraced by multiplied quarrels among the chambers. The five aſſemblies which followed, exhibited alternate ſcenes of civil diſcord and ſanguinary ſuperſtition. The States were ſummoned for the laſt time in 1614; and this aſſembly, like moſt of the preceding ones, broke up as abruptly as it had deliberated uſeleſsly. Eſſais Hiſtoriques ſur les Commices de Rome, les Etats Generaux de France, & le Parlement d'Angleterre, v. ii. p. 189, & ſeq.

[b] Conf. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 186. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 96. Liban. Argum. in Demoſt. Orat. in Androt.

[c] Julius Pollux, &c. apud Potter. Antiq. v. i. p. 26.

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of the firſt month, called Hecatombaion, in alluſion to the numerous ſacrifices by which it was diſtinguiſhed, the Athenians from the wards in the city, and the diſtricts in the country, amounting collectively to one hundred and ſeventy-four in number [d], aſſembled in the public market-place of the capital, in order to elect the ſenate, the archons, and other annual magiſtrates. For the purpoſe of conducting theſe elections, as well as other public matters, with the greater regularity and expedition, the people voted by diviſions, called tribes; which were four in the time of Solon, but raiſed to ten by Cliſthenes [e], who reſtored the republic after the expulſion of Hippias. From perſons properly qualified [f] in point of age, character, and fortune, each of the ten tribes choſe by lot fifty ſenators, who formed collectively the ſenate of the five hundred for the ſucceeding year. To the ſenate thus conſtituted, another body was aggregated [g], to ſupply the place of thoſe ſenators who might be removed by death, or diſmiſſed for malverſation in office. The whole ſenators, actual and ſupplemental, were divided into ten claſſes, repreſenting the ten tribes; each of which enjoyed preſidency in rotation [h]. The order of this pre-eminence was alſo determined by lot. The fifty preſiding ſenators were entitled the Prytanes; the hall in which they aſſembled and dined, the Prytaneum; and the period of thirty-five days, during which they held their dignity, was called a Prytany [i]. This period was divided into five weeks; and the fifty Prytanes into five companies, each conſiſting of ten perſons, and each preſiding in the ſenate during

[d] Strabo, l. ix. p. 396.
[e] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xiii.
[f] Lyſias adverſ. Philon.
[g] Harpocrat. in Επιλαχοντες.
[h] Suidas in Πρυτανι. Liban. Argument. in Androt.
[i] Pollux. l. viii. c. 15. Demoſth. de Corona.

during its reſpective week [k]. From theſe preſidents of preſidents, a ſingle perſon was choſen by lot to preſide in the ſenate for a ſingle day, during which he was entruſted with the command of the citadel, the key of the treaſury, and the cuſtody of the public ſeal of the commonwealth [l]. The nine other tribes attained the honour of the Prytany, each in the order which had been eſtabliſhed by lot; and their preſiding companies, as well as the preſident himſelf, were appointed preciſely in the manner above deſcribed [m]. With this repreſentative body, Solon lodged the moſt important branches of ſovereignty. The ſenate convened daily [n]: it prepared all matters of deliberation for the popular aſſembly [o]; no meaſure could be lawfully enforced by the people which had not been previouſly approved by the ſenate [p]; and the ſenate, independently of the people, made laws which had force for a year, that is, during the period of its own exiſtence [q]. The preſidents of the ſenate alſo preſided in the popular aſſembly; ſummoned its extraordinary meetings by their authority; put the queſtion to a vote; collected the ſuffrages; and having declared the will of the majority, diſſolved the aſſembly [r]. The ſenate, therefore, enjoyed the principal ſhare in the *legiſlative and executive* powers of government; but the judicature was merely a temporary commiſſion, exerciſed by juries choſen by lot from the people at large [s]. Theſe juries were directed in their proceedings by the nine

[k] Liban. Argument. in Demoſth. Androt. [l] Suidas in Επις.

[m] Suidas & Harpocrat. in Προεδροι & Επιστατα.

[n] Petit. Leg. Attic. 183. [o] Harpocrat. in Προβουλ. Demoſth. in Leptin.

[p] Idem ibid. & Plutarch in Solon. [q] Plut. ibid. & Demoſth. in Ariſtocrat.

[r] Æſchin. de Falſa Legation. & Ariſtophan. Concionatric.

[s] Plutarch in Solon. Demoſth. in Ariſtogeit.

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nine archons [t], who were annually appointed at the ſame time with the ſenate, and from perſons of the ſame deſcription with thoſe qualified to ſit in that council [u]. In the ſtated aſſemblies held at the end of every year, and commonly during the laſt four days of it, the people alſo appointed the military commanders, the ſurveyors of roads and buildings, the commiſſaries and controllers of accounts, and a variety of other officers; each department of office commonly containing ten citizens, that the ten tribes might be reſpectively repreſented, each by one of its own members [x].

Solon could not foreſee the events which deſtroyed this political arrangement. He foreſaw, however, that it was extremely liable to deſtruction. He was fully apprized of the danger of tyranny, by which the republic was firſt aſſailed [y], and of the danger of democracy, by which it was finally ruined [z]. The regulations which he eſtabliſhed were admirably calculated to prevent both thoſe evils. I ſhall not here dwell on the judicious plan of public education which he preſcribed and enforced [a], or on the admired authority of the Areopagus, which he extended or confirmed [b]; inſtitutions reſpectively adapted to maintain the equality of freedom on the one hand, and to uphold a fair and moderate ariſtocracy on the other. This ariſtocracy was ſtill farther ſtrengthened by the laws regulating the mode of proceeding in the popular aſſembly,

[t] Ulpian in Demoſth. adverſus Midiam. Demoſth. in Neær. Pollux. l. viii. c. ix.

[u] Pollux. l. viii. c. vi. Æſchin. in Cteſiph. Pelit. de Leg. Attic. p. 237.

[x] Compar. Æſchin. in Cteſiph. p. 429. and p. 432. Harpocrat. in λογισται. Pollux. l. viii. c. ix.

[y] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii. [z] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xiii.

[a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. & Iſocrat. Areopagit.

bly, which ſubjected to a rigorous perquiſition the lives and characters and qualifications of the orators entitled to addreſs the people [c], and which gave a legal precedency in every debate to thoſe ſpeakers who had paſt their fiftieth year [d]. But theſe wiſe regulations, all breathing the ſame ſpirit, were unable to reſiſt the ſtorms by which a republic enriched by commerce and elated by conqueſt muſt ever neceſſarily be aſſailed. They could not prevent the multitude aſſembled in a large and luxurious city from yielding to the perfidious voice of demagogues, while they encouraged the people at large to become managers of their own affairs [e]; to act on every occaſion as their own miniſters; and thereby to deſtroy that line of diſtinction between the ſovereign and the ſubject, on the unalterable continuance of which the ſtability of good government will ever moſt firmly reſt, under every fluctuation of external circumſtances, of proſperity or adverſity, ſimplicity or refinement.

[c] Æſchin. in Timarch. Suidas & Harpocrateon in ἑητορων γραφη.

[d] Æſchin. ibid. [e] Demoſth. paſſim.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Plato's republic.—Community of wives, children, and goods.—Nature and neceſſity of ſeparate property.—Plato's books of laws examined.—Schemes for equalizing property.—Their futility.—Hippodamus.—His ideal republic.—Arguments in favour of political innovation.—Stronger arguments againſt it.—The Spartan government.—The Cretan.—The Carthaginian.—The Athenian.—Zaleucus.—Charondas.—Philolaus.—Dioiles.—Phaleas.—Pittacus.—Androgamas.

BOOK II.

Chap. I.

The ſubject, and the end or purpoſe of this inquiry.

IN order to diſcover and aſcertain that form of ſociety under which thoſe would prefer to live, who were at liberty to chooſe a mode of civil exiſtence completely agreeable to their wiſh, we muſt not only conſider the moſt admired political inſtitutions that have actually prevailed in the world, but likewiſe examine thoſe imaginary plans of perfect governments, which fancy has deviſed, and which philoſophy has highly approved. Such an examination will enable us to determine the hitherto undefined limits of juſtice and utility, in matters of ſociety and government; and will thus reſcue the preſent work from the reproach of being undertaken for the unworthy purpoſes of oſtentation or cenſure [a].

Every

[a] σοφιζεσθαι βελομενων. I reſolve the firſt word into the two motives by which the ſophiſts were uſually actuated.

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To what objects the partnerſhip of a commonwealth ought to extend.

Every commonwealth being, as we have ſaid, a partnerſhip, it follows, that in every commonwealth men muſt be partners in ſome things or in all [b]. Some things they muſt poſſeſs in common, ſince the community could not otherwiſe ſubſiſt. The advantageous ſituation of the capital and of the territory is neceſſarily a part of the common ſtock; and all men who inhabit the ſame city and country muſt breathe the ſame air, and enjoy the ſame climate. A queſtion therefore ariſes, how far this community ought to extend? Whether the partnerſhip of a commonwealth has its defined limits? Or whether, as Socrates maintains in the republic of Plato, all things ought to be common, wives, children, and poſſeſſions?

This extraordinary innovation, which is ſo different from every thing that has hitherto prevailed in the world, is attended with innumerable difficulties. Were it reduced into practice, we deny that this novelty would anſwer the purpoſe which its author means it ſhould ſerve; we deny likewiſe, that this purpoſe, which Socrates ſays ſhould be the end and aim of every commonwealth, is in itſelf deſirable.

Plato's opinion refuted.

According to this philoſopher, the main object of legiſlation is to promote the union of the citizens, "to unite them as much

[b] Ariſtotle's diviſion is threefold. He ſays, it is neceſſary that the citizens ſhould enjoy all things in common; or nothing in common; or ſome things in common, and other things not. But he immediately adds, that the ſecond branch of the diviſion is impoſſible, ſince, if nothing were common, a republic would not be what he has defined it, a community or partnerſhip. In compliance with the general rules which he lays down concerning diviſion, he introduces a part or member, which the nature and definition of the particular ſubject of inveſtigation obliges him immediately to reject. The inventor of method could ſcarcely be held guilty of pedantry in exemplifying his own rules: his ſcholaſtic imitators indeed are frequently liable to this reproach; but even the pedantry of method is ſeldom a very grievous fault when real inſtruction is the aim.

much as poſſible; and to reduce them, as nearly as may be, from many to one." Yet it is plain, that this project of uniting, when carried beyond certain limits, would totally deſtroy the community, reducing a commonwealth to a family, and a family to an individual [c]. But a commonwealth muſt, from its nature, conſiſt not only of many individuals, but of individuals differently endowed, and differently employed [d]. It is not an alliance in war, operating by the mere ſtrength of numbers; it is not a nation living in ſcattered families, remote, detached; and, in civil concerns, totally unimportant to each other. But it is a ſociety of men united by their mutual exigencies, and their reſpective acquirements; ſo that the very circumſtance itſelf which, in one ſenſe, unites a city, that is, harmoniſes it into one body or ſyſtem, neceſſarily infers a multiplicity of wants, a diverſity of talents, and a diſtinction of property. The reciprocation of good offices, reſulting from all theſe varieties, upholds ſtates;

By the nature of political ſociety.

[c] Vid. Platon. de Republic. l. v. paſſim. Ariſtotle's reaſonings never ſeem to us leſs worthy of himſelf than when he combats the exceptionable doctrines of his maſter; not that he does not ſufficiently refute them, but becauſe he refutes at too great length, extravagancies that neither merit nor require ſuch patience of examination, and ſuch perſeverance of oppoſition. Yet to the contemporaries and immediate ſucceſſors of Ariſtotle, the paſſages which to us appear tireſome and frigid, probably ranked among the moſt intereſting parts of his work. Such was the great fame of Plato, juſtly earned by the ſublimity and truth of many of his doctrines; and even by his paradoxes themſelves, ſo naturally introduced, ſo ingeniouſly ſupported, with ſuch power of arrangement, and ſuch charms of ſtyle, that under his plaſtic art, the moſt ſhapeleſs crudities received form, beauty, and brilliancy. That fanciful writer became a philoſopher by choice, but always remained what he had been originally, a poet by nature; and like men of a ſimilar ſtamp in modern times, often perplexed thoſe ſciences which he ſought to adorn.

[d] This doctrine is beautifully illuſtrated by the greateſt of all ſyſtems in the Treatiſe de Mundo. Ariſtot. p. 608, & ſeq.

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ſtates[e]; and the more numerous are the varieties that within certain limits prevail, the more completely will that purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence be obtained, for which civil ſociety was inſtituted[f].

In

[e] Ariſtotle here refers to his Treatiſes on Ethics, in which he has explained with great accuracy the doctrine of juſtice, both moral and political. See vol. i. from p. 257 to p. 284. Comp. Ethic. Eudem. b. iv. from beginning to end. Magna Moral. b. i. c. 34. In purſuing his firſt compariſon of government to a partnerſhip in trade, he obſerves, that it is eaſy to regulate the ſhares of the profit by thoſe of the capital. But when the greater ſkill or the greater labour of one partner is to be ſet in oppoſition to the greater capital of another, the diſtribution of profits then becomes more difficult; the matter, however, may, for the moſt part, be pretty accurately adjuſted. But in the great partnerſhip of civil ſociety, how many intricate proportions are to be unravelled, before the jarring elements of birth, wealth, talents, induſtry, can be harmonized into any laſting ſyſtem of equitable policy? This, however, muſt be done, not indeed with ſcientific accuracy, but according to thoſe liberal principles of moral geometry, which are the only rules that the practice of civil life either requires or admits. When this great work is effected, and the intereſts of the many are thus reconciled with the fair pretenſions of the few, diſtributive or political juſtice will then have performed its office; and room will be left for the impartial exerciſe of juſtice, commutative or corrective; which is to be regulated not by geometrical analogy, but by the ſimpler kind, called arithmetical (ὁ κατα την αναλογιαν εκεινην αλλα κατα την αριθμητικην.); in which the terms of any numerical ſeries increaſe or decreaſe by a fixed and given difference. This, therefore, according to Ariſtotle, is the only kind of juſtice and the only kind of virtue which admits of preciſe and definite rules; for as in any ſeries of terms in arithmetical proportion, the common difference always remains the ſame, whatever be the terms, ſo in commutative or corrective juſtice, whatever be the quality or the merits of the perſons concerned, the contracts and the injuries defined by law are conſidered as things fixed and invariable, and having fixed and invariable equivalents. See vol. i. p. 265, & ſeq.

[f] δει μεν γαρ ειναι πως μιαν, και την οικιαν και την πολιν, αλλα ὁ παντως. ἐστι γαρ ὡς ουκ ἐστας προιουσα πολις, ἐστι δ' ὡς ἐσται μεν, ἐγγυς δ' ὁσα τὸ μη πολις ειναι, ἐστι χειρων πολις. Literally, "both a family and a commonwealth ought to be in *ſome* reſpects one; but not in all. For a commonwealth, when it attains perfect unity, ceaſes to be a commonwealth, and as it approximates this ultimate limit, it will continually become a worſe commonwealth than it was." The thought is finely illuſtrated by Cicero, "Ut in fidibus ac tibiis, atque cantu ipſo ac vocibus, concentus eſt quidam tenendus ex diſtinctis ſonis, quem immutatam

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Reaſon why the great principle of the diviſion of labour cannot be applied to government.

In proportion as labour is divided, arts are perfected; and the various branches of induſtry are all of them beſt cultivated, when the ſame individual is ſtrictly confined to the ſame branch of art. In matters of civil government, the ſame principle is applicable; but juſtice prohibits, that, in ſuch matters, this principle ſhould always be actually applied. In ſome communities the citizens are ſo nearly equal in merit[8], that it would be highly unjuſt that one portion of the ſtate ſhould be continually debarred from offices of magiſtracy; it would be equally unjuſt that another portion ſhould excluſively appropriate them. Whether government be a good or a bad thing, it is fair that men of equal abilities and virtues ſhould equally ſhare in it; that they ſhould receive the advantage of it as their right, or bear the burden of it as their duty. But as they cannot all of them exerciſe magiſtracy at once, it is neceſſary

immutatam ac diſcrepantem aures eruditæ ferre non poſſunt; iſque concentus ex diſſimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens: ſic ex ſummis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus, ut ſonis, moderata ratione civitas conſenſu diſſimillimorum concinit; & quæ harmonia a muſicis dicitur in cantu, ea eſt in civitate concordia." "Concord in ſtates is like harmony in muſic. The one reſults from the differences and relations of diſtinct and moſt diſſimilar ſounds; the other, from the diſtinction of ranks among the citizens; the high, the low, and the middle order, which is interpoſed between them." We ſhall learn from Ariſtotle, that it is this middle order which binds and cements the political edifice. Men of this claſs underſtand better than any other, how to deal with the multitude. They have many intereſts in common with both of the extremes; their ſuperiors, and their inferiors. Whence Ariſtotle maintains, that thoſe ſtates are the beſt and happieſt, and moſt ſecure, where the middle ranks moſt abound.

[8] This is here the force of the word φυσις. "They have ſo equally attained the perfections of their nature." See vol. i. p. 22. This equality among the citizens implies the ſameneſs of education and purſuits, as our author afterwards explains; and, therefore, infers that the arts of productive induſtry ſhould be exerciſed, and the exigencies of bodily accommodation ſhould be ſupplied, by thoſe who are not citizens.

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neceſſary that they ſhould govern by vicarious ſucceſſion, each ruling and ſubmitting in his turn, and thus aſſuming and laying down ſuch important prerogatives, as render them, in their civil capacities, at different times, altogether different men.

Chap. 2.

Arguments againſt the community of wives and children.

Should we allow the propriety of the end at which Socrates thinks that every legiſlation ought to aim, yet we could not admire the propriety of the means by which he thinks this end is likely to be attained. For this purpoſe, he propoſes the abolition of the diſtinction "mine and thine," and maintains that the citizens of his ſuppoſed commonwealth would be perfectly unanimous, if all of them could apply the word "mine" in ſpeaking of the ſame objects. In this remark there is an evident fallacy. The word "all" may be taken diſtributively, or collectively; if taken diſtributively, it is plain, that on the ſuppoſition of the community of goods, the word "mine" could not be applied by any body; no *one* of the citizens could juſtly ſay this is my wife, my ſon, or my property; and though all collectively might, indeed, ſay ſo, yet their doing this would not be found conducive to concord.

Farther, that which is a common concern is very generally neglected. The energies of man are excited by that which depends on himſelf alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, it is with reluctance that he employs ſuch a degree of attention and activity, as even his own intereſt requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care; and as other men prove equally negligent with himſelf, the common intereſt is univerſally abandoned. Thoſe families, beſides, are commonly the worſt ſerved, in which the domeſtics are the moſt numerous. In a commonwealth where each father had a thouſand

thouſand ſons, and each ſon a thouſand fathers, it is plain that neither fathers nor ſons would be very zealous in performing their relative duties; and the condition of a nephew[h] would be more eligible under an ordinary government, than that of a ſon in Plato's republic.

In the interior parts of Africa, geographers tell us that women are common, but that each man appropriates the children which moſt reſemble himſelf. Among quadrupeds, ſome females have been obſerved to bring forth young wonderfully reſembling their fathers. The famous mare of Pharſalus was ſo remarkable for this property, that ſhe was called "The juſt." It will be impoſſible, therefore, to hinder men from forming conjectures, grounded on reſemblance[i] and other circumſtances, that certain children are their's; and theſe conjectures, though attended with the uneaſineſs of anxious doubt, will not prevent the partialities of parental affection. The uncertainty, alſo, will produce many evils in its turn; it will multiply and embitter crimes; raillery and reproach will be converted into irreverence and impiety; love will often degenerate into inceſt, and murder into parricide; and when ſuch abominations happen, men who are ignorant of the enormity of their crimes, becauſe ignorant that they were committed againſt their kindred, will often neglect performing the ceremonies appointed by religion for expiating their unnatural wickedneſs[k].

Concord,

[h] The Greek word more commonly means a couſin-german. The Romans ſaid, "ne ſis mihi patruus:" uſing the word uncle metaphorically, for a ſevere reprover, and a moroſe guardian.

[i] Nicolaus Damaſcenus apud Stobæum, ſerm. 42. p. 291., mentions a people called Limyrnii, among whom wives were common; and children alſo, until their ſixth year; at which age they were aſſigned, after a public examination, to thoſe of the men whom they moſt reſembled.

[k] See Ethics, l. ix. c. 6.

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Concord, doubtleſs, forms the happineſs of ſtates; but this community of wives and children would totally deſtroy that affection on which concord is founded. As a drop of honey is diſſipated and loſt in a pail of water, ſo the ſweet affection of love would totally periſh through too extenſive a diffuſion; for two circumſtances are requiſite to maintain and invigorate this affection, that the objects of it be in themſelves lovely, and that they be peculiarly recommended to our love. The community of wives and children, were it in any caſe to be adopted, might, therefore, be more advantageouſly eſtabliſhed with regard to the peaſants, whom Plato has appointed to labour and to obey, than with regard to the military claſs, whom he has appointed to legiſlate and to govern. By deſtroying all affection among the peaſants, it would prevent their conſpiring againſt their maſters [1].

Chap. 3.

Arguments againſt the community of goods.

The community of property, depending on different principles, merits a ſeparate conſideration. Among ſome barbarous nations the lands are ſeparately cultivated, but the fruits of them are promiſcuouſly conſumed. Among others, the lands are common, and cultivated by the conjunct labour of the community; but each family appropriates its ſhare of their fruits. Where the peaſants form a diſtinct but dependent claſs, the community of lands will be liberated from ſeveral of its inconveniences. The martial lords of the ſoil, as in that caſe none of them would have any labour to beſtow, could not quarrel

[1] Some ſentences are omitted in this chapter, either as containing repetitions, or as relating to the ſubject of Greek love; a perverſion of ſentiment to which Ariſtotle, of all the philoſophers of his age, ſhews himſelf the moſt decided and moſt zealous adverſary. None of them, indeed, as has been erroneouſly ſuppoſed, patronize ſuch an abominable degeneracy; but Ariſtotle alone, in his moral and political writings, uniformly treats the ſubject with that marked reprobation which became a philoſopher ſuperior to the prejudices and faſhions of his own times.

quarrel with each other about proportioning the fruits of their induſtry to the quantity of their reſpective exertions. But ſhould the proprietors themſelves cultivate with their own hands their common property, innumerable jealouſies would immediately ſpring up, as fatal experience proves almoſt always to happen among thoſe connected in too cloſe a communion of life, the partners in a voyage or a journey, who diſpute for ſtraws with each other; and as a maſter is moſt quarrelſome with thoſe ſervants who are moſt frequently in his way, being employed in attendance on his perſon.

The uſeful and practical community of goods, a community that will neither engender animoſity nor check induſtry, muſt reſult from the ſalutary diſcipline of laws, and the ſkilful application of early and aſſiduous culture. According to the proverb, "all things are common among friends:" we muſt imitate, extend, and, if poſſible, carry to perfection, the plans of thoſe legiſlators who have in any meaſure ſucceeded in producing this deſirable effect. At Sparta, the eſtabliſhment of property does not hinder the free communication of many of the benefits which it confers. The ſlaves of the Lacedæmonians, their horſes, their dogs, their carriages[m], are all at the ſervice of any citizen who has occaſion to employ them; goods are appropriated, but their uſes are freely communicated; and this double advantage is the natural reſult of a wiſe legiſlation.

The uſeful and practical community of goods.

Socrates's community of goods would deſtroy the delightful pleaſure which ariſes from ſaying "this field is mine." This pleaſure,

Contraſted with the fanciful ſpeculations of Plato.

[m] ἐφόδια, viatica, things neceſſary for a journey, which Aretinus tranſlates vehicula, without authority indeed, as to the interpretation of the word, but conſiſtently enough with the ſenſe of the paſſage. Vid. Xenoph. &c. Republ. Laced. & Plutarch. in Lycurg.

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pleaſure, indeed, proceeds from ſelf-love, but a ſelf-love that is natural and juſt; and as different from ſelfiſhneſs, as a virtuous and proper affection is different from a vicious and blamable exceſs. Deprived of ſeparate property, we ſhould be deprived of a pleaſure belonging to it ſtill more delightful; the pleaſure of beſtowing it on our friends, on our companions, and even on deſerving ſtrangers [n]. Deſtroy wedlock, and what room will be left for the virtue of chaſtity? Deſtroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality?

The diſtinction of property infers its unequal diſtribution.

Yet the ſyſtem of Socrates carries with it at firſt ſight a ſpecious ſhew of humanity, becauſe our attention is withdrawn from its emptineſs, and forcibly arreſted by the evils actually exiſting in ſociety; law-ſuits, perjury, clamorous reproach, and mean adulation, all of which are charged on the unequal diſtribution of property, but which are all more juſtly chargeable on human villany. The illuſion is ſupported by a falſe compariſon. We compare the diſputes occaſioned by ſeparate property, which is of great amount, with thoſe occaſioned by common property, which is of little value; not reflecting that the quantities of both ought to be fairly eſtimated, and that the proportion being thus rightly ſtated, we ſhould find the evils reſulting from common property, to be the greater of the two. A falſe principle deceived Socrates; he took for granted that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate; whereas, in reality, this union carried beyond certain limits, would prove the deſtruction of the commonwealth; and the nearer it approximates to its deſtruction, the commonwealth becomes the worſe. Symphony is good, and metre is good; but ſymphony is deſtroyed when it changes into ſameneſs of

The neceſſity of this illuſtrated by muſic.

[n] ξένοι, foreigners connected with us by the ties of hoſpitality

of tone, and metre is deſtroyed when it changes into ſameneſs of time[o].

The impracticability of Plato's community.

Amidſt the innumerable experiments that have been made in matters of government, the ſyſtem of Socrates would undoubtedly have been earlier invented, and ſubmitted with other ſchemes of innovation to a fair trial, had it appeared to be in any degree practicable. If tried by the teſt of experiment, its inſufficiency would manifeſtly ſhew itſelf. The uniting principles in ſtates are,——laws, education, manners, and a congeniality of ſentiments and affections produced by the intercourſe of life, and cemented by mutual good offices[p]. But this intercourſe and theſe offices imply the uſual inſtitutions of wards, diſtricts, and common tables; to which, had Socrates confined himſelf, his plan of legiſlation would have wanted novelty; ſince, even in relieving his firſt claſs from the labour and cares of agriculture, he would only have propoſed what the Lacedæmonians had previouſly enacted[q].

Imperfectly explained by himſelf.

The remaining parts of his plan, Socrates does not clearly explain. We are not informed whether the community of wives and poſſeſſions is to extend to the peaſants. If it does, wherein will they differ from the military? and how can they be kept in obedience, unleſs, like the Cretan ſlaves, they be prohibited the uſe of arms, and forbidden the gymnaſtic exerciſes? Yet, if the peaſants are not comprehended in the new regu-

[o] This juſt compariſon ſhould have occurred to the fancy of a lively nation, when they were exhorted to embrace the wild deſign of forming a commonwealth from one element.

[p] See vol. i. p. 376, & ſeq.

[q] ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι, which the Lacedæmonians are now attempting to do. Ariſtotle ſpeaks as if they had never completely effected their purpoſe. The order of the ſentences is, in this paragraph, ſomewhat altered; and the words ſometimes paraphraſed, the better to expreſs the ſenſe.

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Difficulties reſpecting his peaſants,

regulations, Socrates, who allows them the rank of citizens, will have two republics in the ſame territory, differing in laws and inſtitutions, eternally at variance with each other, and in one of which all thoſe diſorders will prevail which are found in other ſtates. The peaſants, individually or collectively, are however to be maſters of the ſoil, provided they pay to the military a due proportion of its fruits; a degree of independence that would engender inſolence, and render them more formidable to the government than the Peneſts of Theſſaly and the Helots of Sparta [p]. Again, if lands are property, but women common, will the women manage houſes in which they have no ſeparate intereſt, with the ſame attention that the men cultivate their own fields? The example of inferior animals does not prove that men and women ought to exerciſe the ſame employments, becauſe no animal but man is acquainted with the benefits reſulting from the mutual exchange of the fruits of labour [q]; and the œconomy reſulting from appropriate taſks is peculiar to the human race.

and women.

His diſtribution of ranks

Socrates divides his commonwealth into two orders, that of ſoldiers, and that of peaſants; but whether the peaſants are occaſionally to bear arms, or whether they are ever to be entruſted with any ſhare in the government, he does not determine. The wives of the ſoldiers, that is, the women who are common to this claſs, are to be trained to the gymnaſtic exerciſes as well as their huſbands; they are not only to participate in the

[p] The Peneſts (ſo called from their poverty) were the deſcendants of the neighbouring nations conquered and enſlaved by the Theſſalians, and moſt commonly employed in cultivating the lands of their ſevere maſters. In their employments, their numbers, and their continual diſpoſition to revolt, they agreed with the Lacedæmonian Helots. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 157, & paſſim.

[q] See above, p. 38.

the military games of their country, but to ſuſtain the laborious duties and real dangers of the field. Though the military forms a privileged order, yet only a portion of this military is to be inveſted with the powers of deliberation and final reſolution; in other words, a ſmall body of men are to be the ſovereigns of the ſtate; and it ſhould ſeem as if thoſe ſovereigns were to reign for life; for Socrates informs us, that the divinity infuſes into ſome men, even at their birth, a portion of intellectual gold; into others, a portion of intellectual ſilver; but that the third claſs, the peaſants and artificers, are compoſed of braſs and iron. Theſe golden men, therefore, are, according to Socrates, to be perpetual magiſtrates; but, under ſuch an arrangement, can it be expected that a high-minded people, with arms in their hands, ſhould be reſtrained from ſedition?

unfit for attaining the end of political ſociety.

Though exempted from this evil, even the governing part of the city, ſubjected to ſo many privations and bound to ſo many hard duties, would not deſerve the epithet of happy; and if happineſs does not belong to them, can we expect to find it among the peaſants and mechanics? Socrates, indeed, ſays, that it is the buſineſs of a legiſlator to conſult, not the good of any particular claſs of men, but that of the whole ſtate; he forgets that the happineſs of a ſtate is to be meaſured by the common ſtandard of happineſs of the individuals compoſing it; for happineſs is not like an *even* number that may be compoſed of parts which are *odd*.

Chap. 4.

Examination of Plato's books of laws.

In his books of laws which were written afterwards, Plato intended to delineate a more practicable ſcheme of government. Yet even theſe laws he gradually bends to his favourite ſyſtem; and except in the articles of the community of wives and

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poſſeſſions, and of the public tables deſtined for the women, his two republics nearly agree in form, though they differ in magnitude; the firſt containing one thouſand, and the ſecond five thouſand men bearing arms. All the diſcourſes of Socrates, doubtleſs, diſcover great freedom of thought, and much patience of inveſtigation; they are diſtinguiſhed by novelty, ingenuity, and elegance; but that all his obſervations ſhould be juſt, is more than could be expected from man. Five thouſand ſoldiers confined to the buſineſs of war, and cultivating no one kind of productive induſtry, would, with their due proportion of wives, children, and domeſtics, require for their comfortable ſubſiſtence the plains of Babylon, or ſome other country equally extenſive [a]. Suppoſitions, though arbitrary, ought not to be impoſſible.

Socrates

[a] The purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence for which commonwealths are inſtituted, requiring a minute ſubdiviſion of labour, Ariſtotle ſays, that in this particular view, the more populous is the community, its end will be the more completely attained. But the conveniencies and accommodations, furniſhed by the mutual exchange of labour and its fruits, are not the only ingredients of comfortable ſubſiſtence; education, morals, and other elements, conſtituting national felicity, ſet bounds to that populouſneſs which the mere traffic of conveniencies would leave unlimited. It is thus, in general, that the degree in which one political advantage can be attained, is limited by a regard to other advantages which muſt not be neglected; and to compare and reconcile them with each other, to compenſate inequalities and to adjuſt contrarieties, is the great duty of the ſtateſman. All things conſidered, he declares in favour of what would be now deemed a very ſmall commonwealth, conſiſting of 15,000 or 20,000 citizens (which muſt provide for defence, by confederating with other ſtates formed on a ſimilar plan); and he ſays, that the third or fourth part of this community could not ſubſiſt in arms and idleneſs, unleſs the territory was very extenſive. Experience juſtifies this remark. Political writers ſay, that ſcarcely one man in a hundred, and certainly not one in fifty, can in modern times be maintained as a ſoldier without the gradual depopulation of their reſpective communities. Yet how great is the diſproportion between a fourth and a fiftieth? and how ſcantily are modern ſoldiers provided for, in compariſon with the ſoldiers of antiquity?

Socrates does not ſay that his ſoldiers are to ſubſiſt comfortably, but temperately; this is ill expreſſed, for men may ſubſiſt temperately, but wretchedly[r]. He ſays, that laws ought to be relative to the country, and to the men of that country; he ought to have added, "and to the ſurrounding nations." The proviſions for defenſive war, at leaſt[s], ought not to be omitted in any wiſe plan of legiſlation.

His equalization of landed property, imperfect without concomitant regulations.

In his ſecond republic he equalizes eſtates, but leaves population unlimited; ſaying, that deaths and barrenneſs are found by experience to keep the populouſneſs of moſt countries, at different periods, nearly on the ſame level. But under ordinary governments, increaſe of population would only occaſion a greater ſubdiviſion of landed property; whereas in Plato's republic, the ſupernumeraries would be altogether deſtitute of eſtates; becauſe the lands being already reduced to equal, and, as it were, elementary parts, would be incapable of farther partition. In all countries the juſt proportion between wealth and populouſneſs ought to be an object of the moſt ſerious attention. Neglect in this particular produces that poverty which is the mother of villany and ſedition. In the laws of Pheidon of Corinth, one of the moſt ancient writers on the ſubject of politics, a regulation is introduced directly the reverſe of Plato's; Pheidon limits population, but does not equalize poſſeſſions; the relative advantages of either plan we ſhall afterwards examine.

Imperfection of his conſtitutional regulations.

In Plato's ſecond republic, the characters of men fit for office are very imperfectly deſcribed by ſaying, that in the compo-

[r] The author adds, "liberally and luxuriouſly." The adjuncts, "liberally and ſoberly" muſt be united in order to expreſs ζην ευ.

[s] Ariſtotle, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, juſtifies even offenſive war in certain caſes.

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compoſition of a commonwealth, the governors ſhould be as different from the governed, as, in the compoſition of a web, the warp is from the woof. In point of wealth his citizens are divided into four claſſes, of which the firſt is to be four times as rich as the laſt. Having thus permitted the unequal accumulation of perſonals, why does he ſo nicely limit the acquiſition of landed property? To each family he aſſigns two houſes, a preſent as inconvenient as it is expenſive. The general ſcheme of his commonwealth is to be neither democratical nor oligarchical, but a mixture of both forms; ſince all the citizens capable of purchaſing heavy armour are to be entitled to a ſhare in the government; a regulation which excludes only the meaneſt portion of the loweſt claſs. This mixed form of policy is well adapted to common uſe, but if Plato meant it as the beſt poſſible ſyſtem, next to that of his philoſophical commonwealth, he probably rates it too highly; many will prefer to it the government of Sparta, and other ſyſtems of policy more ſtrictly formed on the ariſtocratic model.

Judgment in favour of mixed government.

Some men are of opinion that the beſt government muſt be compounded of monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy. On this account they highly commend the inſtitutions of Sparta, which admit of a king, of a ſenate, and of the democratical power of the Ephori, who are choſen by and from the people. Others regard the power of the Ephori as too arbitrary and tyrannical; and think that whatever is democratical at Sparta, reſults, not from its political conſtitution, but from its cuſtoms and manners; the common and frugal tables; the public and uniform education; the daily commerce of life, and the habitual interchange of good offices among perſons of all ranks.

In

In Plato's ſecond commonwealth there is not any mixture of monarchy, it conſiſts of democracy and oligarchy, but contains moſt of oligarchy; and yet he ſays, inconſiſtently enough, that the beſt government is compoſed of democracy and tyranny[t], which two corruptions can hardly be honoured with the name of governments, or if ſo called, muſt ſurely be held the very worſt of all.

Particularly with regard to elections.

That Plato's ſecond commonwealth inclines moſt to oligarchy, is evident from the laws reſpecting the appointment of the magiſtrates. This appointment is partly by ſuffrage, partly by lot; the former of which is conformable to oligarchy, the latter to democracy. This mixed mode of appointment is, therefore,

[t] Plato does not ſay tyranny, but monarchy. The paſſage alluded to is in the Sixth Book of his Laws, p. 858. edit. Ficin. I had often read it without conſidering it as liable to the objection ſtated in the text, becauſe I never doubted that there was an error of the preſs, *viz.* μοναρχιας inſtead of αριστοκρατικης. In the ſenſe in which the paſſage is taken by Ariſtotle, it is not only inconſiſtent with the context, but with the whole tenor of Plato's political writings; decidedly and uniformly hoſtile to arbitrary power, whether monarchical or democratical. See his Republic, book i. p. 582. edit. Ficin. The difficulty may, however, be removed without correcting the text, if we ſuppoſe that Plato conſiders monarchy as the limit of ariſtocracy, as democracy is of republicaniſm. Abſolute monarchy and perfect democracy are two extremes, and good government lies between them. When a republic expands into democracy, it ceaſes to be a republic; when an ariſtocracy contracts into a monarchy, it ceaſes to be an ariſtocracy. Republics and ariſtocracies, as both Plato and Ariſtotle ſhew, have reſpectively a tendency to this expanſion and contraction, which may be conſidered as their ultimate limits; or two contrary extremes, by the due blending of which juſt government is produced. In conformity with this, ſee what is ſaid of the twofold juſtice and twofold equality; the one conſiſting in fameneſs of meaſure, weight, and number, which is eaſily recognized; the other hardly diſcernible by man, though approved by the judgment of God himſelf; and, as far as it prevails in this lower world, the ſource of happineſs to individuals and communities. The reaſon is given, τῳ μεν γαρ μειζονι πλεω, τῳ δ' ελαττονι σμικροτερα νεμει, μετρια δοθεντα προς την αυτων φυσιν εκατερῳ; "for it attributes to the greater more, and to the leſſer leſs, aſſigning to each what is commenſurate to its reſpective nature." De Legib. l. vi. p. 859.

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therefore, conformable to a mixture of thoſe two forms. But that the rich ſhould be compelled, under a forfeit, to attend the aſſemblies for electing magiſtrates, and for other public duties, while the attendance of the poor is optional, is a regulation highly favourable to oligarchy. The lower claſſes will frequently neglect attendance, and the public affairs will thus devolve excluſively on the more wealthy portion of the community. In conſtituting the ſenate, candidates are to be named from the four claſſes of the citizens at large. But the two lower claſſes are not bound to attend at the naming of candidates from men of their own order. From candidates thus named the ſenate is, by a new election, to be conſtituted; but this ſucceſſion of elections, in which the magiſtrates are choſen from candidates previouſly named, is always a dangerous expedient, ſince it expoſes the government to be uſurped by a combination of artful men, who need not be very numerous. Such is Plato's ſecond republic, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, as will evidently appear when we have examined more accurately the polity compounded of thoſe two forms [t].

Chap. 5.

Concerning other ſchemes of ideal commonwealths.

Other ſchemes of ideal commonwealths have been delineated by philoſophers and politicians, and alſo by men entitled to neither appellation; all of which ſchemes approach much nearer to ſuch governments as have actually prevailed in the world, than do the two republics of Plato. In none of the political models propoſed by other writers do we read any thing concerning the community of wives, the community of goods, or common tables deſtined for the women. They begin their codes of legiſlation by inſtitutions more neceſſary and more practicable.

To

[t] The text is confuſed and corrupt. I have given to it the order and the ſenſe ſeemingly moſt conſiſtent with other parts of the work.

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To ſome writers nothing appears of ſo much conſequence as the ſkilful regulation of property; becauſe it is this much-coveted object that gives birth to moſt diſputes and moſt ſeditions. Phaleas of Chalcedon [u] was the firſt who propoſed, as a moſt ſalutary inſtitution, the equalizing of wealth among the citizens; a thing, he thinks, eaſily eſtabliſhed in new ſettlements; and which, he ſays, might eaſily be introduced into old countries by one ſimple law, commanding the rich always to give marriage portions with their daughters, but never to receive any; and the poor always to receive, but never to give them. Plato in his laws, on the contrary, allows the inequality of fortunes within certain limits; permitting, as we before obſerved, the citizens of the firſt claſs to be four times as rich as thoſe of the laſt. Whoever would regulate the extent of fortunes, muſt alſo regulate the increaſe of families. If children multiply beyond the means of ſupporting them, the intention of the law will be fruſtrated, and families will be ſuddenly reduced from opulence to beggary; a revolution always dangerous to public tranquillity.

Phaleas's plan for equalizing property.

Its inconveniences.

That a certain degree of equalization of property tends to ſtrengthen the bands of ſociety, eſcaped not the ſagacity of ancient legiſlators. In legiſlating for Athens, Solon acknowledged the

Other ſchemes of a ſimilar nature.

[u] Neither of this Phaleas, nor of Pheidon mentioned above, have we any notices but thoſe left by Ariſtotle. Chriſtopher Hendreich (De Repub. Carthagin. p. 166, & p. 239) makes Phaleas a Carthaginian: he was the lawgiver of Chalcedon, a city on the Thracian Boſporus, oppoſite to Byzantium, or Conſtantinople, and built ſeventeen years before it. Chalcedon was called in deriſion "the city of the blind," becauſe its founders, overlooking the noble ſituation on which Conſtantinople now ſtands, had choſen one greatly inferior to it. Plin. v. 32. Tacitus, xii. 62. A legiſlator, ſix centuries before Chriſt, equalizing fortunes on the eaſtern coaſt of the Boſporus—how ſtrange a contraſt with the laws now prevalent there!

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the influence of this principle [x]. The early inſtitutions of ſeveral republics both limit the acquiſition, and prohibit, under certain circumſtances, the ſale, of lands. In Locris a citizen cannot diſpoſe of his eſtate, unleſs he can make it appear that he is reduced to this neceſſity by ſome unmerited and manifeſt calamity. The alienation of ancient inheritances in Leucas prepared the way for a revolution in the government; and offices of magiſtracy no longer requiring a fixed qualification in point of fortune, the mixed form of policy gradually degenerated into nearly a ſimple democracy. But equality itſelf is not a thing univerſally deſirable; for ſhares may be all equal, and yet all too great if they foſter ſloth and luxury; they may be all equal, and yet all too ſmall if they engender wretchedneſs. Mediocrity, therefore, ought to be the aim of legiſlation; but this object will be better attained by moderating paſſion than by levelling property.

Their futility.

Phaleas, indeed, propoſes not only to equalize poſſeſſions, but to render education uniform. He does not explain, however, wherein this uniform education is to conſiſt. The citizens may be all educated alike, and all of them ill educated, if care be not taken early to ſubdue in them the miſerable paſſions of avarice and ambition.

The real cauſes of civil diſorders.

Diſcontents ariſe not merely from the inequality of poſſeſſions, but from the equality of honours. The multitude complain

[x] Solon allowed a brother to marry his ſiſter on the father's ſide, but not his ſiſter uterine; becauſe by marrying the latter he might have increaſed the eſtate which deſcended to him from his father, by that which came from the firſt huſband of his mother; and thus in his own perſon have accummulated two inheritances. Comp. Plutarch. in Themiſt. p. 128. Petit. Leg. Attic. p. 480. and Monteſquieu Eſprit de Loix, l. v. c. 5. Several other of Solon's laws breathe the ſame ſpirit. Conf. Plutarch in Solon, p. 89. Demoſth. in Macart. p. 1036. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 441—444.

complain that property is unjuſtly, becauſe unequally, diſtributed; men of ſuperior merit or ſuperior pretenſions complain that honours are unjuſtly, if equally, diſtributed; and that

"The good and worthleſs find their meed the ſame[y]."

The bare neceſſaries of life, food and fuel, cloaths to cover our nakedneſs, and a home to ſhelter us from the ſtorm, comforts which it is pretended the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injuſtice. The greateſt crimes are committed for none of thoſe things, but for obtaining or ſecuring the objects of ill-regulated deſires, and ſenſeleſs, becauſe inſatiable paſſions; and ſometimes for acquiring objects of taſte and elegance, from which we expect to derive pleaſure unmixed with pain, pure, unfading, and independent enjoyment. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themſelves with blood; and ſtates decree the moſt illuſtrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an uſurper[z]. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is uſeful, therefore, againſt the leaſt and moſt inconſiderable only of the three evils which diſturb ſociety; evils, for each of which there is an appropriate remedy; ſubſiſtence inſured by induſtry, for the firſt; an education inſpiring the habit of moderation and ſelf-command, for the ſecond; and for the third, the attractive, rational, and uncloying charms of philoſophy; in the ſtudy and practice of which men will find a delight, and the only

Their remedies.

[y] Iliad ix. Achilles ſpeaks to Ulyſſes.

[z] The word τυραννος properly denotes him who has acquired the ſovereignty of a ſtate formerly free. With whatever moderation he might exerciſe his power, he was called τυραννος from the manner by which he obtained it. But Ariſtotle here means the tyrannical abuſer of uſurped power.

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only delight not liable to contingencies, round and complete in itſelf, and as ſtable as it is independent.

The proper limits of national wealth.

In delineating the ſcheme of his republic, Phaleas has confined his attention to matters of domeſtic policy. He has not inquired, though the inquiry was neceſſary, how the national force is to be raiſed or ſupported. Money, or its equivalents, are eſſential in war as well as in peace. Phaleas has not endeavoured to aſcertain the extent of the national wealth. Yet there are certain limits within which it ought to be confined; its immoderate magnitude might tempt the rapacity or provoke the invaſion of greater powers; but it ought to be ſufficiently conſiderable to enable us to meet our equals with confidence; and even to teach our ſuperiors that they may probably loſe more by conteſt than they are likely to gain by victory. When Autaphradates prepared to beſiege Atarneus[a], Eubulus, the maſter of that city, deſired him to calculate how much time would be waſted in the ſiege, and how much money would in that time be expended; obſerving that for a leſs ſum he would probably be willing to ſell the place. Autaphradates calculated, reflected, and deſiſted from the ſiege.

Inefficacy and imperfection of laws equalizing wealth.

The equalization of fortunes may have ſome ſlight tendency to ſtifle animoſity and to prevent diſſenſion. But its effect is always inconſiderable, and often doubtful; ſince thoſe who think themſelves entitled to ſuperiority will not patiently brook equality. To ſtand on a level with the multitude is not their proper

[a] See above, p. 7, & p. 11. and Pauſanias, b. iv. c. 35. This place had fallen to decay in Pliny's time, though ſtill renowned for precious ſtones as clear as cryſtal. "Cepionides in Æolidis Atarne quondam oppido, nunc pago naſcuntur." Plin. N. H. v. 30. Conf. xxxvii. 10.

proper place; and to acquire their due elevation, they will conſpire together and ſubvert the commonwealth. The wickedneſs of man is boundleſs: it ſeems at firſt as if a trifle would content him, but his paſſions invigorate by gratification; always indulged, always craving, and continually preying on him who feeds them. This evil cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables, of which laſt Phaleas has omitted to ſpeak. It can be cured only by that ſalutary diſcipline which will make one part of the community delight in doing juſtice, and by that ſound policy which will prevent the remaining part from committing with impunity any ſerious wrong; for the majority of mankind will always be the ſport of their own headſtrong paſſions; and though they ought to be treated with equity and humanity, muſt be habitually overawed by authority, and ſeaſonably reſtrained by power. Phaleas's republic will be but a ſmall one if mechanics and artificers be debarred from all ſhare in the government. The inſtitutions of Epidamnus[b] reſpecting the lower ranks, and thoſe eſtabliſhed on the ſame ſubject by Diophantus at Athens, are worthy of imitation. Such are the merits and the defects of the republic of Phaleas.

Chap. 6.

The ideal republic of Hippodamus an architect of Miletus.

Hippodamus, the ſon of Euryphon, a Mileſian, and by profeſſion an architect, gained celebrity in his own art by conſtructing the Piræus at Athens, and by improving the method of diſtributing ſtreets, and planning cities. His love of diſtinction expoſed him to the reproach of vanity; and many aſcribed to affectation

[b] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 375. and vol. ii. p. 185. The lower claſſes in Epidamnus as well as in Athens, though not public ſlaves as in Laconia and Theſſaly, were much employed in what Ariſtotle conſiders as ſervile taſks, becauſe performed by the exertions of mere bodily labour; particularly in building, mining, and other public works.

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affectation his magnificent dreſs, his flowing locks, and the warm mantle which he wore, even during the heat of ſummer. Hippodamus was ambitious of reaching eminence in all kinds of knowledge, and is the firſt author who, without any practice in affairs, wrote a treatiſe concerning the beſt form of government. His republic conſiſted of ten thouſand men, divided into the three claſſes of artificers, huſbandmen, and ſoldiers. The territory he likewiſe divides into three portions; the ſacred, deſtined for the various exigencies of the public worſhip; the common, to be cultivated for the common benefit of the ſoldiers; and the private, to be ſeparately appropriated by the huſbandmen. His laws alſo were divided into three kinds, becauſe he thought there were only three ſorts of injuries; inſults, damages, and death. He inſtituted a court of appeal, compoſed of ſelect ſenators. Sentence, he thought, ought not to be paſſed by votes or ballot; but that each judge ſhould be furniſhed with a tablet, on which he ſhould write guilty, if he ſimply condemned; and which he ſhould leave unwritten, if he ſimply acquitted; but on which, if he found the defendant in ſome meaſure guilty, but not to the full extent of the indictment, he ſhould mark this difference, ſtating how much the culprit ſhould pay, or what puniſhment he ſhould ſuffer. As the law formerly ſtood, Hippodamus obſerved, that in all caſes requiring this diſtinction, the judge, who was bound by oath to obſerve juſtice in his deciſions, muſt commit perjury whenever he either ſimply and poſitively condemned, or ſimply and poſitively acquitted. Hippodamus alſo eſtabliſhed a law in favour of thoſe whoſe inventions tended to improve the conſtitution of the commonwealth; they were to be diſtinguiſhed by peculiar honours; and

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and the children of thoſe who fell in battle were to be maintained and educated at the public expence. This laſt regulation, firſt introduced by the architect of Miletus, has been adopted by Athens and other cities. According to his plan of policy, the magiſtrates were all of them to be elected by the free and impartial ſuffrages of their fellow-citizens, conſiſting of the three claſſes of men abovementioned: the concerns of the ſtate, the affairs of ſtrangers, the care and management of orphans, formed the three important objects entruſted to their adminiſtration.

Examination of his republic.

Such are the leading features of the republic of Hippodamus. In examining this republic, the firſt difficulty that occurs reſpects his diviſion of the citizens. The huſbandmen, the artificers, and the ſoldiers, are all of them to be members of the ſtate; but the huſbandmen deſtitute of arms, the artificers deſtitute of both lands and arms, will maintain a very unequal conflict with the ſoldiers, if theſe laſt ſhould be tempted to enſlave them. An aſſociation of men, ſo unequally treated by the legiſlator, muſt continually tend to diſſolution. The great executive magiſtracies, together with every office of military command, devolve of courſe on the ſoldiers. Can the two remaining claſſes be expected to wiſh the continuance of a government, from whoſe honours and emoluments they are for ever to be excluded? A revolution, therefore, muſt ſpeedily take place, unleſs the military be more powerful than both the huſbandmen and the artificers united; and if they actually be ſo, of what ſignification is it, that theſe degraded claſſes are ſummoned to give their votes at elections, and mocked with the appellation of citizens? Artificers, ſubſiſting by the fruits of their own labour, are eſſential to the exiſtence of every city or community. But the claſs of huſbandmen, as regulated by

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Hippodamus, by what tie of utility are they linked to the ſtate? The common lands might be cultivated by the military themſelves, which would deſtroy the diſtinction between the ſoldiers and the peaſants. They might be cultivated by men deſtitute of private eſtates; and this would form a fourth claſs, diſtinct from the huſbandmen of Hippodamus; who, by a moſt awkward regulation, are to labour one diſtrict, conſiſting of their private eſtates, for their own maintenance; and another, conſiſting of the common lands, for the maintenance of the military; a moſt uſeleſs diſtinction of property, and moſt abſurd partition of employment, by which much valuable time would be loſt, and much unneceſſary expence incurred.

Of his judicial regulations.

The judicial regulations of Hippodamus are not leſs blameable, ſince their direct tendency is to convert judges into arbiters, and thereby to arm them with an arbitrary power of deciſion, which can never be expedient to the parties, unleſs it be ſpecially granted, and voluntarily entruſted. In matters ſubmitted to arbitration, communication of ſentiment and diſcuſſion of opinion is not only allowed but required. In courts of juſtice, moſt legiſlators have ſtrictly prohibited both; commanding each judge ſimply to condemn or ſimply to acquit, as his own reaſon directs. By the innovations of Hippodamus, legal proceedings would be involved in inextricable confuſion. The defendant might be ordered by one judge to pay twenty minæ; by another, more; and by a third, leſs; each might differ from every other; and all from the plaintiff. The ſentence would be thus ſplit into ſuch a multitude of parts as it would be difficult to collect, and impoſſible to unite; and all theſe difficulties would be created and encountered, in order to obviate an imaginary inconvenience; for it is falſe that the judge

judge is perjured, who ſimply acquits a party ſued for twenty minæ, although he may believe that he really owes half that ſum. The judge would, on the contrary, be perjured, if he did not acquit him; and in all ſimilar caſes, the fault lies not in the law or in the judge, but in the libel and in the plaintiff, whoſe caſe is not juſtly ſtated, and whoſe action is not fairly brought.

His law in favour of political improvements.

The law in favour of thoſe whoſe inventions tend to improve the conſtitution of the commonwealth, is more ſpecious than ſolid. Bearing beauty on its ſurface [c], it is fraught with perſecution, innovation, and ſedition. It is the opinion of many, that ancient laws, which are good, are preferable to new ones, though better; and that a moderately wiſe conſtitution of government ought never to be altered. Upon this delicate ſubject, the following obſervations may deſerve attention. The advocates for alteration and improvement obſerve, that the gymnaſtic exerciſes and medicine, as well as all other arts and faculties, have been carried to their actual ſtate of perfection by repeated trials and reiterated efforts. If legiſlation be a ſcience or an art, muſt it not partake of the ſame nature, and follow the ſame progreſs with all other arts and ſciences, which being founded on obſervation, have been reared, extended, and perfected by experiment and reflection? That it does partake of the ſame progreſs, civil hiſtory affords the moſt convincing proofs. What can be more rude, what more barbarous, than the

Arguments in favour of political innovation.

[c] Ariſtotle's expreſſion is remarkable; ευφθαλμον ακουσαι: the firſt word, denoting what is pleaſing to the eye, had come to denote what is agreeable in general; and thence joined with ακουσαι, "what is pleaſing to hear."

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the ancient laws of the Greeks, when they frequented the public places with ſwords by their ſides; and bought and ſold their women like cattle in a market? In thoſe ſtates which have adhered too ſcrupulouſly to their hereditary uſages, what groſſneſs, iniquity, and cruelty every where prevail? At Cumæ, a man may be convicted and puniſhed as a murderer, on the evidence of the kindred of him who proſecutes for the murder. It is not for what is ancient, but for what is uſeful, that men of ſenſe ought to contend; and whatever is diſtinguiſhed by the former quality, cannot be expected to poſſeſs much of the latter. The ancient inhabitants of the world, whether produced by the genial power of the earth [d], or ſaved from the ruins of ſome dreadful cataſtrophe, muſt have been degraded by weakneſs of underſtanding, and diſgraced by unruly ſtrength of paſſion. The inſtitutions aſcribed to the earth-born giants are not, ſurely, worthy of being followed with reſpectful deference. But innovations, were it deſirable to prevent them, are not, however, to be prevented: they are neceſſary and inevitable. Written laws, with whatever comprehenſiveneſs and preciſion they may be penned, cannot expreſs all that variety of caſes to which, and which only, they may with juſtice be applied. Rights are to be maintained, wrongs to be prevented, and therefore laws are made. Theſe laws are general; exceptions to them occur; new exceptions multiply; and the number and importance of the exceptions at length produce new laws far more equitable than thoſe which had previouſly been eſtabliſhed.

Formidable

[d] Ariſtotle is here ſpeaking as an advocate; and in ſtating the arguments in favour of innovation, does not, therefore, think it neceſſary to adhere to the eſtabliſhed tenets of his philoſophy. See Analyſis, p. 117.

Stronger arguments againſt it.

Formidable as theſe arguments ſeem, they may be oppoſed by others of not leſs weight: arguments which prove that even the ruſt of government is to be reſpected, and that its fabric is never to be touched but with a fearful and trembling hand. When the evil of perſevering in hereditary inſtitutions is ſmall, it ought always to be endured, becauſe the evil of departing from them is certainly very great. Slight imperfections, therefore, whether in the laws themſelves, or in thoſe who adminiſter and execute the laws, ought always to be overlooked, becauſe they cannot be corrected without occaſioning a much greater miſchief, and tending to weaken that reverence which the ſafety of all governments requires that the citizens at large ſhould entertain, cultivate, and cheriſh for the hereditary inſtitutions of their country. The compariſon drawn from the improvement of arts, does not apply to the amendment of laws. To change or improve an art, and to alter or amend a law, are things as diſſimilar in their operation as different in their tendency: for laws operate as practical principles of moral action[e]; and, like all the rules of morality, derive their force

[e] The Stagirite's argument againſt innovation does not apply to that kind of it propoſed by Lord Bacon, namely the imitating that great innovator Time, whoſe operations are ſo ſlow and ſkilful, that they elude the ſenſes and eſcape obſervation, "Novator maximus, tempus; quid ni igitur tempus imitemur?" and again, "Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes ita inſinuat, ut ſenſus fallant?" That great man concludes with Ariſtotle, "It is improper to try new experiments in the political body, unleſs the neceſſity be urgent, or the utility evident. Great care muſt be taken that the deſire of reformation may occaſion the change, and not the deſire of the change plead for the reformation. Again, let all novelty, though it cannot, perhaps, be rejected, yet be held ſuſpected. And laſtly, as the Scripture directs, let us ſtand upon the old paths, and ſee and aſk for the good way and walk therein." Political Eſſays, Eſſay xi. It is worthy of remark, that Bacon lived in the age of reformation in religion, and was himſelf a great reformer in philoſophy. He combated

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force and efficacy, as even the name imports, from the cuſtomary repetition of habitual acts, and the ſlow operation of time. Every alteration of the laws therefore tends to ſubvert that authority on which the perſuaſive energy of all laws is founded; to abridge, weaken, and deſtroy the power of law itſelf[f]. Though innovation in general ſhould not be univerſally

bated ſucceſsfully the pretended philoſophy of Ariſtotle, which was certainly far worſe than no philoſophy at all; but his diſlike to the diſtorted ſhadow made him think, at leaſt ſpeak, too diſreſpectfully of the ſubſtance. Whoever has read only the works of Bacon, is not a competent judge; but whoever has read the works both of Bacon and of Ariſtotle, will be ready to acknowledge that the former is wanting in gratitude to an author whom he is continually arraigning, and continually copying. Yet Lord Bacon is not altogether without excuſe: in his time the pretended authority of Ariſtotle enthralled the human mind. In the preſent age, that illuſtrious modern might, conſiſtently with his *principles*, greatly vary his *conduct*; and exaggerate the merit of the Stagirite, in the ſame ſpirit, and with the ſame views, which made him formerly depreciate his fame.

[f] Notwithſtanding this deciſion of Ariſtotle's, a learned modern writer obſerves; "As to the perpetuating their inſtitutions and rendering them immutable, this entered not into the intention of the old Grecian legiſlation. A ſyſtem of immutable and irrevocable laws might indeed be the barbarous project of eaſtern policy; but the Grecian legiſlators were too well experienced in the nature of mankind, the genius of ſociety, and the ceaſeleſs viciſſitude of human things, ever to dream of ſo ridiculous a deſign." Warburton's Divine Legation of Moſes, b. ii. ſect. 3. This is expreſſed too ſtrongly and too abſolutely. Not to mention the example of Lycurgus, (ſee Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. 3,) which Warburton indeed admits as an exception, but ſays that Lycurgus was ſingle in the ridiculous attempt of making his laws perpetual; a whole volume might be written to prove Ariſtotle's deciſion conformable to the general voice of poets, orators, hiſtorians, and legiſlators. Δει δε και τους νομους της πατριδος καθαπερ τινας δευτερους θεους συντηρειν. "That we ought to maintain the laws of our country, and reſpect them as certain ſecondary divinities." Stobæus, ſerm. xxxviii. p. 229. Such is the general corollary reſulting from the political writings of Grecian antiquity; a corollary adopted by Cicero[a], their beſt interpreter, De Legibus; and ſuch is the doctrine maintained by Demoſthenes himſelf, when ſpeaking to the Athenians, whoſe decrees, governed by wild demagogues, were as variable as the Euripus. See his Oration

[a] Debet enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas, ut æterna ſit. Fragm. de Legibus, l. iii.

ſally reprobated, yet various queſtions would ariſe, on what occaſions it is warrantable. The difference of manners, governments, and of men, by whom alterations are propoſed, and by whom they are to be conducted, will produce very complicated and almoſt innumerable queſtions; the ſolution of which we ſhall defer to a more ſeaſonable opportunity.

In

tion againſt Timocrates, particularly the laſt pages. In the ſame Oration (p. 480, ex edit. Wolf) there is a paſſage worthy of remark. "I am inclined, citizen judges, to explain to you how the Locrians make laws. You will not ſuffer any detriment by hearing this example; an example of the mode of legiſlation in a well-regulated ſtate. The Locrians are ſo firmly perſuaded that it is their duty to uphold their ancient laws, and to defend them againſt the intereſt or caprice of innovators, that whoever propoſes a new law, does it with a halter about his neck. Should the law be approved, the propoſer departs unhurt; but ſhould his law be rejected, he is ſtrangled in his own halter. This ſalutary inſtitution proves an effectual check to innovation; and the Locrians ſtrictly obſerve their ancient laws; inſomuch, that in a great length of time only one ſingle law has been altered. The old law ordained, that whoever ſtruck out the eye of another, ſhould loſe one of his own eyes; a puniſhment which did not admit of any pecuniary commutation, but was to be rigorouſly inflicted. A man with only one eye, being threatened by his adverſary with the loſs of the ſingle eye he had, and thinking life inſupportable under the calamity of blindneſs, ventured to propoſe this alteration of the law; 'That he who ſtruck out the eye of a perſon who had but one, ſhould be deprived of both his own eyes, ſo that the puniſhment might be equal to the crime.' The amendment was approved; and this is ſaid to have been the only alteration in the Locrian law, in the ſpace of more than two hundred years. But your demagogues, citizen judges, make new laws, ſolely for their own convenience, almoſt every month: if you do not puniſh them, the people at large will ſoon be enſlaved by theſe wild beaſts." ουκ αν φθαιοι το πληθος τουτοις τοις θηριοις δουλευον. As the law mentioned by Demoſthenes is aſcribed to Zaleucus (Ζαλευκου ος εισηνεγκατο τον καινον εισαισοντα νομον ξροχον περικειμενον, &c. Stobæus, p. 229. ſerm. xxxviii.) the Locrians here ſpoken of muſt be the Locri Epizephyrij; ſo called from their territory near the promontory Zephyrium, at the ſouthern extremity of Italy. Pindar calls them Zephyrian Locrians, in his ſhort and pithy panegyric:

Νεμει γαρ ατρεκεια πολιν Λοκρων
Ζεφυριων, μελει δε τοισι, Καλλιοπα
Και χαλκεος Αρης.

"Juſtice

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Chap. 7.

Obſervations preparatory to an examination of the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian re-

In examining the Spartan, the Cretan, or indeed any ſyſtem of laws, two queſtions ought chiefly to fix our attention. The firſt queſtion is, Whether theſe laws be calculated to promote the beſt intereſts of mankind? The ſecond, Whether they be calculated to promote thoſe intereſts which, under particular circumſtances, the legiſlator takes to be the beſt: in other words, whether the inſtitutions which we examine be conſiſtent with the moſt deſirable and moſt perfect model of civil polity; or whether they be conſiſtent with what the lawgiver, all things conſidered, deems the government moſt ſuitable to thoſe for whom he legiſlates? In every well-regulated commonwealth, it is agreed that all thoſe citizens who have any ſhare in the public adminiſtration, ſhould enjoy leiſure for attending to this important concern. But how ſuch leiſure may beſt be obtained, is not eaſy to determine. The Peneſts have often with arms aſſailed the Theſſalians; and the Helots, the Spartans; and thoſe degraded orders of peaſants live as it were in continual ambuſh, watching the moment to retaliate thoſe injuries which they have indignantly ſuffered from men whoſe leiſure reſults only from their own toil. The Cretan peaſants have never diſcovered the ſame ſpirit of ſedition; becauſe the cities of Crete being all of them ſupported by the labour of ſervile ruſtics, it could not be the intereſt of any one ſtate to teach the ſlaves

Difficulties in regulating the peaſants.

Why they are leſs ſeditious in Crete than in Theſſaly, &c.

" Juſtice governs the republic of the Zephyrian Locrians; who cultivate, with equal ſucceſs, arts and arms." The law concerning the halter, which Stobæus refers to Zeleucus, is numbered by Diodorus Siculus among the laws of Charondas. But the ſame writer tells us, that Charondas borrowed moſt of his laws from former codes. Diodor. xii. 79. p. 485. It is probable therefore that the principle of reſiſting innovation once prevailed at Thurij, as well as in the republic of the Locri Epizephyrij; though hiſtory indicates that it was far leſs rigidly adhered to in the former republic, which was diſturbed by frequent revolutions. Ephor. apud Strabon. p. 260.

ſlaves of its neighbours to rebel, ſince every neighbour, who happened to be hoſtile, would conſtantly enjoy an opportunity of retorting the injury. But the Argives, Arcadians, and Meſſenians, ſubſiſting chiefly by their own labour, and waging eternal wars with Sparta, always endeavoured to divide and divert the enemy's force, by ſtirring the Helots to rebellion; and the Peneſts firſt revolted from the Theſſalians, during the wars of the latter with the Acheans, Perræbians, and Magneſians. In the treatment of ſlaves and peaſants, it is difficult to hit the middle point between the extremes of indulgence and harſhneſs; indulgence that is productive of inſolence, and harſhneſs that is repaid with hatred. But either extreme is highly inconſiſtent with the proper management of thoſe lower claſſes, who form as it were the arms of the community.

Lycurgus's faulty indulgence to women.

Nothing proves more ruinous to a ſtate than the defective education of the women; ſince wherever the inſtitutions reſpecting one half of the community are faulty, the corruptions of that half will gradually taint the whole. The undiſciplined manners of the Spartan women are inconſiſtent with every wiſe plan of legiſlation, and totally adverſe to the principal aim of Lycurgus; who, exacting the moſt rigid temperance in his men, with a view to harden them to fortitude, has granted every indulgence to his women, and thereby corrupted them with licentiouſneſs. In a nation of ſoldiers, the errors in female education, and the vicious paſſions reſulting from that fatal ſource, are doubly prejudicial; for the poet had ſurveyed life and manners with diſcernment who firſt coupled Mars and Venus; all martial nations being immoderately amorous, and therefore particularly obnoxious to the undue influence, or rather the dominion, of women; with

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the exception however of the Celts[g], and if there be any other people who openly prefer unnatural love. It is of little conſequence whether women rule the ſtate, or men, governed by women, rule it in ſubſervience to female paſſions. During the invaſion of the Thebans, the Spartan women[h], inſtead of rendering thoſe ſervices which women on ſimilar occaſions have often performed, cauſed more evil than even the arms of the enemy; and avarice muſt always domineer wherever women bear ſway.

Whence it aroſe.

The incongruous regulations reſpecting the two ſexes in Sparta proceeded from a natural cauſe. The ſevere duties of the field had prepared the men for ſubmiſſion to civil diſcipline; but the women, untamed and turbulent, ſpurned the yoke of legiſlation. The fault, therefore, is chargeable on themſelves, rather than on Lycurgus. But we are not now inquiring who is to blame, but what is blamable?

Faulty regulations reſpecting property.

The unequal diſtribution of property forms another material defect in the Spartan government. Lycurgus prohibited the acquiſition of lands by purchaſe, but ſet no bounds to their tranſmiſſion and accumulation by gifts and teſtaments. Landed property therefore has been engroſſed by a few; and if the whole territory were divided into five equal portions, not leſs than two of theſe portions would be found veſted in women; ſuch is the improvidence of the laws reſpecting ſucceſſion, the enormity of dowers, and the extravagance of marriage ſettlements!

Their ill effects.

The natural effect of ſuch faulty regulations is to diminiſh the populouſneſs of the country, which ſcarcely contains the twentieth part of the inhabitants which it is capable of ſupplying

[g] Vid. Athenæum, l. xiii. c. 27.

[h] See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. iii. p. 394.

plying with ſubſiſtence, or the twentieth part of the thirty thouſand heavy-armed men, and fifteen hundred cavalry, which it was thought able to ſend into the field. One great evil reſulting from this diminution of people was fatally experienced when the ſingle defeat at Leuctra reduced this ancient kingdom to the brink of ruin. It is reported that the kings preceding Lycurgus ſupplied the waſte of the natives in war, by alluring foreigners into the country; and that the Spartans alone amounted to ten thouſand men bearing arms. Without examining this report we may affirm, that the ſtrength derived from numbers will be better and more ſafely promoted by levelling the exceſſive inequalities of property. Lycurgus, however, certainly wiſhed to increaſe the ſtrength of the ſtate, when he enacted, that the man who had *three* ſons ſhould be exempted from the night watch, and that he who had four ſhould enjoy a complete immunity from all public burdens. But this regulation evidently claſhes with the preceding, ſince, under a faulty diſtribution of property, an increaſe of populouſneſs is only an augmentation of miſery.

Advantages and inconveniencies attending the Ephori.

The popular part of the conſtitution of Sparta, reſiding in the Ephori, is liable to many objections; though inveſted with the moſt awful powers, the Ephori or inſpectors muſt all of them be choſen indiſcriminately from the multitude, and often from thoſe of the loweſt and pooreſt claſs. The deciſions of ſuch men ought not to be arbitrary or final. Their corruption has been ſhamefully manifeſt on many former occaſions[1]; and in a very recent tranſaction, their venality, reſulting from their poverty, had well nigh ruined the commonwealth. Their authority, too, is exorbitant and tyrannical; even the kings

[1] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 61.

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kings acknowledge the neceſſity of paying court to them; and their undue influence in the government has often expoſed the ariſtocracy of Sparta to the evils flowing from the moſt turbulent democracy. Yet it muſt be acknowledged, that this magiſtracy of the Ephori, ill regulated as it is, tends to preſerve the balance of the conſtitution, and has thereby perpetuated its duration. To give ſtability to any government, it is neceſſary that all orders of the ſtate ſhould feel their intereſt in its ſafety. Whether by accident or deſign this ſalutary purpoſe has been effected at Sparta. The kings are inflexibly bound to a conſtitution which confers on them peculiar honours: the fidelity of the higher ranks of men is ſecured by the inſtitution of the ſenate, an admiſſion into which is the excluſive reward of their merit and ſervices: the people at large remain content with their condition, when they contemplate the ſovereign magiſtracy of the five Ephori promiſcuouſly elected from the whole; and who ought certainly to be ſo elected, though not after the childiſh faſhion that now prevails[k]. The indulgences alſo permitted to the Ephori in their ordinary

[k] Ariſtotle applies the ſame epithet, a few ſentences below, to the election of the ſenate; but omits telling us wherein this puerility conſiſted. The defect is ſupplied by Plutarch, in the life of Lycurgus; who relates, "That the aſſembly of the people having convened in the market-place, a certain number of ſelect perſons were confined in a neighbouring edifice; where, without the poſſibility of ſeeing or being ſeen by the aſſembly, they could only hear its ſhouts. The candidates for the ſenate then marched through the middle of the aſſembly, one after the other, in the order determined by lot. As each candidate paſſed in review, the people teſtified their favour by acclamation; while the impriſoned judges marked on tablets the loudneſs and frequency of the ſhouts, without knowing to which of the candidates they belonged. He who was honoured by the moſt frequent repetition of the loudeſt ſhouts, was declared ſenator." Our author juſtly condemns this mode of election as childiſh, ſince the Lacedæmonians,

ordinary mode of life, are totally inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of Lycurgus's legiſlation. Severity of manners carried to the extremes of harſhneſs and rigour is the prevailing feature of his policy; but while the reſt of the citizens ſnatch only by ſtealth even the moſt lawful pleaſures, the Ephori are abſurdly indulged in the unbounded gratification of all their paſſions.

Imperfections of the ſenate.

The conſtitution of the Spartan ſenate labours under many defects; when the legiſlator enacted that the members of this council ſhould hold their office for life, he did not conſider that the underſtanding[l] grows old as well as the body. The great and uncontroverted powers veſted in the ſenate might be ſafely entruſted to conſummate wiſdom and perfect virtue: but the Spartan ſenators have been ſeduced by partiality, and often corrupted by bribes. Their malverſations therefore ought to be reſtrained by the regular operation of a law, compelling them at ſtated times to give an account of their adminiſtration; as their undue exerciſe of power is but imperfectly checked by being occaſionally obnoxious to the wild tyranny of the Ephori. Their mode of election is puerile[m]; and that none ſhould be admitted into the ſenate, but thoſe who canvaſs for that honour, tends to excite and invigorate that impudence of ſelfiſh ambition which occaſions half the

nians, like children unable to count, contented themſelves with probability in a matter where, by telling the votes, abſolute certainty might have been attained. This mode of election was alſo well calculated to gratify the fraudulent deſigns of the judges; for when they happened to have an undue partiality for any of the candidates, they might gueſs, from his general character, with what kind of ſhouts he was likely to be received; and, in oppoſition to truth, declare the acclamations in his favour the loudeſt and moſt frequent. Vid. Thucydid. l. i. p. 58. edit. Francfort, 1594.

[l] See Analyſis, p. 50, & ſeq.

[m] See note k.

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the wickedneſs of mankind, and which is imprudently inflamed by the inſtitutions of Lycurgus.

Of the two kings of Sparta.

Whether the office of king be at all uſeful in a republican government, ſhall be examined hereafter. In whatever manner that queſtion may be determined, it is plain that this office ought to be the reward of tried and approved merit; ſince the inſtitutions of Sparta have not been found capable of forming men, recommended by the accidental circumſtance of birth, worthy of filling a throne. The legiſlator, indeed, viſibly deſpaired of perfecting his fellow-citizens in virtue, ſince he condeſcended to derive aſſiſtance from their paſſions and their vices. Men at variance with each other are conſidered as the fitteſt perſons to be joined in the ſame important commiſſions; and the ſafety of the ſtate is thought to have no ſmall dependence on the diſſenſion of the kings.

Of the Phiditia, or common tables.

The Phiditia, or public tables, are ill inſtituted, for thoſe only can frequent them who are capable of bearing their fair proportion of the expence. At Crete the expence of the public tables is ſupplied by the ſtate, and even the pooreſt citizens may enjoy them; but as managed at Sparta, the Phiditia have weakened the democratical part of the conſtitution, which they were intended to ſtrengthen and uphold.

Of the high admiral.

The extraordinary powers granted to the high admiral of the republic have been juſtly condemned by ſeveral writers. The two kings are the perpetual and hereditary commanders of the army; but the high admiral is veſted with ſuch unbounded authority in naval affairs as renders him a ſort of third king in the country, whoſe ambition has often ſhaken and almoſt rent aſunder the community.

Plato's

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Plato's obſervation is juſt, that the laws of Lycurgus are well adapted to the affairs of war, but to them only; Sparta therefore has been ſaved by her wars, and ruined by her victories, which ſhe knew not how to improve or to enjoy: her citizens thought rightly and wiſely, that virtue was better fitted than vice for acquiring conqueſt and dominion; they thought erroneouſly and abſurdly, that theſe effects of virtue were more valuable than the cauſe.

Lycurgus's undue predilection for war.

At Sparta the ſtate is poor, and the revenues ill levied, for the wide extent of territory renders the citizens negligent in mutually exacting their reciprocal contributions. The poverty and diſintereſtedneſs of the public thus forms a ſtriking contraſt with the wealth and avarice of individuals. But enough concerning the Spartan government, of which we have now enumerated the moſt material defects.

The irregular collection of the Spartan revenue.

Chap. 8.

The civil polity of Crete nearly reſembles that of Sparta, in ſome parts not inferior to it, but in general worſe arranged and leſs poliſhed; the Spartan government being later in its formation, and an improvement on the conſtitution of Crete, which Lycurgus took for his model. During the travels of that lawgiver, after he ceaſed to be guardian to king Charilaus, the iſland of Crete, recommended by its ancient connection with his mother country, chiefly attracted his regard, and long challenged his reſidence; for Lyctos was a colony of Lacedæmon, and the ſettlers in that diſtrict conformed to the laws ſubſiſting in other parts of the iſland, which have continued to prevail to this day as firſt eſtabliſhed by the elder Minos.

The government of Crete.

Crete, riſing in the midſt of the Mediterranean ſea, projecting towards Peleponneſus on one ſide, and on the other advancing towards Rhodes and Triopium on the coaſt of Aſia, is formed as it were by nature for holding the naval empire of Greece, which

Advantageous poſition of that iſland.

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which is every where a maritime country; Minos induſtriouſly availed himſelf of this advantageous ſituation, conquered ſome of the iſlands, colonized others, and died at Camicus in his unfortunate expedition againſt Sicily.

Agreement in the Spartan and Cretan inſtitutions.

There is a ſtriking analogy, we have ſaid, between the Cretan and Spartan inſtitutions: the territory of Laconia is cultivated for the benefit of the public by the ſubordinate claſs of Helots; the territory of Crete is cultivated for the ſame purpoſe by ſervile ruſtics denominated Periæci, becauſe inhabiting the dependent villages ſcattered over the territory, and ſurrounding their reſpective capitals. The inſtitution of common tables prevails in both countries; and theſe tables, at which the men only aſſemble, and which are now from their parſimony called Phiditia at Sparta, were anciently called in that country Andria, or tables appropriated to the male ſex; a term by which they are ſtill diſtinguiſhed in Crete, in which iſland the cuſtom took birth. The ſenate of Sparta correſponds to the ſenate in Crete, and the five Ephori in the one country bear a near affinity to the ten Coſmï of the other. The Cretan armies too were originally commanded by kings; but the power of the kings, which conſiſted, as at Sparta, in their being the hereditary generals of the commonwealth, has devolved on the Coſmï; who, together with the ſenate, have a negative before debate on the deliberations of the popular aſſembly, compoſed of the whole body of the citizens.

The clubs or public tables better regulated at Crete than in Sparta.

The public tables, we have ſaid, are better conſtituted in Crete than in Sparta; in the latter country each meſſmate muſt provide his ſhare of the entertainment, and when he ceaſes to make this proviſion, his right of commenſality is immediately at an end. At Crete, on the other hand, the corn and cattle, the

the produce of the common lands, and the contributions levied on the Periæci, or peaſants, are divided into two great ſhares; the firſt of which is appropriated to temples, ſacrifices, and other objects appertaining to religion and the public ſervice; the ſecond is deſtined for the ſupply of the *Andreia*, or common-tables, and for affording food to perſons of either ſex and of all ages in the country. The Cretan legiſlator has ſome fine ſpeculations on the ſubject of ſpare diet and frugality; and employs, for maintaining the due proportion of citizens and ſubſiſtence, ſome extraordinary regulations, the merits of which, we ſhall take another opportunity to diſcuſs.

The bad regulation of the Coſmï and ſenate.

The office of the Coſmï at Crete labours under all the inconveniences which were found to reſult from that of the Ephori at Sparta. There is not any ſtandard of merit by which perſons ſoliciting either of thoſe high offices muſt, before their election, be examined and tried; and as the Coſmï can only be choſen from a certain number of families, the moſt illuſtrious in the iſland, the honours conferred on them are invidious and dangerous, and have a tendency to excite the greater diſcontent in the multitude, ſince thoſe alone who have diſcharged the office of the Coſmï can be elected into the ſenate, in which they keep their ſeats for life, neither controulable in their deciſions as judges, nor reſponſible for their adminiſtration as ſtateſmen. That the people have hitherto endured this unequal diſtribution of power, affords not any argument by which its policy can be defended; for the inſular ſituation of Crete cuts off communication with ſtrangers, and prevents *their* interference by intrigue and bribery, which, whenever it finds room to operate, always proves dangerous to an unjuſt and partial government. But the

The evils therefrom reſulting.

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The remedy applied worſe than the evil.

remedy employed againſt this evil is ſtill worſe than the evil itſelf; ſince it controls by violence what might be ſubjected to law. The offended citizens conſpire againſt the obnoxious magiſtrate; and ſometimes by themſelves alone, ſometimes with the aſſiſtance of his colleagues, drive him from the community; unleſs he avoids this diſgraceful extremity by ſeaſonably abdicating his office.

The turbulence of the Cretan nobles.

Crete, which is ſometimes ſhaken by the mutinous ſpirit of the people, has been ſtill more fatally convulſed by the turbulence of the nobles, who diſdaining the authority of government, aſſemble their partiſans, levy war againſt the magiſtrates and againſt each other, and for a while rend aſunder all thoſe bands by which communities are upheld and cemented. Men, both willing and able to inflict ſuch dreadful calamities, muſt long ere now have totally ruined their country, had not the ſafety of Crete, as we before ſaid, been wonderfully protected by the ineſtimable advantages of its inſular ſituation; which, by excluding the dangerous interference of ſtrangers, long rendered the fidelity of the Periæci a ſtriking contraſt to the fickleneſs of the Helots. But foreign war having recently invaded the iſland, expoſes the nakedneſs of Crete, and evinces the debility of its government.

Chap. 9.

Excellence of the Carthaginian conſtitution.

The inſtitutions of the Carthaginians have been the ſubject of much commendation; and, when compared with the rudeneſs and coarſeneſs viſible in other ſtates, the refinement of Carthaginian polity, doubtleſs, merits applauſe; particularly thoſe inſtitutions which are analogous to the laws of Lycurgus; for the three conſtitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage bear much reſemblance to each other; they are extremely diſſimilar to all other governments; and all three have adopted many maxims

that are wiſe, and many regulations that are ſalutary. The excellence of the Carthaginian government is evinced by one ſingle reflection. Though its origin remounts to a very ancient date, and though for many centuries it has contained within its boſom a numerous and a free people, yet Carthage has never, to the preſent day, experienced any one ſedition worthy of record, nor has it ever endured for a moment the cruel yoke of a tyrant. The common tables at Carthage are analogous to thoſe of Crete and Sparta: the council of the Hundred and Four in the firſt mentioned country, reſembles the magiſtracy of the Spartan Ephori; except that the Carthaginian Ephori, or inſpectors, are choſen with nicer diſcrimination: both nations acknowledge the experienced wiſdom of ſenates; and both ſubmit to the authority of kings, limited in peace, ſupreme in the field. But the ſtrong claim of merit is preferred to all other conſiderations in aſcertaining the title to the Carthaginian throne [m]; for weak or worthleſs men intruſted with much power, cannot fail to do much harm; a maxim often exemplified in the kings of Sparta.

The corruptions introduced into the Carthaginian government.

The Carthaginian, as well as the Cretan and Spartan governments, whether by ſubſequent and unneceſſary additions, or in virtue of the primary regulations by which they were reſpectively conſtituted, have all of them degenerated from that moſt perfect form of commonwealth, which we call by way of eminence

[m] The author obſerves, that kings, meaning thereby ſuch republican magiſtrates as the Suffetes of Carthage and the Kings of Sparta, ought not to be choſen from ordinary families, nor from ordinary individuals of thoſe families; and that pre-eminence of perſonal merit ſhould take place of ſeniority. What is ſaid of ordinary families, μητε τυτο το τυχοι, bears a reference to the opinion of the Greeks concerning the pre-eminence of particular races. See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii & iii.

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eminence the republic; in which popular and ariſtocratic powers are harmoniouſly blended into one equitable ſyſtem of polity, benefiting all, and doing injury to none. Of the corruptions thus introduced into the Carthaginian government, ſome have a tendency to relax the republic into a democracy; and others have a tendency to narrow the ariſtocracy into an oligarchy. To the former kind we may refer that inſtitution which, when the kings and ſenators do not exactly coincide in opinion, ſubmits every matter of debate to the diſcuſſion and final determination of the people; to the latter, we muſt refer the extraordinary powers of the council of Five, a council ſelf-elected and immortal; and which alſo elects the Ephori, or ſupreme magiſtrates of the people. In the preference of ſuffrage to lot, and in ſerving the public without fee or reward, the Carthaginians ſeem to reſpect the ariſtocratic model. But the conſtitution of the judiciary power is highly oligarchical[n], the whole

[n] Nothing can be more intereſting than Ariſtotle's account of the Carthaginian government; ſince the misfortunes, which his ſagacity foreſaw, are deſcribed in hiſtory; his prophecies being exactly fulfilled. Two centuries after Ariſtotle's time, Livy obſerves, "Judicum ordo Carthagine ea tempeſtate dominabatur; eò maxime quod iidem perpetui judices erant. Res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum poteſtate erat. Qui unum ejus ordinis, idem omnes adverſos habebat." "The judiciary order at that time were tyrants in Carthage; and chiefly becauſe their juriſdiction was perpetual. The eſtate, the character, and the life of each individual was entirely in their hands. Whoever incurred the diſpleaſure of a ſingle judge, had the whole body for his enemies." Lib. xxxiii. c. xlvi. It is here worthy of remark, that Livy's language tends to convey a falſe notion of the Carthaginian government. There was no judiciary order in Carthage, as in ſeveral of the Greek republics, and likewiſe in Rome, where the judges were appointed, in ſome ages of the commonwealth, from the ſenators, and in others from the knights. In Carthage, on the other hand, Ariſtotle expreſsly tells us that none but the actual magiſtrates were allowed to exerciſe the judiciary function. The political hiſtory of Carthage remains ſtill to be written; for the Roman writers univerſally miſrepreſent the inſtitutions of that country through ignorance

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whole of that power being veſted in one court, which tries all kinds of cauſes, and decides all of them without appeal. Yet that which has principally tended to convert the republic into an oligarchy, is an opinion ſtrongly impreſſed on the nation at large, that in recommending to office, opulence ought to concur with merit; ſo that as virtue or merit forms the principle of an ariſtocracy, and wealth of an oligarchy, the government of Carthage will conſtitute a third and mixed kind of civil polity; blending in equal proportions the principles of ariſtocracy and oligarchy, of which it is compounded.

Occaſioned chiefly by the undue preponderance of wealth over greater political advantages.

Wealth muſt be poſſeſſed before leiſure can be obtained; and until leiſure is obtained, office ought not to be courted; ſince he who is oppreſſed by private concerns, cannot be expected to manage public affairs, either wiſely or faithfully. But the legiſlator and conſtitution are in fault, if men eminent for abilities and virtues, whether in public or private ſtations, be ever diſgraced by unſeemly poverty, or ever prevented by meaner cares from exerciſing their powers, and benefiting their country. In the diſtribution of honours, to prefer wealth to virtue, is to vilify and debaſe thoſe honours themſelves; it is to corrupt and degrade thoſe who wear them. The evil is deep and univerſal; for ſuch as the heads * of the community are,

Reflections on this ſubject.

ignorance or prejudice; and by beſtowing Roman appellations on Carthaginian magiſtrates, lead the reader to ſuppoſe much greater analogy than really ſubſiſted between two ſtates, founded on the moſt diſſimilar principles, and actuated by the moſt oppoſite views. But into this extenſive and important ſubject it would be improper here to enter, becauſe I ſhall have occaſion fully to diſcuſs it in my Hiſtory of the Macedonian Empire; of which I have written the firſt volume, and collected materials for the ſecond.

* Ariſtotle ſays, that whatever ſeems eſtimable to the heads of the community, the ſame will be eſteemed by the reſt of the citizens. Cicero has admirably tranſlated, generaliſed,

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are, ſuch muſt the people at large ſpeedily become. No ariſtocracy can be ſafe, which does not prefer perſonal merit to all other diſtinctions; for he who by wealth obtains office, will endeavour by office to augment wealth; and if poverty intruſted with authority be liable, even in honeſt minds, to the ſuſpicion of ſacrificing duty to gain, it is abſurd to expect that corruption, armed with power, will refuſe to repair loſs, and to compenſate by rapacity the expences of bribery [p].

The dangerous accumulation of office,

The Carthaginian government acts unwiſely in accumulating too many offices in the ſame hands. The example of well-organized

generaliſed, and expanded the reflection. "Nec enim tantum mali eſt peccare principes (quanquam eſt magnum hoc per ſe ipſum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum exiſtunt. Nam licet videre, ſi velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualeſcunque ſummi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuiſſe; quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus exſtiterit, eandem in populo ſecuturam. Idque haud paulo eſt verius, quam quod Platoni noſtro placet, qui muſicorum cantibus ait mutatis, mutari civitatum ſtatus. Ego autem nobilium vita vectuque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciosius de republica merentur vitioſi principes, quod non ſolum vitia concipiunt ipſi, ſed infundant in civitatem; neque ſolum obſunt, quod ipſi corrumpuntur, pluſque exemplo quam peccato nocent." De Legibus, l. iii. c. xiv. "The vices and crimes of the nobility, though great evils in themſelves, are rendered ſtill greater, becauſe they will always be the objects of general imitation. The experience of hiſtory teaches, that, in point of morals, ſuch as have been the leading men of a ſtate, ſuch alſo has been the ſtate itſelf; and that whatever alteration has taken place in the manners of the great, a ſimilar alteration has followed in thoſe of the people at large. This truth is far better aſcertained than the obſervation of Plato, that the character of a nation changes, by changing the ſtyle of its muſic. But I aſſert, that it changes by changing the lives and behaviour of the Great. Wherefore profligate princes and profligate leaders are ſo much the more puniſhable than other men, becauſe they are not only vitious in themſelves, but infuſe their vices into the public; and becauſe whatever miſchief reſults from their crimes, ſtill greater reſults from their example."

[p] Livy ſpeaks as if Ariſtotle's prophecy had been before his eyes, when he relates the facts by which it was accompliſhed. "Vectigalia publica prædæ ac diviſui principum quibuſdam ac magiſtratibus erant." And again, "Tum vero iſti, quos paverat per aliquot annos publicus peculatus, velut bonis ereptis, non furto eorum manibus extorto, infenſi & irati, Romanos in Annibalem inſtigabant." Liv. l. xxxiii. c. xlvi and xlvii.

ganized armies ſhews the ineſtimable benefits reſulting from the nice partition of duty, and the innumerable gradations of authority. The more minutely labour of every kind is ſubdivided, the more perfectly, and the more promptly, each man will perform his aſſigned taſk; and that government only is firmly ſupported which aſſociates many deſerving citizens to its functions and its honours. The conduct of the Carthaginians is preciſely the reverſe; and this conduct has produced a deep and permanent diſeaſe in the conſtitution, which the magiſtrates have hitherto palliated by a temporary and precarious remedy. As the national proſperity of Carthage has long continued in an advancing ſtate, the principal families have been enabled to maintain their odious monopoly of government, by employing thoſe moſt inclined and moſt able to ſubvert it, in the numerous and increaſing dependencies of their empire. But the ſucceſs of this remedy requires the co-operation of fortune; both its cauſe and effects are barely external. A good conſtitution ſhould be found within [q]. Such are the excellencies, and ſuch the imperfections, of the governments of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; which, in compariſon with moſt others, have been juſtly celebrated.

palliated in Carthage by a temporary and precarious remedy.

Of the writers on the ſubject of politics, ſome have confined themſelves merely to theory; others have illuſtrated theory by practice, and aſſiſted in their own or in foreign countries, in the adminiſtration of thoſe governments which they had deviſed and eſtabliſhed, or of thoſe laws which they had contrived and enacted.

Chap. 10.

The conſtitution of Athens.

[q] Theſe obſervations are worthy of the moſt ſerious attention. When a nation is advancing in wealth and greatneſs, the moſt dangerous maladies, exiſting only in an indolent ſtate, may long lie altogether concealed. The firſt ſhock of adverſity reveals the fatal ſecret; but then, perhaps, it is no longer time to attempt the radical cure.

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enacted. The principal doctrines of merely ſpeculative politicians we have already examined; we have likewiſe deſcribed the practical ſyſtem of Lycurgus; and now proceed to explain the legiſlation of Solon, who is celebrated as the reſtorer of the hereditary freedom of Athens, and as the deliverer of the people from the yoke of an intemperate and cruel oligarchy. In the conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Solon, his admirers obſerve, that the jarring intereſts of hoſtile orders are ſkilfully harmoniſed into one equitable ſyſtem, juſtly formed, and nicely balanced, by the oligarchy of the Areopagus, which is perpetual; the ariſtocracy of the Archons, who are elective; and the democracy of the courts of judicature, whoſe members are appointed indiſcriminately from all the citizens by lot. Solon, it is probable, did not firſt introduce, but ſimply receive and approve, the perpetuity of the Areopagus, and the election of the Archons: but he invented and eſtabliſhed the popular conſtitution of the judiciary power; a conſtitution, which ſome writers have branded as introductory to the confuſion and tyranny of a wild democracy. Maſters of the courts of juſtice, and conſequently of the lives and fortunes of all ranks of men in the ſtate, the people have drained and exhauſted every ſource of authority, not flowing from themſelves.

Cauſes of its degeneracy.

Pericles, with the aſſiſtance of Ephialtes, abridged the power of the Areopagus; the ſame Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, ſtill farther debaſed the compoſition, and increaſed the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles left imperfect, ſucceeding demagogues ſupplied; and one democratical regulation ſtill followed another, until the government aſſumed its preſent form, or rather exhibited its preſent deformity.

deformity. Yet this fatal reſult is not imputable to Solon [r], but rather chargeable on fortune. The naval victories of Athens, in the Perſian war, ſwelled the inſolence of the populace, who, headed by orators more inſolent than themſelves, arrogated all authority to their own order, and uſurped the government. Solon juſtly intruſted the multitude with the power of electing the magiſtrates, and with that of taking an account of their adminiſtration; powers which cannot eaſily be withheld from the people without degrading them into ſlaves, or converting them into enemies. But all the executive offices of government were confined to men of the three firſt claſſes: the *Thetes*, conſiſting of labourers and mechanics, and forming the moſt numerous portion of the community, were totally excluded from every employment requiring either coolneſs of temper or quickneſs of underſtanding.

The legiſlations of Zaleucus and Charondas.

Zaleucus legiſlated for the weſtern Locrians; and Charondas, a native of Catana in Sicily, gave laws, not only to his own citizens, but to the other Ionic communities ſcattered over Sicily and Italy. Some writers trace up to Onomacritus the inſtitutions of thoſe legiſlators, relating that Onomacritus ſailed to Crete to learn the art of divination; that he became famous as a lawgiver; that Thales was his companion, and Lycurgus the ſcholar of Thales, Zaleucus the ſcholar of Lycurgus, and Charondas the ſcholar of Zaleucus: but this order of ſucceſſion is not juſtified by chronology.

Of Philolaus.

Philolaus, a native of Corinth, and deſcended from the illuſtrious family of the Bacchiadæ, who long governed that city, gave laws to the Thebans. Philolaus was the friend of Diocles,

[r] See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, paſſim. particularly vol. ii. c. xiii.

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Diocles, likewiſe a Corinthian, who gained the Olympic prize, and who fled from his native city, as deteſting the inceſtuous paſſion of his mother Halcyoné. Diocles fixed his reſidence in Thebes; the affectionate Philolaus ſoon followed him thither; in that city they lived and died; and there, the monuments of theſe two friends are ſtill ſhewn to ſtrangers, diſpoſed in ſuch ſituations as render them fully conſpicuous to each other, that of Philolaus alſo enjoying a view of Corinth, but that of Diocles concealing from the ſight both that city and its territory, as if he wiſhed to baniſh from his eyes objects only calculated to recall the ſad memory of his domeſtic calamity. Philolaus having thus fixed his abode in Thebes, propoſed various laws for the benefit of that republic; particularly the law of adoption, contrived for perpetuating the ancient families, and for preſerving a due proportion between the number of landholders, and the number of ſhares or lots, into which the territory was divided. Charondas inſtituted a new action[s] againſt the odious crimes of calumny

[s] The name of this action, as Bentley proves, was επισκηψις, which took place when a man, caſt in a trial by falſe teſtimony, entered his plea to have another trial to prove the witneſſes perjured. It is mentioned by Demoſthenes more than once, and by Lyſias contra Pandionem. See Diſſertation upon Phalaris, p. 368. Bentley ſays, "that Diodorus tells us from his copy of Charondas's laws that he had πολλα ιδια, many things peculiar, and reckons up half a ſcore of them; and yet the ſingle thing obſerved by Ariſtotle does not appear among them." In this Bentley is miſtaken; for the peculiarity of Charondas's law againſt perjured calumniators appears in Diodorus, and makes a great figure there.—His words follow, Τους δ' επι συκοφαντια καταγνωσθεντας προσεταξε περιπατειν εστεφανωμενους μυρικη, ὡπως εν πασι τοις πολιταις πρωτειον της πονηριας περιποιημενοι· διο και τινας επι τουτῳ τῳ εγκληματι καταδικασθεντας, το μεγεθος της ὑβρεως ουκ ενεγκοντας, εκουσιως εαυτους εκ του ζην μεταστησαι. ὁ συντελεσθεντος, εφυγαγευθη πας εκ της πολεως ὁ συκοφαντειν ειωθως, και το πολιτευμα μακαριον ειχε θειον της ταιαυτης κακιας απηλλαγμενον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 486. "He commanded thoſe convicted of calumny to go about crowned with tamariſk, that they might appear to all the citizens to have attained the laſt ſtage of wickedneſs; therefore ſome of thoſe convicted of this crime, incapable of ſupporting

calumny and perjury; and his laws ſurpaſs, in elegancy and in accuracy, even the juridical compoſitions of the preſent day. Phaleas diſtinguiſhed himſelf by equalizing property; and Plato by appointing common tables for women; and by propoſing among men, the community of wives, children, and goods. His leſs extravagant novelties are, that children ſhould be taught to uſe both hands with equal dexterity, and that a perſon bound to the obſervance of perfect ſobriety ſhould preſide in companies aſſembled for convivial merriment. The laws of Draco [t] were remarkable for nothing but their exceſſive and undiſtinguiſhing ſeverity. Pittacus [u] did not delineate any new ſcheme of policy, but eſtabliſhed ſeveral new laws, of which one peculiar to himſelf is, that offences committed by perſons intoxicated, ſhould be puniſhed with double rigour; a law founded rather on inflexible utility, which conſiders how evils may be prevented, than on merciful juſtice, which examines what offences ought to be pardoned [x]. Androgamas, a native of

ſupporting the weight of infamy, voluntarily deſtroyed themſelves; in conſequence of which examples, calumny totally diſappeared, and the ſtate thenceforth ſubſiſted happily, being divorced from ſuch a miſchief." The word tamariſk is in the original μυρικη, myrice, of which Pliny ſays, "Myricen in Italia quam alii tamaricen vocant, cujus infelicia ligna appellamus. Solitaria circum ſaxa aquoſa, qua in domum illata, difficiles partus fieri produnt, morteſque miſeras." Plin. Nat. Hiſt. xii. 21. This unhappy and unauſpicious plant, creeping ſolitary amidſt watery rocks, was a fit decoration for an outcaſt of ſociety, a wretch ſhunned and deteſted. To how many expreſſive cuſtoms of antiquity do we ſtill want a key?

[t] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 105. [u] Ibid. vol. . p. 225.

[x] Both Plato and Ariſtotle are more indulgent in the article of wine, than the more ancient philoſophers and legiſlators. A law of Zaleucus is preſerved in Athenæus, l. x. p. 226. and commented in Elian, Var. Hiſt. ii. 37. which treats the drinking of pure wine

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of Rhegium, gave laws to Chalcis in Thrace; his code is moſt ample on the ſubjects of heireſſes and of murders; but is not diſtinguiſhed by any peculiarity worthy of record. Let this much ſuffice concerning plans of policy and laws, which either authority has eſtabliſhed, or ſpeculation deviſed.

wine with Mahommedan ſeverity, ει τις ακρατον επιε, μη προσταξαντος ιατρου θεραπειας ενεκα, θανατος ην ἡ ζημια.—"Whoever drinks pure wine, except for the ſake of health, and by the preſcription of a phyſician, let him be puniſhed by death."

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

APPENDIX TO BOOK II.

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IN my endeavour to illuſtrate various ſubjects treated in this Book, I frequently had occaſion to allude to the Italian republics of the middle age; which exhibited a faint and rude picture of the polities of ancient Greece. Of all theſe republics, there is one, and only one, ſtill ſubſiſting on the ancient model. This ſmall but precious remain of former, and by ſome thought better times, I endeavoured from careful obſervation to delineate upwards of twenty years ago, in an article [a] firſt made public in 1795, and ſince that time frequently reprinted. But the intimate connexion of that juvenile performance with the ſubject of the preſent Book of Ariſtotle's Politics, has ſuggeſted the propriety of giving here an enlarged edition of it, enriched and confirmed by original documents, extracted, through the intereſt of Sir John Cox Hippeſley, from the ſecret archives of the republic, and moſt obligingly communicated to me by Sir John Macpherſon.

"At the diſtance of twelve miles from Rimini and the Hadriatic Sea, we beheld a cloud-capt mountain, ſteep, rugged, and inhoſpitable, yet to Britons, whoſe affection for their own happy

[a] Given as an extract from my manuſcript travels in that agreeable work, intitled, "Anecdotes of ſome diſtinguiſhed Perſons chiefly of the preſent and two preceding Centuries."

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happy iſland cheriſhed even the fainteſt image of congenial liberty, more attractive and more engaging than all the gay luxuriance of Tuſcan [b] plains. A black expanſion of vapour partly concealed from our view the territory of what the Greeks would have called a nation, ſeldom viſited by ſtrangers, though aſſuredly moſt deſerving of that honour. Liberty brightens and fertilizes the craggy rocks of St. Marino; and inſtead of paradiſes inhabited by devils, (for thus the recollection or ſuppoſition of better times indignantly characteriſes the countries through which we had juſt travelled,) this little ſtate, we were told, would exhibit rugged hills and ſavage precipices cultivated and adorned by the ſtubborn induſtry of free men, who labour with alacrity, becauſe they reap with ſecurity. We panted at the thoughts of taking a nearer ſurvey of this political wonder, and were impatient to leave Rimini; but the country adjacent to that city was deluged with rain; the rivers continued to overflow; horſes could not ſafely clamber over rocks; and Rimini could not furniſh us with mules. But they are delicate travellers whom ſuch puny difficulties could reſtrain from viſiting this illuſtrious mountain, where Liberty, herſelf a mountain goddeſs, has upwards of twelve centuries fixed her rural throne. Careleſs of mules, or horſes, or carriages, to which laſt the republic of St. Marino is at all times inacceſſible, we adopted

[b] "The epithet Tuſcan is juſtified by the authority of Polybius, l. ii. c. 14. and c. 17. He deſcribes that extenſive plain bounded by the Alps, the Apennines, and the Hadriatic, and alſo the plains about Nola and Capua, called the Phlegræan Fields, as anciently inhabited by the Tuſcans. The territory of this people, he ſays, formed incomparably the fineſt portion of Europe. Before Polybius wrote his Hiſtory, the dominion of the Tuſcans had contracted to a narrow ſpan; and according to the ſaying of the modern Italians, while the Pope poſſeſſes the marrow, the Great Duke of Tuſcany has now only the bones, of Italy."

adopted a mode of travelling which in a country where pomp is immoderately ſtudied, becauſe wealth is too indiſcriminately prized, might poſſibly have excluded unknown wanderers from the proud manſions of nobles and princes, the palaces of biſhops, and the vineas of cardinals, but which, we rightly conjectured, would recommend us as welcome gueſts to the citizens of St. Marino, whoſe own manlineſs of character muſt approve the congenial hardihood of humble pedeſtrians.

" The diſtance from Rimini to the Borgo, or ſuburbs of St. Marino, for the città, or city, ſtands half a mile higher on the hill, is computed at only ten Italian miles. But the badneſs of the weather and of the roads would have increaſed the tediouſneſs of our fatiguing journey, had not our fancies been amuſed by the appearance and converſation of ſeveral perſons whom we occaſionally met or overtook, and who, notwithſtanding that hardneſs of features which characteriſes mountaineers, diſplayed in their words and looks a certain candour and ſincerity, with an undeſcribed mixture of humanity and firmneſs, which we had rarely ſeen pourtrayed on the face of an Italian. Such virtues, perhaps, many Italians may poſſeſs; ſuch virtues Raphael and Guido probably diſcerned in their contemporaries; unleſs it be ſuppoſed that the *antique* not only ennobled and exalted, but originally inſpired their conceptions. Yet whatever might be the pre-eminence of Tranſalpine beauty, during the ſplendour of the *cinque cento*, it muſt be confeſſed of the Italians of our days, that the expreſſion indicating virtues of the mild or generous caſt, ſeldom breaks through the dark gloom and ſullen cares which contract their brows and cloud their countenances.

" At

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" At the diſtance of five miles from Rimini, a ſmall rivulet, decorated by a diſproportionably large ſtone bridge, which at another ſeaſon of the year would have exemplified the Spaniſh proverb of a bridge without water, ſeparates the territories of St. Marino from thoſe of the Pope. Proceeding forward, we found the road extremely narrow, much worn by the rain, alternately rough and ſlippery, and always ſo bad, that we congratulated each other on rejecting the uſe of the miſerable rips that were offered to us at Rimini. In the midſt of a heavy ſhower we clambered to the Borgo, ſituate on the ſide of the hill, and diſtant (as already ſaid) half a mile from the città, on its ſummit. The former is deſtined for the habitation of peaſants, artiſans, and ſtrangers; the honour of inhabiting the latter is reſerved for the nobles, the citizens, and thoſe who, in the language of antiquity, would be ſtyled the public gueſts of the commonwealth. In the whole territory there is but one inn; and that of courſe in the Borgo; for lone houſes are rare in all parts of the continent, the Britiſh dominions alone, by their native ſtrength and the excellence of their government, being happily exempted from the terror of banditti in time of peace, and marauders in time of war. We diſcovered the inn at St. Marino, as is uſual in Italy, by the crowd before the door. Having entered, we were civilly received by the landlord, ſeated by the fire-ſide in company with ſeveral other ſtrangers, and ſpeedily preſented with a bottle of ſparkling white wine, the beſt we had taſted in Italy, and reſembling Champagne in the characteriſtic excellencies of that ſprightly liquor.

" We had not remained long in this caravanſera, (for ſuch is the proper name for the place of hoſpitality in which we were received,)

received), when the dreſs, manners, and converſation of our fellow-travellers ſtrongly excited our attention, and afforded ſcope for boundleſs ſpeculation. They were the moſt ſavage-looking men that I had ever beheld; covered with thick capottas [c], of coarſe dark brown woollen, lined with black ſheep's ſkin. Their hats, which they kept on their heads, were of an enormous ſize, ſwelling to the circumference of an ordinary umbrella. With their dreſs and appearance their words and geſtures bore too faithful a correſpondence. "*Schioppi*" and "*coltellate*" (gun-ſhots and dagger-thruſts) were frequently in their mouths. As the wine went briſkly round, the converſation became ſtill more animated, and took a turn more decidedly terrible. They now talked of nothing but fierce encounters, hair-breadth eſcapes, and hideous lurking-places. From their whole behaviour, there was reaſon to apprehend, that we had unwarily fallen into company with Rinaldo's party: but a few hints that dropped from him who was moſt intoxicated finally undeceived us, and diſcovered, to our ſatisfaction and ſhame, that inſtead of a band of robbers, we had only met with a party of ſmugglers. Their maſſy capottas and broad-brimmed hats formed their defenſive armour againſt cuſtom-houſe officers and *ſbirri* [d]; and the narratives which they heard or related with ſuch ardor and delight, contained the acts of proweſs by which they had repelled the bravery of the Romans, and the arts of ſtratagem by which they had deceived the cunning of the Tuſcans. From the intermediate ſituation of St. Marino between the dominions of Tuſcany and thoſe of the Pope, its territory is continually infeſted by viſits from thoſe unlicenſed traffickers, who being enemies

[c] Great coats. [d] Thoſe who execute the orders of civil magiſtrates.

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enemies by trade to thoſe who adminiſter the laws and collect the revenues of their country, naturally degenerate into daring and diſorderly ruffians, the terror of peaceful men, and both the diſgrace and the bane of civilized ſociety.

From the company of the ſmugglers we longed to ſeparate, the more becauſe they eagerly ſolicited our ſtay, promiſing to conduct us ſafely acroſs the mountains, and to defend our perſons and properties againſt robbers and aſſaſſins; but we thought it a piece of good fortune, that our moſt valuable property, as we ſhewed to them, conſiſted in our ſwords and piſtols. Having called our St. Marino hoſt, we paid him for his wine and his ſauſage (*proſciutto*); and were pleaſed to find, that contrary to our univerſal experience of Italian landlords, he was uncommonly thankful for a very moderate gratification, a ſingularity which, though it probably proceeded from his being little converſant with Engliſh and other opulent travellers, we treaſured with delight, as a conſpicuous proof of republican [e] virtue, that had eſcaped pure and unſullied from the contagion of thoſe worthleſs gueſts, with whom the nature of his trade condemned him often to aſſociate.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, we left the Borgo to climb up to the Città, carrying our ſwords in our right hands; a precaution which the company we had juſt left warranted in this modern republic, but which, as Thucydides informs us in his proem, would have expoſed us to be branded with the appellation

[e] According to Machiavelli and Monteſquieu, and their maſter Ariſtotle, republics require more virtue than monarchies, becauſe in republics the citizens make laws to govern themſelves, whereas in monarchies the ſubjects are compelled to obey the laws made by the prince. In republican governments, therefore, the citizens ought, in the words of Ariſtotle, and of a ſtill higher authority, 'to be a law unto themſelves.' How few nations, therefore, are qualified, in modern times, for living quietly and happily under a republic; and leaſt of all, that nation which has ſhewn itſelf the leaſt virtuous of all.

pellation of barbarians in the republics of Ancient Greece. Before we had reached the ſummit of the hill, the cloud had diſperſed, the ſun ſhone bright, we breathed a purer air, and the clear light, which diſplayed the city and territory of St. Marino was heightened by contraſt with the thick gloom which involved the circumjacent plains. Tranſported with the contemplation of a landſcape which ſeemed ſo admirably to accord with the political ſtate of the mountain, a bright gem of liberty amidſt the darkneſs of Italian ſervitude, we clambered cheerfully over the precipices, never reflecting that as there was not any place of reception for ſtrangers in the Città, we might poſſibly be expoſed to the alternative of ſleeping in the ſtreets, or returning to the caravanſera, crowded with ſmugglers, whoſe intoxication might exaſperate their natural ferocity. From all our paſt remarks, we had concluded that the vice of drunkenneſs was abominated even by the loweſt claſſes of the Italians. We dreaded their fury and their knives in this unuſual ſtate of mind; but amidſt all our terrors could not forbear philoſophiſing[f] on what we had ſeen, and conjecturing, from the tumultuous merriment and drunken debauchery of the ſmugglers, that the famed ſobriety of the Italian nation is an artificial virtue ariſing from ſituation and accident, not depending on temperament, or reſulting from character. Drinking is the vice of men whoſe lives are chequered by viciſſitudes of toil and eaſe, of danger and ſecurity. It is the vice of ſoldiers, mariners, and huntſmen;

[f] This word requires an apology; for the ſacred name of philoſophy has been as ſhamefully polluted in modern times, by ſophiſts and ſceptics, as the word republic by madmen and levellers. The preſent generation muſt perhaps paſs away, before either of theſe terms ſhall reſume its priſtine and native honours.

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huntſmen; of thoſe who exerciſe boiſterous occupations, or purſue dangerous amuſements: and if the modern Italians are leſs addicted to exceſs in wine than the Greeks and Romans in ancient, or the Engliſh and Germans in modern times, their temperance may fairly be aſcribed to the indolent monotony of their liſtleſs lives; which, being never exhauſted by fatigue, can never be gladdened by repoſe; and being never agitated by the terrors of danger, can never be tranſported by the joys of deliverance.

From theſe airy ſpeculations, by which we fancied that we ſtripped Italy of what ſome travellers have too haſtily concluded to be the only virtue which ſhe has left, we were awakened by the appearance of a venerable perſon, in a bag wig and ſword, cautiouſly leading his *bourrique*[g] down the precipice. He returned our ſalute with an air of courteſy beſpeaking ſuch affability, that we quickly entered into converſation with him, and diſcovered to our ſurpriſe and joy, that we were in company with a very reſpectable perſonage, and one whom Mr. Addiſon has dignified with the appellation of 'the fourth man in the ſtate.' The ſtipendiary phyſician of St. Marino (for this was the perſon with whom we were converſing) told us, that we might be accommodated with good lodging in the convent of Capuchins; and as we were ſtrangers, that he would return, ſhew us the houſe, and preſent us to Father Bonelli. We expreſſed our unwillingneſs to give him the trouble of again aſcending the hill; but of this trouble the deeply-wrinkled mountaineer made light, and we yielded to his propoſal with only apparent reluctance; ſince, to the indelicacy of introducing ourſelves, we preferred the introduction of a man whom we had even caſually met

[g] Aſs.

met with on the road. To the convent we were admitted by a *frate ſervente*, or lay friar, and conducted to the *Padre Maeſtro*, the Prior Bonelli, a man ſixty years old, and, as we were told by the phyſician, deſcended from one of the nobleſt families in the commonwealth. Having received and returned ſuch compliments as are held indiſpenſable in this ceremonious country, the prior conducted us above ſtairs, and ſhewed us two clean and comfortable chambers, which he ſaid we might command while we deigned to honour the republic (ſuch were his expreſſions) with the favour of our reſidence. As to our entertainment, he ſaid we might, as beſt pleaſed us, either ſup apart by ourſelves, or in company with him and his monks. We told him, our happineſs would be complete, were we permitted to enjoy the advantage of his company and converſation. My converſation! You ſhall ſoon enjoy better than mine; ſince within half an hour I ſhall have the honour of conducting you to the houſe of a charming young lady (ſo I muſt call her, though my own kinſwoman), whoſe *converſazione* aſſembles this evening. During this dialogue a ſervant arrived, bringing our portmanteau from Rimini, and thereby enabling us with more decency of appearance to pay our reſpects to the lady, in company with the prior her uncle. The Signora P—— received us politely in an inner apartment, after we had paſſed through two outer rooms, in each of which there was a ſervant in waiting. Above a dozen gentlemen, well dreſſed and polite after the faſhion of Italy, with ſix other ladies, formed this agreeable party. Coffee and ſorbettis being ſerved, cards were introduced; and, in quality of ſtrangers, we had the honour of loſing a few ſequins at ombre with the miſtreſs of the houſe. The other ladies preſent took up, each of them, two gentlemen;

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for ombre is the univerſal game, becauſe in Italian aſſemblies the number of men commonly triples that of women; the latter, when unmarried, ſeldom going abroad; and when married, being ambitious of appearing to receive company every evening at home. During the intervals of play, we endeavoured to turn the converſation on the hiſtory and preſent ſtate of St. Marino, but found this ſubject to be too grave for the company. In this little ſtate, as well as in other parts of Italy, the ſocial amuſements of life conſiſting chiefly in what are called *converſazioni*, have widely deviated from the *ſympoſia* of the Greeks and the *convivia* of the Romans. Inſtead of philoſophical dialogues and epideiktic orations; and inſtead of thoſe animated rehearſals of approved works of hiſtory and poetry, which formed the entertainment and delight of antiquity, the modern Italian *converſazioni* exhibit a very different ſcene; a ſcene in which play is the buſineſs, gallantry the amuſement; and of which avarice, vanity, and mere ſenſual pleaſure form the ſole connecting principle and chief ultimate end. Such inſipid and ſuch mercenary aſſemblies are ſometimes enlivened by the jokes of the buffoon; the *improviſatore* ſometimes diſplays in them the powers of his memory rather than the elegance of his fancy; and every entertainment in Italy, whether gay or ſerious, is always ſeaſoned with muſic; but chiefly that ſoft voluptuous muſic which was baniſhed by Lycurgus, proſcribed by Plato, and prohibited by other legiſlators, under ſevere penalties, as unfriendly to virtue and deſtructive of manhood. The great amuſements of life are commonly nothing more than images of its neceſſary occupations; and where the latter, therefore, are different, ſo alſo muſt be the former. Is it becauſe the occupations of the ancients were leſs ſoftened than thoſe

thoſe of the moderns, that women are found to have acted among different nations ſuch different parts in ſociety? And that the contraſt is ſo ſtriking between the wife of a citizen of St. Marino, ſurrounded with her card-tables, her muſic, and her admirers, and the Roman Lucretia, *nocte ſerâ deditam lanæ inter lucubrantes ancillas* (Tit. Liv. i. 57.), or the more copious deſcriptions of female modeſty and induſtry given by Iſchomachus in Xenophon's Treatiſe on Domeſtic Œconomy? In modern Italy this contraſt of manners diſplays its greateſt force. Though leſs beautiful and leſs accompliſhed than the Engliſh and French, the Italian women expect ſuperior attention, and exact greater aſſiduities. To be well with the ladies, is the higheſt ambition of the men. Upon this principle their manners are formed; by this their behaviour is regulated; and the art of converſation, in its utmoſt ſprightlineſs and higheſt perfection, is reduced to that playful wantonneſs which, touching ſlightly on what is felt moſt ſenſibly, amuſes with perpetual ſhadows of deſired realities.

To the honour of St. Marino it muſt be obſerved, that neither the Prior Bonelli, nor two *counſellors* who were preſent, took any conſiderable part in this too ſportive converſation; and the gentlemen at the Signora P——'s were chiefly Romans and Florentines; men, we were told, whom ſometimes misfortune and ſometimes inclination, but more frequently extravagance and neceſſity, drive from their reſpective countries, and who, having relations or friends in St. Marino, eſtabliſh themſelves in that cheap city, where they ſubſiſt on the wreck of their fortunes, and elude the purſuit of their creditors.

Next morning Bonelli having invited ſeveral of his fellow-citizens to drink chocolate, we learned from them, that the morality

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morality and piety which had long diſtinguiſhed St. Marino, daily ſuffered decline through the contagious influence of thoſe profligate intruders, whom good policy ought never to have admitted within the territory, but whom the indulgence of humanity could not be prevailed on to expel.

After breakfaſt, our good-natured landlord kindly propoſed a walk, that his Engliſh gueſts might view the city and adjacent country. The main ſtreet is well paved, but narrow and ſteep. The ſimilarity of the houſes indicates a happy mediocrity of fortune. There is a fine ciſtern of pure water; and we admired the coolneſs and dryneſs of the wine-cellars, ventilated by communications with caverns in the rock. To this circumſtance, as much as to the quality of the ſoil and careful culture of the grape, the wine of St. Marino is indebted for its peculiar excellence.

The whole territory of the republic extends about thirty-five miles in circumference. It is of an irregular oval form, and its mean diameter may be eſtimated at ſix Engliſh miles. The ſoil naturally craggy and barren, and hardly fit for goats, yet actually maintains (ſuch are the attractions of liberty) upwards of ſeven thouſand perſons; and being everywhere adorned by mulberry-trees, vines, and olives, ſupplies the materials of an advantageous trade, particularly in ſilk, with Rome, Florence, and other cities of Italy.

In extent of territory, St. Marino, inconſiderable as it ſeems, equals many republics that have performed mighty atchievements and purchaſed immortal renown. The independent ſtates of Theſpiæ and Platæa were reſpectively leſs extenſive; and the boundaries of the modern republic exceed thoſe of Ægina and Megara; the former of which was diſtinguiſhed by its

its commerce and its colonies in Egypt and the Eaſt; and the latter, as Lyſias and Xenophon inform us, could bring into the field, beſides proportional bodies of light troops, 3000 hardy pikemen, who with the ſervice of Mars united that of Ceres and of Bacchus; extracting from bleak hills and rugged mountains rich harveſts and teeming vintages.

The remembrance of our beloved republics of Greece, ennobled by the ineſtimable gifts of unrivalled genius, endeared to us St. Marino, even by its littleneſs. In this literary enthuſiaſm, we could willingly have traverſed every inch of its diminutive territory: but politeneſs required that we ſhould not ſubject Bonelli and his friends to ſuch unneceſſary fatigue; and the changeableneſs of the weather, a continual variation of ſunſhine and cloudineſs, the ſolemnity of dark magnifying vapours, together with the velocity of drizzly or gleamy ſhowers, produced ſuch unuſual accidents of light and ſhade in this mountain ſcene, as often ſuſpended the motion of our limbs, and fixed our eyes in aſtoniſhment. From the higheſt top of St. Marino we beheld the bright ſummit of another and far loftier mountain, towering above, and beyond a dark cloud, which by contraſt threw the conical top of the hill to ſuch a diſtance, that it ſeemed to riſe from another world. The height of St. Marino (we were told) had been accurately meaſured by Father Boſcovich, and found to be nearly half a mile above the level of the neighbouring ſea.

Almoſt immediately after returning from our walk, dinner was ſerved at the convent; for the politeneſs of Father Bonelli had prolonged his ſtay abroad far beyond his uſual hour of repaſt. Speedily after dinner we were conducted by the good father to the *converſazione* of another lady, alſo his relation,

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where we had the honour of meeting the *capitaneos*, or conſuls, the *commiſſareo*, or chief judge, and ſeveral diſtinguiſhed members of the ſenate. Recommended only by our youth and curioſity, we ſpent the evening moſt agreeably with thoſe reſpectable magiſtrates, who were as communicative in anſwering as inquiſitive in aſking queſtions. The company continually increaſing, and Father Bonelli carefully addreſſing all newcomers by the titles of their reſpective offices, we were ſurpriſed toward the cloſe of the evening, and the uſual hour of retirement, that we had not yet ſeen *Il Signor Dottore* and *Il Pædagogo Publico*, the phyſician and ſchoolmaſter, repreſented by Mr. Addiſon as two of the moſt diſtinguiſhed dignitaries in the commonwealth. A ſhort acquaintance is ſufficient to inſpire confidence between congenial minds. We frankly teſtified our ſurpriſe to the father. He laughed heartily at our ſimplicity, and thought the joke too good not to be communicated to the company. When their vociferous mirth had ſubſided, an old gentleman, who had been repeatedly inveſted with the higheſt honours of his country, obſerved, that he well knew Mr. Addiſon's account of St. Marino, which had been tranſlated more than once into the French and Italian languages. Remote and inconſiderable as they were, his anceſtors were highly honoured by the notice of that illuſtrious traveller, who, he underſtood, was not only a claſſic author in Engliſh, but an author who had uniformly and moſt ſucceſsfully employed his pen in the cauſe of virtue and liberty. Yet, as muſt often happen to travellers, Mr. Addiſon, he continued, has, in ſpeaking of this little republic, been deceived by firſt appearances. Neither our ſchoolmaſter nor phyſician enjoy any pre-eminence in the ſtate. They are maintained indeed by public ſalaries, as in ſeveral other

other cities of Italy; and there is nothing peculiar in their condition here, except that the ſchoolmaſter has more, and the phyſician leſs, to do, than in moſt other places, becauſe our diſeaſes are few, and our children are many. This ſally having been received with approbation by the company, the veteran proceeded to explain the real diſtinction of ranks in St. Marino, conſiſting in the *nobili*, *cittadini*, and *ſtipendiate*, nobles, citizens, and ſtipendiaries. The nobles, he told us, exceeded not twenty families, of which ſeveral enjoyed eſtates without the territory, worth from three to eight hundred pounds ſterling a-year: that, from reſpect to the Holy See, under whoſe protection the republic had long ſubſiſted quietly and happily, many perſons of diſtinction in the Pope's territories had been admitted *cittadini honorati*, honorary citizens of St. Marino, particularly ſeveral illuſtrious houſes of Rimini, and the forty noble families of Bologna. Even of the Venetian nobles themſelves, ancient as they certainly were, and inveſted as they ſtill continued to be with the whole ſovereignty of their country, many diſdained not to be aſſociated to the diminutive honours of St. Marino, and to increaſe the number of its citizens; and that this aggregation of illuſtrious foreigners, far from being conſidered as dangerous to public liberty, was deemed eſſential, in ſo ſmall a commonwealth, to national ſafety.

Leſt the converſation might take another turn, I drew from my pocket Mr. Addiſon's account of St. Marino, which, being exceedingly ſhort, I begged leave to read, that his errors, if he had committed any, might be corrected, and the alterations noted which the country had undergone in the ſpace of ſeventy years, from 1703 to 1773.

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The propoſal being obligingly accepted, I read in Mr. Addiſon, 'They have at St. Marino five churches, and reckon above five thouſand ſouls in their community.' Inſtead of which I was deſired to ſay, 'They have in St. Marino ten pariſhes, ten churches, and reckon above ſeven thouſand ſouls in their community.' Again Mr. Addiſon ſays, 'The Council of Sixty, notwithſtanding its name, conſiſts but of forty perſons.' That was the caſe when this illuſtrious author viſited the republic; but the council has ſince that time been augmented by twenty members, and the number now agrees with the name. Theſe circumſtances are important; for from them it appears, that while the neighbouring territory of Rome is impoveriſhed and gloomed by the dominion of eccleſiaſtics, of which, in the words of Dr. Robertſon, 'to ſqueeze and to amaſs, not to meliorate, is the object [h];' and while the neighbouring cities of Tuſcany are accuſed of ſhamefully abandoning their privileges and

[h] See Robertſon's Charles V. vol. i. ſect. iii. p. 157. The Doctor adds, 'The patrimony of St. Peter was worſe governed than any other part of Europe; and though a generous pontiff might ſuſpend for a little, or counteract the effect of thoſe vices which are peculiar to the government of eccleſiaſtics, the diſeaſe not only remained incurable, but has gone on increaſing from age to age, and the decline of the ſtate has kept pace with its progreſs.' On reading over this paſſage a doubt ariſes whether it ought not to be expunged, as unjuſtly ſevere. Conſidered in one view, the dominion of the popes was naturally prejudicial to ſociety; but an evil becomes a good, which prevents evils greater than itſelf. The authority of popes reſtrained the alternate tyranny of paramount kings and feudal barons. Religion, in its leaſt perfect form, was a check to headſtrong paſſion, and a reſtraint on ruffian violence: and ſhould it be admitted, that the temporal government of eccleſiaſtics had tended to depreſs the induſtry and populouſneſs of their immediate dominions, (a poſition which would require a very complex and elaborate inveſtigation to ſubſtantiate,) yet this local depreſſion would be compenſated and overbalanced by the diſtinguiſhed merit of the popes, in the preſervation, advancement, and diffuſion of learning, civility, and elegant arts; to which Rome, in barbarous ages, offered the only, or the ſafeſt, aſylum; and of which ſhe ſtill exhibits the moſt ineſtimable models.

and their wealth to the Grand Duke, who, parſimonious in the extreme, as to his own perſon and government, is thought ſolicitous of ſeconding by his heavy purſe the wild projects of his brother the Emperor Joſeph, the little republic of St. Marino, on the contrary, has been increaſing its populouſneſs, confirming its ſtrength, and extending the baſis of its government. For theſe advantages it is indebted to its mountainous ſituation, virtuous manners, and total want of ambition; which laſt-mentioned qualities, as ancient hiſtory teaches us, are far from being characteriſtics of republican government; though a republic that is without them can neither ſubſiſt happily itſelf, nor allow happineſs to its neighbours.

In the republics of Italy, (St. Marino alone excepted,) the people at large are excluded, by the circumſtance of their birth, from any principal ſhare in the ſovereignty. Inſtead of one royal maſter, they are ſubjects of ſix hundred[1] petty princes; and their condition is far leſs eligible than that of the ſubjects of monarchies; becauſe the latter cannot be collectively degraded by the rank of a monarch, which, excluding compariſon, is ſuperior to envy; and are individually entitled to aſpire, by their talents and merits, to the exerciſe of every magiſtracy, and to the enjoyment of every preferment and every honour which their king and country can beſtow. The republic of St. Marino, on the other hand, like ſeveral commonwealths of antiquity, and like ſome leſſer Cantons of Switzerland, for the greater are univerſally moulded after the rigid Italian model, contains

[1] In the ſhop of an eminent bookſeller and publiſher of an ancient and celebrated republic of Italy, I was explaining to a young patrician the nature of an Engliſh circulating library. 'Why do not you, Paſquali,' ſaid he, turning to the bookſeller, 'introduce ſuch an inſtitution?' The other replied, '*Sono troppo principi!*—We have too many princes.'

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contains what is found by experience to be a due mixture of popular government among ſo ſimple a people, and in ſo ſmall a ſtate. The Council of Sixty is equally compoſed of *nobili* and *cittadini*, patricians and plebeians. This council, which may be called the ſenate, conducts the ordinary branches of public adminiſtration; but the *Arengo*, or aſſembly of the people, containing a repreſentative from every houſe or family, may be ſummoned for the purpoſe of elections and on other important emergencies: it has long uniformly approved the deciſions of the ſenate. In chooſing ſenators and magiſtrates, the reſpect of the citizens for hereditary worth commonly raiſes the ſon to the dignity before held by his father. Indeed moſt profeſſions and employments deſcend in lineal ſucceſſion among this ſimple people; a circumſtance which explains a very extraordinary fact mentioned by Mr. Addiſon, that in two purchaſes made reſpectively in the years 1100 and 1170, the names of the commiſſioners or agents, on the part of the republic, ſhould be the ſame in both tranſactions, though the deeds were executed at the diſtance of ſeventy years from each other.

Notwithſtanding the natural and proper influence of wealth and birth and merit, the liberties and properties of individuals are incomparably more ſafe in St. Marino than they can ever poſſibly be under the capricious tyranny of a levelling democracy; and the people at large have the firmeſt ſecurity that their ſuperiors will not abuſe their juſt pre-eminence, ſince all the plebeians of full age are trained to arms, and commanded by a ſort of military tribune of their own chooſing, whoſe employment is inferior in dignity to that of the *capitaneos*, or conſuls, yet altogether diſtinct from the juriſdiction of thoſe patrician magiſtrates. This important military officer is overlooked by Mr.

Mr. Addiſon, who has alſo omitted to mention the treaſurer of the republic. The buſineſs of the latter conſiſts in collecting and adminiſtering the public contributions, and in paying the *ſtipendiati* or penſionaries, whoſe ſalaries, as may be imagined, are extremely moderate; that of the *commiſſareo*, or chief judge, amounting only to ſixty pounds a-year. His income is conſiderably augmented by the *ſportulæ*, or fees paid by the litigant parties; ſo that his whole appointments fall little ſhort of one hundred pounds *per annum*, a ſum which in this primitive commonwealth is found ſufficient to ſupport the dignity of a chief juſtice.

The laws of St. Marino are contained in a thin folio, printed in 1599, at Rimini, intitled, "*Statuta Illuſtriſſimæ Reipublicæ;*" and the whole hiſtory of this happy and truly illuſtrious, becauſe virtuous and peaceful, community is compriſed in the following pages, extracted from the ſecret archives of the ſtate.

Marino and his companion Leon came from Illyria to Rimini towards the commencement of the fourth century, and exhibited the new phænomenon of Anachorites in the weſtern world. In order to practice their auſterities undiſturbed, Leon retired to Mount Feretro; and Marino, to Mount Titan; which mountains, diſtant ſeven Italian miles from each other, reſpectively aſſumed the names of San Leo and San Marino, about the beginning of the ninth century [k].

But

[k] The fame of theſe Saints appears to have been increaſed and confirmed by time. Marino, with whom we are concerned, is mentioned in martyrologies and calendars. He is ſaid to have been a Dalmatian by birth, and an architect by profeſſion; and to have come to Rimini, in his youth, towards the commencement of the fourth century. In the annals of Baronius, there is a letter of the year 511, which makes mention of an Anachorite who lived on Mount Titan. Marino, who afforded the firſt example of

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But long before this æra, many Italian monks emulating the auſtere ſuperſtition of the Illyrian ſtrangers, had been allured by romantic ſituations which accorded with the loftineſs and ſolemnity of their own characters; the inhabitants of the neighbouring plains, haraſſed by the barbarous incurſions which prevailed in the fifth and following centuries, occaſionally ſought refuge among rude and ſavage mountains, from more rude and more ſavage invaders. Amidſt theſe ferocious incurſions, which were finally repreſſed by Pepin and Charlemagne, the lay inhabitants of Mount Titan gradually united into a regular commonwealth; and the Anachorites formed themſelves into a religious ſociety, under the direction of an abbot. The *republic* early endowed the *convent* with lands amply ſufficient for its ſupport; the property of which lands, as appears by a rare manuſcript of the year 884, preſerved in the ſecret archives of the republic, was conteſted by Delton biſhop of Rimini againſt Stephen abbot of Mount Titan. The cauſe was tried, according to the cuſtom of thoſe times, by the *judices datini* and *ſcabini*; and decided in favour of the monaſtery. The ſame valuable monument which bears teſtimony to theſe facts, diſproves the fictitious donation of the mountain by King Pepin; of which grant the original has never been produced, but of which there are ſaid to be two copies, one by the Librarian Anaſtaſio, and the other by the Chamberlain Centio.

In

this auſtere mode of life in the weſt, muſt have left behind him a ſtrong impreſſion of his piety; ſince many churches were dedicated to his worſhip at wide intervals of time and place; among which may be mentioned the Royal Monaſtery of Pavia, built or reſtored by Aſtolphus king of the Lombards; an ancient church with a rich monaſtery at Rimini; the great pariſh church in Bologna, as well as the cathedral in the city and iſland of Arbe in the Adriatic, oppoſite to the Venetian province of Morlachia.

In the former we read "Serram[1] caſtrum St. Mariani," and in the latter, "Serram caſtrum St. Martini;" inſtead of both which names, St. Marino has been as abſurdly as arbitrarily ſubſtituted; ſince the place now bearing that name retained its original appellation of Mount Titan for more than a century after the date of king Pepin's pretended diploma.

The firſt inhabitants of the mountain did not eſtabliſh themſelves on the rough and rocky ſummits on which part of the city now ſtands, but occupied the gentle ſlope at a mile's diſtance in the direction of ſouth-weſt, then embraced by deep woods, and ſtill called *Il Luogo Vecchio;* words indicating that it was the ancient ſeat of the republic. In this ſequeſtered wilderneſs the inhabitants of Mount Titan long enjoyed a peaceful obſcurity, undiſturbed by the great powers which ſwayed the politics of Italy; and almoſt unknown to them, until Otho the Great invaded that country in the year 962, to make war on king Berenger. The latter retreated to Mount Feretro, aftewards called San Leo. His fortreſſes there were blocked up two years; he was at length compelled to ſurrender through famine; his queen and himſelf were carried priſoners into Franconia. During this warfare, the diſtrict of Mount Titan, conſpicuous by its vicinity and its loftineſs to the contending parties, was allowed to maintain its neutrality; an indulgence for which it was in part indebted to the jealouſy ſubſiſting

[1] In barbarous Latin and Italian, *ſerra* means a craggy mountain—a word applicable enough, but never really applied in ancient records to Mount Titan, afterwards called "Penne de St. Marino." The name is ſaid, in the manuſcript above cited, to have ariſen from the towers ſhaped like the feathers of an arrow, with which the mountain was crowned.

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ſubſiſting between the emperor Otho and John XII., who then wore the papal crown. The latter laboured by repeated embaſſies to moderate the ambition of the former, and to reſtrain the incurſions of his troops. The emperor, on the other hand, ſtruck by the ſingular manners of a people, whoſe honeſt ſimplicity gained his eſteem, and whoſe poverty could not tempt his avarice, frequently viſited Mount Titan, while his army was employed in the ſiege of Feretro; and on one occaſion of this ſort, confirmed by his Imperial grant the entire liberty and independence which the principal citizens of the republic ſwore that their anceſtors had from time immemorial enjoyed.

During the eleventh century Italy began to be torn by the diſſenſions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines; the former, partiſans of the pope; the latter, of the emperor. This inteſtine war, which pervaded the whole country, greatly multiplied the towers and baſtions by which every province, every diſtrict, and the reſidence of almoſt every diſtinguiſhed nobleman long continued to be fortified. Men ſcarcely felt themſelves ſecure in the moſt inacceſſible ſituations; and the inhabitants of St. Titan, now denominated St. Marino, removed from the ſloping lawn formerly mentioned, to the very ſummit of the mountain called Rocca di Girone, which natural faſtneſs the jealous republicans farther ſecured by walls and towers [m].

In the twelfth century they ſtrengthened their ſecurity by entering into an intimate connection with the counts of Felori, diſtinguiſhed ornaments of the Imperial party. This noble family, which afterwards gave dukes to Urbino, condeſcended to

[m] In the principal church of the preſent city, there is a ſtatue of the ſuppoſed founder of the republic, holding a mountain in his hand, crowned with three towers or caſtles; emblems fitly choſen for the arms of the community.

to become citizens of the republic; and brought to it an acceſſion of ſtrength and wealth, which ſoon diſcovered itſelf in the purchaſe of ſome grounds on the ſouth-weſt, and the extenſion of the city to ſituations more eligible than the Rocca di Girone, where the ſafety of the inhabitants was frequently endangered by the fury of the winds.

During the greater part of the thirteenth century, St. Marino eſcaped moleſtation from the petty, but almoſt continual, hoſtilities which diſtreſſed the neighbouring territories. This happy exemption from the evils incident to war, the republic owed to the wiſdom and moderation of its own councils, and to the friendly protection of the biſhopric of Feretro, which was long hereditary in the family of the counts of Felori of Mount Capiolo. But when that biſhopric fell into the poſſeſſion of the Guelph faction, and eſpecially after the new biſhop treacherouſly ſeized, in 1281, the fortreſs of San Leo belonging to the counts of Felori, the republic had its full ſhare of troubles. Its territories were repeatedly invaded, but the invaders were as often manfully repelled. The danger, however, increaſed when the crafty Malateſta de Verrucchio, who was alſo a warm partiſan of the Guelphs, made himſelf maſter of Rimini towards the cloſe of the thirteenth century; after having expelled from that city the chevalier Percitaule, a powerful Ghibelline, who with much difficulty eſcaped to St. Marino to the houſe of his friend the celebrated Guido Felorio, a man who afterwards inflicted ſignal vengeance on the party of the Guelphs.

From the æra laſt mentioned, the age of perſecution commenced; and the republic was continually haraſſed by the biſhops of Feretro, or by the lords of Rimini, for upwards of a century and a half; until, in the year 1462, the fierce Sigiſ-

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mond Malateſta, an execrated and excommunicated heretic, as odious by his vices, as eminent for his talents, was totally defeated by Pope Pius II. During this long period of warfare, the republic defended itſelf valiantly, under the counts of Felori and dukes of Urbino, its counſellors, protectors, and generals. About the middle of the fifteenth century, duke Frederic of Felorio procured for it an alliance with Florence; an alliance faithfully maintained on both ſides, while that republic continued to ſubſiſt. St. Marino alſo entered into a tranſaction with the king of the two Sicilies in 1459, in virtue of which it acquired the two ſouthern diſtricts of Fiorentino and Torricella, abounding in rich paſtures, embowered in lofty foreſts of oak and cheſnut trees. At the expence of its perſecutor Sigiſmond, it alſo extended its dominions on the north and eaſt, by gaining the diſtricts Serravalle and Faettano, highly productive in vines and olives; as well as the fertile fields of Mongiardino, which ſtill form the granary of the republic.

Thus did this little ſtate continue to flouriſh amidſt perpetual wars, and upheld by the virtue of its citizens, and guided by the paternal care of the family of the Felori. The alliance procured for it with Florence by means of Federico Felorio proved effectual for repelling the incurſions of the pope's armies, which in 1489 beſieged Robert Malateſta, the ſon of Sigiſmond, in Rimini. The Florentines enabled Federic duke of Urbino, to cover the dominions of its ally, and completely to defeat the invaders, who ſeem to have aimed at nothing leſs than the ſubjection of the community. The letters written by the government of Florence in this ſeaſon of danger, are ſtill preſerved in the ſecret archives of St. Marino. They bear teſtimony to that ſpirit of liberty which had prevailed in Italy from the æra

of

of the famous peace of Conſtance in 1170, when many of the principal cities in that country aſſumed the republican form of government. The Florentines write to their diſtreſſed allies, whom they addreſs by the appellation of "Magnificent lords, our deareſt friends," that they were not more indignant at the inſolence of the pope's troops in making inroads into the poſſeſſions of St. Marino, than if they had carried their incurſions to the gates of Florence itſelf. They obſerve, that they had haſtened to ſend troops and money, and alſo to diſpatch letters to the duke of Urbino, and to the governments of Naples and Milan; that aſſiſtance would ſpeedily arrive; and the remedy, doubtleſs, prove more effecacious than even the greatneſs of the evil required. "Exhortations to you, to be of good comfort, are unneceſſary, eſpecially from us who know the greatneſs of your ſouls, which render you ſo reſpectable a branch of our confederacy. Perſevere in ſhewing your prudence, fidelity, and courage, which, beſides that they will delight and gladden your own ſouls, (ſuch being the nature of virtue,) will greatly oblige us and our allies, who will keep your meritorious exertions in eternal remembrance." Next day the Florentines wrote again, exhorting the citizens of St. Marino "to remain firm and reſolute, to loſe their lives rather than their liberties, ſince it was far better for men accuſtomed to freedom to be dead than enſlaved. God, who favours the cauſe of freedom, will proſper your undertakings; and your intereſts will never be forſaken by us and our friends. You have heard of the ſupplies of men and money already raiſed for your aſſiſtance. More of both will continue to be provided, until you have enough."

From this time forward, until the year 1543, the republic, being unmoleſted by foreign enemies, flouriſhed in peace and

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and proſperity under the wiſe guidance of the dukes of Urbino, its counſellors and protectors. But in the year abovementioned, the exile Peter Strozzi, who commanded the French troops cantoned in Mirandola and its confines, where he was buſily employed in raiſing recruits for the ſervice of his maſter, Francis I. entered into a correſpondence with ſome of the pope's generals in that neighbourhood, for the ſurpriſe and conqueſt of St. Marino. The inſtrument choſen for effecting this deſign, was Captain Fabiano of Mount San Savino. The emperor Charles V. had landed at Genoa; and the pope Paul III. had proceeded as far as Bologna, eager to have an interview with the emperor, who was equally ſolicitous to avoid all intercourſe with his Holineſs. The movement thereby occaſioned in that part of Italy ſeemed to Strozzi and Fabiano the moſt favourable moment for executing their treacherous enterpriſe. Five hundred armed men were ſent in ſmall diviſions acroſs the ridges of Montagnaola. It was intended that, under the conduct of different guides, they ſhould unite into one body, and aſſail in the night the unſuſpecting republicans. But a thick fog baffled the local knowledge of the guides. The troops could not be in due time aſſembled: and the inhabitants of the place, being meanwhile apprized of their own imminent danger, immediately flew to arms, and compelled the invaders to retreat with the mortification of committing a fruitleſs crime, which had redounded as much to their own diſgrace as to the honour of their adverſaries.

The moſt memorable circumſtance attending this event was the warm intereſt taken by the Italian powers in the ſafety of St. Marino. Coſmo di Medici, duke of Florence, in a letter addreſſed to that government, and dated the 20th June 1543, mentions with how much diſpleaſure he had heard of Captain Fabiano's

Fabiano's undertaking; he requeſts that he himſelf might be favoured with a full account of the whole enterpriſe; its authors, agents, and abettors; aſſuring the "reſpectable citizens of St. Marino, his deareſt friends, that he will ever be ready to prove, by his utmoſt exertions, his unalterable attachment to whatever may concern their intereſt or honour." The marquis of Graſſales, then reſiding at Fano, as ambaſſador from the emperor to the pope, immediately diſpatched a courier to Genoa, to acquaint his Imperial majeſty with the tranſaction. This powerful and renowned prince, whoſe mind was equal to the greateſt affairs, thought not the ſmalleſt below his notice. He was no ſooner informed of the enterpriſe againſt St. Marino, than he ſent Baſtamenti di Herrera to confer in his name with its magiſtrates; to congratulate them on their ſafety, and to aſſure them that he would always conſider their affairs as his own; ſince, beſides his great concern for the tranquillity of Italy in general, he could not but view with the fondeſt partiality a commonwealth, whoſe government had ever been ſo wiſely and ſo regularly adminiſtered. The pope, Paul III., did not chooſe to be behind-hand with other princes in his profeſſions of regard: and in order to ingratiate himſelf with the emperor, whoſe favour he then courted, thought fit to order the French troops to quit the neighbourhood of St. Marino, and to keep at an unſuſpicious diſtance from its territory.

This favourable diſpoſition in his Holineſs towards them, was cultivated by the republicans with equal aſſiduity and ſucceſs. In the year 1548, the pope's treaſurer and the officers of his revenue in Romagna endeavoured indeed to ſubject the commonwealth to the new tax on ſalt, which had been impoſed on all the reſt of that province. But Paul himſelf explicitly

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plicitly diſavowed this proceeding; and iſſued his brief, dated 11th October 1548, declaring the complete independence of St. Marino in temporal affairs; and thus confirming its inhabitants in the enjoyment of their immemorial liberties. The ſame equitable conduct towards the republic was purſued by his ſucceſſors Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; under the latter of whom, the duchy of Urbino, on the demiſe of its laſt duke in 1623, being united to the dominions of the Holy See, the republic of St. Marino paſſed under the protection of the ſame power, upon many and well-defined conditions. This political connection with the pope was not thought greatly to intrench on the independence of the commonwealth. It had been uſual with the Italian republics of the middle age to court the patronage of neighbouring princes; and, even in their conſtitutional concerns, to have recourſe to noblemen of high rank and ſplendid fortune, who might alternately preſide in their tribunals[n], and command their armies. St. Marino had long repoſed unbounded yet well-placed confidence in the family of Felori; and what Machiavel ſays of Florence is in a great degree applicable to all the other free ſtates of Italy, that their affairs were never proſperous, unleſs when conducted by the ſteady wiſdom of ſome illuſtrious individual.

St. Marino reſpected the popes in their civil, and venerated them in their religious character. The warm expreſſions of thoſe ſentiments contented the vicars of St. Peter; but ſuch empty acknowledgments would not ſatisfy the ambitious and intriguing

[n] St. Marino was diſtinguiſhed above the neighbouring republics, for the impartiality with which juſtice was adminiſtered; and was later than moſt of them in adopting the "Judice eſtero," the juriſdiction of a foreigner, "articolo troppo neceſſario per tolgierſi ogni ſuſpicione nei guidici pæſani:" an eſtabliſhment found neceſſary in conſequence of the too juſt ſuſpicions againſt judges born in the country."

intriguing Alberoni, who, when legate of Romagna in the year 1740, formed a plan for converting reſpect into allegiance, and the duty of protection into the right of dominion. A conſiderable party of the inhabitants, ſeduced by his promiſes, or gained by his bribes, had conſented to betray into his hands the liberties of their country. When the appointed day arrived, Alberoni rode up the mountain, attended by a numerous ſuite. He was received by the principal inhabitants at the door of the great church, and conducted by the prieſts to a magnificent ſeat under a canopy. But unfortunately for the execution of his purpoſe, the maſs began, as uſual in that republic, with the word "Libertas." This ſingle word produced ſuch an enthuſiaſm in the minds of thoſe who underſtood his deſigns, as well as of thoſe who only ſuſpected them, that they roſe with common conſent, attacked the cardinal and his attendants, drove them precipitately from the church, and made them deſcend the mountain with a degree of diſordered trepidation extremely unlike to the ſlow and pompous ſolemnity with which they had aſcended it. This laſt memorable event in the hiſtory of St. Marino well correſponds with that firmneſs and courage with which it is ſuppoſed to have maintained its independence, amidſt the hoſtile colliſions of Imperial and Pontifical power; an independence, however, which appears to have been owing to the penurious circumſtances of a people, which could not tempt rapacity, and their virtuous manners which always conciliated the affection of one party, more than they provoked the animoſity of another.

From the preceding narrative it is not very eaſy to aſcertain what ſhare Marino, the Dalmatian architect, had in the firſt inſtitution of the ſtate. On the ſuppoſition that he was its

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founder and lawgiver, Mr. Addiſon obſerves, " that the origin of St. Marino muſt be acknowledged to be far nobler than that of Rome, which was an aſylum for robbers and murderers; whereas St. Marino was the reſort of perſons eminent for their piety and devotion. This obſervation appears to me to be erroneous in two reſpects, decorating with unfair honours the one republic, and heaping unmerited diſgrace on the other. If piety founded St. Marino, with this piety much ſuperſtition was intermixed; a ſuperſtition unfriendly to the beſt principles of ſociety, and hoſtile to the favourite ends of nature, preaching celibacy, and exacting mortification, the hideous offspring of ignorance and terror, deteſting men as criminals, and trembling at God as a tyrant. But Rome, according to the only hiſtorian° who has circumſtantially and authentically deſcribed its early tranſactions, was an expanſion of Alba Longa, itſelf a Grecian colony, which, according to the immemorial and ſacred cuſtom of its mother-country, diffuſed into new ſettlements the exuberance of a flouriſhing population, produced by the wiſeſt and moſt liberal inſtitutions. According to the ſame admirable hiſtorian, the manly diſcernment of Romulus offered an aſylum not merely for robbers and murderers, but for thoſe who were threatened with murder or robbery, who ſpurned ſubjection, or fled from oppreſſion; for amidſt the lawleſs turbulence of ancient Italy, the weak needed protectors againſt the ſtrong, the few againſt the many; and Rome, at her earlieſt age, already ſyſtematically aſſiſted the weakeſt party; thus adopting in her infancy that politic heroiſm, that was deſtined by firm and majeſtic ſteps to conduct her manhood and maturity to the fair ſovereignty of conſenting nations.

Both

° Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus.

Both in their origin and in their progreſs, Rome and St. Marino form the natural objects, not indeed of a compariſon, but of a ſtriking contraſt; and compreſſed as is the latter republic between the dominions of the Pope and thoſe of the Grand Duke, to whoſe ſubjects St. Marino is now bound to allow a free paſſage through its territory, its citizens would deſerve ridicule or pity, did they affect the character, or imitate the maxims, of thoſe magnanimous ſenators, who, for the ſpace of more than two centuries, ſwayed the politics and controlled the revolutions of the world. Convinced that their independence reſults chiefly from their inſignificancy, the ſenators of St. Marino ſmiled, when we read in Mr. Addiſon, 'Theſe republicans would ſell their liberties dear to any that attacked them.' We had not the indelicacy to deſire them to interpret this ſmile; or to make ourſelves any comment upon it, being perſuaded, that, precarious and ſhadowy as their liberty is, their rational knowledge and their virtues have enabled them to extract from it both ſubſtantial and permanent enjoyment, and make them live happier here, amidſt rocks and ſnows, than are their Tuſcan and Roman neighbours in rich plains and warm vallies.

To the inhabitants of this little ſtate, the ſenate, the aſſembly, the different offices of magiſtracy, innocent rural labours, and military exerciſes equally uſeful and innocent, ſupply a continual ſucceſſion of manly engagements. Hopes and fears reſpecting the ſafety of their country awaken curioſity and excite inquiry. They read the gazettes of Europe with intereſt; they ſtudy hiſtory with improvement; in converſation their queſtions are pertinent, and their anſwers ſatisfactory. Contrary to what has been obſerved by travellers of other

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Italians, the citizens of St. Marino delight in literary converſation; and Mr. Addiſon remarks, that he hardly met with an unlettered man in their republic. In ſpeaking of Beccaria's book on Style, then recently publiſhed, one of the ſenators ſaid, that it was a treatiſe on ſtyle in a very bad ſtyle, abounding in falſe ornaments and epigrammatic galliciſm. Another obſerved, he wiſhed that faſhionable writer, who had been commented on by Voltaire, an author ſtill more faſhionable and more pernicious than himſelf, would confine himſelf to ſuch harmleſs topics as rhetoric and ſtyle; for his book on crimes and puniſhments was calculated to do much ſerious miſchief, at leaſt to prevent much poſitive good; becauſe in that popular work he had declaimed very perſuaſively againſt capital puniſhments, in a country long diſgraced by capital crimes, which were ſcarcely ever capitally puniſhed.

The love of letters which diſtinguiſhes the people of St. Marino makes them regret that they are ſeldom viſited by literary travellers. Of our own countrymen belonging to this deſcription, they mentioned with much reſpect Mr. Addiſon, and Il Signor Giovanni Symonds, now profeſſor of hiſtory in the univerſity of Cambridge. We were proud of being claſſed with ſuch men by the honeſt ſimplicity of theſe virtuous mountaineers, whom we left with regret, moſt heartily wiſhing to them the continuance of their liberties; which, to men of their character, and theirs only, are real and ſolid bleſſings.

For let it never be forgotten, that the ineſtimable gift of civil liberty may often be providentially withheld, becauſe it cannot be ſafely beſtowed, unleſs rational knowledge has been attained, and virtuous habits have been acquired. In the language of the wiſeſt man of Pagan antiquity, a great length of time

time is requiſite to the formation of any moderately good government; becauſe that government is always the beſt, which is the beſt adapted to the genius and habits of its ſubjects [p]. The inſtitutions which ſuit the well-balanced frame of mind of the mountaineers of St. Marino, who, breathing a purer air, ſeem to have diveſted themſelves of many of the groſſer and more earthly affections, might ill accord with the ſoftened tenants of the Capuan plains; ſince, according to the ſame penetrating ſearcher into the ſecrets of human nature, 'the inhabitants of the Fortunate Iſlands, if ſuch iſlands really exiſt, muſt either be the moſt virtuous or the moſt wretched of men.' Ariſtotle hardly knew the inhabitants of the Britiſh Iſles; but let us, who know ourſelves and our good fortune, confide in the aſſurance, that this incompatible author would no longer entertain the above geographical doubt, were he to revive in the eighteenth century, and to viſit the Britiſh dominions under the government of George III. [q] As we have long been the happieſt of nations, let us cheriſh the hope, that the cauſes of our happineſs are, morally ſpeaking, unalterable. The character of our anceſtors, uniting, beyond all people on earth, firmneſs with humanity, gave to us our government; and the preſervation of our government, as it now ſtands, under a prince who is at once the patron and the model of thoſe virtues on which alone national proſperity can reſt, forms the ſureſt pledge for the ſtability of that character, which has long adorned, and we truſt will ever adorn, the envied name of BRITON.

[p] Ariſtot. Politics, b. ii. p. 6.

[q] About the time this was written, a letter from a foreign prelate, now high in office in a neighbouring country, contained the following memorable words: "Tout ici," meaning England, "eſt dans un état de proſperité vraiment révoltante."

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

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IN this Third Book, the author, proceeding to inveſtigate the nature and characteriſtic qualities of the different forms of government, begins, according to his uſual method, by analyſing that complex object, a commonwealth, into its conſtituent elements, called citizens. His firſt inquiry, therefore, is, what conſtitutes a citizen? An inquiry that will appear very ſimple to many of thoſe ſimple men who are continually debating particular caſes involved in the ſolution of this general queſtion.

It is worthy of remark that in oppoſition to thoſe ancient, as well as thoſe modern theories, which vainly endeavour to reduce practical matters to metaphyſical preciſion, Ariſtotle maintains that the definition of a citizen which holds good in one ſtate, is often not at all applicable in another. He even beſtows that honourable name on thoſe who, in modern times, are more uſually denominated ſubjects; obſerving, "that as government is properly an arrangement of thoſe who are partners in the benefits of political ſociety, the fitneſs of government muſt, like that of every other arrangement, depend primarily and principally on the nature and differences of the objects that collectively compoſe the ſyſtem. This arrangement, therefore, muſt vary

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with every variation of its parts, materials, or elements; which, in this caſe, are ſentient and moral beings, liable to be affected and altered by a wide variety of actuating principles." In enmuerating theſe principles, the author obſerves, that the diſtinctive characters of communities are greatly dependent on the means uſually employed by them for acquiring the neceſſaries and accommodations of life. Paſtoral, agricultural, and commercial nations are, therefore, ſeverally marked by ſtrong lines of diſcrimination. Climate alſo has a conſpicuous influence; and innumerable local cauſes concurring with the events of time and chance, and co-operating with education and nature ſo variouſly mould mankind, that nothing but the blindneſs of ignorance and narrowneſs of prejudice could think of extending ſimilar plans of policy to nations as differently circumſtanced, as they are unlike in the bent of their genius.

But though governments may and muſt vary in their form, they ought all to agree in their end, "the good of the governed." Ariſtotle ſtrenuouſly maintains this doctrine, which will ever ſound ſo harſhly in the ears of political bigots of all deſcriptions; and which has ever been as inſolently ſcorned in the practice of republican demagogues, as it has been ſhameleſsly combated in the arguments of court flatterers. By what arrangements the good of the governed is moſt likely to be promoted, muſt be learned from the experience of hiſtory; but, in our author's opinion, that people ought to remain contented with its lot, which is not mocked with ſhadows inſtead of realities; deluded with tyranny under the ſemblance of royalty, oligarchy under that of ariſtocracy, and democracy under that of a republic. Regardleſs of perſonal danger from tyrants or a tyrannical populace, the philoſopher boldly arraigns thoſe baſe

baſe cheats and vile counterfeits; thoſe unnatural perverſions of lawful power, and wicked mimics of legitimate government. It is not eaſy to diſcover which of the parties that then divided and tore in pieces their common country, he moſt heartily abhors. In civil commotions, a man who is called to act, ought publicly to chooſe his ſide, though he may often have but a choice of difficulties; but he whoſe buſineſs is ſpeculation will commonly beſt perform his duty, if, in proportion to the meaſure of his courage and abilities, he ventures to expoſe and condemn the exceſſes of contending factions, and to ſuggeſt thoſe reflections that have the moſt direct tendency to ſooth their rage, and to moderate their fury. This taſk our philoſopher ſkilfully performs, by proving with irreſiſtible evidence that birth, wealth, education, and authority, as well as courage, ſtrength, numbers, and liberty, are all of them eſſential ingredients in the compoſition of a well-conſtituted commonwealth; but that the compoſition muſt fall in pieces, when any one of the elements is active beyond its ſphere; whether government be engroſſed by contemptuous opulence, or uſurped by rapacious poverty; oppreſſed by the unfeeling pride of the few, or diſgraced by the malignant paſſions of the multitude.

The Third Book of the Politics concludes with an enumeration and deſcription of the different kinds of monarchy; a ſpecies of government which, according to our author, is not only legitimate, but in many countries neceſſary. The moſt extenſive ſurvey of hiſtory fully juſtifies the concluſions which the philoſopher had drawn from the records of Egypt and the eaſt. The Romans, who in the age of the Scipios had admired "the ſervile ſtupidity of the Cappadocians in declaring that they could not live without a king [a]," acknowledged in the age

[a] Θαυμασαντες ει τινες εισιν ἐτως απειρηκοτες προς την ἐλευθεριαν. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

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age of Auguſtus, that their own commonwealth could not happily ſubſiſt but under the dominion of one prince [b]. The emperor Julian [c] repreſents all the great nations of his own times as governed by the ſame political principles, which had been ſo uniformly [d] maintained by the Cappadocians. If liberty had been offered to the Thracians, the Myſians, and the Getæ, thoſe populous and warlike tribes would, according to Philoſtratus [e], have ſpurned the unwelcome preſent. The hiſtorian Livy acknowledges that the cities ſubject to king Eumenes had not any reaſon to envy the boaſted condition of republicans [f]; and the orator Iſocrates congratulates in ſtill warmer language, the felicity of the ſtates of Cyprus, which had ſubmitted to the dominion of Evagoras [g]. But the ſtrongeſt argument in favour of monarchy is deducible from the progreſſive proſperity of moſt countries of Europe, during the preſent and two preceding centuries; in which courſe of time the diſmembered provinces of the weſtern empire have enjoyed under kings a meaſure of national felicity unexampled in the hiſtory of the world.

As a conſiderable part of Ariſtole's treatiſe on monarchy has periſhed, it would be preſumptuous to aſſign limits to the improvement of which he thought that form of government ſuſceptible. From a hint in the Sixth Book of his Politics, he appears to have been fully aware of the utility of a reviſion of ſentences paſſed under the influence of popular deluſion, or

[b] Seneca de Beneficiis, l. ii. c. 20. [c] Julian. adverſ. Chriſtian.

[d] They rejected the republican government when offered to them by their conquerors; and when their own royal line became extinct, called Ariobarzanes to an hereditary throne; and after the extinction alſo of the line of Ariobarzanes in the third generation, cheerfully ſubmitted to Archelaus, a ſtranger, recommended to them by Mark Anthony. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

[e] Philoſtrat. in Vit. Apollon. [f] Liv. l. xlii. c. 5. [g] Iſocrat. in Evagor.

or extorted through the ſeverity of legal forms; maintaining that in every well-governed ſtate, a diſcretionary power of grace and mercy ſhould be lodged, not with the ſubordinate magiſtrate, but with the ſupreme executive authority. This doubtleſs, if not the moſt ſplendid diſtinction, is at leaſt the moſt amiable prerogative of the throne. But there are other diſtinctions totally unknown to antiquity, yet calculated to produce both the moſt important immediate benefits, and to give to modern monarchy a degree of firmneſs and ſtability of which no other form of government can boaſt.

We read in Plutarch [h] of the coronation oath adminiſtered to the kings of Epirus. Xenophon [i] mentions a ſimilar inſtitution in Lacedæmon. Both Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus [k] deſcribe the conſtitutional limitations of the kings of Perſia. The laſt-mentioned writer alſo copiouſly expatiates on the ſingular reſtraints impoſed on the kings of Egypt during their lives, and relates that thoſe of them who had incurred public indignation, were publicly arraigned after their death, and publicly puniſhed by the privation of a royal, or even a decent ſepulture [l]. Joſephus informs us that this regulation alſo prevailed in Judæa [m]. But all theſe expedients, as well as thoſe employed by the Macedonians, the freeſt nation of antiquity acknowledging the authority of kings, were coarſe and uncertain contrivances for limiting the regal power; contrivances always ſo doubtful, and often ſo ineffectual, that by the conſenting voice of antiquity, the happineſs of a people was held by the precarious tenure of perſonal merit in the prince. In conſequence of this opinion, the

[h] Plut. in Pyrrho. [i] De Repub. Lacedæm. [k] L. xvii.
[l] Diodor. l. i. ſect. 72. [m] Joſeph. l. viii. c. 3.

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the right of election appeared the moſt plauſible title to a throne; and even in thoſe countries where the royal pre-eminence of particular families was univerſally acknowledged, there was not any invariable rule for aſcertaining among different pretenders the order of ſucceſſion. This is fully illuſtrated in the hiſtory of the kingdoms formed from the diſmemberment of the Macedonian empire, and deſerves to be conſidered as one principal cauſe of their rapid decline and final extinction. But when the ſalutary maxims are eſtabliſhed "that kings can do no wrong, and that acts of government can be legaliſed only through the intervention of reſponſible miniſters," the inequalities of perſonal character in princes become ſo harmleſs in practice, that the caſual advantages of election totally diſappear on compariſon with the certain benefit of a fixed and definite rule to which nations may always have recourſe for tranſmitting without bloodſhed the inheritance of their crowns.

On this ſpecies of monarchy, limited and hereditary, the fruits of genuine republicaniſm have been ſucceſsfully engrafted; and are found by experience to flouriſh there, with a degree of vigour and of beauty which they had never exhibited on their parent plant. This form of government alone completely ſolves the problem propoſed by our author, when he obſerves, that, "difficult as it is to adjuſt the true theory of political arrangements, it is ſtill more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper poſitions." This difficulty, I ſay, is ſurmounted by modern monarchy, and by it only; under which alſo, as will be proved hereafter, that diſtribution of political functions on which all kinds of good adminiſtration ſo greatly depend, may be moſt completely eſtabliſhed, and moſt ſteadily upheld.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Citizen—How conſtituted.—Virtues of the man and of the citizen.—Their difference.—Different forms of government.—Their diſtinctive characters.—Pretenſions of democracy—Of oligarchy.—Monarchy.—Its five kinds—Arraigned—Defended.

BOOK III. Chap. 1.

Analyſis of a commonwealth.

IN explaining the nature and principle [a] of the different forms of government, which are nothing elſe than various arrangements of men in ſociety, it is neceſſary clearly to aſcertain what conſtitutes a ſtate; an object not uniformly conceived, nor accurately defined; ſince one perſon often aſcribes *that* to the ſtate, which another holds to be an act merely of the king or of the ſenate, of the tyrant or the oligarchy. A ſtate or commonwealth, then, is a complex object; its component elements are thoſe called citizens; to know therefore what is a commonwealth, we muſt previouſly inveſtigate what conſtitutes a citizen. In different governments, the term citizen denotes different deſcriptions of perſons; in democracies, men in the loweſt walks of life are often entitled to this reſpectable appellation; from which perſons of the ſame claſs are, in oligarchies, totally

[a] τις ἑκαστη (ſcil. πολιτεια) και ποια τις. "What each form of government is, and what are its qualities" Its qualities, as we ſhall ſee, reſult from its principle, and this again depends on the materials from which it is compoſed; for Ariſtotle did not agree with thoſe audacious political ſpeculatiſts, who think it allowable to treat men as artificers do wood or metal.

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totally excluded. It is not, therefore, the rank in life that conſtitutes the rank in a commonwealth [o].

What conſtitutes a citizen.

The term citizen is ſometimes applied to illuſtrious foreigners who, for their merit or ſervices, have been aſſociated to the honours and adopted into the boſom of the republic. But ſuch honorary citizens form not the ſubject of our preſent inquiry. It is plain likewiſe that the bare circumſtance of place, or the habitual reſidence in the territory or city, does not conſtitute a citizen, ſince ſlaves, and the claſs of men called inhabitants [p], are not diſtinguiſhed by this appellation. Nor are thoſe to be conſidered as our fellow-citizens who merely enjoy the protection of our laws, and who are qualified in their own perſons to appear under the characters of plaintiffs and defendants; for ſtrangers with whoſe countries we have a treaty of commerce, or an intercourſe of hoſpitality, are entitled to challenge as their due the protection of our courts of juſtice; although in many cities thoſe who are ſimply inhabitants cannot proſecute or defend in their own name, but in all their legal tranſactions muſt have recourſe to their procurator or patron. Minors not yet enrolled at the regiſter-office, and perſons ſuperannuated, who are honourably diſcharged from civil functions, fugitives, outlaws, and men branded by the note of infamy, can none of them be called properly or ſimply citizens, ſince whenever we apply to them this name, we muſt join with it ſome epithet or corrective,

[o] For the ſake of perſpicuity, I have expanded this paſſage conformably to the author's words below, c. iii. and in various parts of his works.

[p] μετοικοι, commonly but improperly tranſlated ſojourners, ſince theſe have a caſual, merely, and unſettled reſidence; whereas the Grecian μετοικοι reſided habitually and fixedly in their reſpective ſtates, like the claſs called "habitans" in Geneva, and ſome Swiſs Cantons; and were, as our author ſays in another paſſage, ſharers in the ſame habitation, though not partners in the government.

corrective, without which addition we do not accurately explain our meaning. Who then is ſimply or properly a citizen? He, and he only, who enjoys a due ſhare in the government of that community of which he is a member.

The ſhare of the government, or magiſtracy, common to all the citizens not diſtinguiſhed by a name.

Of the offices of government, ſome are limited in point of time; the man who has exerciſed them once, cannot exerciſe them again, or at leaſt cannot reſume them, till a certain interval has elapſed from the time when he laid them down. Other offices are not thus limited, but may be occaſionally exerciſed by all the citizens, at all times, indifferently. Of this kind is the power of deciding as a judge or juryman in the tribunals, and that of voting as a member in the national aſſembly. It is true, that jurymen[q] and voters, as their office is common to all the citizens, are not diſtinguiſhed by any appropriate appellation denoting their indefinite or perpetual powers; they are not even dignified by the name of magiſtrates; yet if magiſtracy be ſomething more than an honorary title, it belongs in reality moſt peculiarly to thoſe who are inveſted with the higheſt authority in the ſtate; who direct the national deliberations, who govern the public reſolves, and who are the ultimate umpires of reputation, life, and property.

Though anonymous, the moſt important of all magiſtracies.

Under what conſtitutions the ſtrict definition of a citizen is applicable.

This definition of a citizen cannot, however, be applied in the greater part of governments actually exiſting in the world, many of which, as will appear hereafter, are nothing better than corruptions

[q] The Grecian tribunals agreed more nearly with our notion of juries than the Roman. The former generally admitted of the citizens at large; whereas the Roman judicature was exerciſed on ordinary occaſions, for near three centuries, by the Patricians excluſively. But that the Romans thought with Ariſtotle as to the ſupreme importance of the judicial power, appears from the perpetual ſtruggles on this ſubject among the orders in the commonwealth; particularly during that moſt important period which elapſed from the ſeditions of the Gracchi, to the deſpotiſm of the Cæſars.

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corruptions and tyrannies. Neither is it applicable in its full extent in thoſe communities which, though governed with a view to the public good, have ſubſtituted the authority of kings or ſenates to the power of popular aſſemblies and popular tribunals. In Sparta and at Carthage, as we have before ſeen, the judiciary power is intruſted to certain magiſtrates; to the Ephori in civil, to the ſenate in criminal, trials; and when ſuch magiſtrates rule by vicarious ſucceſſion, he may be called a citizen who has a right to govern in his turn. In democracies, this right is extended to the people at large. The definition of a citizen above given is therefore peculiarly applicable to popular governments; and a city or commonwealth is nothing elſe than a collection of citizens thus deſcribed, ſufficiently numerous for attaining that purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which civil ſociety was inſtituted.

Coarſe definitions of a citizen.

It is a coarſe and unſatisfactory, but ſometimes an uſeful, definition of a citizen, to ſay that he is one deſcended from citizens in the male and female line; or one whoſe anceſtors were citizens for two or more generations. The queſtion ſtill recurs, what conferred this character on thoſe anceſtors who

Difficulties occaſioned thereby.

firſt founded the ſtate? To them the circumſtance of deſcent cannot poſſibly apply; and if anceſtry alone were ſufficient to make citizens, we might inquire, as Gorgias of Leontium, either in doubt or in irony, aſked the Theſſalians of Lariſſa, whether as potters make pots [r], there were certain artificers at Lariſſa for manufacturing Lariſſean citizens. It is inquired with better reaſon, whether thoſe are citizens who have obtained this appellation in conſequence of a revolution in the commonwealth? At Athens, Cliſthenes, after the expulſion of the tyrants,

[r] The original ſays, "as mortar-makers make mortars."

tyrants, aggregated many ſtrangers and many ſlaves to this honourable claſs [s]. In this caſe, the queſtion is not whether theſe are citizens, but whether they became ſuch *juſtly*. Some, indeed, hold that he who is unjuſtly a citizen, is a pſeudo-citizen, a mere counterfeit. But this cannot be true, if we define a citizen, as above, by the power or magiſtracy with which he is inveſted, and acknowledge that many magiſtrates, and even kings, who have obtained their offices unjuſtly, ſtill continue nevertheleſs to govern and to reign. He is juſtly a citizen who is created ſuch by the act of the commonwealth; but what is an act of the commonwealth may ſometimes, as we before obſerved, be a matter of diſpute. When an oligarchy or a tyranny is converted into a democracy, ſome people are of opinion that the contracts entered into by the magiſtrates or the tyrant ought not to be fulfilled, becauſe thoſe contracts were the acts not of the commonwealth, but of the government; and of a government too, not founded on public utility, but eſtabliſhed by injuſtice, and ſupported by force. Yet democracies themſelves have often been ſo eſtabliſhed and ſo ſupported, and *their* acts, at leaſt, have nevertheleſs always been conſidered as the acts of the commonwealth [t].

To

[s] Ariſtotle ſays, "εφυλετευσε, diſtributed among the tribes, many ſtrangers," &c. See above, p. 68.

[t] Therefore, "If the acts of tyrannical democracies are conſidered as thoſe of the ſtate, in the ſame manner ought the acts of oligarchies and tyrannies." Hooker had ſtudied Ariſtotle, and from this *arch philoſopher*, as he calls him, (Eccleſiaſtical Polity, l. i. ſect. 10.) he himſelf borrowed the moſt ſolid parts of his excellent, but often miſapplied, work. In reference to the ſubject in the text, he obſerves, "that in many things aſſent is given, they that give it not imagining that they do ſo, becauſe the manner of their aſſenting is not apparent. As for example, when an abſolute monarch commandeth his ſubjects that which ſeemeth good in his own diſcretion,

BOOK III. Chap. 2.

What conſtitutes the identity of a commonwealth.

To determine what is the act of the body politic often depends on aſcertaining the circumſtances which conſtitute its ſameneſs or identity; circumſtances which are no ſooner withdrawn, than its continuity of exiſtence is diſſolved, and the commonwealth or city [u] no longer remains the ſame identical city that it was before. That the ſameneſs of local ſituation does not conſtitute this identity, will appear evident to the moſt ſuperficial obſerver. A commonwealth may tranſport itſelf from one place to another, and ſome portion of its members may live at a remote diſtance from the reſt. The Peloponneſus and its ſeven republics might be incloſed within one wall; but within this wall would be contained not a city or commonwealth, but an aggregate of nations, leſs connected with each other than the inhabitants of Babylon, whoſe walls, it is ſaid, were ſtormed and taken upwards of two days before every diviſion of the immenſe multitude was appriſed of the public diſaſter. Concerning the magnitude of ſtates we ſhall have occaſion afterwards to ſpeak; and to examine whether they may be compoſed of many nations, or ought to conſiſt of one only; an inquiry not miſbecoming a ſtateſman. At preſent, let us inquire whether the ſameneſs of inhabitants, or rather the continuance

hath not this edict the force of a law, whether they diſapprove or diſlike it? Again, that which hath been received long ſince, and is by cuſtom now eſtabliſhed, we keep as a law which we may not tranſgreſs.... And to be commanded we conſent, where that ſociety, whereof we are part, hath at any time before conſented, without revoking the ſame after by the like univerſal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed paſt is good as long as he himſelf continueth it, ſo the act of a public ſociety of men done five hundred years ſince ſtandeth their's who preſently are of the ſame ſociety, becauſe corporations are immortal: we were then alive in our predeceſſors, and they in their ſucceſſors do live ſtill." Eccleſ. Polit. p. 19. edit. 1723.

[u] A city, the author obſerves, is one of thoſe words which are taken in different acceptations; in the ſenſe here meant it is ſynonymous with commonwealth.

continuance of the ſame race of inhabitants, conſtitutes the identity of a commonwealth, in the ſame manner as the identity of a fountain or river is aſcertained by the flowing of the ſame kind of water from the ſame ſources, though in perpetually varying ſtreams. Agreeably to this compariſon, ought we to ſay that the commonwealth, while compoſed of the ſame race of men, continues the ſame identical commonwealth? Or rather, ought we not to ſay that the identity, in this caſe, is to be aſcribed merely to the people or the inhabitants? Every commonwealth, as we have ſaid, forms a ſort of partnerſhip or community; and in this community or partnerſhip each individual has his ſhare. This ſhare is determined by the form of the government, which is nothing elſe than the arrangement of the different individuals in the community; and when this arrangement is altered, the commonwealth, though ſtill compoſed of the ſame perſons, cannot remain ſpecifically the ſame. A tragic and a comic chorus may be executed by preciſely the ſame performers; preciſely the ſame notes compoſe the boldneſs of the Doric, and the wildneſs of the Phrygian muſic. In ſuch caſes, though the conſtituent parts be the ſame, a difference in their arrangement and diſpoſition produces a totally different reſult. The identity of a commonwealth depends, therefore, on the continuance of the ſame form of government; but it is a diſtinct inquiry, whether, in conſequence of a change in the form of government, contracts ſubſiſting before the revolution ought, in juſtice, to be fulfilled [x]?

A queſtion

[x] The author does not examine this queſtion, but it is eaſy to perceive that he would have decided it in a manner little conformable to the prevailing practice of his own times. The Athenians, indeed, gave one illuſtrious example of their reſpect for the ſanctity of engagements contracted in the name of the public, when they burdened

BOOK III. Chap. 3.

Diſtinction between the virtues of the man and of the citizen.

A queſtion naturally follows, whether a good citizen muſt of neceſſity be endowed with the virtues of a good man? This queſtion can only be ſolved by conſidering what are the eſſential qualities of a citizen. A citizen then is, as it were, one of a ſhip's company, and a ſharer with the reſt in one common concern. Different ſailors have different occupations. One ſteers the helm; another is boatſwain; many ply the oars. The accurate and complete definition of each individual muſt, doubtleſs, expreſs his particular employment and his appropriate duty. Yet one general definition is applicable to them all; ſince they are all alike concerned in promoting a proſperous navigation, and all alike intereſted in the ſafety of the common veſſel. The republic is the veſſel in which citizens are embarked; and the ſafety of the republic is, as we proved above, the ſafety of its form of government. To this the virtues of good citizens muſt always be relative; and as civil conſtitutions widely differ, the virtues neceſſary to preſerve them muſt differ as widely. They are virtues not abſolutely, but politically; and bear a reference to an end or purpoſe, independently of which they would not deſerve even the name of virtue. But the virtues of a good man are ultimately deſirable on their own account, as conſtituting in themſelves the perfection and happineſs of his rational and moral nature.

Political virtues relative to rank, age, and ſex.

In no country whatever have the greater part of mankind attained this conſummate excellence; but unleſs the majority in every country were politically virtuous, the commonwealth muſt ſoon periſh, ſince its ſubſiſtence can only be maintained while

themſelves with a loan which had been made to the thirty tyrants. Demoſthen. adverſ. Leptin. & Iſocrat. Areopagit. See alſo my Tranſlation of Iſocrates, p. 495. and Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 125.

while each, or at leaſt the greater part of its members perform their proper offices, or, in other words, exerciſe their reſpective virtues; virtues as different from each other, as are the various exigencies of human life to which they are reſpectively adapted. Our compariſon of the chorus is here ſtrictly applicable. The office and the virtue of him who leads the band is altogether different from the office and the virtue of any other performer. But of the leader himſelf, of him who directs the chorus of ſtate, what are the peculiar excellencies? When he executes his office aright, wiſdom and goodneſs are with propriety aſcribed to him. There is an education too, that befits men born to command, and them only; leſſons of war and horſemanſhip are given to the ſons of kings; and Euripides ſays in the perſon of a young prince,

> "Teach me not frivolous arts,
> "But teach me only how to ſerve my country."

There is an education, therefore, becoming a prince, and there are men fit for receiving none other. Jaſon[y] of Pheræ declared, without a figure of ſpeech, that he was famiſhed for want of empire. Power, it ſeems, was as neceſſary to Jaſon, as food to other men; and if he had not gained a crown, he muſt have ceaſed to live. This magnanimous Theſſalian had learned, forſooth, only how to command, but a citizen muſt alſo learn how to obey; and it is juſtly obſerved, that, in the equality of free commonwealths, men muſt be diſciplined by obedience, before they can be ſafely intruſted with authority. In proportion, therefore, as the form of government approximates political perfection, the virtues of a good man and of a good citizen will the more nearly coincide. In all ſuch governments, prudence

[y] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. pp. 377, 378, & ſeq.

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prudence in the governors, and right opinion in the governed, are eſſential and peculiar requiſites; other virtues are common to both, but variouſly modified by age, ſex, office, and condition [z].

Citizens and their virtues different in different forms of government.

If virtue, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, be eſſential to a citizen, by what name ſhall we call thoſe low mechanics, who are condemned by their indigence to unwholeſome and degrading drudgery? They are not ſlaves, they are not mere inhabitants, their labour is uſeful to the ſtate, and yet the lives which neceſſity compels them to lead, contribute not in any degree to the formation of virtue, either intellectual or moral. In ancient times, theſe mean artiſans were ſometimes claſſed with ſlaves; and as ſlaves in many cities, they ſtill continue to be conſidered; for it is worthy of remark, that defining a citizen as above, "one entitled to ſhare the government of his country," we exclude from that rank, women, minors, and children, who are not leſs eſſential in a ſtate than mechanics and artiſans. But as there are various forms of government, there muſt alſo be various kinds of citizens. In democracies, artiſans and even day-labourers may enjoy the honours of the ſtate; in ariſtocracies this is impoſſible, becauſe office is the reward of virtue; in oligarchies, the labourer never can, but the artiſan ſometimes may attain the rank of citizen; becauſe in ſuch governments wealth chiefly opens the road to preferment, and induſtrious and ſkilful workmen often acquire conſiderable opulence. A law therefore prevailed at Thebes, excluding every artiſan who had not ſhut ſhop upwards of ten years, from enjoying any office of magiſtracy. In times of national calamity, ſtrangers, baſtards, perſons of half-blood, and even ſlaves,

[z] I have tranſpoſed and compreſſed this paſſage, omitting ſome obſcure clauſes which are elſewhere more clearly expreſſed.

ſlaves, have been aſſociated to the honours of the commonwealth; but this liberality gradually ceaſed with the public exigency, and an honourable deſcent, firſt on the father's ſide at leaſt, and afterwards on the ſide alſo of the mother, was again required for conſtituting a citizen. Homer introduces Achilles complaining that he is treated like "an unhonoured ſtranger." A participation in honours and offices is, in fact, eſſential to the character of him who is truly a citizen; and when the appellation is beſtowed on any other, it is to be conſidered as nothing better than a flattering cheat. It is plain, therefore, that the character of a good man coincides in ſome governments with that of a good citizen, in others not; but that even in the former, the two characters completely coincide in the caſe only of thoſe properly qualified to ſhare and to direct the public adminiſtration [a].

Chap. 4.

Of the different forms of government.

We now proceed to inveſtigate the number, the nature, and the genius of the different forms of government [b]. Man, we have ſaid, is naturally a herding and political animal; he delights in the company of others, and covets it for no other purpoſe

[a] Hard would be the lot of mankind if thoſe only were fit to live in ſociety who had acquired confirmed habits of virtue. The purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which communities are inſtituted, does not require in the greater part of the perſons compoſing them ſuch conſummate perfection. There is one caſe, however, pointed out in the text, in which the character of a good citizen neceſſarily infers that of a good man. This is the caſe of magiſtrates or miniſters, of thoſe called to direct or conduct the affairs of the community. In political life, the diſtinction between private and public character was firſt invented by the moſt deteſtable knavery, as it is unhappily perpetuated by the moſt lamentable credulity.

[b] Ariſtotle here repeats, that government is the arrangement of men in ſociety, and eſpecially of thoſe men who, by the forms of the conſtitution, are inveſted with the ſovereignty. He enumerates alſo ſome different kinds of republics, as is done by him more fully hereafter in the next chapter.

BOOK III.

purpoſe but merely that of enjoyment. But utility ſoon ſtrengthens the aſſociation which nature has collected; for ſociety is recommended to us not only for the purpoſe of ſupporting life, a thing ſo ſweet in itſelf that men are eager to preſerve it even under moſt deplorable circumſtances, but for the purpoſe of living honourably and happily. The comfortable ſubſiſtence, therefore, of the whole body collectively, and of each individual ſeparately, ought to be regarded as the end and purpoſe for which communities have aſſembled, and the bond by which they are held together. In that moſt unequal of all aſſociations, the aſſociation, if it may be ſo called, of the maſter and the ſlave, we have already proved that there is a ſtrict coincidence of intereſts; for though the advantage of the maſter be the thing principally intended, the advantage of the ſlave (we mean the ſlave by imbecility of nature) is alſo a neceſſary reſult [c].

That all juſt government has for its end and object the good of the governed.

In the management of families, the intereſt of fathers and huſbands coincides with that of wives and children; but as every art has for its object the benefit of thoſe on whom it is exerciſed; phyſic, the health of the patient; gymnaſtic, the ſtrength and dexterity of the ſcholar; ſo the art of domeſtic government muſt have for its object the benefit of the houſe or family. The benefit of the maſter is likewiſe the uſual reſult; for as he who profeſſes the gymnaſtic may himſelf ſometimes be a wreſtler, and as he who directs the veſſel muſt always

[c] See above, p. 32. The imperfection of modern language does not enable us to expreſs by one word δεσποτεια, which I have tranſlated the aſſociation of maſter and ſlave: an aſſociation which the author endeavours to prove mutually beneficial to both parties, by obſerving, as he had before done, that the deſtruction of the ſlave would put an end to the δεσποτεια.

always be a paſſenger, ſo the one ſometimes, and the other always, derives perſonal advantage from his reſpective art, the direct and eſſential object of which lies, however, beyond himſelf, and centers in thoſe for whoſe improvement the leſſons of the former are given, and for whoſe ſafety the ſkill of the latter is exerciſed. In political partnerſhips, the ſame principle holds good; and the art of government, like all other arts, is practiſed directly and principally for the benefit of thoſe over whom it is exerciſed, that is, the good of the governed [d]. This is ſo ſtrictly true, that in the equality of ancient republics, thoſe who performed the taſk and ſuſtained the burden of magiſtracy, and who ſubjected themſelves to the painful duties of uninterrupted vigilance and ſtrenuous exertion in the ſervice of the public, thought it juſt that others next in ſucceſſion ſhould perform the ſame taſk, ſuſtain the ſame burden, and ſubmit to the ſame duties; and thus repay the benefit which they had previouſly received, and ſerve in their turn as guardians and watchmen of the community [e]. But fees and ſalaries have corrupted this natural and healthy condition of ſociety, and engendered the diſeaſe of avarice, which is only to be cured by the emolument of perpetual office. The emolument, however, is accidental; the burden eſſential. Thoſe governments, therefore, which conſult the good of the public, and thoſe only, are right and juſt. Thoſe which conſult the good of the magiſtrates alone, are mere perverſions of government, corrupt tyrannies of unworthy maſters

[d] Plato, and, before him, the Pythagorean Fragments, forcibly maintain and beautifully illuſtrate this doctrine. Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584. edit. Ficin. and Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi. p. 28.

[e] Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584.

BOOK III. Chap. 5.

maſters over reluctant ſlaves: but a commonwealth is the partnerſhip of freedom.

Enumeration and definition of the different forms of government.

In enumerating and explaining the various forms of government, method requires that we begin with thoſe which are right and juſt, becauſe theſe being previouſly defined, their counterfeits and corruptions will at once become manifeſt. In every political aſſociation, it is neceſſary that one man, the few, or the many, ſhould bear ſway; and whichever of them happens to take place, if the public good be the great rule of adminiſtration, the government is right and juſt, and is called a monarchy when lodged in the hands of one; an ariſtocracy, when in the hands of the few; and a republic, when in the hands of the many. The word ariſtocracy denotes the government of the beſt men, or the government that is beſt in itſelf. A republic is the general name of all commonwealths, but is applied particularly to denote a government adminiſtered by the people at large, but adminiſtered with juſtice, not oppreſſive to any claſs of citizens, but impartially conſulting the good of all.

The diſtinctive characters of governments.

The propriety of theſe names is juſtified by the nature of things. That one man, or a few, may be adorned by an accumulation of virtues, is what experience will juſtify; but that the multitude in any country ſhould be ſo illuſtriouſly diſtinguiſhed, is inconſiſtent with experience. The virtue moſt likely to pervade a whole people, is martial ſpirit. Citizens, therefore, who are ſoldiers, naturally bear ſway in that form of civil polity which is called by way of diſtinction *the republic* [f]. The corrupt

[f] The natural connection between republicaniſm and martial ſpirit is ſtrongly atteſted by all the hiſtorians of antiquity from Herodotus to Livy. See Herodot. l. v. c. lxxviii. and Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii. p. 364. and vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 7.

corrupt deviation from monarchy, or rather from royalty, is tyranny; for a tyrant is a monarch who rules with no other view than the benefit of himself and his family. Ariſtocracy degenerates into oligarchy, when the few, who are rich, govern the ſtate as beſt ſuits the intereſts of their avarice and ambition: and a republic degenerates into a democracy, when the many, who are poor, make the gratification of their own paſſions the only rule of their adminiſtration [g]. Wherever wealth alone opens the road to preferment, oligarchy prevails; poverty, on the other hand, is the conſtant attendant of democracy; and the diſtinctive character of thoſe governments conſiſts not in this, that the many or the few bear ſway, but in the one caſe, that rapacious poverty be armed with power, and in the other, that contemptuous opulence be inveſted with authority. But as

Read in Livy the Hiſtory of Rome after the expulſion of the Tarquins, and the deſtruction of the Decemvirs. But it is worthy of obſervation, that this eſſential connection has been ſometimes overlooked in modern times, and well it might by thoſe who attended only to names; for in ſpeaking of the greateſt battle fought among the Italian ſtates, many of which were called republics, towards the end of the fifteenth century, Machiavel has the following memorable words: "Et fuc queſta giornata combattuta con più virtu, che alcun altra che foſſe ſtata fatta in cinquanta anni in Italia; perche vi mori tra l'una parte & l'altra più che mille huomini." Delle Hiſtorie, l. viii. p. 306. "This action was fought with more valour than any other which had happened for fifty years in Italy; ſince on the two ſides, the number of the ſlain exceeded 1000 men."

[g] Ariſtotle makes an apology for ſpeaking ſo freely of oligarchies and democracies, which were in fact the only governments then exiſting in Greece; and into one or other of which all republics have ſo natural and ſo ſtrong a tendency to degenerate. He ſays, that in treating a ſubject philoſophically, and not merely for the purpoſe of practical utility, a juſt theory cannot be educed, unleſs the particulars which enter into the general queſtion be fully enumerated and fairly examined. We are happy in living in a country where the injuſtice and cruelty both of oligarchies and democracies may be unreſervedly expoſed and fearleſsly arraigned.

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as eminence in wealth can only fall to the ſhare of a few, and as *all* may participate the advantages of equal freedom, the partiſans of the rich and of the multitude agitate republican ſtates, each faction ſtriving to engroſs the government.

Chap. 6.

The unjuſt pretenſions of the partiſans of democracy; and

In the contentions which take place, both parties pretend to have juſtice on their ſide; but there is a democratical and an oligarchical juſtice, which ſtrongly favours of iniquity. Moſt men are wretched judges in their own cauſe. Paſſion narrows their underſtanding; and in every complicated caſe they ſee thoſe circumſtances only which are favourable to themſelves, and obſtinately ſhut their eyes to whatever favours their adverſaries. Juſtice, the partiſans of democracy aſſert to be nothing but equality; adding, that where men are equal in liberty, they are entitled to an equal enjoyment of all other advantages. Juſtice, the partiſans of oligarchy maintain, and maintain rightly, to conſiſt not in equality, but in proportion [h]; not in this, that the ſhares of all be equal, but in this, that each man have his due: but as they themſelves are ſuperior in wealth, they claim a ſuperiority in all other reſpects.

the unjuſt pretenſions of the aſſertors of oligarchy, or what is now called ariſtocracy.

Their reaſoning would be concluſive, had communities been formed merely for the purpoſes of preſerving and accumulating riches. On that ſuppoſition, the proportions of the profit might be exactly aſcertained by the ſhares of the capital. But commonwealths have *not* been inſtituted for the ſake of riches, nor for commerce by which riches are acquired, nor for that ſort of juſtice or convention, by which they are maintained and defended. The Tuſcans, Carthaginians, and other maritime nations, are connected by the bonds of mutual traffic; their exports

[h] The ſubject of juſtice is fully diſcuſſed in the Fifth Book of the Ethics, to which the author here refers. See vol. i. p. 257, & ſeq.

ports and imports are carefully regulated by treaties; they have courts of juſtice to which the ſubjects of one country may apply when injured by thoſe of another; and they have alliances in war ſtipulating mutually to enſure to each other their reſpective commercial advantages. But here, their reciprocal connections end; they are not ſubject, in other matters, to the ſame laws, nor governed by the ſame magiſtrates; they are not united by affection or friendſhip; and provided each party be juſt in his dealings, it is totally indifferent to the other what may be his character in all other particulars; an indifference which cannot prevail among thoſe who are fellow-citizens in reality, and not merely in name. But ſuppoſe the connection to be rendered more intimate, and imagine the walls of Corinth to be united with thoſe of Megara: ſuppoſe ſtill farther, that the right of intermarriage, a right eſſential to the exiſtence of communities, were eſtabliſhed; and admit that each individual were protected in his induſtry and in his dealings, by laws wiſely framed, faithfully adminiſtered, and realiſing the metaphor of the ſophiſt Lycophron[1], "that law is a ſurety and a pledge;" yet nothing of all this, neither the community of reſidence, nor the connection of affinity, nor mutual dependence in trade, nor common aſſociation in war, none of theſe ties, nor all of them together, would be ſufficient to conſolidate the political edifice, and to conſtitute that kind of partnerſhip which is properly called a commonwealth: a partnerſhip aiming not merely at ſubſiſtence, but at well-being; and ſubſervient not merely to the intereſts of life, but to the intereſts of that kind of life which is

Difference between a commonwealth and other aſſociations.

[1] This Lycophron is mentioned by our author in his Sophiſtic. Elench. paſſim; & Rhetor. l. iii. c. iii.

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is ultimately deſirable to man, as the perfection of his ſocial and moral nature.

This perfection cannot be attained independently of the community of reſidence, the connections of affinity, and the long-continued habits of daily and familiar intercourſe. Feſtivals, ſacrifices, common occupations, and common amuſements knit mankind into friendſhip, collect families into cantons, and conſolidate cantons into commonwealths. By exerciſing the energies and operations of the ſocial principle, the genuine happineſs of human life is improved and perfected: and that man who, by his perſonal excellencies and the lovelineſs of his character, contributes moſt to this great end, whatever may be his inferiority to many others in birth or in wealth, ought to be regarded as the principal ſharer in the great political partnerſhip[k].

Chap. 7.

Difficulties attending the queſtion, in what portion of the ſtate the ſovereignty ought to reſide.

It has been found a matter of difficulty to determine in what portion of the ſtate the ſovereignty ought to reſide. In the majority of the people at large? Then the ſovereignty muſt be veſted in poverty; and if the poor plunder the rich, who ſhall arraign their injuſtice? In the few, who are wealthy, or thoſe ſtill fewer, who are virtuous? Then the public muſt be inſulted in the one caſe, and diſhonoured in the other: for offices of authority are the honours conferred by republics; and ſhould the ſame men remain always in place, they muſt purchaſe this pre-eminence by the diſgrace of the people at large. Shall we

[k] The author concludes this chapter with a ſentence unconnected with the context, namely, "The doubts and diſputes concerning governments ariſe from conſidering juſtice, which is a complex object, under one only aſpect; and thus ſubſtituting a part of it for the whole." This remark, which was before made, it ſeemed unneceſſary to repeat.

we then eſtabliſh a king? The evil evidently would become the greater, how meritorious ſoever we may ſuppoſe the character of this king to be[l], ſince the ſphere of honour would thus be ſtill more narrowly contracted, and that of diſgrace ſtill more widely expanded. Perhaps the vigour of ſovereign power is incompatible with the imbecility of human paſſion; and, therefore, ought not to be committed to man, but intruſted to law. Yet if the ſpirit of your laws be democratical or oligarchical, wherein will this alteration avail you? The evils complained of, will evidently ſtill prevail.

Solution of theſe difficulties.

Great as theſe difficulties ſeem, they are not, however, altogether incapable of ſolution. The people at large, how contemptible ſoever they may appear when taken individually, are yet, when collectively conſidered, not, perhaps, unworthy of ſovereignty[m]. It is a trite obſervation, that thoſe entertainments where each man ſends the diſh moſt agreeable to his own palate, are preferable to thoſe furniſhed by the moſt ſumptuous delicacy of individuals. The people at large are allowed to be the beſt judges of muſic and of poetry. The general taſte is thus acknowledged to be better than that of the few, or of one man,

[l] The author here does not dogmatiſe, but diſcuſs. In purſuing the principle on which he now reaſons, he draws a concluſion againſt royalty: but viewing the ſubject under a different aſpect, he conſiders, in other paſſages, the kingly power as a fit balance between the people and the great; and regards the royal authority as a firm pledge, that the poor ſhall not be oppreſſed, nor the rich plundered.

[m] This is the only queſtion which the author here examines; leaving, as he obſerves, the ſolution of the other difficulties to another opportunity. In the whole of what he ſays, he ſpeaks merely as an advocate; and his arguments, he obſerves, apply not to any people indiſcriminately, but to a people peculiarly circumſtanced (πρὸς τι πλῆθος), who are the only fit materials for what he calls his πολιτεια, or republic; as will be explained more fully hereafter. It is farther worthy of remark, that when Ariſtotle ſpeaks of the people, he here means *populus*, not *plebs*; the people at large, not the lower ranks only.

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man, however ſkilful. Conſidered collectively, the people form a complex animal, with many feet, with many hands, with many faculties, with many virtues; each member contributing ſomething, more or leſs valuable, to the perfection of the whole body. The moral and intellectual excellencies of the multitude thus differ from thoſe of a wiſe and virtuous man, as the beauty of a fine picture[n] does from the beauty of individuals; of whom ſome may have eyes, and others may have other features, more perfect and more beautiful than thoſe of the picture; yet the picture, collecting only excellencies, and always avoiding deformities, will be found more beautiful and more perfect than any original in nature, with whom it can be compared. The excellencies, therefore, of that complex entity the public, may ſometimes ſurpaſs thoſe of the moſt accompliſhed prince or moſt virtuous council. That this commonly holds, I would not, indeed, venture to affirm. It rather ſeems manifeſt, that to ſome bodies of men the argument cannot poſſibly apply; for if it applied to them, it would extend alſo to wild beaſts, ſince wherein ſome multitudes differ from wild beaſts it is not eaſy to diſcover.

For what functions the people at large are beſt qualified.

The ſafety of every free government requires that the major part of the citizens ſhould enjoy a certain weight in the adminiſtration. If this does not take place, the majority muſt be diſſatisfied; and where the majority are diſſatisfied, the government will ſoon be ſubverted. But what ſort of magiſtracy is the humble citizen, the mere unit of the crowd, qualified to exerciſe? Offices of high perſonal truſt, or of important executive authority, his ignorance would diſgrace, or his injuſtice might

[n] Such was the Helen of Crotona painted by Zeuxis. "Neque enim putavit, omnia, quæ quæreret ad venuſtatem, uno in corpore ſe reperire poſſe," &c. Cicero de Inventione Rhetorica, l. ii. c. i.

might betray. For the performance of extraordinary tasks, extraordinary virtues, as well as extraordinary abilities, are required; and such virtues and abilities are not to be expected in the individuals of a promiscuous multitude. It remains, therefore, that the people at large be intrusted with the deliberative [o] and judicial powers of government, because the members of assemblies, senates, and courts of justice, acting, not individually, but collectively, prove mutually assisting to each other. In such popular tribunals, virtue and passion, reason and sentiment, courage and wisdom, are harmoniously blended into one salutary composition, in which even the grossest ingredients are not without their use; for experience teaches, that the purest nourishment is not always the best, but that fine flour is most wholesome when mixed with the coarse [p].

The exercise of the deliberative and judicial powers.

Guided by this principle, Solon and some other legislators committed to the people at large the power of appointing the magistrates, as well as that of taking an account of their administration. This political arrangement, indeed, is exposed to the following objection. To appoint a physician, or to take an account of his conduct in his profession, seems to belong only to those who are skilled in the art of physic [q]. A geometer must

Objections on this subject proposed and answered.

[o] In what sense the word "deliberative" is to be here understood, will be explained presently.

[p] Nam multitudo fere melius quam singuli de rebus omnibus judicat. Singuli enim quasdam habent virtutum particulas, quæ simul collatæ unam excellentem virtutem conficiunt. Quod in medicorum pharmacis, ac in primis in antidoto eo, quod Mithridaticum vocant, perspicue cerni potest. In eo enim pleræque res per se noxiæ, ubi confusæ fuerint, salutare adversas venena remedium afferunt. Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. xxviii.

[q] Persons thus skilled, the author divides into three classes: δημιοργοι, αρχιτεκτονικοι, πεπαιδευμενοι; mere practitioners; men of accurate and profound science; and persons instructed,

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muſt be examined by geometricians; and a pilot, by men acquainted with navigation. Wherefore, then, ought the people indiſcriminately to be entitled to judge their magiſtrates, and to appreciate their merit or demerit in employments, which the people indiſcriminately are not qualified to exerciſe? This objection may be anſwered by recurring to the principles already eſtabliſhed, that the people collectively conſidered (unleſs conſiſting of a vile and ſlaviſh populace) are capable of diſcharging functions, of which, in their individual character, they ſeem altogether unworthy. Beſides this, the productions of every art are not beſt appreciated by its profeſſors. The pilot is a better judge of a helm than the ſhip carpenter. A cook is ſeldom conſulted about the merit of the ſupper which he has dreſſed; and he who inhabits a houſe, needs not a jury of architects to aſcertain the degree of praiſe or of blame due to the contrivance of the builder.

There is ſtill another ground on which the arrangement of popular governments is cenſured. That magiſtrates ſhould be elected by, and reſponſible to, the promiſcuous crowd of citizens, convened in aſſemblies and courts of juſtice, ſeems highly unreaſonable, becauſe the upper ranks of men are thus ſubjected to the authority of their inferiors. To be a general or a treaſurer, that is, to command the public force, or to manage the public purſe, or to perform any ſeparate function of executive magiſtracy, it is neceſſary to be endowed with certain pre-eminent qualifications; a mature age, an ample patrimony, an uniformly approved and reſpected character. Ought ſuch dignified perſonages

inſtructed, but leſs correctly and deeply, in the healing art. The diſtinction between οἱ αρχιτεκτονικοι, or οἱ ειδοτες; and οἱ πεπαιδευμενοι, occurs frequently in other parts of his works, and in reference to other arts and ſciences.

perſonages to be examined, tried, and ſometimes proſecuted to puniſhment, by men of no eſtimation; of different ages, different characters, and often deſtitute of fortune? Is not this to commit the greater magiſtracy to thoſe judged unworthy of holding the leſſer? Theſe queſtions may be ſatisfactorily anſwered by obſerving, that the individuals compoſing the ſenate or aſſembly are not themſelves the aſſembly or ſenate. They are parts only of thoſe awful tribunals, and the magiſtrates are tried not by the parts, but by the whole; that is, by the aſſembly, ſenate, or courts of juſtice, which, whatever may be the character and condition of many of the members compoſing them, are certainly more wealthy and more reſpectable than any of thoſe magiſtrates who are held amenable to their juriſdiction. The preſent difficulty, therefore, may thus be removed; but the doubt which we firſt ſtarted, proves that the laws ſhould always decide whenever their general language (for their language muſt be general) applies to the caſe in queſtion; and that judges ſhould then only ſpeak when the laws are ſilent. But what laws are entitled to the appellation of good, does not yet appear. This only is manifeſt, that the laws muſt depend on the nature of the government; juſt, therefore, under a good government, and unjuſt under a bad one.

Chap. 8.

According to what circumſtances and qualities political honours and advantages ought to be apportioned and diſtributed.

Every ſcience and every art propoſes to itſelf ſome end or purpoſe which it conſiders as abſolutely good and ultimately deſirable, that is, good and deſirable in itſelf without reference to the attainment of any object beyond it. Of politics, the moſt comprehenſive and the moſt important of all ſciences, the end and aim is the public good of the community, which can only be upheld by juſtice, which, as we before ſaid, forms the great law of the moral world, To a certain length, the general

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opinions of mankind coincide, reſpecting juſtice, with the accurate deciſions of philoſophy. Among equals, juſtice is acknowledged to conſiſt in equality; among thoſe who are unequal, it is acknowledged to conſiſt in proportion, that is, in giving to each his due. But what, and how many, are the circumſtances which ought to regulate this proportion, is not clearly aſcertained. Ought a ſuperiority in every advantageous quality, when other things are alike, to entitle its poſſeſſor to a ſuperiority of political advantages? Shall men's ſtatures or colours be conſidered as laying a foundation for the diſcrimination of ranks in ſociety? In leſſer matters, ſuch a principle of diſtinction is not allowed to operate. At a concert of muſic, the beſt inſtrument is given, not to the handſomeſt man, but to the beſt performer. How much ſoever he may be ſurpaſſed in beauty or nobility, and how much ſoever the value of beauty and nobility may ſurpaſs that of muſical ſkill, yet the beſt performer is always honoured with the beſt flute. The reaſon is plain; the circumſtances in which his rivals are ſuperior, contribute nothing to the work in hand. They have no manner of relation to muſical performance; and therefore, with regard to it, cannot ſtand in competition with the quality in which he excels them. For things ſpecifically different, and which admit not of a common meaſure, can only be eſtimated by conſidering how far they reſpectively contribute to ſome common end. To compare them abſtractedly is impoſſible or abſurd. A difference in every valuable quality ought not, therefore, to be a ſource of political diſtinction. Swiftneſs meets with due honour at the Olympic games. But the honours conferred by cities, are apportioned to qualities eſſential to the exiſtence or well-being of the ſtate. A community cannot

cannot conſiſt of beggars or of ſlaves. Liberty, therefore, and wealth and birth, naturally contend for pre-eminence; but if theſe things be neceſſary to conſtitute a commonwealth, juſtice and valour are not leſs neceſſary to defend and uphold it. In the conteſt, therefore, for civil pre-eminence, education and virtue ſeem fairly entitled to the firſt honours; becauſe of all things, education and virtue moſt contribute to the perfection of civil ſociety. The partiſans of wealth allege, that the rich are moſt faithful to their engagements; and that thoſe who have the greateſt ſhare in the public ſtock, ought to be inveſted with the government. The nobles contend, that as ſlaves are eſſentially different from citizens, he who is fartheſt removed from a ſervile extraction, ought to be held a citizen of a ſuperior claſs, and therefore to be armed with authority. They ſtrengthen this concluſion, by obſerving that nobility is nothing elſe but the virtue of the race, hereditary worth, and preſcriptive dignity. But ſuch arguments, in their ultimate tendency, would prove, that one man, if more noble and wealthy than the reſt, ought to be made king; and even in a virtuous republic, that he who ſurpaſſed his fellow-citizens in virtue, ought to be exalted to regal power. Such is the abſurdity reſulting from the ſuppoſition, that thoſe who are ſuperior in one particular[r] ought to be entitled to a ſuperiority in political ſociety; in which mankind have aſſembled in order to club their reſpective advantages, and in order to direct their various but united efforts,

[r] Ariſtotle obſerves, that nothing is eaſier than to eſtabliſh a democracy, an oligarchy, or a tyranny; becauſe all thoſe governments are perfectly ſimple in their conſtruction; to make them requires no accuracy of compariſon, no power of combination. But he obſerves and proves, again and again, that they are all of them mere perverſions and mockeries of juſt government.

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efforts, to one falutary end and purpoſe; and in which the people at large may always quaſh the vain pretenſions of the few, by ſaying, *we collectively* are richer, wiſer, and nobler than you. The beſt laws, therefore, are thoſe which are framed for the general benefit of the citizens; that is, of men qualified alternately to govern and to obey, differently qualified, indeed, in different governments; but in the beſt, qualified and determined to govern and to obey according to the rules which right reaſon preſcribes.

Chap. 9.

Virtue beyond compare unfit for ſociety.

The exiſtence of every commonwealth preſuppoſes, however, a certain degree of equality among thoſe who are its conſtituent members. Should exceſſive inequality prevail, eſpecially in thoſe things which form the power and ſplendour of ſociety itſelf, the aſſociation will gradually tend to a diſſolution; and, therefore, if one man, or a few, ſhould diſplay a degree of virtue, by which that of all the reſt would be totally eclipſed, ſuch men, if too few in number to ſubſiſt by themſelves in a ſeparate ſociety, could not form a part, or be conſidered as members, of any community whatever. It is the law of commonwealths, that the citizens compoſing them ſhould rule by vicarious ſucceſſion; becauſe thoſe who contribute, nearly in equal portions, to the benefit and luſtre of the community, are entitled to expect from that community nearly the ſame treatment. But the ſame treatment, that is, a mere equality of honours and advantages, would be the height of injuſtice to conſpicuous eminence and incomparable worth. Who is to govern the natural governors of mankind? What laws are made for men who are a law unto themſelves? The attempt to legiſlate for ſuch men would be expoſed to ridicule; and

and they might anſwer the arguments of thoſe fooliſh enough to undertake this taſk, as Antiſthenes[s] ſays, that the lions, in the aſſembly of beaſts, anſwered the eloquent harangue of the hares on the ſubject of equal laws.

Neceſſity of the oſtraciſm.

The oſtraciſm of democratics was invented for levelling that extreme inequality, under which ſuch forms of government cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt. The aſſembly baniſhes for a limited time thoſe too conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed by wealth, popularity, connections, or any other political advantage. For a ſimilar reaſon, the Argonauts, we are told, rejected the aſſiſtance of Hercules. His virtues too much overtopped thoſe of the adventurers with whom he wiſhed to be aſſociated. The counſel, therefore, which Periander gave to Thraſybulus is not blamable, abſtractedly and in itſelf, but becauſe that counſel was both given and employed for the purpoſe of ſupporting a cruel tyranny. Periander, we are told, ſaid nothing to the queſtion of Thraſybulus, "by what means he ſhould maintain the ſovereignty of Miletus;" but conducting his meſſenger into a field of corn, lopped the talleſt ſtalks, and thus levelled the ſurface. The meſſenger reported what he had ſeen, and what Thraſybulus appears to have underſtood, having ſpeedily ſet himſelf to cut off the firſt men of the city. Both democracies and oligarchies follow the ſame policy. The Athenians, in violation of treaties, chaſtiſed the Samians, Chians, and Leſbians, in order to break the ſtubborn pride of thoſe fierce iſlanders, and to level their aſpiring ſentiments with thoſe of their more ſervile allies. The Perſian monarch has often ſmit and humbled the Medes and Babylonians, vainly elated by the remembrance of their ancient empire.

[s] Antiſthenes was a ſcholar of Socrates, who, in imitation of his maſter, mixed facetiouſneſs with ſeverity. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxiv. p. 149.

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empire[t]. The levelling maxim, therefore, is univerſally applicable in all ſuch governments. The ſame principle obtains in muſic, in mechanics, in painting, and indeed in every art. A painter would not admit into his performance, any limb or member, however beautiful, exceeding the proportional magnitude of the figure which he delineates. A ſhip-builder muſt adapt the helm, and every other part, to the ſize of the whole veſſel; and in a chorus of muſic, an overpowering voice would diſturb and deſtroy the effect of the ſymphony. The oſtraciſm, therefore, in democracies, and ſome analogous inſtitution in monarchies, is uſeful for maintaining the harmony of the political concert. It is better, indeed, that the legiſlator, at the firſt formation of the commonwealth, ſhould provide againſt the neceſſity of ever having recourſe to ſuch violent remedies. But if this has not been done originally, he muſt, in that caſe, as at ſea, tack about, and thus ſteer the veſſel of the ſtate into a ſafe harbour.

Illuſtrated by the example of the arts.

The oſtraciſm, however, inſtead of being ſeaſonably and uſefully employed, is too often abuſed to factious and pernicious purpoſes. In corrupt commonwealths, juſtice is meaſured by the utility of that portion of the ſtate, to whoſe intereſt the public good is, on all occaſions, readily ſacrificed. Such apparent or relative juſtice is, indeed, real and abſolute iniquity; but it is the only kind of juſtice that, under bad governments, can poſſibly prevail. The oſtraciſm, therefore, will not be properly applied in thoſe caſes to which it is ſolely or chiefly applicable; for it is a matter of doubt, whether this invention ought

The groſs abuſe of this inſtitution.

[t] The author does not ſay that theſe things are right; but he maintains that they are neceſſary for the ſafety of the government, which being bad in itſelf, can only be preſerved by bad means.

ought ever to be employed in a virtuous and well-regulated community. When a man conſpicuouſly overtops his fellow-citizens, I ſay not in other political advantages, but in virtue itſelf, what is then to be done? It will not be ſaid, that in a well-regulated ſtate, his ſuperiority in virtue ought to ſubject him to baniſhment. Nor will it be ſaid, that ſuch conſpicuous ſuperiority, ſubmitting to the law of vicarious ſucceſſion, ought to command and obey alternately. This would be as abſurd as dividing the empire with Jupiter. It remains, therefore, that all men ſhould cheerfully and uniformly obey ſuch rulers, and acknowledge the natural and perpetual ſovereignty of their virtues.

To what caſe inapplicable.

Chap. 10.

Of monarchy, and its five kinds.

This obſervation naturally leads us to ſpeak of kings. We have formerly numbered monarchy among the juſt forms of government. But whether is it univerſally the beſt form; or uſeful in ſome ſtates and hurtful in others? Firſt of all, it is evident that there are various kinds of monarchy. The kings of Sparta, who ſeem to be of all kings the moſt limited by law, conduct the military expeditions, and preſide in the religious worſhip, of their country. They are the hereditary generals of the commonwealth. In the heroic ages, kings were not armed with the power of life and death, except by a kind of martial law, limited in its execution to a day of battle. Agamemnon patiently endures reproach and inſult in the council; but iſſuing to the field, he ſays,

"Who dares inglorious in his ſhips to ſtay?
Who dares to tremble on this ſignal day?
That wretch, too mean to fall by martial power,
The birds ſhall mangle and the dogs devour,
For death is in my hand[u]."

This,

[u] Iliad ii. v. 391. Ariſtotle quotes Homer, and even Herodotus, from memory; ſo

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This, therefore, is one kind of monarchy, a perpetual generalſhip, ſometimes hereditary, and ſometimes elective. Another ſpecies of monarchy is that which prevails among the Aſiatic barbarians. Their kings exerciſe a power abſolute, unlimited, and almoſt tyrannical; yet their authority is legal, hereditary, and ſecure. The genius of the Greeks is, in point of government, different from that of the barbarians; and the genius of the Europeans is different from that of the Aſiatics, who of all nations are the moſt patient of deſpotiſm. Their kings, therefore, are guarded, not as tyrants are in Europe, by the arms of foreign mercenaries, but by the ſervile fidelity of their native troops; and their dominion becomes lawful, becauſe voluntarily endured; inſomuch that the guards of European princes are employed againſt the citizens, and the guards of Aſiatic princes conſiſt of the citizens themſelves. A third ſpecies of monarchy is that of the Æſymnetes in ancient Greece, who were nothing elſe than *elective tyrants*, ſometimes choſen for life, and ſometimes appointed for a limited time, or the concluſion of a particular buſineſs. The people of Mitylené thus choſe Pittacus to conduct the war againſt the exiles, headed by Antimenides, and the poet Alcæus; who, in one of his convivial ſongs, arraigns the folly of the multitude, "for appointing, vociferouſly and tumultuouſly, the baneful Pittacus to tyranniſe a frantic and ill-fated country." The government of the Æſymnetes partook both of tyranny and of royalty; they were deſpots exerciſing lawful power, becauſe lawfully granted; but differing from Aſiatic monarchs, becauſe their temporary power

ſo familiar was he with thoſe admired authors. From this circumſtance, his citations are not always correct; as in the example before us, where, to the four verſes in the text, he adds, from another part of the Iliad, παρ' γαρ μοι θανατος—"For death is in my hand."

power was not congenial to the ſpirit and uſages of their country. A fourth ſpecies of monarchy prevailed in the heroic ages, a limited royalty; juſt, legal, and hereditary. Thoſe who ſignally benefited mankind in arts or arms, who collected ſocieties, formed ſettlements, and eſtabliſhed colonies, received voluntary ſubmiſſion from public gratitude [x]. They became generals in war, judges in peace, and preſided in ſuch acts of religion as were not excluſively attached to particular prieſthoods. In deciding the differences of their ſubjects, they ſwore to obſerve the rules of juſtice; and the form of the oath conſiſted in elevating the ſceptre [y]. In progreſs of time, theſe branches of authority were either voluntarily reſigned by kings, or forcibly reſumed by their people. In moſt commonwealths, kings have been reduced to the condition of mere preſidents in religious ceremonies; and in that country of Greece in which their office beſt deſerves the name of royalty, they are merely hereditary generals.

To theſe four kinds of monarchy above mentioned, we muſt ſtill add a fifth and laſt kind, the moſt abſolute of all. A king may bear to a ſtate the ſame relation which a maſter does to a family, having the whole power of the ſovereignty concentrated in his own perſon. The office of ſuch a monarch, and that of a king

[x] See Sarpedon's ſpeech in Homer, Γλαυκε τιη δε νωι τετιμηϰεσθα μαλιϛα, &c. Il. xii. v. 310. and Pope, v. 370—386.

"Such, they may cry, deſerve the ſovereign ſtate,
Whom thoſe that envy, dare not imitate."

[y] The ſceptre was given to kings as the badge of their authority, and entitled them to adminiſter the θεμιϛας Διος, Jove's laws; which when they perverted or infringed, the ſceptre dropped from their hands. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. paſſim.

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a king of Sparta, form the two ultimate limits of monarchical power, which cannot be greater than it is in the firſt caſe, nor leſſer than it is in the ſecond. The perpetual generalſhip of Sparta cannot even be ſaid to conſtitute a particular form of government. It is not the conſtitution itſelf, but rather a law of that conſtitution; and a law that may take place under any other conſtitution whatever. We ſhall not, therefore, at preſent examine its advantages or inconveniences; but proceed to conſider thoſe kinds of royalty which contain the ſpecific qualities of kingly government.

Chap. II.

An eſtimate of the advantages and defects of monarchy.

In appreciating their merits or defects, we muſt eſtimate the contending pretenſions of good laws and good men [y]. The partiſans of kings obſerve, that laws can only ſpeak a general language; that their applications to particular caſes, which, taken collectively, form the ſum of human tranſactions, is often doubtful, dangerous, or hurtful; that there is not any art of which the practice can be regulated by immutable precept; that even in Egypt, a country ſingularly attached to the formality of rules, phyſicians are allowed, after the third day of the malady, to alter the mode of treatment preſcribed by authority; and even before that time, to alter it at their peril. The advocates for laws aſſert, and aſſert juſtly, that the queſtion partly reſolves itſelf into one more general, "whether ought reaſon or paſſion to bear ſway." Laws, therefore, muſt be eſtabliſhed; but as they cannot completely involve the deciſion of each particular caſe, whether ought one man, or many, to adminiſter and apply them? The arguments in favour of the *judgment* of the many, we have already

[y] In treating of monarchy, Ariſtotle has principally abſolute monarchy in view. He ſtates the objections to it with that fulneſs and force with which he commonly repreſents the arguments of his adverſaries; refuting them afterwards with as much brevity as the ſubject can poſſibly admit.

already had occaſion to explain [z]; and in favour of their *juſtice*, it may be obſerved, that the many are leſs liable to corruption than one man or the few, in the ſame manner that a large lake is leſs corruptible than a ſmall pool. If we deal, therefore, impartially with kings, magiſtrates, and people, regarding them all as compoſed of the ſame materials, endowed with ſimilar excellencies, and liable to ſimilar imperfections; it muſt be acknowledged that in communities conſiſting of ſuch members, and particularly in the cities of Greece, a republic is better than an ariſtocracy, and an ariſtocracy than a monarchy. Kings were originally eſtabliſhed by the gratitude of ſmall communities, in which there were but few perſons of conſiderable weight or diſtinguiſhed merit. But as the number of men deſerving the name of peers, or equals, increaſed, the kingly government was changed for an ariſtocratical republic. Under this government nations flouriſhed, and riches were accumulated. Riches were followed by luxury, and luxury by rapacity. The wealth of the ſtate became the plunder of individuals. Oligarchies, and then tyrannies, ſucceſſively prevailed; an uſurping faction continually narrowing the baſis of its own power, till this power, ſupported on a ſingle point, was eaſily overturned by the juſt reſentment of the multitude [a]. Democracy then

Why introduced, and wherefore abeliſhed.

[z] See above, c. viii. p. 187.

[a] Ariſtotle's theory of political revolutions is wonderfully confirmed by the ancient Hiſtory of Italy. In that country limited monarchies firſt prevailed, which degenerating into tyrannies, made way for ariſtocracies. Rome, Naples, Capua, Nola, Tuſculum, were long governed by ſenates: but as cities became more populous, an epidemical malady ſeized the people of perſecuting the Patricians. This evil raged during the Carthaginian wars, from which time there was a continual progreſs towards democracy. Yet in all theſe republics, whether popular or ariſtocratical, the ſupreme power of the ſtate was generally held by diſtinguiſhed individuals; a Valerius, Camillus, or Fabius, of Rome; a Manilius, chief of the Latins; a Herennius, of the Samnites,

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then aroſe, and prevailed in its turn; and it is a matter, perhaps, of ſome difficulty to eſtabliſh any other form of government in large cities and populous communities.

Inconveniences of hereditary monarchy.

Should monarchy be admitted as an uſeful inſtitution, a new queſtion occurs, whether it ought to be hereditary? Whatever be the character of a young prince, ought he, in default of his father, to aſſume the government, and to rule for the ruin of his country? But the king, knowing the profligacy of the prince, will provide a more worthy ſucceſſor. This ſurely ſuppoſes a degree of virtue greater than can be expected from man, that, for the good of the public, a father ſhould exclude his own ſon from a throne. As adminiſtrator of the laws, the king muſt be entruſted with a military force, ſufficient to render them effectual. This force, it is eaſy to ſee, ought to be ſuch as will enable him to coerce refractory individuals, but not to oppreſs the community. Such was the proportion of troops anciently committed by the Greeks to their Æſymnetes; and ſuch was the rule by which a citizen of Syracuſe wiſhed to limit the military force entruſted to Dionyſius.

Chap. 12.

Monarchy arraigned.

But ſome perſons aſſert, that it is impoſſible to modify kingly power into any thing like reaſon and juſtice. That the invention is altogether unnatural; and that placing a prince on the throne is nothing elſe than raiſing paſſion and a wild beaſt to the ſeat of ſovereignty. That no man is a fair judge in his own cauſe; and that a king, therefore, can never judge fairly between himſelf and his people. That phyſicians, when ſick, truſt not to their own ſkill, but require the advice of others; and that maſters of the gymnaſtic exerciſes pretend not to be proper

Samnites, &c. all which acted ſomething of a ſimilar part in the cities of their reſpective diſtricts, which the Medici did in modern times in Florence, and the Malateſtas, Viſcontis, Felorios, &c. in other cities of Italy.

proper judges of their own exhibitions. In all cafes whatever, mankind acknowledge the danger of impaffioned, and therefore partial, deciſions, and ought the more earneſtly to ſtrive againſt this danger, in proportion to the importance of the objects that inflame the ardour of deſire, and ſtrengthen the bias of ſelfiſhneſs. That the only juſt ſovereigns, therefore, are God and the laws; eſpecially thoſe unwritten, moral, and univerſal laws, founded in nature, reared and perfected by education and cuſtom. Beſides this, were the heart and will of a king not to be diſtruſted, his head and his underſtanding would be totally unequal to the diſcharge of an office not made for humanity. Can one man be ſuppoſed capable of ſuperintending the concerns of a whole people? Let him be ever ſo good, two muſt ſtill be better than one.

> "By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
> Great deeds are done, and great diſcoveries made;
> The wiſe new prudence from the wiſe acquire,
> And one brave hero fans another's fire[b]."

And Agamemnon, ſenſible of his own inability to exerciſe regal power, prayed,

> "Oh! would the Gods, in love to Greece, decree
> But ten ſuch ſages as they grant in thee[c]:
> Such wiſdom ſoon ſhould Priam's force deſtroy,
> And ſoon ſhould fall the haughty towers of Troy[d]."

That the laws muſt be adminiſtered, and their general language adapted to particular caſes, by the diſcernment of upright judges, affords not any argument in favour of the judge as ſuperior to the law. For it is acknowledged, that in every caſe

[b] Pope's Iliad, ii. 224. [c] Ibid. 370. [d] Ibid. 443.

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caſe to which laws are applicable, they only ought to judge and to govern; and from the law itſelf men derive thoſe principles that enlighten their reaſon and direct their deciſions. Enured to the diſcipline of this wiſe ſchool-miſtreſs, they not only underſtand the letter, but imbibe the ſpirit of her inſtructions; and in continuing habitually ſubject to the laws, they become duly qualified to explain them, which that man can never be, who is raiſed above the laws.

All monarchies reſolve themſelves into oligarchies, or ariſtocracies.

Beſides, there is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing that one man with two eyes and two ears can obſerve as widely, or with two hands and two feet can act as vigorouſly, as many men with many perceptive and many active powers. Kings themſelves bear witneſs to the law of nature, aſſociating to their government many eyes, many hands, many organs of ſenſe, and many inſtruments of action. Their *friends*, that is, the friends both of their perſons and government, are full partners in power; they would not exert themſelves to ſupport a ſyſtem to which they were unfriendly; and friendſhip, we have before proved, can only ſubſiſt among equals. The government of one, therefore, neceſſarily terminating in that of many, his peers and equals, it is ſurely moſt adviſable to form directly and at once, that kind of conſtitution which muſt always be circuitouſly eſtabliſhed.

Monarchy defended: to what nations it is beſt adapted.

Theſe arguments againſt royalty are not ſo concluſive as they ſeem; becauſe they reſt entirely on the fallacy of extending to mankind in general, obſervations that have been found applicable to ſome particular communities. Government is nothing elſe but the arrangement of individuals in a ſtate, and the propriety of every arrangement or compoſition muſt depend on the number and nature of its materials. Some ſocieties of men are fitted for living under what we have called a republic,

that is, a juſt and equal polity, adminiſtered by rotation; and no people whatever are fitted for living under a tyranny, whether of one man, of an oligarchical ſenate, or of a democratical aſſembly; all which we have declared baſe perverſions of government, and direct violations of nature. But between theſe extremes, there may be ſome nations ſo conſtituted as ſpontaneouſly to obey a lord or deſpot, as ſervants obey a maſter; and others ſo conſtituted as voluntarily to obey a king, or even an ariſtocratical ſenate, as wives and children obey their fathers or huſbands. Thoſe who are unequal by nature, cannot be levelled by any contrivance of man; and when authority is juſt and uſeful, ſubmiſſion will be ready and cheerful. Even in republics themſelves, where men are arranged, not according to their wealth, but according to their worth; where the citizens love liberty, which they have arms and courage to defend; yet ſhould the illuſtrious virtues of one man, or one family, totally eclipſe the merit of the community at large, ſuch a man, or ſuch a family, muſt either be baniſhed by the oſtraciſm or enthroned. So much concerning monarchy, its nature and kinds; what nations it ſuits, and for what reaſons it ſuits them [e].

[e] The laſt chapter is merely a recapitulation; after which the author ſays, that it is his intention to proceed to treat of the beſt form of government.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

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IN the Firſt Book of his Politics, Ariſtotle examines the origin of ſociety and government, the eſſential diſtinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and the beſt plans of political œconomy. In the Second, he deſcribes the moſt admired ſchemes of policy, either delineated by philoſophers, or inſtituted by legiſlators. In the Third, (of which a conſiderable part is now loſt,) he explained the nature and principle of the various governments exiſting in Greece and in the ancient world, whether republican or monarchical; beſtowing juſt and liberal praiſe, where praiſe ſeemed to be due; but declaring himſelf not completely ſatisfied with any thing that philoſophers had deviſed, legiſlators preſcribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in the Fourth (commonly publiſhed as the Seventh) Book, to exhibit the reſult of his own reflections concerning the great queſtion, which form of government is the beſt?

This problem cannot, he obſerves, be ſolved abſtractedly; becauſe government being an arrangement, the beſt government muſt be the beſt arrangement, and the beſt arrangement is that

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which the materials to be arranged, are the beſt fitted both to receive and to preſerve. The great nations of Egypt and the Eaſt had ſhewn themſelves incapable of ſubſiſting under any milder dominion than that of abſolute monarchy, which was not tyranny to them, becauſe voluntarily endured; congenial to their original character, and confirmed by hereditary and preſcriptive uſage. The genius and temper of the Greeks, indeed, were as different from thoſe of the Aſiatics and Africans, as from thoſe of the fierce and undiſciplined barbarians in the north and weſt of Europe. The queſtion therefore comes to be, what is the beſt government for the Greeks, or rather for that portion of the Greeks, ſufficiently numerous to form a community apart? for Ariſtotle thought the whole nation far too bulky to be moulded into one commonwealth, but well adapted by its magnitude to form a powerful confederacy; which by purſuing a line of policy which he marks out, in its foreign as well as domeſtic tranſactions, might have greatly accelerated the improvement and eminently heightened the proſperity of the ſurrounding world. The queſtion, therefore, ſtill returns, How are the firſt elements of this confederacy to be produced? What ought to be the conſtitution, and what the properties of that political germ, deſtined to invigorate into ſuch ſolid ſtrength, at the ſame time that it expands to ſuch flouriſhing beauty?

In treating this ſubject, Ariſtotle proves, with convincing evidence, that the ſame energies and habits conſtitute the happineſs both of individuals and of nations. Men make governments, not governments them: nor by any ſyſtem of political arrangement can a happy commonwealth be conſtituted from fools or cowards, profligates or knaves. The bricks muſt firſt be prepared before the edifice can be reared; and to the ſophiſts

ſophiſts of Greece, who maintained, that as men were corrupted by bad governments, ſo they might be corrected and purified by good ones, the author replies by aſking, how a good building can be made from bad materials? To make a government requires great length of time; and to amend a corrupt government, he obſerves, requires ſtill longer time; becauſe, in this latter caſe, men have not only to learn what they did not before know, but alſo to unlearn what they had previouſly been taught. The happineſs of the community at large is the end of all good government; but Ariſtotle derides the vain opinion that this happineſs, which is often deſtroyed by the injuſtice and cruelty of magiſtrates, is only to be recovered and reſtored through the operation of popular aſſemblies. The majority of the people are poor, their juſtice will therefore be rapacity; the majority of the people are ignorant, their policy therefore will be folly; the majority of the people are themſelves domineered by headſtrong and impetuous paſſions, their dominion therefore will be anarchy, oppreſſion, and cruelty; and to intruſt government, even for a moment, to ſuch clumſy and artleſs hands, will, inſtead of having any tendency to reform it, be the likelieſt means to prevent the poſſibility of any thing like rational reform from ever being effected.

Virtue, in a political ſenſe, is defined the love of the conſtitution; but under the beſt conſtitution poſſible, virtue ſimply, and political virtue, perfectly coincide. How virtue, ſimple and unqualified, that is, virtue in the ſtrict philoſophical ſenſe, may be rendered the actuating principle of government, Ariſtotle proceeds with great accuracy to explain; and the ariſtocracy which he thus eſtabliſhes, while it maintains the juſt pre-eminence of the few, will invariably promote the

beſt

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beſt intereſts of all; containing in itſelf a perennial ſpring of gradual but ſure improvement; and raiſing to higher benefits all deſcriptions of men, (not excepting ſlaves themſelves,) exactly in proportion to their capacities for enjoying them.

Readers of reflection will peruſe with pleaſure his judicious obſervations concerning the extent and populouſneſs of his commonwealth; the moſt advantageous ſoil and climate, the beſt ſituation of the country and of the capital; their neceſſary accommodations, and moſt deſirable embelliſhments. Such particulars as theſe ſufficiently explain themſelves; but the three following points, two of which relate to domeſtic, and one to foreign policy, are not unworthy of illuſtration.

For cementing his citizens into friendſhip, and for maintaining, unimpaired, the true ſpirit of any thing like a free and a good conſtitution, Ariſtotle, both in this and other Books, aſcribes ſingular efficacy to thoſe convivial meetings, called by the Greeks *ſyſſitics*, and by the Engliſh *clubs*. In the Greek ſenſe of the word, clubs long formed the prevailing characteriſtic and peculiar delight of one modern nation. Our neighbours neither had the name nor the thing: and an Engliſhman who had inhabited the capital, whatever inducements might lead him to foreign lands, always ſighed with regret (and that in a degree proportional to his good ſenſe) for thoſe precious hours unincumbered by care and unfettered by ceremony, where frankneſs chaſtiſed by decency, and ardour fraught with knowledge, flowed in full and free ſtreams of unguarded converſation. Before haſtily condemning Ariſtotle for aſcribing great and momentous effects to ſlight and trivial cauſes, it may be worth while to pauſe, and carefully to conſider how much this ſingularity in our own manners contributed to form that cha-

racter, and eſpecially that temper, which is beſt calculated for enjoying, without abuſe, the ineſtimable benefits of a free government. BOOK IV.

A ſecond point on which Ariſtotle reſts the chief ſupport of his commonwealth, is the diſtribution of public functions among its citizens, according to their reſpective ages. That a city or commonwealth may ſubſiſt comfortably, as to matters of bodily accommodation, it muſt be provided with peaſants, mechanics, and merchants; that it may ſubſiſt happily, ſecurely, and reſpectably, it muſt be provided with magiſtrates, prieſts, and ſoldiers. Ariſtotle endeavours to prove, both by experience and arguments, that the claſſes of men habitually employed as inſtruments of productive induſtry, ought to be all of them ſtrictly confined, each to his aſſigned taſk; and that the more minutely their taſks are ſubdivided, and the more rigidly each through life adheres to his own, the more promptly and the more perfectly will the work of all be performed. But does the ſame reaſoning apply to thoſe public and political functions which conſtitute the duty and dignity of a citizen? As the trade of a weaver ought never to be conjoined with that of a ſmith or a carpenter; in the ſame manner ought the military profeſſion never to be exerciſed at the ſame time, and by the ſame perſons who perform the offices of prieſts and magiſtrates. Ariſtotle maintains, that thoſe functions ought to be performed by the ſame perſons, not however ſimultaneouſly, but at different periods of their lives. Young men in the bloom of their health, ſtrength, and courage, make the beſt ſoldiers; the matured vigour of underſtanding is neceſſary to the due exerciſe of deliberative and judicial powers; whereas the honourable functions of the prieſthood, not requiringany painful or

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any ſtrenuous exertion either of the body or of the mind, ought to be reſerved for the occupation and the reward of declining years.

Ariſtotle would have eaſily perceived the incompatibility of ſuch regulations with the condition of modern times. The civil law of Athens, and of every other republic of Greece, was a ſcience ſtill more ſimple than the civil law of Rome, of which Cicero boaſts, that amidſt all his variety of occupations he could make himſelf maſter in the courſe of a few weeks. In the Chriſtian kingdoms of Europe, prieſts are not only the performers of religious ceremonies, but the great moral inſtructors of mankind; and the preparations requiſite for the profeſſion either of the law or of the church are ſufficient to employ and exhauſt the diligence of that portion of life which, according to Ariſtotle's plan, ought to be dedicated to far different purſuits. It is thus that the arrangements in political ſociety muſt always depend on the materials to be arranged; and that inſtitutions ſeemingly the moſt natural and moſt ſalutary will, under given circumſtances, be found the moſt abſurd and moſt deſtructive. The ſtudy of abſtract politics is, therefore, of all ſciences the moſt liable to abuſe, though of them all the moſt uſeful, when confined within its proper ſphere. By determining thoſe arrangements which, independently of local and temporary circumſtances, are moſt conformable to the eſſential ſtructure and eſſential ends of ſociety, it ſupplies the conductors of public affairs with a political limit or model of perfection, to which, without ever reaching, they may continually ſtrive to approximate; thereby counteracting that tendency from bad to worſe, of which the ſuperficial as well as the deep obſervers of human life have at all times and in all countries ſo juſtly and ſo univerſally

verſally complained. In moral and intellectual endowments, one man is ſcarcely ever more different from another, than the ſame man is different from himſelf at different periods of his life. The diſtinctions of age are the moſt natural, the moſt palpable, and the leaſt invidious of all diſtinctions; and wretched muſt be that commonwealth, in which the prerogatives of virtuous old age are not both honourably ſuſtained and cheerfully acknowledged!

The juſt and natural prerogatives of age ought, however, to be carefully diſtinguiſhed from the abſolute and unnatural dominion of fathers over their children, which was eſtabliſhed by law in ancient Perſia, and in ancient Rome. With reſpect to the former country, Ariſtotle ſays, that its regulations concerning the *patria poteſtas* were barbarous and tyrannical[a]. At Rome, fathers were not puniſhable for ſelling their children, or even for putting them to death; and a ſon, while his father lived, could not, unleſs emancipated, legally enjoy any ſeparate property. Extraordinary as thoſe powers ſeem, they were not, however, raſhly given to fathers by the founders of the Roman ſtate, the deepeſt of all politicians, "ſince they were induced to confer them, by conſidering the natural pre-eminence of fathers, the innumerable labours which they ſuſtain for the ſake of their children, the neceſſity of keeping the latter under a watchful authority; which they knew, from the inſtinctive affection of parents for their offſpring, would be mildly exerciſed." Such are the ſentiments of Simplicius[b]; but Ariſtotle holds, that parents, as to the treatment of their children, and maſters, as to the treatment of their ſlaves, ought

[a] Ethic. Nichom. viii. 12. [b] Ad Epictet. Encheirid.

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ought to be amenable to the laws, and accountable to the magiſtrates; ſince power without reſponſibilty is not made for man.

The third point in the preſent Book requiring illuſtration, relates to the moſt important branch of foreign policy. According to the theory at leaſt, though not the practice, both of the Greeks and Romans, war could be warrantably undertaken only for the purpoſes of ſelf-defence, of making repriſals, and of revenging injuries[c]. But the mild and manly ſpirit of Chriſtianity, reprobating, as an unjuſtifiable cauſe of action, every ſpecies and every degree of revenge, is thought to have altered and improved the law of nations reſpecting war and peace; and to have reſtricted the right of hoſtility ſimply to reſiſtance. Even this law of reſiſtance or defence has been rejected by the ſcruples of ſome of the auſterer ſects: but their arguments, founded on the literal ſenſe of particular texts, have been anſwered by proving, that theſe texts enjoin forbearance only in the caſe of ſlight and trivial injuries, and are to be regarded as general recommendations of Chriſtian patience, not as particular commands for abandoning to unjuſt violence our perſons, our families, our friends, and our country. Had Chriſtianity purpoſed the complete abolition of war on all grounds whatever, ſuch an innovation muſt have been announced in language ſpecific and peremptory. The new and extraordinary law would not have been left to be collected by inference; it would have been expreſsly declared and ſolemnly promulgated. By the power, indeed, of moral motives, and the force of rational arguments, Chriſtianity renders odious or contemptible, ambition, avarice, uncharitableneſs, and all thoſe ſelfiſh

[c] Omnia quæ defendi, repetique et ulciſci fas ſit. Liv. l. v. c. xlix.

ſelfiſh paſſions which are the principal and ordinary cauſes of aggreſſion. Were its divine doctrines univerſally reſpected, wars would from that moment univerſally ceaſe, becauſe none could meditate future wrong; and the party who had already committed injuries would be ſolicitous amply to repair them. But until this happy revolution be effected in human manners, violence may be repelled by force; crimes may be puniſhed for the ſake of amendment and example; and incorrigible offenders, whether individuals or communities, may be utterly cut off, when their deſtruction appears eſſentially requiſite to the public ſafety. Beſides thoſe plain and palpable grounds of war, which have always been avowed in the practice at leaſt of all Chriſtian nations, Ariſtotle maintains, that individuals or communities, qualified for command, may aſſert by arms an authority juſtifiable, becauſe uſeful, to thoſe who are its ſubjects; an authority moderate and political over freemen, abſolute and deſpotic over ſlaves. For extenuating the harſhneſs of this deciſion, it may be obſerved, that by metaphors familiar to moſt languages, we ſpeak of the infancy of ſociety, indicating that many human beings, who have attained the age of manhood, are nearly as incapable as children of governing their own conduct. To ſuch full-grown children, it would ſurely be a piece of good fortune to fall under the direction of a wiſe and virtuous father. We ſpeak of other communities of men as ſervile, barbarous, ſavage, and even brutal; it would, aſſuredly, be highly advantageous to ſuch nations to meet with wiſe and virtuous maſters. Barbarous and ſavage nations, therefore, may be rightfully attacked in war, if, without being conquered, the former could not be civiliſed, nor the latter be tamed.

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This ſpecious maxim is liable indeed to be frequently abuſed, becauſe it muſt be explained and applied by human reaſon, dark in itſelf, and often clouded by paſſion. But does the principle of ſelf-defence, which Grotius would ſubſtitute in its ſtead, delineate an unerring rule of action? According to the uniform current of modern hiſtory, has not the approved right of ſelf-defence been conſtituted by an apprehenſion of remote and improbable contingencies? In the practice, at leaſt, of nations, does it not include whatever our avarice, our ambition, in one word, our ſelfiſhneſs, ſuppoſes eſſential to our well-being, the increaſe of our wealth or power, the ſuperiority of our military or naval force, the preſervation of our hereditary advantages, and the inſurance of our future proſpects? One nation is too ſtrong—our ſafety requires that it ſhould be weakened; another, by its ſituation, may be tempted to extend its borders—our own frontier is to be fortified by new acquiſitions of territory, and defended by new bulwarks; by territory to be gained by invaſion, and bulwarks which inſpire more real terror than that by which they were raiſed. It would be endleſs to recite the incongruities reſulting from the interpretation of a law, which tends to ſet the practice of nations at continual variance with their principles; a law too refined for the coarſeneſs, and too limited for the variety of human tranſactions; which, in our preſent imperfect ſtate, require that the exerciſe of the right of war, like all other deliberate acts, ſhould be governed by the fallible dictates of human prudence, adjuſting, as well as may be, the meaſures of coercion to the ſalutary ends of public expediency, including the beſt intereſts both of the victors and of the vanquiſhed.

It may be worthy of remark, in concluding this introduction to Ariſtotle's ideal commonwealth, that his great political as well as philoſophical adverſary was employed, in 1663, to delineate a plan of government for Carolina. He gave the whole authority, legiſlative and executive, to the eight proprietors. The great Milton propoſed a plan of government for England [d]. The ſovereignty was to reſide in a grand council, not only ſupreme but perpetual. Compared with Ariſtotle's commonwealth, that of Locke will appear no better than a diet of *ſtaroſts*; and that of Milton, an oligarchy of *decemvirs*.

[d] See his "Ready and eaſy Way to eſtabliſh a Free Commonwealth."

BOOK IV.*

ARGUMENT.

Different views of national happineſs.—Fair eſtimate thereof.—The beſt commonwealth.—Extent and nature of its territory.—Commerce.—Naval power.—Climate.—Conſtituent members.—Health.—Marriage.—Children.

BOOK IV. Chap. 1. The foundation of public happineſs.

RIGHTLY to inveſtigate the beſt form of government, it is neceſſary previouſly to aſcertain what is the beſt kind of life; ſince the latter of theſe remaining undetermined, the former alſo muſt continue to be unknown. Thoſe men (barring improbable accidents) are the happieſt, who live under the beſt government of which their circumſtances admit. We muſt begin, therefore, by examining what kind of life is moſt eligible for mankind in general; and ſecondly, whether the well-being of individuals and of communities reſults from the ſame cauſes, and is to be eſtimated by the ſame ſtandard. The former of theſe topics has been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in our popular diſcourſes; where we made uſe of a diviſion that appears to be indiſputably accurate; namely, that the happineſs of men depends on their external proſperity, on the frame and habit of their bodies, on the ſtate and condition of their minds. He ſurely would be unworthy to be called happy, who poſſeſſed not the ſmalleſt particle of fortitude, of temperance, of juſtice, or of prudence; ſince the wretch totally deſtitute of theſe

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VII.

theſe virtues reſpectively, would be frightened at the buzzing of a fly; would wallow unreſtrained in the moſt beaſtly ſenſuality; would not heſitate, for the ſmalleſt gain, to deſtroy his beſt benefactor; and in point of intellectual operations, would betray either childiſh imbecility or frantic abſurdity. That a certain portion of virtue is eſſential to the well-being of a human creature, cannot, therefore, be a matter of diſpute; but to what this portion ought to amount, occaſions much diverſity of opinion. In general, mankind are ſatisfied with their reſpective ſhares of virtue, how ſcanty ſoever they may be, but extremely diſſatisfied with their ſhares of all other advantages; for their meaſure of virtue, however inconſiderable it may appear to others, rarely appearing deficient to themſelves, they ſeek not to augment it; while their eſtates and money, their fame and their power, cannot poſſibly, in their own opinion, be too widely enlarged, or too highly accumulated. But *we* ſay to them, that ſuch vulgar illuſions, even vulgar obſervation may ſuffice to diſpel. The external advantages of power and fortune are acquired and maintained by virtue, not virtue by them; and whether we conſider the virtuous energies themſelves, or the fruits which they unceaſingly produce, the ſovereign good of life muſt evidently be found in moral and intellectual excellence, moderately ſupplied with external accommodations, rather than in the greateſt accumulation of external advantages, unimproved and unadorned by virtue. External proſperity is indeed inſtrumental in producing happineſs, and therefore, like every other inſtrument, muſt have its aſſigned limits; beyond which it is inconvenient or hurtful. But to mental excellence no limit can be aſſigned: the farther it extends, the more *uſeful* it becomes, if the epithet

of *uſeful* need ever to be ſuperadded to that of *honourable*. Beſides this, the relative importance of qualities is beſt eſtimated by that of their reſpective ſubjects. But the mind, both in itſelf and in reference to man, is far better than the body, or than property. The excellencies of the mind, therefore, are in the ſame proportion to be preferred to the higheſt perfection of the body, and the beſt diſpoſition of external circumſtances. The two laſt are of a far inferior, and merely a ſubſervient nature; ſince no man of ſenſe covets or purſues them, but for the ſake of the mind, with a view to promote its genuine improvement, and to heighten its native joys. Let this great truth then be acknowledged; a truth evinced by the Deity himſelf, who is happy, not from any external cauſe, but through the inherent attributes of his divine nature.

Chap. 2.

The ſame with that of individuals.

Proſperity and happineſs, then, are things altogether different. Chance or fortune may beſtow the former, but they cannot produce the energies of virtue, which are the eſſential ſource of the latter. Theſe energies are preciſely the ſame, whether exerciſed by individuals or by communities; neither altering their inward form, nor changing their external effects. Public and private happineſs, therefore, muſt reſt on preciſely the ſame foundation, a concluſion juſtified even by univerſal conſent; ſince thoſe who place the happineſs of the individual in riches, are ſolicitous chiefly about preſerving and augmenting national wealth; and thoſe who place the happineſs of the individual in power, are ſolicitous chiefly about preſerving or augmenting national dominion. A ſimilar inference is drawn by the admirer of virtue: He who regards it as the ſupreme felicity of the individual, alſo conſiders it as the main ſource of national happineſs.

BOOK IV. Chap. 3.

The beſt ſchemes of national happineſs.

But ſince virtue is twofold, ſpeculative and practical, and that men ambitious of excellence reſpectively dedicate themſelves to the purſuit of philoſophy or that of politics; it is worth while to conſider which of the two kinds of life, a life of ſtrenuous action or of peaceful contemplation, is moſt deſerving of being imitated by ſtates; ſince it is the office of wiſdom to teach nations as well as individuals to prefer the beſt ends, and ſkilfully to purſue them. The advocates for peaceful repoſe and contemplative tranquillity obſerve, that for a nation to govern its neighbour deſpotically is the height of injuſtice, and therefore the moſt conſummate folly; and that to govern them moderately and carefully, though not liable to ſuch palpable objections, is however a work of great difficulty, and fraught with much trouble and much anxiety. Other reaſoners, though they condemn every kind of injuſtice and deſpotiſm, maintain that the contentious agitations of war and government form the happineſs and glory of nations, ſince they afford the beſt and nobleſt field for the public exhibition of illuſtrious abilities, and of pre-eminent virtues. A third claſs, and this is the moſt numerous, boldly patroniſe ambition and tyranny, and aſſert that the main buſineſs of nations conſiſts in extending their power and aggrandiſing their empire.

The practice of moſt great nations ſhews that they placed it in valour and conqueſt.

In Sparta and in Crete, the public education, as well as the laws, are contrived merely as means for attaining this favourite end. The ſame remark applies to the Scythians, the Perſians, the Thracians, and the Celts; and, indeed, to all thoſe great nations whoſe valour or populouſneſs have enabled them to aſſert their pretenſions, or encouraged them to diſplay their ambition. In Carthage, a ſoldier is entitled to wear as many rings as he has ſerved campaigns. There was an old law in

Macedon, that the man who had not ſlain an enemy in the field of battle, ſhould be girt, not with an ornamental belt, but with a halter. The Scythians, in their public feſtivals, never preſented the circling cup to hands guiltleſs of blood. The Iberians, a martial people, adorn the tombs of their deceaſed warriors with obeliſks or pillars, equal in number to the enemies whom they have reſpectively ſlain [c]. Similar inſtitutions prevail in other countries, either enacted by law, or eſtabliſhed by cuſtom; and yet nothing can appear more abſurd to men capable of reflection, than to believe it the buſineſs of government to hold either nations or individuals in reluctant ſubjection. Who ever heard that it was the duty of a phyſician to compel, or even to perſuade his patients to be cured, or the duty of a pilot to compel, or even to perſuade the ſhip's company to be ſaved? The ſcience of government, like that of phyſic and of navigation,

[c] The inſtitutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity, which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Ariſtotle, who flouriſhed towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were diſtinguiſhed above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffuſion, of military honours. From the time of the Publilian law, "ut plebiſcita omnes Quirites tenerent," U. C. 416. which was a confirmation of the Valerian, U. C. 306.; and which was itſelf confirmed by the Hortenſian, U. C. 467.*, the people at large enjoyed an aſcendancy in the government; and the military ambition of the commonwealth thereby acquired that degree of vigour and activity, which (external circumſtances permitting) has always moſt conſpicuouſly appeared under ſuch a political arrangement. In modern times, military diſtinctions, as well as the martial ſpirit, have prevailed moſt in monarchies. This was not the caſe anciently, but completely the reverſe: and it may be obſerved, that external circumſtances being the ſame, the ambition of conqueſt diffuſed through the general maſs of a ſociety, muſt be a more ardent as well as a more firm and ſteady principle of action, than when confined within the breaſts of a few individuals, whoſe paſſions are not, like thoſe of communities, immortal.

* Conf. T. Liv. iii. 55. vii. 42. Plin. Nat. Hiſt. xvi. 10. & Pompon. de Origin. ii. 8. Aul. Gell. xv. 27.

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navigation, is invented for the public benefit; and men will allow themſelves to be benefited, without perſuaſion and without compulſion.

Their eſtimate proved to be erroneous.

The conduct of nations has perplexed this ſubject, becauſe the conduct of nations has been diſtorted by paſſion. They have impoſed laws on their neighbours, which they themſelves would have indignantly rejected. Behaving moderately and equitably at home, they have acted tyrannically abroad, confounding the limits of politic and deſpotic government, although, as we have already proved, to enſlave freemen, is not leſs abſurd and contrary to nature, than to hunt and eat them. A ſtate may be ſo circumſtanced as to exiſt happily without conqueſt and without war; and how ſplendid ſoever military glory may be deemed, it is valuable merely as the means of obtaining a ſtill more valuable end. This end cannot ſurely conſiſt in gratifying the luſt of ambition, for no pleaſure is more contemptible than that of commanding ſlaves, and to reduce freemen into ſervitude is an unnatural gratification, equally dangerous and deceitful. The happineſs of communities, as well as of individuals, conſiſts, doubtleſs, in action; but to the external action of a ſtate, a wide field lies often in the diverſity of genius and character of the ſurrounding nations, each of which, to be treated juſtly, muſt perhaps be treated differently. Beſides this, there are many internal relations which the conſtituent parts of a commonwealth bear to each other, and many reſulting duties to be habitually and daily performed[r]. But were nothing of this kind to be performed, nor

[r] Ariſtotle here dwells on what is often repeated in other parts of this work, the injuſtice of any kind of authority not derived from nature; the differences between the power or juriſdiction of maſters, fathers, and huſbands, and the evils reſulting from confounding the limits of governments ſpecifically different.

nor any external effect to be produced, action would not, therefore, ceaſe; nor the purpoſe of happineſs be defeated. The pleaſure of intellectual action is the more perfect, in proportion as ſuch action terminates in itſelf. The geometer who ſolves his problem, the philoſopher who purſues his ſpeculation[g], reſpectively exerciſe energies immediately delightful in themſelves, independently of any diſtant end, or any external effect. What can be external to God and the univerſe? Yet the action of the univerſe is not therefore ſuſpended; and the Deity[h], who ſuſtains

[g] τῃς ταις διανοιαις αρχετεκτονας. The word architect in Greek was extended to ſignify a contriver in general, the man who planned with his head, what others were to execute with their hands. In this ſenſe it is uſed in the text; of which I have endeavoured to convey the full meaning without adhering literally to the words. How, indeed, can we tranſlate clearly, yet literally, παλυ μαλλον τας αυτοτελεις. . . ἡ γαρ ευπραξια τελος, ὡστε και πραξις τις. Cicero, in many of the fineſt paſſages of his works, expands and adorns Ariſtotle's thoughts. "Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum inſulis, immortale ævum, ut fabulæ ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus eſſet eloquentia, cum judicia nulla fierent? aut ipſis etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudinis indigeremus, nullo propoſito aut labore aut periculo; nec juſtitia, cum eſſet nihil, quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quæ regeret eas, quæ nullæ eſſent libidines: ne prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo dilectu propoſito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur eſſemus beati cognitione naturæ, et ſcientia, qua ſola etiam deorum eſt vita laudanda. Ex quo intelligi poteſt, cetera neceſſitatis; unum hoc voluptatis." Cicero Fragment. Philoſoph. ſive Hortenſius.

[h] This is conformable to a ſublime theological paſſage in the Treatiſe de Cœlo, L. ii. c. xiii. p. 465. in which Ariſtotle, after explaining the Pythagorean ſyſtem of aſtronomy, is endeavouring to refute one of its principal doctrines. The Pythagoreans held the element of fire to be more precious than that of earth, and therefore aſſigned to it the more honourable place, and conſidered it as the center of the celeſtial motions. This center being the poſt of greateſt importance in the univerſe, and requiring the moſt vigilant watch, they called the fire occupying this poſt Διος φυλακην, the watch of Jupiter. In oppoſition to theſe hypotheſes, Ariſtotle, conſtantly guided in his concluſions by obſervation and analogy, takes notice that the center or middle is certainly that which is moſt important and principal in any ſyſtem, when it is that by which the ſyſtem is connected and ſuſtained. But this middle, or rather this principle of connection,

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ſuſtains the whole, enjoys the perfection of felicity in exerciſing his divine energies. By ſuch ſublime compariſons we are taught, that the happineſs of men, conſidered collectively or individually, is ſtill to be found within themſelves; and that the ſame kind of life which is the beſt for each citizen apart, is alſo the beſt for the whole community.

Chap. 4.

Tranſition to the examination of what is abſolutely the beſt commonwealth.

This ſhort preface ſeemed a neceſſary prelude to our treatiſe concerning the beſt form of goverment, for it was proper to begin with that which is the moſt important of all, to which all other things are relative and ſubſervient, and *without* which they are not, all of them taken collectively, of any, the ſmalleſt value: we now proceed to examine thoſe external advantages and outward accommodations, which ſerve as the materials from which the beſt commonwealths are compoſed, and as foundations on which the beſt conſtitutions are conſtructed.

That ſuch a commonwealth has limits in point of populouſneſs.

In explaining this ſubject our ſuppoſitions, doubtleſs, are arbitrary; but good ſenſe requires that they be not impracticable. The ſtateſman, like the ſhipbuilder or the weaver, requires a due proviſion of materials; and the better thoſe materials are, the more perfect will be the fruit of his political labour. The materials of the ſtateſman or legiſlator, are the number and character of his people, the extent and quality of his country. The

connection, will not be found to coincide with what is the middle in point of magnitude, or with what is called the center of gravity. In animals, the connecting and ſuſtaining principle reſides not in the middle of their bodies; neither is there good reaſon for ſuppoſing it to be ſo ſituated in the univerſe. Philoſophers need not, therefore, give themſelves trouble about the ſafety of the univerſe, letting a watch at the center of its ſpace or magnitude, but rather to inveſtigate its connecting and ſuſtaining principle, where and of what kind it is. The reſt is mere matter; this is the ſoul of the ſyſtem: ἡ κατα της συστασεως, "that which gives the ſyſtem its characteriſtic form, makes it ſubſiſt, and be what it is."

The excellence of a commonwealth, however, is not to be eſtimated by its populouſneſs or extent, but by its fitneſs for performing its proper functions. Hippocrates was a greater phyſician than many phyſicians twice his ſize. Slaves, ſojourners, and ſtrangers render a city populous, but do not make it *great*; neither can this epithet be beſtowed, where there are many mechanics and manufacturers, but few citizens completely armed and ſkilfully diſciplined. The experience of hiſtory proves, that ſtates of unlimited populouſneſs have never been well regulated. How is it poſſible that they ſhould, if law be nothing elſe than an arrangement, and if *that* be incapable of arrangement which is indefinite in number or quantity? To harmoniſe immenſity into ſyſtem, is the work only of that Divine Power which comprehends the univerſe. Beauty commonly reſults from the proportion of quantity; and that which exceeds, as well as that which falls ſhort of the due proportion, cannot be called beautiful, either literally or figuratively. There is a limit, therefore, to the magnitude of every whole or ſyſtem, whether it be the work of nature or of art. A ſhip of two furlongs in length, is as unfit for the purpoſe of navigation as one of two ſpans; and although a community may contain a greater number of individuals than are requiſite for thoſe purpoſes of ſelf-ſufficiency and comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which commonwealths are inſtituted, yet this exceſs is not unlimited; ſince, when carried beyond certain bounds, it would diſqualify the body-politic for its proper functions; rendering it incapable both of prudent command and of prompt obedience. An army reinforced by continual acceſſions, would finally ceaſe to be an army; for were Stentor fit to be its herald, who would preſume

to

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to be its general? What human ſkill would undertake to combine its operations, and to harmoniſe its movements?

What theſe limits are.

The ſovereign functions of a ſtate conſiſt in appointing magiſtrates, and in deciding differences. But it is impoſſible that magiſtrates ſhould be judiciouſly appointed, or differences ſkilfully decided, unleſs the characters and abilities of the citizens be carefully obſerved and accurately aſcertained: and theſe precautions will not be eaſily taken in countries of unbounded populouſneſs; in which, alſo, there is this inconvenience, that ſtrangers and ſojourners will have an opportunity, through the difficulty of detection, of clandeſtinely uſurping the rank of citizens. The magnitude of a commonwealth, though variable, has, therefore, on either ſide, its fixed boundaries. It muſt be all-ſufficient in itſelf for the purpoſes of comfortable ſubſiſtence, and for the reciprocal ſupply of mutual wants. But its inhabitants muſt not be too numerous to be comprehended at one glance of the ſtateſman's eye, and to be conducted in all their actions by the vigilant operation of political diſcipline.

Chap. 5.

Concerning the extent and nature of the territory.

Upon ſimilar principles we muſt decide concerning the extent and nature of the territory. That which is moſt fertile in the greateſt variety of productions ſeems entitled to a juſt preference, provided this fertility be not ſo luxuriant as to encourage indolence or engender voluptuouſneſs [1]. Military men will tell us what makes a country eaſy of egreſs yet difficult of invaſion.

[1] The author here promiſes to examine more accurately hereafter, what ought to be the limits of national wealth; but in the work as it now ſtands, this promiſe is not fulfilled. Several other queſtions are ſtarted by Ariſtotle in his Politics, which are not any where anſwered; which proves that performance to have come down to us in an imperfect ſtate.

ſion. The territory ſhould alſo be compactly ſituate; that it may eaſily fall within the ſuperintending eye of the ſtateſman or general, that its parts may be able mutually to aſſiſt each other, and that the whole may be readily defended.

Chap. 6.

Whether the capital ought to be ſituated near the ſea.

The maritime poſition of the capital will greatly contribute to this laſt purpoſe; for its inhabitants may ſpeedily embark, and ſail to the defence of any part of their poſſeſſions that happens to be attacked; and they may attack the enemy in thoſe parts that are moſt vulnerable. It is alſo of great importance to commerce, and eſpecially to the tranſportation of wood and other bulky articles, that the capital be conveniently ſituate with regard both to the ſea, and to the circumjacent land. Yet, in other reſpects, the vicinity of the ſea[k] is attended with dangerous conſequences. Men will generally entertain a higher veneration for their hereditary inſtitutions, in proportion as they leſs communicate with ſtrangers; and the promiſcuous crowd of ſailors and foreigners, which traffic naturally collects, can ſcarcely fail to injure the morals of well-educated citizens.

If

[k] Maritime power was ſo groſsly abuſed by the ancient republics, that it is continually branded by moraliſts as producing vile and verſatile manners, ηθη ποικιλα και φαυλα, Plato de Leg. ſub. init. The ſurpriſing of defenceleſs cities, the deſolating of unguarded coaſts, attacks without glory, and retreats without ſhame, were repreſented as operations not leſs inconſiſtent with true courage, than incompatible with humanity and juſtice. Iſocrat. Orat. de Pace, & Plato ubi ſupra. The ancient republics entruſted arms to thoſe only who had a property to defend. Their ſoldiers were levied from the firſt claſſes, or privileged orders, of ſociety. But ſailors were taken from the promiſcuous crowd, and generally from the meaneſt populace. This practice, which prevailed equally in Greece and Rome, was founded on ſound policy. The exertions of ſailors, being naturally directed againſt foreign enemies, are leſs likely to prove dangerous to the internal ſtability of government.

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How far commerce ought to be cultivated, and how its inconveniences may be remedied.

If we cultivate commerce, it muſt be for accommodation only, not for gain: our citizens are not to degrade themſelves into brokers and carriers, nor to ſquander away in the arts of luxury that labour which may be far more profitably as well as more honourably employed, in the cultivation of the ſoil and in the production of neceſſaries; the occupation which is of all others the beſt adapted to the bulk of mankind, the moſt favourable to the health of their minds and bodies, and therefore the beſt fitted to promote national proſperity. Our commerce muſt be limited to the purpoſe of ſupplying our domeſtic wants; and in order to attain this purpoſe without endangering the purity of our domeſtic manners, we may imitate the example of thoſe cities and countries which have their docks and harbours encloſed by walls and fortifications, and ſeparated at a due diſtance from the capital; thus permitting the importation of foreign commodities, but intercepting the contagion of foreign vices.

Concerning naval power.

Naval power is peculiarly uſeful for the purpoſes of intimidating our enemies and protecting our allies; but its extent ought to be commenſurate with the rank which a ſtate aſpires to hold in the political ſyſtem. A people ambitious of command muſt be provided with a ſtrong navy; and this may be equipped without raiſing the naval crowd to the condition of citizens. Even on ſhipboard, thoſe who brandiſh the ſpear muſt maintain their ſuperiority over thoſe who handle the oar; and the latter, in whatever number they may be wanted, will eaſily be raiſed from the maſs of the peaſants and labourers. Such is the practice of ſeveral wiſe ſtates, particularly of that of Heraclæa, which maintains a numerous fleet of gallies, yet preſerves its citizens untainted by the contagious profligacy of mariners.

Thus

Thus much may ſuffice concerning the extent of the city and territory, and concerning the magnitude of the naval force. We formerly aſſigned due limits to the number of the citizens, and now proceed to conſider what ought to be their genius and character; a queſtion that will be beſt ſolved by paſſing in review, and examining, thoſe nations of Greece, and of the world in general, which appear to be moſt worthy of our eſteem.

Chap. 7.

Of the character reſulting from a cold climate;

The inhabitants of Europe, and of moſt cold countries, abound in ſtrength and courage; but their intellectual powers are feeble or defective. They enjoy liberty, but are unacquainted with good polity; and though capable of maintaining their independence, are unworthy of aſpiring to empire.

from a warm climate;

The inhabitants of Aſia, on the contrary, are artful and ingenious, but mean-ſpirited and daſtardly. They have, therefore, always been, and continue to this day, either ſubjects or ſlaves.

from a temperate climate;

But the intermediate ſituation of the Greeks ſeems to have happily blended in their character the virtues of courage and prudence, and to have formed them for thinking calmly, yet feeling ſtrongly. They enjoy, therefore, the double advantage of liberty and laws; and are qualified for ruling the world, were they happily confederate under one form of government[1]. The Greeks, however, are not all equally conſpicuous for this happy

[1] Ariſtotle maintained in a former chapter that a commonwealth had its limits in point of populouſneſs; and endeavoured to point out with ſufficient accuracy for all practical purpoſes what theſe limits were. In the paſſage before us he ſays, γενος Ελληνων δυναμενον αρχειν παντων, μιας τυγχανον πολιτειας. "That the Greeks would be able to command all nations, if they had the ſame form of government." In fact, the extreme difference in the forms of government in Greece, was the great obſtacle to their national union in one political confederacy; which is the thing here intended by Ariſtotle, ſince, according to the principles above explained, Greece was far too populous to be happily united in one commonwealth.

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The beſt moral materials for legiſlation.

happy temperament, and the manly policy which is its natural reſult. In ſome nations the character is rude and ſhapeleſs; one quality being deficient, while another is redundant: but in whatever people ardent courage moſt naturally harmoniſes with cool combination, and dignity of ſentiment with energy of intellect, that people muſt be conſidered as the beſt materials for legiſlation, and the fitteſt to be moulded into a virtuous commonwealth. It is ſaid by ſome writers, that the military guardians of ſtates ought, like faithful dogs, to ſhew themſelves mild towards thoſe whom they know, but fierce towards ſtrangers. Yet true magnanimity is incapable of ferocity, and is never moved even to aſperity, but in reſentment of injuſtice or inſult. When theſe provocations proceed from friends and acquaintances, our anger is enhanced by this circumſtance. "Waſt thou not tormented by thy friends?" ſays Archilochus, to whet his ſatire; and it is reaſonable that men ſhould be doubly offended when they meet with injury and neglect, where they had a right to expect friendſhip and regard. Hence the proverbs, "cruel are the wars of brothers;" and "thoſe who are incapable of anger and reſentment, muſt alſo be incapable of friendſhip and gratitude;" and indeed all thoſe affections originate in one and the ſame ſource [1]. Thus much may ſuffice concerning the qualities moſt uſeful towards the formation of good citizens; for in practical matters, ſcientific accuracy is neither attainable nor requiſite.

Chap. 8.

Diſtinction between the integral parts of a ſtate, and

Every whole or ſyſtem, whether it be the work of nature or of art, may require many things for its ſubſiſtence which are not to be numbered among its conſtituent parts. Food is neceſſary for ſupporting animal life, but is not a part of thoſe animals who conſume it. Land and other objects of property, whether

[1] See vol. i. b. vi. c. ii. p. 288. & ſeq.

whether inanimate or endued with life, are neceſſary for upholding ſtates, yet none of theſe poſſeſſions or inſtruments form any part of the commonwealth; which, as defined above, is the aſſociation of equals for the purpoſe of living happily, that is, of living virtuouſly, for happineſs has been proved to conſiſt in the exerciſe of virtuous energies; though men, indeed, ſeek to find it in very different purſuits, hunting vain ſhadows, which diverſify without correcting their purpoſes of life, and vary without improving their forms of government.

the things neceſſary for its ſubſiſtence.

The things eſſential to every ſtate, whether as conſtituent parts or as concomitants [m], may be reduced to the ſix following heads. 1. Food, the great want of mankind. 2. Arts, becauſe to effect the comfort of life is a work requiring many inſtruments. 3. Arms, for citizens muſt be armed to prevent domeſtic diſorders, and ward off foreign violence. 4. Money, as the medium of exchange, and meaſure of value, and neceſſary in the exigences of war as well as in the operations of commerce. 5. An eſtabliſhment for the functions of religion [n], which are of all functions the firſt in dignity. 6. Councils of deliberation, and courts of juſtice, which are of all eſtabliſhments the moſt neceſſary. Any of theſe objects being wanting, the commonwealth is imperfect, or incapable of anſwering its end. In every commonwealth, therefore, there muſt be huſbandmen, artiſans, ſoldiers, merchants, prieſts, and judges [o].

Enumeration of the things neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of a commonwealth.

A queſtion

[m] The author dwells here on this diſtinction, which is fully explained elſewhere.

[n] If we except the French republic, the Chineſe are the only great nation who, according to recent accounts, ever diſſented from Ariſtotle in this particular. See Staunton's Embaſſy to China, vol. ii. p. 101.

[o] Under the name of judges he means to comprehend, as in the following chapter, το βουλευομενον περι των συμφεροντων, as well as το κρινον περι των δικαιων, "thoſe who deliberate and determine in queſtions of public expediency," as well as "thoſe who examine into and adjuſt the controverſies between individuals."

BOOK IV.

Chap. 9.

In the beſt commonwealth, thoſe employed in mean and mercenary labour not to rank as citizens.

A queſtion ariſes, whether in that moſt perfect community of which human nature is ſuſceptible, the citizens ſhould aſſume indifferently, and as their occaſions may require, all thoſe various characters; or whether certain employments be not inconſiſtent with the habitual exerciſe of thoſe virtuous energies, which we have proved to be the principal end and aim of every political partnerſhip. It appears at firſt ſight, that a life of mechanical drudgery, or a life of haggling commerce, is totally incompatible with that dignified life which it is our wiſh that our citizens ſhould lead, and totally adverſe to that generous elevation of mind with which it is our ambition to inſpire them. The mere trade of huſbandry, the aſſiduous labour and minute attentions which it requires, would be deſtructive of that ſecure leiſure which is eſſential to the formation of their characters; and ſuch ſordid cares would impede and obſtruct the generous and manly exertions by which virtue is diſplayed and confirmed. Men, habitually addicted to the lowly purſuits of providing neceſſaries and accumulating gain, are unfit members of our republic, becauſe they are incapable of reliſhing thoſe enjoyments in which we have ſuppoſed its chief happineſs to conſiſt. They are to be claſſed with things neceſſary to the commonwealth, but not to be ranked with its citizens; for the beſt and moſt perfect commonwealth muſt provide for the happineſs of all its members, and a commonwealth founded on virtue cannot provide for the happineſs of men who are but feebly touched by her charms. Such men, therefore, though neceſſary to a commonwealth, are not parts of the commonwealth, any more than food, though neceſſary to an animal, is part of an animal; or than the inſtruments employed in producing any work, are themſelves parts of that work. The productive labour of

peaſants and artiſans, how neceſſary ſoever to the purpoſes of outward accommodation and comfortable ſubſiſtence, is not, therefore, to be confounded nor claſſed with the high political functions of ſoldiers, prieſts, and magiſtrates °.

What are the proper employments of citizens.

It remains, therefore, to examine, whether arms, religion, and magiſtracy ought to be regarded as things ſpecifically different, and of which the offices ought to be ſeparately exerciſed by diſtinct profeſſions. In every good government the military ought, doubtleſs, to depend on the civil power; but will men bearing arms be contented with a condition of unalterable dependence? Or will thoſe who feel their ability to change the conſtitution at pleaſure, ſubmit for ever to a political arrangement diſgraceful to themſelves? Such patient reſignation cannot reaſonably be expected, nor can that which is contrary to reaſon be requiſite to good government. The capacity for exerciſing military and civil functions depends on qualities that are variable, becauſe they reſult from a variable cauſe, the changeable powers of man in the different periods of human life. Strength, agility, and courage attain their higheſt perfection at that period of youth when the body reaches its prime; foreſight, temper, and wiſdom do not acquire their full maturity, but with the acmè and perfection of the mind. The *ſame* perſons, therefore, but at *different* periods of their lives, muſt exerciſe military and civil functions; and thus each claſs of citizens will perform that office for which it is beſt qualified, and to which it is beſt entitled. It remains only to ſpeak of the prieſthood. This ſolemn function muſt, doubtleſs, be exerciſed by men of the

That theſe employments ought to be diſtributed according to the different periods of human life.

° In this paſſage I have changed the order of the ſentences, the better to prepare the modern reader for a deciſion, which to him muſt appear harſh in the extreme, though it could not be viewed in that light by the readers of antiquity.

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the moſt reſpectable claſs. But to perform with decency and dignity the rites of religion, requires not any violent exertion of body or mind. Such honourable duties, therefore, ought to be reſerved for the occupation and the reward of declining years; and thoſe who have ſpent their youth and their manhood in more active and ſtrenuous cares, ought to dedicate their old age to the calm ceremonies of religion, and finally to repoſe in the peaceful ſanctuaries of the gods.

Chap. 10.

That the wiſeſt nations of antiquity acknowledged the diſtinction between citizens on the one hand, and peaſants and artiſans on the other.

The diſtinction between the conſtituent parts of a commonwealth, and things merely neceſſary for its ſubſiſtence, remounts to the higheſt antiquity. Both in Egypt and in Crete [p], the ſoldiers have long been, what they continue to this day, a claſs altogether diſtinct from the peaſants. Seſoſtris is ſaid to have eſtabliſhed this arrangement in Egypt; and Minos, in Crete. The *ſyſſitia* or public tables, in that iſland, are thought to have been inſtituted as early as the time of Minos; and ſimilar eſtabliſhments are ſaid to have taken place in Italy at a ſtill earlier date. For the hiſtorians of that country inform us, that Œnotria received the name of Italy from king Italus; a name comprehending the coaſt between the Scyllatine and Lametine gulphs; which are oppoſite to each other, and diſtant by land only half a day's journey [q]. Italus is ſaid to have changed the Œnotrians from ſhepherds into huſbandmen, and to have given them other laws relative to their new mode of life, and particularly thoſe regulating the public tables; which remain in force among his deſcendants to this day. For northwards, from the country firſt called Italy, the Opici and Auſonians

[p] This chapter may be conſidered as an illuſtration of the principles eſtabliſhed in the preceding, from the hiſtory of thoſe nations who diffuſed religion, laws, and civility over the ancient world.

[q] Vid. Cluverii Ital. Antiq. p. 1290. & ſeq.

Auſonians extend themſelves, on one hand, towards the Tuſcan ſea; but on the other hand, the Chaonians, an Œnotrian tribe, have ſtretched towards the Ionian ſea and Iapygia. Among them the eſtabliſhment of *ſyſſitia* firſt prevailed, and from them it was adopted by other nations. But the ſeparation of citizens and peaſants prevailed much earlier; for the age of Seſoſtris long preceded that of Minos. It is probable that political, like all other inventions, have been often diſcovered and often loſt; and that many inſtitutions have been laid aſide and revived, times without number. Men having acquired neceſſaries, naturally ſeek accommodations; and having provided for the ſtrength and ſupport of their political edifices, they ſet themſelves to improve and embelliſh them. The ſtyle of ſuperfluous ornaments varies with the caprice by which they are produced; but there are ornaments connected with uſe, which ought to be found in every well-regulated commonwealth; and why we take the *ſyſſitia* to be of this kind will be afterwards explained.

Of the diſtribution and character of the peaſants and artiſans, and that liberty ought to be propoſed as the reward of all ſlaves worthy to enjoy it.

We are now to ſpeak of the diſtribution and character of the peaſants and artiſans, which, according to our principles, muſt be partly the property of the public and partly the property of particular citizens; for although our republic rejects the community of goods as repreſſive to exertion, and even deſtructive of virtue, yet wiſhing poſſeſſions to be ſtrictly appropriated, we wiſh that their uſes be freely communicated; that according to the proverb all things may be common among friends; and that no one of the citizens may long continue in want of any object with which another can conveniently ſupply him. The citizens, therefore, are to be maintained at public tables,

BOOK IV.

the expences of which, as well as thoſe of the ſacrifices and religious feſtivals, are to be ſupplied from the lands laboured in common by the public ſlaves; for men of ſmall incomes could not contribute ſufficiently for theſe purpoſes, and at the ſame time ſupport eaſily the charges of their private families. The territory, therefore, ought to conſiſt partly of common, and partly of private property; and each of theſe ought to be again ſubdivided, ſince the common is deſtined to anſwer two purpoſes, and to ſupply the expences of religion and thoſe of the *ſyſſitia*; and ſince the lands of each citizen ought to lie partly in the vicinity of the capital, and partly on the frontier, or, if united in one maſs, ought to have ſome ſituation nearly equidiſtant from thoſe extremes. Both juſtice and expediency require ſuch a diſtribution; for advantages and inconveniences will thus be more fairly balanced among the private citizens, and the ſtate itſelf will be thus rendered more unanimous in public deliberations and military enterpriſes. As poſſeſſions are now arranged, one portion of the community is commonly too much, and another too little, alarmed at the proſpect of a foreign war; wherefore ſome ſtates have enacted that landholders living on the frontier ſhould not be allowed to vote in queſtions concerning war and peace, becauſe ſuch perſons are likely to ſacrifice to private intereſt the advantage and honour of their country. Such ought to be the diſtribution of the territory, and thoſe who cultivate it ought (if we can have them to our wiſh) to be ſlaves of various extractions, different in manners and endowments, but all deſtitute of courage. But if this cannot be obtained, let them be the barbarians in our neighbourhood, of ſtrong bodies and ſervile minds. How ſlaves are to be treated

we ſhall afterwards explain; and alſo aſſign our reaſons why liberty ought to be the reward of all ſlaves univerſally [r] who approve themſelves worthy of obtaining and capable of enjoying it.

Chap. 11.

The ſituation of the capital ought to be determined by circumſtances moſt conducive to wealth, comfort, and ſecurity.

We have explained what is the beſt ſituation of the capital, both with reſpect to the ſea and to the contiguous territory. But its ſituation ought alſo to be relative to health, which depends chiefly on good air and good water; and calculated for the enjoyment of peace, and for ſafety in war. The circumſtances, therefore, that ought to determine the poſition of our capital are theſe four, air, water, comfort, and ſecurity. In Greece, cities open to the eaſt are deemed the moſt healthful; and next to that, a northern aſpect is preferred, chiefly for the ſake of coolneſs. A capital ſituate to our wiſh, ought to abound in ſalubrious fountains; and if that advantage cannot be obtained, preparations ſhould be made for receiving the rain water

The circumſtances moſt conducive to health;

[r] The moſt ſolid objection to ſlavery is that of its perpetuity; that a human being, whatever may be his acquirements and his merits, ſhould never be the director of his own conduct; and how well qualified ſoever he may become to govern himſelf, ſhould be perpetually and unalterably ſubjected to the authority of another. This objection forcibly ſtruck Ariſtotle at a time when the lower claſſes of men in all countries and under all forms of government univerſally ſubſiſted in the condition of ſervitude. It is to be regretted that we have not his reaſons at length why emancipation, the practice of which was ſo common in the ancient world, ſhould not depend on the will of individual maſters, but ſhould reſult from the general will of the community, granting on certain conditions, and after a certain time, liberty to ſlaves. It may be objected indeed, that a cruel or unjuſt maſter would be ready to impoſe a double taſk on thoſe who were likely ſoon to eſcape from his hands. But this is anſwered by ſaying, that according to Ariſtotle's principles ſuch a man was not qualified, and therefore not entitled to be a maſter; and that ſlaves in the ancient republics at leaſt were under the protection of the laws, which reſtrained or puniſhed the cruelty or injuſtice of maſters. See above, b. i. c. iii. p. 33.

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water in copious reſervoirs: and the pureſt ſprings ſhould be ſet apart for the ſuſtenance of human life, under ſtrict prohibitions of employing them for any leſs important purpoſe. This law ought not to be regarded as frivolous: for good health depends chiefly on the quality of thoſe things of which we make the moſt frequent uſe; and ſuch manifeſtly are air and water.

to comfort and ſecurity.

The nature of fortifications and fortreſſes is relative to the nature of government, and ought to vary with the alteration of its forms. Lofty and impregnable citadels beſt ſuit monarchies and oligarchies. The equal defence of walls, guarding with impartial juſtice the ſafety of the people at large, is beſt adapted to republics and democracies; and the authority of ariſtocratical nobles will be moſt ſecurely maintained, neither by walls nor citadels, but by a number of well-fortified caſtles. With regard to the form and diſtribution of manſions and ſtreets, the modern ſtyle of building, introduced by the architect Hippodamus[s], is moſt favourable to health and pleaſure, and moſt convenient for all the occupations and purpoſes of civil life. But his ſtraight lines and ſpacious openings impair ſtrength while they embelliſh beauty, and render his cities eaſily pervious to an invading enemy. For the purpoſes of war, ſtreets ought to be winding and intricate, obſtructed by impediments and entangled by perplexities. But that cities may anſwer the ends both of war and peace, they ſhould be at once ſtrong and elegant; and this complex object will be beſt effected by imitating the labours of the gardener in planting his quincunx, where reſiſtance combines with arrangement, and where perplexity reſults from uniformity itſelf. There is more folly than magnanimity in the opinion, that cities ought not to be walled. True

[s] See b. ii. c. vi. p. 95. & ſeq.

True courage will not reject the aſſiſtance of art under manifeſt inequality of ſtrength; and as miſſile weapons and battering engines have been perfected by the ingenuity of the preſent age, the ſafety of cities requires that the ſcience of defence ſhould keep pace with that of attack. The Lacedæmonians and others who have diſdained walls as the refuge of cowardice, have dearly paid for their temerity.

Chap. 12.

The ornaments of the capital.

By good regulations, fortified cities may enjoy all the advantages of thoſe that are open to the country on every ſide; and the bulwarks and battlements may be converted into agreeable ornaments, ſcenes of pleaſing recreation to the citizens, but of threatening aſpect to hoſtile neighbours. The guard rooms may ſerve as halls for the ſyſſitia or common tables; near to which may be worſhipped, in one edifice, thoſe Gods whoſe temples neither laws or oracles command to be ſeparated, at a certain diſtance from all other buildings. This edifice, erected in honour of religion in general, ought to be as lofty and conſpicuous as its purpoſe is uſeful and dignified, of awful magnificence and commanding ſtrength. Around this temple a forum ought to be formed and incloſed, ſimilar to that of Theſſaly, called the libèral rendezvous. This ſpacious incloſure is not to be encumbered by the ſhops of artificers, nor polluted by the tricks of traffic. Neither peaſant nor mechanic is ever to enter its pure precincts, unleſs ſummoned by the magiſtrate; for it is conſecrated as the ſcene of liberal converſe and manly exerciſe; where perſons, claſſed by their ages, are to invigorate and confirm their powers by emulous contention; and where youth is to be trained to modeſty and manlineſs, under the vigilant ſuperintendence of virtuous old age. The ſquare employed for the market-place, is to be totally diſtinct; it ought to

The liberal rendezvous.

The market-place, and courts of juſtice.

BOOK IV.

to be eaſily acceſſible to imports by ſea, and tranſportations by land; the officers of police and the courts of juſtice are to aſſemble in its neighbourhood; it is deſtined for buſineſs and neceſſity, as the liberal forum is deſtined for exerciſe and enjoyment. The diſtricts and townſhips are to be regulated after the model of the capital; but on this ſubject it is not neceſſary to enlarge: to contrive good arrangements is eaſy; the difficulty lies in reducing them to practice. Good intentions are ſufficient for the firſt; the ſecond requires the co-operation of good fortune.

The diſtricts and townſhips.

Chap. 13.

Having thus explained the external accommodations of our commonwealth, we next proceed to examine what ought to be the genius and character of its citizens; and to explain what are the means moſt likely to inſpire that genius, and impreſs that character, which will beſt qualify them for enjoying political happineſs. The perfection of human felicity requires that we ſhould chooſe the beſt ends, and employ the beſt means for attaining them. Theſe objects ſometimes harmoniſe, and are ſometimes diſcordant; the means being bad while the ends are good, or the ends being bad while the means are good; and ſometimes neither the one nor the other are worthy of approbation; which happens when the means are not likely to attain the end propoſed, and when this end itſelf, though attained, is not likely to promote the great ultimate purpoſe of good or happineſs. This takes place in phyſic, when the phyſician errs both in aſcertaining that habit of body which is moſt conducive to the health of his patient, and in appreciating that mode of life, that diet, and exerciſe which are fitted to ſuperinduce the habit which he has erroneouſly preferred. But the felicity of men depends not entirely on human efforts; for nature

Tranſition to the character of the citizens of the beſt commonwealth.

BOOK IV.

What this character ought to be.

nature or fortune muſt alſo contribute their ſhare. Yet to minds confirmed in virtue, few accommodations are requiſite; while ſuch is the depravity of ſome characters, that the moſt favourable circumſtances only heighten their wretchedneſs; and to think with the vulgar, that external advantages alone can produce happineſs, is not leſs abſurd than to call the lyre a muſician, and to aſcribe *that* to the inſtrument which ought to be referred to the artiſt. A good man will, on every occaſion, act handſomely; and perform his duty under poverty and diſeaſe, as well as in health and proſperity. A juſt judge will condemn guilt as well as reward merit. Yet the happineſs of a good man and the juſt judge is connected with the latter circumſtances rather than with the former; becauſe in the latter no painful conflict is required, but the mind is left to the free exerciſe of virtuous energies, unclogged by difficulties [s] and unretarded by obſtacles. In forming our republic, we may, therefore, ſuppoſe the work of fortune to be done to our hands; our buſineſs is to teach the legiſlator how to perform his duty; or, in other words, how to render his commonwealth virtuous and happy.

Chap. 14.

Analyſis of education.

Happineſs depends on virtue; and virtue depends on nature, cuſtom, and reaſon. That we are formed capable of virtue, and ſuſceptible of certain qualities of mind and body, is the bounty of Nature, which has made us of the human kind. But habit can improve or pervert theſe natural advantages. Other animals

[s] This doctrine is more fully explained in thoſe paſſages of the Ethics which treat of happineſs. What the author calls in the text the χρησις αρετης τελειας, and the χρησις εξ ὑποθεσεως; "abſolute and conditional virtue;" is ſufficiently explained by the examples given in the tranſlation. Happineſs conſiſts rather in ſuch actions as are virtuous *ſimply and abſolutely*, than in ſuch as neceſſarily imply ſome pre-exiſting evil, which they are exerted to remedy.

BOOK IV.

animals march uniformly in the tract of nature; ſome few are guided alſo by cuſtom; but man only is diſciplined by reaſon; and may be perſuaded even to change bad habits, by the influence of example and the conviction of argument. From theſe two united, the power of education reſults; that forming and preſerving power without which the beſt political fabrics would ſoon crumble into duſt; and which we now proceed to explain, having formerly deſcribed what ought to be the natural diſpoſitions of thoſe moſt ſuſceptible of its benefits.

That education ought to be public and uniform.

Firſt of all, this education ought, according to our principles, to be uniform; for it is our aim to render the citizens at large virtuous and happy, and to qualify all of them for the offices of government as well as for the duties of obedience. Were one portion of the community as far diſtinguiſhed above the reſt, as we believe the gods and heroes to be exalted above men, or as Scylax ſays, "that the kings of India are ſuperior to their ſubjects, in the virtues of mind and body," it would be proper that theſe dignified races or families ſhould be inveſted with hereditary and unalterable authority; and, for this purpoſe, trained and educated in a manner peculiar to themſelves, and relative to that pre-eminent rank which they were for ever deſtined to hold. But ſince ſuch races or families are no where to be found in theſe parts of the world, juſtice concurs with good policy, in requiring that the citizens ſhould rule by vicarious ſucceſſion; and how this ought to be done, nature herſelf ſufficiently indicates. According to the order of Nature, ſome men are young while others are old. This diſtinction of age is the leaſt invidious of all diſtinctions; and it is well obſerved, that thoſe only are qualified to command, who have been ſkilfully trained to obey. Of the command exerciſed by

deſpots

deſpots we do not here ſpeak; *their* government is uſeful only to themſelves, to their families and favourites; but the government of a commonwealth is inſtituted for the benefit of the governed; who in youth will cheerfully ſubmit to many taſks and many ſervices, which would be diſgraceful if performed merely for the ſake of others, but which are ennobled by their tendency to promote the improvement of thoſe on whom they are impoſed.

What are the ends at which it ought to aim.

Since the education of the citizens ought then to be uniform, and ſince we formerly proved that the virtues and happineſs of the citizen coincide with thoſe of the man, we have next to inquire wherein the perfection of the individual conſiſts. In the human ſoul there are two diſtinct parts, one of which is endowed with reaſon, and the other, though not poſſeſſing reaſon in itſelf, is framed capable of liſtening to, and obeying its dictates. On the diſpoſition of theſe two parts, the virtues and excellencies of human nature depend; but in which of the two the ultimate end or chief happineſs of man is placed, will not be difficult for thoſe acquainted with our philoſophy to decide. From the works of art and nature ſubmitted to our obſervation, it it eaſy to remark that things which are worſe are always made for the ſake of thoſe that are better; that this order is never on any occaſion reverſed; but how long ſoever may be the ſeries of means and ends, that all the intermediate ends finally terminate and center in ſome one great and ultimate purpoſe. But that part of the ſoul which is endowed with reaſon, is manifeſtly better than that which is merely capable of obeying its dictates; the operations of the one, therefore, muſt be proportionably better than thoſe of the other; and the exerciſe of the latter muſt be conſidered as merely preparatory to the

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energies of the former. The energies of reaſon or intellect may either be employed in comtemplation, or applied to the practice of life. It is, therefore, theoretical or practical; the former engaged in the purſuit and contemplation of truth and beauty, the latter occupied in the acquiſition of things neceſſary or uſeful to ourſelves or others. Human life is thus divided between war and peace, buſineſs and leiſure, the occupations impoſed by neceſſity, and the enjoyments attending that refined pleaſure which accompanies and completes our intellectual energies. In his ſyſtem of education, the legiſlator ought to have reſpect, doubtleſs, to all theſe objects; yet never to forget that war is undertaken for the ſake of peace, and buſineſs for the ſake of leiſure; and that the occupations of utility and neceſſity ultimately terminate in the purſuit of beauty and truth.

That theſe ends have been miſtaken by Lycurgus and other legiſlators.

But in oppoſition to theſe unalterable maxims, the moſt famed legiſlators of Greece have illiberally perferred things uſeful to things honourable, and have been illiberally and abſurdly praiſed by Thibro, and other writers, for this prepoſterous preference of means to ends. Lycurgus is celebrated for forming a nation of conquerors; his laws were in force when the Lacedæmonians were defeated and ſubdued. Yet had his deſign been ſucceſsful, it would not have been either commendable or profitable, ſince the unjuſt dominion exerciſed by Sparta over her neighbours and allies would have taught ſome ſecond, but more lucky Pauſanias[r], to render himſelf the tyrant of his country. Abſolute power over equals is deſirable neither for individuals nor ſtates; nor ought war ever to be waged in order to obtain it. Yet the military virtues will be cultivated by

[r] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xii. p. 56. & ſeq.

by every wiſe republic; firſt, for its own defence; ſecondly, for acquiring a dominion juſt and lawful, becauſe advantageous even to the vanquiſhed; and thirdly, for reducing into ſlavery nations incapable of living ſafely under any more honourable condition. Experience juſtifies theſe aſſertions. Moſt ambitious nations have been ſaved for a while by war, but finally ruined by conqueſt. Their characters ruſted like iron, and in peace loſt their ſplendor. Their misfortunes are chargeable on a faulty legiſlation, which had not taught them to enjoy leiſure.

Chap. 15.

Our commonwealth to be formed on a more extenſive plan; great in war, but chiefly illuſtrious in peace.

But, according to the proverb, leiſure is not made for ſlaves. This beſt bleſſing muſt be acquired and preſerved by ardent enterpriſe and unbending fortitude; ſince a community deſtitute of courage and impatient of ſuffering, muſt ſpeedily fall under the yoke of ſome more warlike neighbour. The active and ſtubborn virtues of war are neceſſary, therefore, as remote means towards enjoying the happineſs of peace; but they are neceſſary barely as means, for the enjoyment itſelf muſt be ſought in wiſdom. The virtues of juſtice and temperance are neceſſary under all circumſtances, but chiefly in peace and proſperity; for the hardſhips of war are a ſchool of diſcipline, whereas the indulgences of peace naturally engender inſolence; ſo that were the fable of the Fortunate Iſlands to be realiſed, their inhabitants would of all men moſt require the aſſiſtance of wiſdom, juſtice, and temperance; ſince, deſtitute of thoſe virtues, they would be of all men the moſt wretched. Our commonwealth, therefore, is not to be moulded after the narrow Lacedæmonian model, nor are our citizens to be great only in war; they are to be chiefly illuſtrious in peace; and to render them ſuch, muſt be the work of early and aſſiduous culture.

BOOK IV.

This muſt be the work of education. The order in which it is to be conducted.

In explaining how this culture ought to be conducted, we muſt again obſerve, that man being compounded of ſoul and body, the ſoul itſelf is compoſed of a rational and irrational part; and that thoſe parts of our complex frame which are firſt in their origin, are laſt in dignity. The body is made before the ſoul, and the deſires and paſſions of the ſoul, conſtituting its irrational part, appear in young children and infants long before the age of reaſon. Yet the rational part is that which properly conſtitutes the man, being the end and perfection of his nature. With reference to this end, therefore, culture ſhould begin early to operate, by means of cuſtom and habit, on the appetites and paſſions; ſo that when reaſon firſt dawns, theſe ſubordinate powers may already be diſpoſed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her in due time, in the ſweeteſt harmony. Such then is the order in which education muſt be conducted. The body is firſt to be formed, and that for the ſake of the ſoul; and then the irrational part of the ſoul is to be diſciplined, and that for the ſake of the rational.

Chap. 16.

Importance of the queſtion reſpecting the age fitteſt for entering into wedlock.

According to this ſyſtem of arrangement, the firſt care of the legiſlator ought to conſiſt in aſcertaining the age and qualities of perſons fit to be joined in wedlock. Perſons ſo united, ought to deſcend together into the vale of years; and their powers of producing beings like themſelves ought together to co-exiſt, uniformly to decay, and nearly at the ſame time to ceaſe: the contrary of which ſeldom fails to occaſion much domeſtic uneaſineſs. Reſpect alſo ſhould be had to the ſucceſſion of children, who ought neither to be too remotely diſtant, nor too cloſely to tread on the heels of their parents. When the former takes place, parents can expect to derive but

little benefit from their children; and when the latter is the caſe, children will ſeldom entertain much reverence for their parents, who, being nearly their equals in age, will be conſidered as on a foot of equality in all other reſpects; and with whom, therefore, they will be often ready to differ in matters of opinion, or to quarrel about matters of intereſt. It happens moſt fortunately that all theſe ends and purpoſes may be attained and anſwered by preciſely the ſame means, the coupling parties in wedlock at the proper and ſeaſonable age.

What this age ought to be in either ſex.

About the age of ſeventy, men commonly ceaſe to be huſbands; and after the age of fifty, women ſeldom become mothers. The times of entering into marriage for the different ſexes ought to be reſpectively regulated by theſe extreme limits; which will reduce the fitteſt marriageable age of women to eighteen, and of men to thirty-ſeven, a little more or leſs; for the propriety of practical matters conſiſts not in an indiviſible point. In conſequence of this regulation, the contracting parties, in that which forms one main object of their union, will enjoy the happieſt correſpondence, their powers will ſimultaniouſly flouriſh, and ſimultaniouſly decay. Premature conjunctions produce imperfect offſpring, females rather than males, and thoſe feeble in make, and ſhort in ſtature. That this happens in the human race as well as in other animals, is viſible in the puny inhabitants of countries where early marriages prevail. But to the female ſex premature wedlock is peculiarly dangerous, ſince in conſequence of anticipating the commands of nature, many of them ſuffer greatly in childbirth, and many of them die. The evil reaches the mind itſelf, for early habitudes make the moſt indelible impreſſions; and the germ of voluptuouſneſs too ſpeedily expanded, will penetrate the whole frame, and for ever vitiate the character. In males, premature

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premature venery ſeems to ſtunt the growth: the animal ought to be itſelf perfect before it is duly qualified to propagate its kind. Let the ſexes, therefore, contract marriage at the periods above determined. They will be then reſpectively in the acmè and full bloom of their age. The correſpondence of their powers will render their deſires harmonious, and their lives happy. They will grow old together; and, as ſuch ſeaſonable marriages will for the moſt part be ſoon productive of progeny, the ſon will be advancing to perfect manhood when the father is verging to the extremity of old age.

The fitteſt ſeaſon and beſt habit for the purpoſe of wedlock.

Winter is the fitteſt ſeaſon for conſummating marriage; and, as naturaliſts tell us, when the wind blows from the north[s]. The ſtate of body moſt likely to ſupply the commonwealth with good children, is neither the artificial brawnineſs of prize-fighters, nor a frame emaciated and worn out by abſtemiouſneſs or fatigue; but a conſtitution equally remote from theſe vitious extremes, invigorated by ſuch exerciſes as the life of a free citizen requires; not exceſſive, but frequent; various, not violent.

Attention due to pregnant women for the ſake of their minds and of their offſpring.

Theſe obſervations are applicable to both ſexes; but of women in pregnancy particular care is to be taken that they do not indulge themſelves in indolence, nor enfeeble their offſpring by uſing too thin a diet. For the prevention of both evils, (ſince exerciſe will ſtrengthen appetite,) the legiſlator ſhould enjoin his countrywomen, when pregnant, to walk daily to the temples, and pay their devotions to the powers preſiding over childbirth. At the ſame time the female mind, in this delicate ſituation, ſhould be diligently attended to, neither ſoured by neglect

[s] This explains why the governors of the winds were invoked by the Greeks wiſhing to have children: a thing which archbiſhop Potter thinks extraordinary and unaccountable: "What buſineſs the winds have in generation is difficult to imagine." Potter's Antiq. vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 318.

neglect nor ruffled by paſſion, but amuſed by images of pleaſure, and ſoothed into unalterable ſerenity; for plants do not more certainly indicate the ſoil from which they ſpring, than children receive and reflect the temper of their parents.

Concerning the expoſition of children.

Concerning the expoſition of children, let it be enacted that nothing that has life ſhall be deſtroyed unleſs it be defective in its members, or groſsly deformed in its ſhape. Yet means muſt be taken to prevent exceſſive population [t]; and, as one period of life is unripe, ſo another is too far decayed for the purpoſes of wedlock. Thoſe who diſtribute the epochs of life into periods of ſeven years, aſſign fifty for the acmè of the mind. Four or five years after fifty, a man, therefore, ſhould abſtain from the rites of love merely for the ſake of offspring, which would probably enjoy neither vigour of mind nor health of body. Let the rites of the marriage-bed be at all times equally reſpected by the huſband and by the wife; but ſhould the huſband, during the period limited for giving children to the republic, be convicted of a breach of chaſtity, let him be puniſhed with public infamy, and thoſe evils which follow in its train.

Chap. 17.

Concerning the nouriſhment of children, their exerciſes and treatment.

The nouriſhment of children is bountifully ſupplied by nature in the copious exuberance of milk, which the example of warlike nations, and even of wild animals, proves to be of all kinds of food the moſt congenial to the body, and the moſt favourable

[t] το δε ὁσιον και το μη, διωρισμενον τη αισθησει και το ξην εσται. Ariſtotle would have the exuberance of population to be reſtrained, yet nothing that has life to be deſtroyed, unleſs marked or depraved by exceſſive deformity. In the career of his ſtern deciſions he ſtops ſhort of the unrelenting Chineſe: "among whom habit ſeems to have familiariſed a notion that life only becomes truly precious, and inattention to it criminal, after it has continued long enough to be endowed with a mind and ſentiment; but that mere dawning exiſtence may be ſuffered to be loſt without ſcruple, though it cannot without reluctance." Staunton's Embaſſy to China, v. ii. p. 158.

BOOK IV.

favourable to its growth and ſtrength. Wine, doubtleſs, gives ſpirits and vigour, but the uſe of wine in children might be productive of diſeaſe. All young animals delight in freely exerting their natural motions; and this inſtinctive propenſity is equally ſtrong and equally ſalutary to infants. Care, however, muſt be taken that their delicate members be not diſtorted through too eager a contention: in this view various mechanical contrivances have been invented, and proved by experience to be of important uſe. Infants ſhould be early accuſtomed to bear cold; which will invigorate their ſtrength, and gradually prepare their bodies for reſiſting the hardſhips of war. Some barbarous nations plunge their new-born infants into rivers. The Celts expoſe their children in thin coverings to the northern blaſt; and whatever is to be effected by cuſtom, ſhould be begun early, and carried on gradually. In the preſent caſe, the firſt experiments will not be attended with danger, for the natural heat of children fits them for ſurmounting the impreſſions of cold. Such are the attentions required by our firſt years.

In the following age, and until children have completed their fifth year, no painful taſk ſhould be impoſed, and no violent exertion required from the mind or body, leſt health might be injured, and growth obſtructed. All that utility demands, is to keep their faculties awake, and to prevent them from contracting any habits of ſloth; which will be beſt effected by ſuch plays and ſports as are neither illiberal, nor fatiguing, nor ſedentary. The tales and fables which are told them, ought to be written, at leaſt examined, by the magiſtrate who preſides over education; and their playful amuſements ought, in general, to be imitations of thoſe ſerious tranſactions in which they will be concerned when called to the buſineſs of life. Laws and contrivances

trivances have been deviſed and framed for preventing thoſe compreſſions of the breath and thoſe exertions of the voice which are frequent with young children; but all ſuch attempts to counteract the deſigns of nature, we totally diſapprove. The contentions of the breath and ſpirits are known by experience to invigorate the exertions of men; and the crying of children, which occaſions ſimilar intenſions and remiſſions of their organs, is equally ſalutary to them, promoting their growth and augmenting their ſtrength.

The education of children till the age of puberty, chiefly phyſical and moral.

Until the age of ſeven complete, the ſchool for children ought to be the father's houſe; but during this early period, they muſt be ſtrictly guarded againſt the infectious communication of ſlaves; no illiberal geſture is to be preſented to their ſight; no illiberal image is to be ſuggeſted to their fancy. Lewd indecency of language ought to be reprobated and puniſhed in every well-regulated city; for, from uſing filthy expreſſions without ſhame, there is an eaſy tranſition to the practiſing of filthy actions without diſguſt. Obſcene ſtatues or pictures are never to be ſeen but in the temples of thoſe divinities, whom the law enjoins to be worſhipped under ſuch emblems, by fathers, in behalf of their wives and families; nor ought children to be ſpectators of comedy or farce, before the age of admiſſion to the public tables, when education, if well directed, will have confirmed their morals. Theodorus, the celebrated tragic actor, made it a rule never to allow any player, how inferior ſoever might be his talents, to occupy the ſtage before him; obſerving, that mankind were always governed by firſt impreſſions. If that be the caſe, how much care ſhould be taken to render the firſt impreſſions of children favourable to virtue, and to make them regard as ſtrange and monſtrous what-

ever might ſow the ſeeds of malice, cruelty, or turpitude? Let them behold in their tender years, thoſe honourable occupations, and thoſe martial exerciſes, which they are deſtined in due time carefully to learn, and ſkilfully to practice. Above all, let thoſe important periods of life preceding and following puberty, be the objects of moſt aſſiduous vigilance; but as this depends not entirely on age, we are leſs to regard the fanciful diſtinctions of numbers, than to watch the ſolid differences of nature; of which it is the ſole buſineſs of education to ſecond the views, and to ſupply the defects.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK V.*

INTRODUCTION.

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IN the Fourth Book Ariſtotle deſcribes the beſt form of government; and in the Fifth, he explains that ſyſtem of education by which this government will be beſt upheld. Plutarch and other approved authors, ancient and modern, who have expreſsly written on education, do little more that expand and illuſtrate the pregnant ſenſe which uniformly pervades this Book; omitting ſome remarks, which, being peculiar to Ariſtotle, will be found by moſt modern readers equally new and important.

Muſic, conſidered under a certain aſpect, was the claſſic learning of antiquity, and regarded as intimately, almoſt inſeparably, connected with morality, as well as poetry. The author, therefore, as might be expected, expatiates on the ſubject of muſic; which he claſſes with thoſe ſciences that terminate completely in themſelves, and which, independently of profit or utility, merit cultivation merely for the ſake of pleaſure; forming at once the higheſt embelliſhment and happieſt exerciſe of the mind.

Having

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VIII.

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Having repeatedly remarked, that education ought to be relative to the nature of the government, he maintains as a conſequence of this maxim, that the cuſtoms prevalent in his own age ought to be totally reverſed; and that the people in democracies ought to be trained to modeſty and reſpect for their ſuperiors, while the nobles in ariſtocracies ought to be habituated to moderation and affability towards their inferiors. In conformity with this doctrine, he thinks that education ought to be public; and I believe that the experience of modern as well as of ancient times will juſtify and confirm his concluſion; having had an opportunity to remark during a long reſidence in a great variety of different countries, that the inhabitants were better educated almoſt exactly in proportion to the degree in which public education prevailed among them.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Education.—Its different branches.—How far to be cultivated.—Grammar—Drawing—Gymnaſtic—Muſic.—Exerciſes adapted to different ages.—Doubts concerning muſic.—Its different kinds.—Purgation of the paſſions.

BOOK V. Chap. 1.

Education the forming and ſuſtaining power of government.

THAT the education of youth ought to form a principal object of the legiſlator's attention cannot be a matter of doubt; ſince it is education that firſt moulds, and that afterwards ſuſtains the various modes of government; a democratical education alone ſuiting a democracy, an oligarchical an oligarchy; and the better and more perfect are the different ſyſtems of education, the better and more perfect will be thoſe plans of government which they are reſpectively calculated to introduce and uphold. Preparation and exerciſe are neceſſary for the acquiſition of every art; and not leaſt for the attainment of the great art of political life. In this important object fellow-citizens are all equally and all deeply concerned; and as they are all united in one common work for one common purpoſe, their education ought to be uniform and public, and regulated by general conſent; not abandoned, as at preſent, to the blind deciſion of chance, or the idle caprice of parents. For the children of citizens belong to the commonwealth, of which they are deſtined to be members; and, like every member or part, muſt be formed and faſhioned in ſubſerviency to

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the good of that whole, or ſyſtem, to which they collectively appertain. Such are the maxims of the Spartans, which cannot in this particular be too highly extolled. Of all men they are the moſt attentive to education, and their education is public.

Chap. 2.

Wherein political education conſiſts.

But wherein ought political education to conſiſt; what are its different branches, and in what manner, or to what extent, ought each branch to be cultivated? The diſcordant practice of nations has involved theſe queſtions in much perplexity. Different ſyſtems of legiſlation have different ſcopes and tendencies, and even when they agree in the ſame end, they employ different means for its attainment. Is education to be chiefly directed to things of common and vulgar uſe, ſubſervient to bodily accommodation and productive of external proſperity? Or ought its main buſineſs to conſiſt in ſharpening, fortifying, and ennobling the mind? If the mind and virtue be juſtly preferred to the body and fortune, yet by what principles are we to arrange the virtues themſelves? With which of them ought our culture to begin, and in which of them ought it to terminate?

Its different branches.

To what extent each branch ought to be cultivated.

Firſt of all, it is evident that children ought to be inſtructed in things ſubſervient to the purpoſe of external accommodation, in proportion to their neceſſity or utility, provided ſuch things be not illiberal and ſordid, tending to diſtort or enervate the body, to narrow or debaſe the ſoul, to chill the fancy or encumber the intellect. From ſuch mean and mercenary drudgery, which would diſqualify them for the exerciſe of virtue, and unfit them for the offices of freemen, our citizens muſt totally abſtain. Even to thoſe arts dignified by the epithet of liberal, their application ought not to be directed without due ſelection and prudent reſerve. In many accompliſhments, mediocrity is preferable to excellence; for an ambition gratified by what is frivolous will be

be incapable of aſpiring to what is great. In aſcertaining the doubtful nature of thoſe frivolous but agreeable talents, much depends on the end or purpoſe for which they are acquired and cultivated. To diſplay them for vanity or gain, is worthy of none but ſlaves; but they will not miſbecome a citizen, if he exerciſes them for his own amuſement, or the gratification of his friends; as relaxations from ſeverer ſtudies, or preparations for higher purſuits.

Chap. 3.

Education is moſt commonly reduced to four heads, grammar [a], gymnaſtic, muſic, and drawing. Letters are the elements of calculation, as well as of grammar or compoſition, and are eſſentially requiſite in innumerable purpoſes of daily occurrence. The ſame may be obſerved of drawing, which teaches the knowledge of forms, about which ſo many indiſpenſable occupations are continually converſant. The gymnaſtic is ſubſervient to ſtrength and courage, invigorating the body and fortifying the mind. Muſic, indeed, is now degraded into a playful paſtime, but was introduced into education, by our wiſer anceſtors, becauſe youth ought to be taught, not only how to purſue buſineſs, but how to enjoy leiſure; an enjoyment which is the end of buſineſs itſelf, and the limit in which all our active purſuits finally terminate. This enjoyment is of a nature too noble and too elevated to conſiſt in plays and paſtimes, which it would be abſurd to conſider as the main end and final purpoſe of life, and which are chiefly uſeful in the intervals of toilſome exertion, as ſalutary recreations of the mind, and ſeaſonable unbendings from contentious activity.

Grammar or letters, their uſe.

Drawing, its uſe.

Gymnaſtic, its uſe.

Muſic, its uſe.

Leiſure is in itſelf pleaſurable; and on its own account, deſirable: whereas buſineſs is never undertaken and purſued merely

The example of muſic proves that there is an

[a] Conf. Diodor. Sicul. vol. i. p. 486.

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education requiſite to the enjoyment of liberal leiſure.

merely for its own ſake, but for the ſake of ſomething beyond it; a ſomething as variable as the opinions of men are manifold, and their habits diſſimilar; ſome placing happineſs in one kind of enjoyment, and others in another; but thoſe who are beſt formed and moſt ſkilfully educated, placing it in ſuch enjoyments only as are honourable and laudable. An education, therefore, is requiſite to make us delight in thoſe things which are beſt calculated to afford genuine ſatisfaction; and the arts and ſtudies from which this ſatisfaction reſults, are not to be degraded by the epithets *uſeful* or *neceſſary*, ſince they relate to nothing external, but terminate in themſelves, and are on their own account and ultimately the objects of deſire, as the immediate cauſes of rational and honeſt pleaſure. In this view the ancients conſidered muſic, and gave it a diſtinguiſhed rank in their ſcholaſtic ſyſtem; not as a thing uſeful, for to what purpoſe does it ſerve? Not as neceſſary in the way that letters are neceſſary in accounts, in œconomy, in literature or ſcience, and a thouſand political purpoſes, both civil and military; or as drawing is uſeful in teaching the knowledge of forms, in appreciating works of art, and in preventing deception in the purchaſe of inſtruments and utenſils, the implements of trade, or the articles of furniture. It remains, therefore, that muſic ſhould be acquired and cultivated as a thing deſirable in itſelf, for the agreeable occupation of liberal leiſure, and the elegant embelliſhment of life. Therefore Homer ſays, "Let ſweet Thalia decorate the feaſt;" and again, "The bard is called to raviſh every ear." And Ulyſſes thus paints the beſt enjoyments of peace and proſperity,

> "How ſweet the products of a peaceful reign,
> The Heaven-taught poet and enchanting ſtrain [b]."

The

[b] Odyſſ. ix. v. 213.

The example of muſic, as taught by the ancients, juſtifies us, therefore, in aſſerting, that our ſons ought to be inſtructed not only in things uſeful or neceſſary, but in things liberal and honourable. How many, and what theſe things are, and by what means the taſte for them may be beſt inſpired, and the knowledge of them beſt communicated, we ſhall examine hereafter. At preſent it is ſufficient to have proved by the authority of the ancients, that ſuch things exiſt, and ought to be objects of our care. This is plain in the caſe of muſic; and a little attention will ſhew that it holds true in other ſtudies. The knowledge of letters is uſeful in the buſineſs of life, in reading and accounts, and innumerable other purpoſes. But the ſtudy of them is not bounded by this vulgar utility. They are preparations for higher branches of ſcience. Drawing alſo is uſeful for the ordinary and coarſe purpoſes above ſpecified; it is, therefore, admitted into the general courſe of common education. But the ſtudy of drawing leads to ſomething beyond theſe vulgar uſes; and by familiariſing us with the nature and variety of forms, carries us to the contemplation of *beauty*, as letters, which are the elements of calculation and compoſition, terminate in the contemplation of *truth*. Thoſe men reſt ſatisfied with a condition far ſhort of the perfection of their nature, whoſe minds have never opened to ſuch ſublime pleaſures. To be always ſeeking what is uſeful, is unworthy of a liberal, and inconſiſtent with an elevated, character.

Chap. 4.

How the body is to be hardened by exerciſe without inſpiring ferocity of character.

We have before obſerved, that moral education ought to precede the intellectual, and that the culture of the body ought to precede that of the mind. The nations moſt attentive to the formation of the body, ſtrive to give to it an athletic habit, which injures the beauty of the ſhape, and ſtunts the growth.

BOOK V.

The Lacedæmonians avoid this error; but by impoſing exceſſive labours on the body, they engender ferocity in the mind, thinking this conducive to martial ſpirit. But, as we before obſerved, education ought not to be confined to any one object, nor chiefly directed to ſuch objects as military valour; and if this excellence were our principal concern, it would not be inſpired by the Spartan diſcipline. For neither in men nor in animals does valour accompany ſullen ferocity, but is rather found in mild, generous, and lion-like natures. There are many nations who delight in carnage, that are deſtitute of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi of Pontus, cowardly as they are, feel neither horror in ſhedding, nor diſguſt in taſting human blood; ſome inland nations of Aſia equal or ſurpaſs this brutal ſavageneſs; they are cruel beaſts of prey, not warlike men. Even the obſtinate fierceneſs of Sparta could not maintain her pre-eminence. She has been excelled by her neighbours in the virtues of war as well as of peace. While the Lacedæmonians alone cultivated arms, they acquired an eaſy aſcendancy over undiſciplined troops. But ſince their neighbours have been trained to martial exerciſes, they have approved themſelves ſuperior in war to the Spartans. Neither a wolf nor any other ſuch bloody ſavage, but only a brave man, is truly qualified to maintain an honourable conflict. For mere warlike courage, taken ſeparately by itſelf, is a doubtful and defective quality; and cultivated too aſſiduouſly by the hardening diſcipline of toils and ſtruggles, will degrade and debaſe the man, blunt his faculties, narrow his ſoul, and render him as bad a ſoldier as he is a contemptible citizen.

Of the exerciſes beſt adapted to

The gymnaſtic, therefore, muſt be taught and exerciſed in ſubſerviency to nobler purſuits. Till the age of puberty, the lighter

lighter exercifes only fhould be enjoined and practifed: athletic exertions and a forced diet ought to be profcribed and prohibited; for fuch artificial violence would marr the work of nature, disfigure the fhape, ftunt the growth, and for ever prevent the attainment of manly ftrength. That this muft be its effect, experience evinces. In the long lift of Olympic victors, fcarcely two or three have gained the prize, both when they were boys and after they became men. Their capacities were checked, and their powers exhaufted by premature exertions and an unfeafonable regimen. During the three years immediately following puberty, the application of youth fhould be directed to thofe branches of education which form and invigorate the mind. They will then, at the age of feventeen, be capable of fubmitting to a regulated diet, and of fuftaining the fatigue of athletic exercifes. For laborious contention of the mind and of the body ought not to take place at the fame age; the exertions of the body obftructing thofe of the mind, and the exertions of the mind relaxing the vigour of the body.

the refpective ages.

Chap. 5.

Doubts concerning mufic.

In a former chapter, fome difficulties occurred refpecting mufic, and fome doubts were ftarted concerning its power and its end. Is it merely a foothing recreation, like the two *care-killing* powers of fleep and wine? Thus they are characterifed by Euripides; and it muft be acknowledged that, by many, mufic, fleep, and wine, are arranged in the fame clafs, and ufed for the fame purpofe; to which, dancing, alfo, is by fome thought to contribute. Or is mufic not merely a recreative paftime, but an eflential branch of difcipline, capable of moulding and faftioning the mind, not lefs than the gymnaftic moulds and faftions the body? Or is the efficacy of this noble art limited by neither of thefe ufes, and mufic to be re-

Is it merely a foothing recreation?

or an eflential branch of difcipline?

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garded neither as a recreation from paſt labours, nor a preparation for future exertions, but as an enjoyment complete and perfect in itſelf, analagous to the pleaſure eſſential to moral and intellectual energies, which, forming the perfection of man, are deſirable on their own account, independently of any thing that has preceded, or of any thing that is to follow them?

or an enjoyment complete in itſelf?

Difficulties attending theſe queſtions.

That muſic, conſidered as a branch of education, is not merely for recreation or ſport, is deducible from this, that every effort of attention, and therefore the learning of muſic, is, in children, attended rather with pain than pleaſure. It is equally evident, that children are not inſtructed in muſic as the agreeable employment of their liberal leiſure; for ſuch perfect enjoyments could not be reliſhed by their imperfect faculties, nor the moſt complete fruits of life gathered from their crude immaturity. But, perhaps, children are taught muſic that it may contribute in their riper years to their recreation, their improvement, or their enjoyment. Yet theſe purpoſes may be better attained without learning the art, or ever touching the lyre. The Perſian and Median kings attain them completely, when they enjoy the correct execution of the beſt muſical performers; the Lacedæmonians, without learning muſic, boaſt that they can readily diſtinguiſh between manly and effeminate airs; between melodies that contribute to moral diſcipline, and thoſe that vitiate the mind, or diſſipate themſelves in empty ſound. To diſtinguiſh and reliſh good victuals, is it neceſſary to be a cook? Which of the poets ever introduced Jupiter ſinging and harping? Such occupations are univerſally aſcribed to inferior divinities; and among men, we know that they belong to mercenary practitioners, whoſe undivided application to muſic has given them great proficiency in this art,

but

but has debaſed their ſouls and narrowed their faculties; whereas by truly liberal and ingenious minds, muſic is ſeldom conſidered as a ſerious engagement, and is rarely practiſed, but as a recreative paſtime, or a natural expanſion of jovial merriment. Such are the doubts attending the accurate arrangement and proper uſe of muſic; and ſuch the difficulties in aſcertaining the place which this agreeable art ought to hold, and the function which it is calculated to perform, in the important ſyſtem of political diſcipline.

Solution of theſe difficulties.

Yet let it be conſidered whether this refined art, though it cannot be accurately and excluſively referred to any one of the ends above ſpecified, may not in ſome meaſure comprehend them all. Play is introduced for the ſake of recreation; and affords no ſmall degree of pleaſure, merely as a repoſe from the pain of labour, of which it is the natural remedy. But the liberal exerciſe of our beſt energies is ſweetened by pleaſure as well as ennobled by dignity; for happineſs, which conſiſts in this exerciſe, certainly includes both theſe elements. Now muſic, whether ſimple or accompanied by poetry, is acknowledged and felt to be one of the moſt delightful of pleaſures; wherefore Muſæus ſays,

"Of human joys, the ſweeteſt is to ſing."

On this account, its power is ſummoned to gladden our feſtivities, to brighten and exalt the enjoyments of peace and proſperity. Our children, therefore, ought to be inſtructed in muſic, becauſe every innocent pleaſure is not only uſeful as a ſalutary and ſeaſonable recreation, but deſirable in itſelf as one of the beſt enjoyments of life. But as the lives of moſt men are a continual variation of toil and repoſe, they are apt to confound the light and temporary pleaſure of recreation, with thoſe more permanent

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nent and more ſerious joys, which conſtitute the perfection of human happineſs; eſpecially ſince there is this reſemblance between them, that neither of them have reference to futurity, our nobleſt and moſt delightful energies *terminating* in *themſelves*, and our lighteſt and moſt frivolous paſtimes, being the medicine of *paſt* labours, and relative to nothing that is future.

The efficacy of muſic in moral diſcipline.

Yet it is worthy of conſideration, whether recreation and enjoyment be not both of them, in this caſe, mere accèſſaries; and whether muſic, if properly directed, may not effect a more important purpoſe, promote moral improvement, refine the ſentiments, and exalt the character. Muſic will be acknowledged to have this tendency, ſhould it appear capable of affecting the paſſions and changing the manners; and that it really does this, manifeſtly appears from various examples, and particularly from the melodies of Olympus, which cannot be liſtened to without inſpiring enthuſiaſm, which is plainly a moral affection. Independently of meaſure or melody, even the ſimple cries of nature, when faithfully imitated, powerfully excite our ſympathy, and diſpoſe us to joy or to grief. Muſic is naturally pleaſant, and the main object of moral education is to teach us to be pleaſed or offended as propriety requires, to love what is truly amiable, and to hate what is truly deteſtable. Nothing, therefore, is of more importance than to learn this art, and by cuſtom to confirm our approbation of thoſe rythmical ſucceſſions of melodious ſounds, which are expreſſive of decent and dignified manners, of manly and honourable actions. Ingenuous and well-diſciplined natures find in the varieties of melody and rhythm, ſtriking reſemblances of anger and meekneſs, of manlineſs and temperance, and of all ſuch moral affections, as well as of their contraries. This is proved by the effect of muſical performance; which, while we liſten to it,

The cauſe of this efficacy explained.

changes

changes the form and quality of the ſoul, melts it to tenderneſs, or hardens it to fortitude; and the habit of being thus powerfully affected by the reſemblances of manners, is nearly related to that of being affected ſtill more powerfully by their realities; ſince, were we highly delighted with looking on a portrait, for no other reaſon than its beautiful form, it would follow of neceſſity, that we ſhould alſo be ſtill more delighted with beholding its original. Of all the objects of our ſenſes, ſounds are the moſt ſtriking reſemblances of manners. The objects of our touch and of our taſte have no moral reſemblance whatever: and even in the objects of our ſight, ſhapes, and colours, the reſemblance is faint and imperfect, becauſe calm and motionleſs, and rather a mere ſign of manners than their natural imitation, ſince manners can only be exhibited by actions, and therefore only repreſented by motions, by which alone actions are forcibly expreſſed. Yet even the mere ſigns of manners are not to be rejected as things uſeleſs in education; and our youth ought, doubtleſs, rather to contemplate the works of Polygnotus, and ſuch artiſts as ſkilfully employ thoſe ſigns or marks, than ſtare on the unmeaning productions of Pauſon. But if the mere ſigns be uſeful, how much more efficacious muſt be the reſemblances. And ſuch reſemblances evidently prevail in the *melodies*; each of which having its diſtinctive character, produces its peculiar effect; ſo that our affection changes with each change of the muſic; and in hearing one melody we are agitated with quite different emotions from thoſe with which we were affected at hearing another. At the will of a ſkilful compoſer, the mind expands into joy, or contracts into grief; ſome airs melt us into ſoftneſs, while the Dorian mode confirms our fortitude, and the Phrygian inſpires us with enthuſiaſm. Theſe

BOOK V.

remarks have been well illuſtrated by the writers on muſic, who take experience for their guide; from which it appears that the efficacy of time, that is of rhythm or meaſure, is not leſs than the efficacy of tune, that is of the modes and melodies. Some movements are briſk and lively, others grave and ſedate; ſome vulgar, and expreſſive of irregular paſſions; others liberal, and expreſſive of well-governed affections. But muſic conſiſts in the ſkilful combination of time and tune, from which its power appears manifeſtly; and, therefore, the propriety of teaching it to youth, eſpecially as muſic is naturally pleaſant, and the attention of that early age is difficultly detained in any exerciſe or employment in which pleaſure is not an ingredient. It appears alſo that there is an affinity between meaſures and melodies, and that both have a near relation to the ſoul; from which ſome have inferred that the ſoul is harmony, and others that harmony is one of its eſſential attributes.

Chap. 6.

That children ſhould be taught to perform muſic.

We now proceed to examine whether children ſhould be taught, not only to underſtand and reliſh, but to practiſe and perform muſic. This queſtion muſt be anſwered in the affirmative, for it is impoſſible, at leaſt exceedingly difficult, to be a good judge of performances which we are ourſelves unable to execute; and whatever affections or qualities muſic may excite or produce, its efficacy will be the ſtronger when it is the work of our own hands. Beſides this, children require ſome employment to occupy and exhauſt their reſtleſs activity; for which reaſon Archytas's rattle is no contemptible invention, ſince while ſhaking this noiſy plaything, their activity is agreeably and harmleſsly employed. Education, well directed, is the rattle of boys; and at this age they may be taught arts, which it would miſbecome them afterwards to exerciſe, but

of

of which the practice in youth will enable them in manhood to relish works of art the better, and to appreciate them the more skilfully. The objection to music as illiberal, may be easily removed, if we distinguish between that taste and skill in the art, which would disqualify a man from performing the offices of a citizen, and that taste and skill which would be attended with no such pernicious effect. If the music that we study, enervates or debases the soul, or the instruments on which we practise, distort or enfeeble the body, or if the mind is narrowed by the intense application to one secondary pursuit, it is plain that this ingenious art will occasion much mischief, and both incapacitate the young for learning their political duties, and disqualify the old from performing them honourably. The artificial and complicated music, therefore, which has little other merit than the difficulty of execution, and little other effect than to astonish the gaping multitude, but which has engrossed and degraded our public exhibitions, ought never to have been introduced into education, whose best purposes it is only calculated to pervert [b].

To what extent musical skill ought to be cultivated.

Musical performance may be cultivated, and manual dexterity acquired; but the degree in which they are desirable, is limited by that proficiency requisite for enabling us to relish liberal rhythms and manly melodies, not to practise those vulgar sleights and musical trifles which delight children, slaves, and even some brute animals. It is plain, therefore, that the simplest instruments deserve the preference, as fittest for the purpose of education. The flute, the harp, and others of that kind are to be rejected as too artificial and complex, and requiring

What instruments are fittest to be employed.

[b] For better understanding what follows concerning music, the reader may consult History of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. . . p 238, & seq.

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quiring more attention and practice than liberal minds can ſpare from more important purſuits. The flute is, beſides, better fitted to excite enthuſiaſm than to regulate the affections, and is therefore better adapted to purgation than to inſtruction; to operate as a violent remedy under violent diſorders of the mind, than to ſerve in uſual health for ſalutary nouriſhment. In playing the flute it is impoſſible to uſe the voice, on which account our anceſtors finally rejected this inſtrument, which they had introduced into education with innumerable other novelties, amidſt the intoxication of their Perſian victories. After the repulſe of Xerxes, a Lacedæmonian exhibiting at his own expence a chorus of muſic, himſelf played on the flute; and there was then ſcarcely an Athenian citizen totally unacquainted with this inſtrument, as appears by the picture dedicated by Thraſyppus of the muſical exhibition, which he defrayed and directed. But on mature reflection, the flute was proſcribed in education, and its uſe forbidden to freemen; and the ſame may be ſaid of the dulcimer and various other inſtruments of different ſhapes and names, which are fitly employed for amuſing the vulgar, by their admitting wonderful diſplays of manual dexterity. It is an ancient and well-contrived fable, which ſays, that Minerva after inventing the flute rejected its uſe. The reaſon why ſhe did ſo, is not a bad one; namely, that ſhe was angry at ſeeing how much the blowing of the flute diſtorted her countenance. Yet it is far more probable, that Minerva, who is believed to preſide over learning and ſcience, diſdained an inſtrument which contributed nothing to mental improvement; which neither fortified diſcipline, nor ſharpened intellect, nor elevated ſentiment. All complex and difficult inſtruments are, therefore, to be baniſhed from the pure region of education,

and

and to be conſigned to the ſordid diſplays of mercenary practitioners, who cultivate muſic, not for any ſalutary purpoſe, but for the low gratification of an illiberal audience; whom ſuch things only can pleaſe as nouriſh their corrupt paſſions, by a mean compliance with which, the muſical performers in our days diſqualify themſelves in mind and body, from performing the duties of good citizens.

Chap. 7.

Analyſis of muſic.

In muſic two things are to be conſidered, tune and time, the varieties of the former conſtituting the different modes and melodies, the varieties of the latter conſtituting the different meaſures and rhythms. Are all theſe gradations and all theſe proportions of ſound to be uſed indifferently, or ought due ſelection to be made? Ought this ſelection to be invariably the ſame, or ought it to be modified by the different ends and purpoſes of muſical performance? And in muſic, which is the principal, time or tune? For minute and circumſtantial ſolutions of theſe queſtions, we refer to the philoſophical writers on muſic, meaning to touch but ſlightly on the ſubject, and as far as ſeems requiſite in a work on legiſlation. We approve the general diviſion of muſic into moral, practical, and rapturous; according as it is fitted to regulate our affections, to excite us to action, or to inſpire us with enthuſiaſm. Experience proves that different melodies and rhythms are reſpectively adapted to theſe different purpoſes; ſo that as moral ſtrains are to be employed for mental diſcipline and liberal pleaſure, the enthuſiaſtic, and ſometimes the practical, may be liſtened to for the purpoſe of what, by a natural metaphor, is called purgation [c] which ſhall be more fully

Its diviſion into moral, practical, and rapturous.

[c] Plutarch de Auditione, p. 42. edit. Paris, quotes a ſaying of the philoſopher Ariſton, that neither a bath nor a diſcourſe did any good unleſs they cleanſed and purified; uſing the verb from which the ſubſtantive here tranſlated purgation is derived.

BOOK V.

What is meant by purgation of the paſſions by muſic.

fully explained in our treatiſe on Poetry. Let it ſuffice at preſent to obſerve, that thoſe paſſions (ſuch is the uniſon of minds) by which one perſon is ſtrongly affected, are felt in a certain degree by all around him[c]; and, therefore, when ſkilfully expreſſed by the muſician, they will be powerfully communicated, eſpecially to thoſe who, by their natural conſtitution, are peculiarly expoſed to their influence; and whoſe extreme ſenſibility will thus be excited and agitated, and thereby purified and refined[d], and

rived. In the following ſentence, by a bold mixture of metaphors, he ſays, λογῳ δριμει την διανοιαν αχλυης πολλης και αμυδρυτητος γεμουσαν εκκαθαιρη. "That we ought to be thankful to philoſophers, who, by the ſeverity of their exhortations, purge our underſtanding from the thick darkneſs and bluntneſs with which they are filled."

[c] Compare above, c. v. ακροωμενοι των μιμησεων, γιγνονται παντες συμπαθεις.

[d] This obſcure ſentence is beſt explained by a collateral paſſage in Plato de Republica, p. 625. edit. Ficini. He is treating of the neceſſity of combining in a well-directed education, muſic with the gymnaſtic; becauſe men who apply only to muſic, will ſoften into effeminacy; and thoſe who apply only to the gymnaſtic, will harden into brutality. In expanding and illuſtrating this obſervation, he ſays that ſtrength is increaſed and courage confirmed by the gymnaſtic, but what will happen if a youth is trained to the gymnaſtic only? ουκ, ει τι ενην αυτω φιλομαθες εν τη ψυχη, ατε ουτε μαθηματος γευομενον ουδενος, ου ζητηματος, ουτε λογω μετεσχεν, ουτε της αλλης μουσικης, ασθενες τε κακωφον και τυφλον γιγνεται, ατε ουκ εγειρομενων, ουδε τρεφομενων, ουδε διακαθαιρομενων των αισθησεων αυτω. "In this caſe, even ſhould he naturally be endowed with an ingenuous and inquiſitive mind, yet having never taſted the pleaſures neither of ſcience, nor inveſtigation, nor reaſon, *nor the other muſic*, his condition as a man will be that of blindneſs, deafneſs, and debility, his faculties having never been *nouriſhed, excited, agitated, and purged*." What Plato means by ſaying *the other muſic*, may be underſtood by the words of Strabo in the admirable mythological digreſſion in his Tenth Book, where he remounts to the root and ſource of myſticiſm in the human heart, and examines the fabulous traditions and religious arcana of his country, with that liberal criticiſm which became an hiſtorian, that was a traveller and a philoſopher. ευ μεν γαρ ειρηται και τουτο, τους ανθρωπους τοτε μαλιστα μιμεισθαι τους θεους, οταν ευεργετωσι· αμεινον δ' αν λεγοι τις, οταν ευδαιμονωσι· τοιουτον δε το χαιρειν και το χορταζειν και το φιλοσοφειν και μουσικης απτεσθαι· μη γαρ ει τις εκπτωσις; προς το χειρον γενηται των μουσικων εις δυπαθειας τρεπομενων τας τεχνας εν τοις συμποσιοις, και θυμελαις και σκηναις και αλλοις τοιουτοις διαβαλλεσθω το πραγμα· αλλα η φυσις η των παιδευματων εξεταζεσθω την αρχην ενθενδε εχουσα.

and (*as melancholy is purged by tears* [c]) diſburdened and lightened with a pleaſurable relief. Thus it is that, at the celebration of Orgic rites, enthuſiaſm vents itſelf and evaporates in thoſe ſacred melodies, during the performance of which the mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is thereby cured of its frenzy. The ſame thing happens in all other violent affections, whoſe exceſſes cure themſelves; and of which, in proportion as the preceding agitation has been the greater, the ſubſequent relief proves the more delightful.

The different kinds of muſic; their nature and effects.

To this purpoſe theatrical muſic might be happily directed; but as the ſpectators at theatres conſiſt, not merely of the liberal and enlightened, but of the vulgar and illiterate; of mechanics, manufacturers, ſervants, and ſlaves; ſuch perſons require paſtimes ſuitable

εχθσα. Και δια τυτο μθσικην εκαλεσεν ὁ πλατων, και ετι προτερον οἱ πυθαγορειοι, την φιλοσοφιαν, και κατα ἁρμονιαν τον κοσμον συνεσταναι, παν το μθσικον θεαν εργον ὑπολαμβανοντες. Ουτο δε και αἱ Μθσαι θεαι και Απολλων Μθσαγετης, και ἡ ποιητικη πασα ὑμνητικη θσα· ὁσαυτως δε και την των ηθων κατασκειην τη μθσικη προσνεμθσι ὡς παν το επανορθωτικον τε ιθ τοις θειοις εγγυς ον.

"It has been well ſaid, that a man moſt imitates the gods, when he does good; but it would be better ſaid, when he is happy; that is, when he enjoys merriment and feſtivity chaſtiſed by the decent charms of muſic and philoſophy. For though muſic is often degraded in our theatres, in our ſtreets, and at our entertainments, into the pander of ſenſual paſſions, yet the art itſelf ought not, therefore, to be arraigned, but rather the merit of that diſcipline fairly eſtimated, of which muſic is the principle and the ſource." On this ground Plato, and the Pythagoreans before him, called philoſophy, muſic, maintained that the world ſubſiſted by harmony, and that muſic in its largeſt ſenſe, meaning arrangement and proportion, ſhone in every work of the gods. The muſes themſelves are goddeſſes; Apollo is the leader of the muſes; and poetry, which originally conſiſted in hymns, was invented to ſing the praiſes of the divinity. To muſic the ancients alſo referred moral philoſophy, or ethics, conſidering as the gift of Heaven whatever tended to exalt and purify the mind *.

[c] Plato de Republ. l. III.

* Literally, "conſidering as near to the gods whatever is corrective of the mind." If every work of the gods partook of muſic, then moral philoſophy, as corrective of the mind and a gift of Heaven, might be referred to muſic as the ſpecies is to its genus. But this will not neceſſarily follow, if we tranſlate with Caſaubon, "that all muſic is the work of the gods."

BOOK V.

ſuitable to their taſte; and their perverſe minds can reliſh none but perverſe muſic; a muſic overſtrained by the vehemence of contention, and disfigured by a crowd of motley embelliſhments. But that which is a fit amuſement for ſlaves and men of ſervile characters, would be of all things the moſt improper for the liberal diſcipline of youth. To the purpoſe of education, the manly Doric, and other congenial moral melodies, are found to be the beſt adapted. Socrates in Plato's Republic admits no other modes of muſic but the Dorian and Phrygian; but there is an inconſiſtency in admitting the latter after he had excluded the uſe of the flute, for the Phrygian is among melodies what the flute is among inſtruments, a pathetic enthuſiaſtic ſtrain; and ſo peculiarly adapted to dithyrambics, that when Philoxenus attempted to ſet theſe rapturous hymns to Doric muſic, he found the thing impoſſible, and naturally reverted to the Phrygian mode. The Dorian is to be preferred for its firmeſs, gravity, and ſtability, as holding the middle place between two exceſſes, that of fury on the one hand, and that of effeminacy on the other.

The different kinds of muſic reſpectively adapted to different periods of human life.

In education we ought never to loſe ſight of poſſibility and propriety; and propriety generally lies in the middle between two vicious extremes. Propriety, therefore, is mediocrity; but this mediocrity, in practical matters, does not conſiſt in an indiviſible point, but admits of conſiderable latitude, and is to be modified in different caſes by different circumſtances; and in the caſe of muſic, chiefly by the circumſtance of age. Strong ſounds and rapid movements accord not with the debility of declining years. The writers on this ſubject, therefore, juſtly blame Socrates for baniſhing the gentle languor of ſoft muſic, as producing the noxious conſequences of wine, when the ardour

ardour of intoxication has given place to painful laſſitude or liſtleſs torpor. But men meaſure every thing by their own ſtandard; and that may be approved by old age, which ſeems feeble or languid to the prime of life. Youth, alſo, has a muſic peculiarly adapted to it. This is the Lydian, which unites grace with ſtrength, and while it regulates the affections, has no ſmall tendency alſo to embelliſh the manners. It is plain then, that poſſibility, mediocrity, and propriety are views and boundaries, of which, in education, we ought never to loſe ſight.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VI.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK VI.

IN this Book Ariſtotle approves himſelf, as even Locke acknowledges, "a maſter in politics;" ſurpaſſing in perſpicuity and preciſion every writer ancient or modern in explaining how "civil ſociety is formed into different models of government, and the ſeveral ſpecies of it [a]." His writings on this ſubject are eminently diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of his rivals and detractors. As he ſtands on a loftier ground, his ſight has a wider range; and while his ſituation is more commanding, his eye is alſo more piercing. A great part of his life was employed in doing for moral and political philoſophy, that which, with regard to modern geometry, Vieta and Deſcartes began; Barrow and Leibnitz and Newton ſo wonderfully carried on and improved; and that which Waring and a few others of our contemporaries are ſtriving ſtill further to extend and perfect. The extraordinary elevation which that noble ſcience has attained, is owing chiefly to obſtinate and patient induſtry in improving and perfecting the ſigns by which our notions of magnitude

* Commonly publiſhed as Book IV.

[a] See Locke's Letter to King.

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magnitude are compared; and the reſults of our compariſons ſurely drawn, and clearly expreſſed. The Stagirite was equally ſucceſsful with thoſe great men, in the ſtill more important taſk of ſimplifying and improving the ſigns or expreſſions by which compariſons are made, involving the civil happineſs of mankind and the beſt intereſts of ſociety. His diſtinction between the eſſential members of a commonwealth and its barely ornamental concomitants; his diviſions and definitions of the different forms of government, with the important principle by which the form is diſtinguiſhed from the ſubſtance; the mutual relations between government and laws; and the relations between both theſe and the variable moral nature of man, which make thoſe inſtitutions and arrangements, that are juſt and ſalutary in one country, unjuſt and pernicious in another; theſe and other collateral points are explained in the preſent Book, with a copiouſneſs that affords ſatisfaction, and a clearneſs that defies contradiction.

In treating of the *ſovereignty* in a ſtate, our author analyſes this complex object into deliberative, appointing or elective, and judicial, powers. To juſtify his diviſion in compariſon with that which modern writers have ſubſtituted in its ſtead; namely, powers legiſlative, executive, and judicial; it may be obſerved that in every community the ſovereignty, whether reſiding in one, the few, or the many, muſt neceſſarily be employed in deliberating concerning public meaſures; in electing or appointing magiſtrates; or in diſtributing juſtice, and deciding differences. But the work of legiſlation, when once complete, ought never afterwards, according to our author, to be touched but with a cautious and trembling hand [b]; and to ſay that the actual ſovereign, whether king, nobles, or commons, or all three collectively, are inveſted with

[b] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 101.

with the plenitude of legiſlative authority, is in his opinion to grant to them a power, which, in its full extent, they cannot ever rightfully exerciſe, unleſs it could be ſuppoſed that one generation of men might be fairly entitled to intercept from poſterity the improvement made, and the light accumulated in the long courſe of preceding ages. To do this, is a ſtretch of authority to which the moſt deſpotic princes of Aſia have never yet laid claim. In the abſolute monarchies of Europe, while unjuſt wars were undertaken, exorbitant taxes impoſed, and temporary regulations reſpecting every public meaſure capriciouſly made, and capriciouſly aboliſhed, the fundamental laws of their reſpective kingdoms were acknowledged and reſpected by thoſe branded as the wildeſt and moſt furious deſpots. In matters of policy that cannot be juſt or fit, which never can be uſeful; and our author endeavours to prove that it never can be uſeful for a nation completely and ſuddenly to depart from its hereditary inſtitutions: a departure which, deſtroying that principle on which the efficacy of all laws is founded, would deſtroy government itſelf[c]; that illuſtrious work of nature, which mere human powers, as they could not originally eſtabliſh it, cannot have a right to purſue thoſe meaſures by which it is likely to be eventually overturned[d].

The branch of government now denominated the executive, Ariſtotle calls the appointing power, when it reſides in one; the electing power, when it reſides in many. His language is more accurate than our's. To give orders, and to appoint or elect thoſe empowered to carry them into execution, is doubtleſs a branch of the ſovereignty; but the part merely executive belongs

[c] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 102.

[d] Ibid. b. i. c. ii. p. 22, & ſeq.

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belongs to low inſtruments; and all the intermediate functions, between the firſt order or appointment, and the final execution or effect, fall within the department of dependent and reſponſible miniſters.

After thus analyſing the ſovereignty, the author proceeds to examine how its different elements are diſtributed in the different forms of government, and how they ought to be placed in a well-conſtituted commonwealth; holding the juſt mean between the vicious extremes of domineering oligarchy and furious democracy. Nothing can be added to the copiouſneſs and perſpicuity with which he explains under what circumſtances democratical and oligarchical laws are to be alternately ſelected; and on what occaſions neither the one nor the other ought to be entirely and excluſively adopted, but rather both to be blended into one truly political and ſalutary inſtitution. The perfection of practical matters, as he often obſerves, lies not in a fixed and indiviſible point; it varies with the indefinite variation of circumſtances; but the beſt practical teſts of good government, he holds to be univerſally the two following: firſt, when men of the middle ranks abound more than either the inſolent rich or the rapacious poor; and ſecondly, when there is a difficulty in determining to which of the ſimple forms of government the conſtitution moſt inclines, and ought moſt properly to be referred. There is a pleaſure not to be expreſſed, but which every friend to his country muſt warmly feel, in reflecting that Ariſtotle's two teſts are more applicable to the government eſtabliſhed in this iſland, than to any other which hiſtory exhibits.

The praiſes which the author beſtows on the ſuperior happineſs of the middle claſſes in ſociety, tends to reconcile the people at large with their reſpective lots, and to ſhew that the condition to which

which every man by an ordinary degree of prudence and good fortune may attain, is preciſely the beſt in which he could be placed. The miſeries of individuals, as well as the convulſions of nations, originate in that moſt prevalent and widely-diffuſed error of conſidering rather their relative than their abſolute advantages [e]. To the bleſſings of health and competency with ſecurity and a good conſcience, what ſlender additions can be made by the moſt extenſive power and moſt unbounded opulence? The loweſt ſituation in civiliſed ſociety is preferable to the higheſt among barbarians. But inſtead of contemplating with grateful complacence the real enjoyments within its reach, diſcontent broods over its comparative inferiority; and each thinking too highly of himſelf, even the more fortunate individuals will ſcarcely allow that full juſtice is done to their merit; while they depreciate the prodigious ſum common to all, and magnify the minute differences by which the ſhares are diſtinguiſhed.

[e] Suique ipſam, *malo arbitrio*, quo a proximis quiſque minime anteiri vult, penituiſſe. T. Liv. l. vi. c. xxxiv.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Governments—Their claſſification.—Democracy—Its four kinds.—Conſtitutions—One thing by law—Another in fact.—Materials reſpectively fitted for different governments.—Mixed governments.—Teſts of good government.—How governments may be meliorated.—Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people—And the people the nobles.—Analyſis of the ſovereignty—Conſtitution of its different branches—Agreeably to the different ſpirit of different governments.

BOOK VI. Chap. 1.

Politics as a ſcience, how it ought to be treated.

IT is the buſineſs of every ſcience, and every inquiry that bears a reference to any whole claſs of objects, to conſider not only the powers or capacities belonging to the beſt and moſt perfect individuals comprehended under that claſs; but thoſe which belong to the claſs in general, or rather to the moſt conſiderable portion of it; and alſo thoſe which belong to ſuch individuals of the claſs as are peculiarly circumſtanced. The maſter of exerciſes, the phyſician, and every other artiſt pays due attention to this threefold diviſion. The teachers of the gymnaſtic art, for example, well know that of the youths committed to their care and diſcipline, few are capable of attaining the moſt athletic habit, or likely to carry off the firſt prizes either of ſtrength or agility. Yet it is the duty of their profeſſion to improve the natural powers of their diſciples, and to exerciſe each of them in ſuch accompliſhments as are moſt ſuitable to their reſpective views and particular conſtitutions.

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tions. It is not enough, therefore, for the ſpeculative politician, if he would render his ſpeculations practically uſeful, to conſider what arrangements beſt ſuit men provided with a complete accumulation of external and internal advantages. He muſt conſider alſo, what are the arrangements beſt adapted to the particular circumſtances in which communities are placed; and moſt likely to promote that particular ſcheme of national happineſs which the founders of the commonwealth have thought fit to prefer; though neither the moſt deſirable abſolutely in itſelf, nor the beſt even in relation to the means and materials which nature or fortune had ſupplied. Above all, the political philoſopher ought moſt diligently to inveſtigate that form of government adapted to mankind in general, circumſtanced as they are moſt commonly found to be; from the neglect of which inquiry, authors who have written well, have not written uſefully. In all matters of practice, poſſibility is to be conſidered as well as perfection; and things eaſily accompliſhed are preferable to thoſe barely poſſible. In oppoſition to theſe maxims, projectors in politics content themſelves with deviſing arrangements adapted only to men formed and circumſtanced agreeably to their mind and wiſh, the mere creations of their own fancy; or if they condeſcend to take leſſons from hiſtory, they are ſatisfied with extolling and recommending the Lacedæmonian or ſome other approved government, without ſtopping to reflect whether the ordinary circumſtances in which nations are placed, will ever allow them to imitate ſuch admired models. For it is not an eaſier taſk to regenerate a conſtitution, than originally to eſtabliſh it; ſince in working this reformation, it is neceſſary that men

ſhould

ſhould not only learn what they did not formerly know, but *unlearn* many things which they had previouſly been taught[f].

Chap. 2.

How governments are to be divided and claſſed.

To treat the ſcience of politics completely and uſefully, we muſt not be contented with the general diviſion of governments into monarchies, ariſtocracies, and republics; and their reſpective corruptions, tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies. It is neceſſary ſtill farther to examine wherein one government, or one corruption of government, differs from another bearing the ſame name. We ſhall then more eaſily diſcern for what materials each political ſtructure is beſt adapted; what are the changes which it is moſt likely to undergo; and what are the laws and regulations by which it may be preſerved, ſubverted, or amended.

Chap. 3.

General diviſion.

The cauſe of the wide variety in governments muſt be ſought for in the wonderful diverſity of their conſtituent parts; for a ſtate is a very complex object, compoſed of individuals and families; ſome rich, others poor; ſome ſubſiſting by agriculture and paſturage, others by manufactures and commerce; and ſome provided with arms, while others are altogether defenceleſs. The higher claſſes of men are alſo variouſly diſtinguiſhed by their abilities, their virtues, their birth, or merely by their wealth; which laſt, when conſiderable, enables them to rear and train horſes, a circumſtance which alone has been ſufficient to decide the nature of the government. For in ancient times, wherever the national force conſiſted in cavalry, oligarchy was prevalent; as among the Chalcideans, the Eretrians, the Magneſians ſituate on the banks of the Meander, and

[f] In the firſt chapters of this book there is much derangement, and much repetition. I have endeavoured to expreſs the author's ſenſe in fewer words, and with greater perſpicuity.

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and many other wealthy communities of Aſiatic Greece[g]. It is plain, therefore, that governments vary according to the differences of thoſe conſtituent parts of the ſtate, which either engroſs or ſhare the ſovereignty. The moſt palpable, and alſo the moſt ſpecific difference (as will appear hereafter) is the diſtinction of riches and poverty: wherefore, all governments have been divided into oligarchies and democracies, as the winds are divided into the north and the ſouth, the former comprehending the weſt, and the latter the eaſt; and as melodies are divided into the Dorian and Phrygian, all other kinds of muſic, in proportion to their reſpective proximities, being aſcribed to the one or the other of thoſe very different ſcales. But the general diviſion, above given in this work, appears more ſatisfactory and more uſeful: namely, that certain polities are wiſely combined and juſtly tempered, as certain harmonies are ſkilfully compoſed and properly blended; that other polities, as well as other harmonies, are vitious deviations and baſe corruptions, whether they be ſtrung into deſpotiſm, or relaxed into democracy.

Chap. 4.

Particular diviſion.

The more minute ſubdiviſions of governments muſt be obtained by the ſame means, by which other objects of ſcience are compared and claſſed. In zoology[h], we begin by conſidering what are the conſtituent parts of animals, or, in other words, the parts eſſentially neceſſary to their exiſtence. Theſe are ſome one of the ſenſes[i], with an inſtrument for ſeizing, and another for receiving food, together with ſome inſtrument or member by which the motions belonging to the animal may conveniently be performed. But all theſe parts or organs are ſuſceptible

[g] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii.
[h] See Analyſis, p. 125.
[i] ἑνια των αισθητηριων. See Analyſis, &c. p. 41.

ſuſceptible of great variety in their reſpective ſtructures, ſince, in ſome animals, one member is very differently formed from an *analogous* member in other animals; that is, from a member anſwering a ſimilar purpoſe. But if our enumeration of the parts or organs be correct, and if we have carefully diſtinguiſhed the differences in the ſtructure of each organ, we muſt obtain the whole number of kinds or claſſes by multiplying the number expreſſing the differences in one conſtituent part, into the product of the numbers expreſſing the differences in all the other conſtituent parts.

The conſtituent parts of commonwealths.

The ſame principle applies to the claſſification of commonwealths, thoſe complex moral entities, conſiſting of many parts or members, differently conſtructed, and variouſly combined. An eſſential ingredient in every commonwealth is, that great portion of the people employed in providing food, which may be variouſly ſupplied by the different modes of induſtry and accumulation above ſpecified. A ſecond indiſpenſable ingredient conſiſts of thoſe employed in arts and manufactures, whether neceſſary for ſubſiſtence, or uſeful for accommodation. A third claſs of the people are thoſe converſant about exchange or traffic, foreign as well as domeſtic. The ſoldiers form a fourth claſs, not leſs neceſſary than any of the preceding; ſince communities are collected for all-ſufficiency, and cannot have attained their end, if continually expoſed to deſtruction or ſervitude. Judges, to adminiſter juſtice, and perſons qualified by their abilities to deliberate and decide concerning public concerns, are the fifth and ſixth claſſes: for if a ſoul be neceſſary to conſtitute an animal, not leſs than a body, juſtice, valour, and political wiſdom, are not leſs eſſential to a ſtate, than thoſe

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exertions of bodily labour by which daily wants are ſupplied*. The ſeventh and eighth claſſes conſiſt in thoſe who perpetually, or interchangeably, exerciſe the various duties of executive magiſtracy; and thoſe who, by their ſeaſonable contributions, ſupply the occaſional exigencies of the public ſervice. Of thoſe various offices or functions, ſome indeed may be united in the ſame perſon. The ſame individual may alternately decide as a judge, and deliberate as a ſenator; the ſame hands may alternately hold the plough and brandiſh the ſpear. But as opulence and poverty cannot in any country be aſcribed to the ſame perſon at once, the moſt diſtinct claſſes of every ſtate are the poor and the rich; and the evident differences in government muſt reſult from theſe diſtinctions: from power engroſſed by wealth, or power uſurped by indigence. Kings, they ſay, are choſen in Æthiopia on account of their beauty and ſtature. If the ſame rule prevailed in electing republican magiſtrates, the principle of election would be highly oligarchical, becauſe the tall and beautiful are always the ſmaller number. The rich alſo are commonly the few: and the poor the many; but to conſtitute an oligarchy, the few, who are maſters of the government, muſt be rich; and to conſtitute a democracy, the many, who are maſters of the government, muſt be poor; for it is only when both circumſtances concur in thoſe governments, that their reſpective characters are ſtrongly impreſſed, and their oppoſite genius fully diſplayed. At Apollonia, near the Ionian ſea, and in the iſle of Thera, the deſcendants of the firſt ſettlers retained the whole government in their hands, notwith-

* The author here, as elſewhere, blames Plato for conſidering in his "Republic" ſoldiers as mere ſupplements, while he places huſbandmen, weavers, &c. among eſſential parts or members.

notwithſtanding powerful acceſſions of new inhabitants. But the government was not a democracy, becauſe the rulers were inconſiderable in number when compared with the ſubjects over whom their power was exerciſed. At Colophon, on the other hand, the many were maſters of the government; yet they did not conſtitute a democracy, becauſe, before the Lydian war, the far greater proportion of the inhabitants of that commercial city were poſſeſſed of conſiderable opulence.

Democracy, its four kinds.

The nature of oligarchies and democracies muſt vary in conſequence of variations in their parts or elements. When the notables, or nobles, are diſtinguiſhed by their education and virtue, there will reſult a very different kind of oligarchy from that in which the ſovereigns of the ſtate are characteriſed merely by their birth or their wealth. The differences in the people at large are occaſioned chiefly by the different occupations which they purſue. Some live by agriculture; others by manufactures and commerce; and many cities and iſlands ſubſiſt chiefly by the ſea. Their veſſels are employed in war, commerce, fiſhing, and carriage. In ſome places, almoſt the whole ſhipping is deſtined for one ſingle uſe; as the fiſhing boats of Byzantium and Tarentum, the gallies of Athens, the merchantmen of Ægina and Chios, and the tranſports of Tenedos. In the commonalty of a country, there may alſo be a variety in the proportion of mere populace, perſons deſtitute of property, condemned through poverty to the meaneſt drudgery, and participating, on one ſide at leaſt, of a foreign or even ſervile extraction. Such are the differences in the parts or elements, from which ſuch a variety of diſpoſitions, habits, manners, and characters muſt neceſſarily flow, as will render

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thoſe arrangements which ſuit the genius of one people altogether unſuitable to that of another. The firſt kind of democracy requires that all men ſhould be treated alike; that the rich and the poor ſhould indifferently ſhare the government, and enjoy an authority in its deliberations and meaſures exactly proportional to their numbers. Liberty, the partiſans of this government aſſert, is chiefly to be found in democracies; and when all men are placed on a foot of equality, then, and then only, this liberty will be complete. The ſecond kind of democracy requires a ſmall qualification in point of fortune, in thoſe entitled to offices of government. The third kind excludes from thoſe offices perſons branded by any note of infamy, or chargeable with any public delinquency. The kind firſt mentioned does not make theſe diſtinctions, but admits to magiſtracy without exception, the citizens at large. Yet all theſe democracies are governed by general and fixed laws, which it is the duty of magiſtrates and aſſemblies to adminiſter and apply, without ever interpoſing their own authority, unleſs the law be ſilent or its voice uncertain. But there is a fourth ſpecies of democracy, differing from the others juſt mentioned, in this important particular, that it is governed not by permanent laws, but by occaſional decrees. This happens through the dangerous artifices of demagogues, a deſcription of men for which there is not any room in countries ſubject to law; but where law is ſet aſide, the authority of wiſe and good men is overturned, and that of demagogues eſtabliſhed on its ruins; the people in the aſſemblies aſſuming the form of one complex monarch; tyrants not individually, but collectively. The authority of the many is reprobated by Homer, in what ſenſe is

uncertain [1]. In ſuch a democracy, then, the people knowing itſelf to be an abſolute monarch, aſſumes all his pretenſions, and exerciſes all his prerogatives; ſetting every principle of order at defiance; rewarding and honouring none but the baſeſt flatterers; and exhibiting in all its tranſactions the ſame contraſt to a well-conſtituted republic, which a tyrannical uſurpation exhibits to a legal monarchy. Of the real individual tyrant, and of this tyrannical corporation, the manners are preciſely the ſame. The decrees of the one are as deſpotical as the edicts and ordinances of the other. Both prove the bane of human ſociety, the oppreſſors of virtue, the muniſicent rewarders of vice. The court flatterer flouriſhes under the tyranny of one man; the demagogue, under the tyranny of the multitude; and the flatterer and demagogue are equally ſolicitous to extend that unlawful domination on which their own influence depends. The demagogue perſuades the multitude to diſregard the authority of precedent, and to trample under foot every law of the conſtitution, that full ſcope may be given to the authority of occaſional decrees, well knowing that while the paſſions of the multitude govern, he who can manage thoſe paſſions muſt be maſter of the ſtate. The multitude liſten with delight to one who ſeems to have nothing at heart but to promote their intereſt, or gratify their pleaſure; and cheerfully accept his invitation of taking the public concerns entirely into their own hands; ſo that every eſtabliſhed magiſtracy, and every regular function of political power is enfeebled, ſuſpended, or utterly aboliſhed. The author, therefore, who arraigns ſuch a democracy

[1] ει αγαθη παλυκοιρανιη, Iliad, ii. v. 204. Ariſtotle ſays, it is uncertain whether Homer meant to brand the complex tyranny of the multitude, or the authority of many individually. Pope prefers the former meaning, "That worſt of tyrants, an uſurping crowd." Iliad ii. v. 242.

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cracy as unworthy of the name of government, ſeems to reaſon juſtly; for what government can ſubſiſt without laws? If we admit, therefore, democracy to be a form of government, it is plain that a ſtate continually ſubject to the caprice of occaſional decrees, cannot properly be claſſed even under the name of democracy [m].

Chap. 5.

Oligarchy, and its four kinds.

Of oligarchy as well as of democracy, there are various kinds. The firſt kind is that in which all political power belongs to men of a certain cenſus or fortune, and in which this cenſus is ſo high, that the great body of the people are totally excluded from every ſhare in the adminiſtration. The ſecond kind is that in which the pecuniary qualification for office is not ſo high as totally to exclude the majority of the citizens, but in which the various councils and magiſtracies ſupply by election the vacancies that happen among their own members: if they elect from the citizens at large, they act conformably to the principle of an ariſtocracy; if they confine their choice to men of a certain cenſus only, they act conformably to the principle of an oligarchy. A third kind of oligarchy takes place, when offices are hereditary; and a fourth, when in addition to this circumſtance, the magiſtrates govern by their own will and pleaſure, and not by eſtabliſhed laws. This laſt and worſt kind is called in Greece a dynaſty. It bears the ſame relation to oligarchy that tyranny does to monarchy, and that the turbulence of the democracy laſt deſcribed bears to the fair equality of popular government.

Such

[m] This worſt ſpecies of democracy is what Polybius calls an ochlocracy.—It takes place, he obſerves, wherever the will of the majority prevails; one caſe only excepted, that of a people among whom it it habitual and hereditary to venerate religion, law, virtue, and old age. Comp. Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. & c. ix. This ochlocracy, he obſerves, neceſſarily terminates in the tyranny of one deſpot. Ibid.

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A conſtitution ſometimes one thing by law and another in fact.

How this happens.

Such then are the various kinds of oligarchies and democracies. But it ought not to eſcape the notice of a diligent inquirer into politics, that a conſtitution may be of one kind by law, and of another in fact. Some ſtates are governed democratically, of which the fundamental laws are not democratical; and others are governed oligarchically, of which the fundamental laws are not oligarchical. In ſuch commonwealths the practice of the government is at variance with its theory; and this moſt frequently happens in conſequence of a ſilent, gradual, and, therefore, unperceived revolution. In operating this revolution, there is ſometimes a long conflict between laws and manners.—Manners finally prevail. The law remains only as a dead letter; while the men who have effected the change, become maſters of the commonwealth.

Chap. 6.

Of the people qualified for enjoying the beſt and cheapeſt form of democracy.

The forms of oligarchy and democracy, which we have hitherto examined abſtractedly, have each of them ſuitable materials with which they naturally incorporate. A people ſubſiſting chiefly by agriculture, and poſſeſſed, as is uſual with ſuch a people, of very moderate fortunes, naturally arrange themſelves into a legal and well-conſtituted democracy. They may ſubſiſt comfortably by labour, they would be ſoon ruined by idleneſs; they contrive a government, therefore, which requires as little expence of time as poſſible; and employ on all occaſions, when it is practicable, the great machine of law to ſave the labour of man. Their aſſemblies convene but rarely, becauſe they never convene unneceſſarily. A certain cenſus is requiſite for enjoying a ſhare in the government; but this cenſus is ſo moderate that it may be acquired by every induſtrious citizen, without greater exertions of labour than are neceſſary to make proviſion for his family. Among ſuch a

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people, government is carried on without ſalaries, without revenues, and without taxes. The affairs of the community, therefore, are left to aſſume their natural order; ſince men have no undue motive to engage them to abandon their own profitable concerns, in order to employ themſelves in matters which will be much better managed without their unſeaſonable interference[1].

Of the profit only for the worſt and moſt extravagant democracy.

Between this ſimple and frugal democracy, and that which naturally eſtabliſhes itſelf in conſequence of wealth acquired by commerce or conqueſt, there are two intermediate gradations; one, in which without requiring any qualification in point of fortune, all thoſe who are not of a ſervile or foreign extraction, are held partners in the government; and another, in which without any regard even to deſcent or birth, all thoſe who are freemen enjoy the rights of citizens. Yet as under both thoſe gradations, ſalaries and fees of office are unknown, there will not be any unſeaſonable interference in matters of adminiſtration; and the regularity of law will prevail over the caprice of human affection. The fourth kind of democracy ariſes the laſt in point of time, becauſe it cannot take place till cities have acquired a certain meaſure of population and of wealth. A great population, and that condenſed in cities, makes the multitude feel, and enables them to exert their ſtrength. All men indiſcriminately claim a ſhare in the government; and as moſt people cannot, without reducing themſelves to beggary, afford time for exerciſing the functions of the citizen or ſtateſman, their public ſervices muſt be paid by the commonwealth, and the revenues of the ſtate muſt ſupply the deficiencies of their private fortunes. By ſuch an expedient the poorer citizens obtain a greater command of leiſure than even the rich themſelves.

The

[1] This meaning is naturally ſuggeſted by what immediately follows.

The former have nothing to care for, their wants being ſupplied by the public; the latter are encumbered with the weight of their private affairs; and on every occaſion ſo much outvoted, that they often ceaſe to attend any aſſemblies whatever, either deliberative or judicial, thus abandoning their country to the licentious and lawleſs multitude.

Chap. 7.

Of the people fit for living under the different kinds of oligarchy.

The firſt kind of oligarchy naturally takes place, when there is a conſiderable but not an exceſſive diſproportion among the eſtates of individuals; and when the cenſus requiſite for ſharing the government, excludes the majority of the people, yet comprehends, however, ſuch a conſiderable number of men, that motives of perſonal intereſt are outweighed by conſiderations of public good. Exceſſive wealth and exceſſive poverty are equally productive of that reſtleſs temper which ſubverts laws and ruins ſtates. When the members of a democracy are not ſo poor that they muſt ſubſiſt at the public expence, and the members of an oligarchy not ſo rich that they diſdain the management of their private eſtates, neither the one nor the other will be eaſily perſuaded unſeaſonably to interfere in matters of government; and their own intereſt and convenience will naturally lead them to prefer the authority of laws to that of men. But when the wealth of an oligarchy increaſes as the number of its members diminiſhes, then ambition will take poſſeſſion of every breaſt; and the *oligarchy* will be exactly the more vicious, in proportion as it approaches to *tyranny*. While diffident of its own ſtrength, it will content itſelf with commanding elections, and raiſing to office its creatures and dependents. It will then proceed to govern by itſelf without the inſtrumentality of others, and advancing from one ſtep to another in its ambitious career, will render its power

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Chap. 8.

Of ariſtocracy, and its different kinds.

firſt abſolute, and then hereditary; thus ſucceſſively degenerating into what has been called a lawleſs and tyrannical dynaſty [m].

Beſides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, there are two other kinds of government; that which is commonly called an ariſtocracy, and that which we have named by the general appellation of all commonwealths, a republic; a form of political arrangement which, as it rarely occurs, has been omitted by Plato and other writers. In ſtrictneſs of language, an ariſtocracy is that form of polity in which the pre-eminence of birth, wealth, and every ſuch political advantage totally diſappears and vaniſhes in compariſon of that which is infinitely greater than them all; a government in which civil honours are diſtributed or apportioned by no other rule or ſtandard but that of virtue alone; and in which the duties of a good man perfectly coincide with the duties of a good citizen. But the ariſtocracies which commonly prevail, are formed on a coarſer model; and as they differ from oligarchies on the one hand, ſo they differ from this perfect republic on the other. In ſuch ariſtocracies, reſpect is had, not merely to wealth, not merely to virtue, not merely to ſtrength and numbers; but all thoſe political advantages claim their reſpective ſhares of political conſideration; and, combined with each other, form the rule or principle according to which honours and offices are diſtributed and conferred. Such is the political arrangement of the ariſtocracy of Carthage. Virtue, pure and unmixed, is not the governing principle of that ſtate. Yet virtue ſtill enjoys a certain ſhare of influence; maintaining in the political conflict, an honourable ſtruggle againſt wealth and numbers; equal to either of them ſingly, though inferior

[m] Ariſtotle here repeats that this kind of oligarchy correſponds with the fourth ſpecies of democracy.

inferior to their united ſtrength. In Sparta, virtue and numbers long divided the field; and the reciprocal ſhocks of thoſe contending principles maintained the pre-eminence of the few, and the freedom of all. There are then various kinds of ariſtocracies, beſides that which is the beſt and moſt perfect; and to thoſe already mentioned, we may add every form of mixed government in which the balance of power viſibly inclines to the ſide of the few.

Chap. 9.

Of a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, or mixed government:

It remains now to treat of this mixed government and of tyranny; which laſt we throw into the background, as being of all others the leaſt deſerving the name of polity. The nature of a mixed government, or what for diſtinction ſake we call a republic, will evidently appear by conſidering the elements of which it is compoſed. Theſe are, oligarchy and democracy; though ſuch mixed governments as incline moſt to the ſide of democracy are commonly called republics, while thoſe which incline moſt to the ſide of oligarchy are commonly called ariſtocracies; becauſe birth and education ſeem to have a natural connection with wealth; the rich being already in poſſeſſion of that very object for the acquiſition of which men are moſt frequently ſtimulated to injuſtice. In vulgar language, therefore, a rich man is confounded with a good one; and as there are only three diſtinct principles which contend for political authority, virtue, wealth, and numbers, (for birth may always be analyſed into hereditary virtue or hereditary wealth,) it is plain that if we comprehend under the name of ariſtocracy, all thoſe governments in which virtue forms a conſtituent element, we muſt define a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, to be that in which wealth and numbers, that is, the prerogatives of the few, and the rights and liberties of the many, are duly reſpected and impartially maintained. The laws, therefore, adapted to a republic, muſt be formed by properly blending thoſe which

its definition.

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By what nice principles eſtabliſhed, and regulated;

which prevail in democracies and oligarchies. When, with regard to any one object, the reſpective laws of theſe diſtinct forms of polity are not incompatible with each other, both are to be employed; when they are totally inconſiſtent, neither of them is to be employed, but a new law is to be framed holding a due middle between them; and when the oligarchic and democratic laws regulating any object, are both of them complex, and conſiſt of many articles or clauſes, ſome clauſes are to be copied from the one, and ſome from the other. In oligarchies, for example, the ſervice of the rich as jurymen, is compelled by a fine; but that of the poor is not rewarded by a fee. In democracies, on the contrary, the attendance of the poor is rewarded, but the non-attendance of the rich is not puniſhed. A law, truly politic and republican, muſt unite both thoſe partial regulations, by puniſhing the non-attendance of the rich, and paying the attendance of the poor. Again, in oligarchies a high qualification, in point of fortune, is neceſſary to conſtitute the right of voting in the national aſſembly; in democracies this qualification is often reduced to a mere trifle. A good political law will adopt neither of theſe extremes, but prefer and eſtabliſh what is the juſt middle between them. Again, appointment to office by ſuffrage is moſt ſuitable to the nature of an oligarchy, and appointment to office by lot is moſt ſuitable to the nature of democracy; in the former government a high cenſus is required in the candidates; in the latter a ſmall cenſus only, or none. A well-conſtituted republic, therefore, will borrow the clauſe reſpecting the mode of appointment to office from oligarchies, and the clauſe reſpecting the pecuniary qualification of the candidates, from democracies. It will *elect* its magiſtrates, but without paying undue regard to their opulence.

Illuſtrated by examples.

The

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The ſtrongeſt proof that a republic is well compoſed and happily blended reſults from this, that the terms oligarchy and democracy may be applied to it with equal, though not exact propriety. Such a republic ſeems to comprehend both extremes, becauſe it contains a due mixture of oppoſite principles, nicely poiſed and accurately adjuſted. Of this kind is Sparta, which many call a democracy, becauſe the children of the poor enjoy a ſimilar education with thoſe of the rich; becauſe, in their advancement to manhood, the ſame inſtitutions and modes of life ſtill embrace both ranks; in their dreſs and diet there is not any diſtinction; they eat at common tables, and the clothes of the moſt wealthy are ſuch as even the pooreſt can afford to wear. Of the two higheſt magiſtracies, the citizens elect the one, and may be themſelves elected to the other. The ſenators are choſen by the aſſembled multitude, and every one of the people may be choſen to fill a place in the council of the Ephori. On the other hand, many call Sparta an oligarchy, becauſe all offices are conferred by ſuffrage, none beſtowed by lot; and becauſe the power of life and death reſides in the breaſts of a few. A well-mixed republic, then, muſt participate of oligarchy and democracy; it muſt ſeem to be both, and neither; and it muſt ſubſiſt by internal vigour, not by foreign influence. Any form of commonwealth, good or bad, may be kept together by the impreſſion of external force; but that form is good which flouriſhes by its native energy; for this can only take place, when each component part feels its own benefit intimately connected with the ſafety of the whole.

Rule by which it may be known whether a republic be well conſtituted.

Chap. 10.

Of tyranny, and its different kinds.

We now proceed to ſpeak of tyranny, rather for the ſake of method, than that ſuch an inſtitution is at all worthy of conſideration. In treating of monarchy, we formerly examined whether kings were, in general, uſeful in a commonwealth;

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and under what particular circumſtances royal government might with propriety be eſtabliſhed. We likewiſe mentioned two kinds of tyranny, both of which bear a reſemblance to royalty; the firſt is, that which generally prevails among barbarians, and which is conſonant to their genius and character; the ſecond is, that which occaſionally prevailed in ſome countries of Greece, the government of the Æſymnetes. Both the Barbarian monarchs and the Grecian Æſymnetes, were unqueſtionably tyrants, ſince they exerciſed unlimited and abſolute power. But they reſembled kings in this, that their power was voluntarily conferred, cheerfully ſubmitted to, and, therefore, lawfully eſtabliſhed. But there is a third kind of tyranny, which moſt properly deſerves that odious name, and which ſtands in direct oppoſition to royalty; it takes place when one man, the worſt, perhaps, and baſeſt in the country, governs a kingdom with no other view than the advantage of himſelf and his family: a government, which it cannot be ſuppoſed, that thoſe who know what freedom is, ſhould voluntarily endure.

Chap. 11.

Principles by which it may be determined, what is practically the beſt form of government.

We proceed now to inveſtigate what is practically the beſt ſort of commonwealth: not ſuch a commonwealth as requires for its conſtruction any extraordinary combination of virtues and talents, embelliſhed by an accumulation of external advantages; the union of all which ought to form the object rather of our prayers, than of our hopes; but ſuch a commonwealth as is adapted to the ordinary condition of ſociety, and of which moſt men are qualified to be members. The ariſtocracies which we formerly deſcribed, are either too refined for the coarſeneſs of practice, or approach ſo nearly to what we have called a republic, that they may be examined by the ſame principles, and eſtimated by the ſame ſtandard; and, indeed, the maxims which we formerly eſtabliſhed in our treatiſe of Ethics, will enable us to appreciate the practical

value of all governments whatever. The beſt and happieſt life, we proved in that treatiſe, to be a life of virtue, unobſtructed in its exertions by external impediments; and virtue itſelf, we proved by an accurate and full analyſis, to conſiſt in mediocrity. What the beſt kind of life, therefore, is to an individual, the beſt government is to a ſtate; for the government I mean (as above ſpecified, not the government conſtituted by law, but the government exiſting in fact) is the life of the ſtate. The perfection, therefore, of this political and incorporated life, muſt be found within the ſame limits or boundaries which comprehend that condition of external circumſtances, and that inward frame of mind, conſtituting the happineſs of thoſe individuals of whom communities are compoſed.

Illuſtration of theſe principles; and the praiſe of mediocrity.

With regard to external circumſtances, communities are compoſed of three claſſes of men: men encumbered by wealth, men oppreſſed by poverty, and men enjoying a happy mediocrity of fortune. Exceſs of wealth, like ſuperiority in ſtrength or in beauty, diſdains the dictates of propriety, and ſpurns the authority of reaſon: extreme poverty, like weakneſs and deformity, ſours the temper and debaſes the character. The former exceſſes produce inſolence; the latter engender baſeneſs: and theſe, together, form the ordinary ſources of all human turpitude; the one ſpreading into every ſpecies of audacious guilt, the other ſinking into every kind of cowardly fraud and mean miſchief. Under great inequality of external circumſtances, a city therefore muſt be filled, not with men, but with deſpots and ſlaves, of thoſe unfit for exerciſing legal authority, and thoſe unfit for yielding liberal obedience; while friendſhip, the bond of ſocial life, is broken, deſtroyed, or corrupted into contempt on the one ſide, and into envy on the other. A certain mediocrity is neceſſary to equality, equality to friendlineſs, and friendlineſs to ſecurity. Under all governments, the happineſs

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pineſs of thoſe men is moſt ſecure, whoſe condition is above committing, and below provoking, an injury. Therefore, Phocylides[n] ſaid, and prayed,

" How happy is the middle walk of life,
" O! may it be my portion in the ſtate!"

It is plain, therefore, that the beſt commonwealth is that in which middling men moſt abound; and prove, if not more powerful than both, at leaſt, ſuperior to either of the extremes. When this does not take place, the commonwealth neceſſarily degenerates either into oligarchy or into democracy; both which forms of government are much more likely than a republic abounding in the middle ranks to fall under the tyranny of one man; as ſhall be explained more clearly hereafter, in treating the ſubject of political revolutions. Such a republic is not only leſs liable to be ſubverted: it ſubſiſts unagitated by ſedition; the great intermediate maſs reſtraining the activity of the two hoſtile extremes; for this reaſon, democracies are found to be more durable than oligarchies, becauſe in the former, the middling claſs is more numerous than in the latter; and large communities enjoy more tranquillity than ſmall ones, which, from the paucity of their members, have few citizens of an intermediate condition between riches and poverty. It is this intermediate claſs, however, that alone balances and keeps ſteady the veſſel of the republic; when this claſs is deſtroyed or removed, an outrageous democracy takes place, which is ſpeedily overwhelmed in its own fury.

The

[n] A gnomic or moral poet of Miletus, who flouriſhed five hundred years before Chriſt, the contemporary of Theognis, of Megara; which two, together with old Heſiod, Iſocrates conſiders as the beſt maſters of life and manners. Orat. ad Nicocl. The remains aſcribed to Phocylides do not contain the words in the text; but although they amount to only 215 verſes, they thrice repeat the ſentiment. See vv. 12, 52, 65.

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The beſt legiſlators have, in point of rank and fortune, been men of an ordinary level. As to himſelf, Solon atteſts this in his poetry. The ſame is to be ſaid of Charondas, and of almoſt all others. Lycurgus was not the king, but the legiſlator of Sparta. A republic founded on the ſalutary principles of mediocrity and juſt equality is, indeed, a rare phænomenon. Of all thoſe inveſted with power, one man alone°, as far as hiſtory informs us, could be prevailed on to eſtabliſh ſuch a political arrangement; moſt other leaders, whether of the nobles or of the people, never contenting themſelves with equality, but always aſpiring to ſuperiority, and alternately abuſing their advantages for giving an undue preponderancy to their reſpective factions. In this fatal ambition they have been encouraged and confirmed by the leading ſtates of Greece, which have always been ſolicitous to mould every neighbouring republic after their own model. Blinded by paſſion, contending parties have been unable, or unwilling, to perceive any thing between the miſerable alternative of commanding with inſolence, or obeying with ſervility; and ſubſtantial happineſs has therefore been almoſt conſtantly ſacrificed to ſilly pride. Having thus examined what is practically the beſt commonwealth, it will be eaſy to appreciate the merit of all others, by their degrees of approximation to this model of perfection; a model, which the legiſlator ought always to keep in view under every condition of ſociety, but which the wide variety of materials, on which he has to operate, will enable him to imitate under different circumſtances with more or leſs exactneſs, and more or leſs facility.

The paſſions of individuals, and of ſtates, reſiſt the eſtabliſhment of the beſt government;

which is a limit and model of perfection, to which legiſlators ought continually to approximate.

In

° Ariſtotle perhaps means Cliſthenes, the Athenian, whom he praiſes in other parts of this work, particularly l. vi. c. 4. See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xviii. p. 118. Cliſthenes reſtored the inſtitutions of Solon. This was his chief merit. I rather think, therefore, that Ariſtotle means Solon himſelf.

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Chap. 12.

The legiſlator and ſtateſman ought always to ſtrengthen the middling claſs, and to render it more powerful than either extreme.

In every community whatever, the ſtability of government requires, that thoſe who deſire its continuance ſhould be more powerful than thoſe who deſire its diſſolution. The political arrangement, therefore, of every ſtate, muſt always depend on the prevailing inclination of that party which is preponderant; and this preponderancy again muſt conſiſt either in quantity or quality; quantity, denoting mere ſuperiority in number; and quality, the diſtinguiſhing excellencies of the upper ranks, birth, wealth, education, the love of glory and of the republic. Quantity and quality often acting in oppoſite directions, their relative forces muſt be eſtimated, and a proportion inſtituted for diſcovering which principle will prevail in the conflict. If one party ſurpaſſes in quality more than it is ſurpaſſed in quantity, it is plain that the balance muſt incline to the ſide of the few, and different kinds of oligarchies muſt neceſſarily be eſtabliſhed. If, on the contrary, the popular party exceed more in quantity, than they are excelled in quality, democracy muſt prevail: the firſt and beſt kind of democracy, if the majority of the people be huſbandmen: the laſt and worſt, if tradeſmen and manufacturers: and, in proportion to the ingredients compoſing them, the intermediate kinds, more or leſs faulty. But, in all thoſe caſes, a wiſe legiſlator will conſtantly endeavour to comprehend, in his ſcheme of polity, men of the middle rank, and to render them, if not more powerful than both the extremes, at leaſt ſuperior to either; becauſe, when this takes place, the government is likely to prove durable. There is not any reaſon to apprehend, that the rich and the poor ſhould lay aſide their natural animoſities, and conſpire againſt this claſs which is comparatively on good terms with both, and the natural mediator between them. The contending parties cannot, therefore, weaken or diminiſh its influ-

ence, without proportionally ſtrengthening the power of their reſpective adverſaries. But thoſe who eſtabliſh oligarchies neglect this conſideration; and by aſpiring to an imaginary good, incur a real evil: for the prepoſterous ambition of the great proves ruinous to more ſtates than even the unjuſt violence of the multitude.

Chap. 13.

The great, in order to diſguiſe their ambition, and the multitude, in order to palliate their injuſtice, have recourſe to many juggling artifices, by which they endeavour mutually to deceive each other. Theſe devices regard the five following objects; the aſſembly, the courts of juſtice, the magiſtracies, the militia, and the gymnaſtic exerciſes. To engroſs all power in the aſſembly, the rich and noble eaſily delude the people into a law, exacting a ſevere fine for non-attendance from men of a certain cenſus. Such men, therefore, will be careful to attend; while the poor, who are not liable to any penalty, will for the moſt part deſert their duty, and thus abandon their ſhare in the government. A ſimilar contrivance ſucceeds with regard to the courts of juſtice, and the duty of ſerving as jurymen. By a law of Charondas[p], a fine was in this caſe impoſed even on the poor; but ſo ſmall, that it ſerved no other purpoſe than that of ſaving appearances; for when one trick is diſcovered, another is ſubſtituted in its ſtead. Thus, all who have inſcribed their names in the public regiſter, are entitled to exerciſe the functions of deliberative and judiciary power; but if, after this, they neglect to exerciſe them, they ſubject themſelves to a ſevere penalty; the poor, therefore, avoid enrolling their names, leſt they ſhould incur the penalty. With regard to burdenſome offices, they are permitted to excuſe themſelves from holding them, without other proof than that of their own oaths; they are not compelled, under heavy fines, to provide

The political ſlights by which the great deceive the multitude, regard five objects.

1ſt, The aſſembly.

2d, Courts of Juſtice.

3d, The magiſtracy.

4th and 5th, Arms and exerciſes.

[p] See above, b. ii. c. x. p. 121.

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provide themſelves with arms, nor to acquire ſkill in the gymnaſtic exerciſes; and all thoſe exemptions, which they are taught to regard as indulgences, effectually diminiſh their conſideration in the ſtate.

Thoſe by which the democratical party deceive the great,

The lower claſſes of men ſometimes endeavour, in their turn, to encounter the artifices of the great with ſimilar addreſs. The non-attendance of the rich in the aſſembly, or courts of juſtice, is not puniſhed; but their own attendance is rewarded; and this fee or reward, which is to them a mighty matter, is far too ſmall to operate as a motive on their ſuperiors. A well-conſtituted republic ought, as we obſerved before, to fee the poor, and fine the rich; by which means, both parties would be rendered diligent in the diſcharge of their political functions, and neither ſide be enabled to engroſs power, and uſurp the commonwealth.

Rule by which the the cenſus ought to be eſtabliſhed.

Wealth is a thing relative and indefinite; and the cenſus, therefore, in each ſtate, muſt vary with the circumſtances of the community. It ought never to be ſo high, as to leave that portion of the citizens which is excluded from office, more conſiderable than that which is admitted: otherwiſe, the government cannot be expected to prove durable. The mere populace will eaſily ſubmit to excluſion, but they will not tolerate injuſtice, or brook inſult. They will even fight boldly, if they are fed abundantly; and the patient ſubmiſſion of the people may generally be enſured by the prudent moderation of their ſuperiors.

Rule by which the military force ought to be eſtabliſhed;

The cenſus, we have ſaid, is a thing comparative and indefinite: but the right of bearing arms has its preciſe limit. It muſt be beſtowed on citizens, and them only; for to diſarm men is little leſs than to enſlave them. In ſome ſtates, as the republic of Malea, all thoſe who have ever borne arms, exerciſed the deliberative

deliberative and judiciary powers; but offices of executive magiſtracy belonged to thoſe only who were actually enrolled as ſoldiers. After the ſubverſion of royalty, the firſt governments in Greece were entirely in the hands of military men, and thoſe wholly horſemen; for before the invention of tactics, the ſtrength of ſtates conſiſted merely in cavalry. But as populouſneſs increaſed, and tactics were improved, the ſphere of political conſideration was extended, and the people at large became ſharers in the great partnerſhip of government. What is now regarded as an ariſtocratical republic was, therefore, anciently *called* a democracy, but had, in *fact*, a ſtrong tendency to oligarchy, or even to royalty. The intermediate ranks were then few in number, and deſtitute of ſtrength; and therefore they, as well as their inferiors, eaſily ſubmitted to the authority of the ſame men in peace whom they had been accuſtomed to follow and obey as their leaders in war.

illuſtrated by hiſtory.

Having thus examined ſtates in relation to the materials of which they are compoſed, and ſhewn how many, and what kinds of compoſitions reſult from the various combinations of the ſame ſimple elements, we muſt proceed to analyſe and explain what is properly called the ſovereignty. This complex object comprehends the deliberative, executive, and judicial powers[q]; powers, which muſt be differently regulated and diſtributed in relation to the nature and plan of each particular conſtitution; but which, in all conſtitutions, ought to be regulated and diſtributed agreebly to public utility, the great end of all legal governments. The deliberative power is generally ſuppoſed to include the right of determining concerning war and

Chap. 14.

Analyſis of the ſovereignty into the deliberative, the executive, and judicial powers.

Wherein the deliberative power conſiſts.

[q] I have here expreſſed Ariſtotle's ſenſe in modern language. In this chapter he treats concerning that part of the ſovereignty which he calls, το βουλευομενον, tranſlated the deliberative;—in chapter xv. concerning that part which he calls το περι τας αρχας, tranſlated the executive;—in chapter xvi, concerning that part which he calls το δικαστικον, tranſlated the judicial.

BOOK VI.

and peace; concerning laws, treaties, alliances, death, baniſhment, and confiſcation; as well as the right of calling the magiſtrates to account for malverſation in office. Theſe important matters muſt be entruſted either to the people at large, or to a certain deſcription of the people conſtituting one or more diſtinct councils: or ſome of thoſe great queſtions muſt be decided by the popular aſſembly, and others committed to diſtinct tribunals, or particular magiſtrates. That all matters of deliberation ſhould be decided by all the people, which is conſonant to the nature of democracy, is ſuſceptible of many variations; for all the people may be entitled to deliberate and decide, either collectively, or ſucceſſively; which latter obtains in the republic of Telecles the Mileſian. In ſome republics, the different magiſtrates form a ſupreme council, which directs the ordinary buſineſs of government; but magiſtracy is exerciſed by men drawn promiſcuouſly from tribes, wards, diſtricts, and the minuteſt ſubdiviſions of the people, until it paſſes ſucceſſively through the whole body. Yet the citizens at large never convene in the popular aſſembly, except for the purpoſe of making new laws; of regulating the conſtitution; or of hearing, on any important emergency, the reſolves of the magiſtrates. In other republics, the aſſembly convenes not only for thoſe purpoſes, but for the purpoſe of elections, for deciding war and peace, and for examining the conduct of men in office, who, on all ordinary occaſions, direct, as well as carry on, the buſineſs of government, acting for the people at large[r], from whom

The various modes in which it may be regulated in democracies;

[r] In modern language, repreſenting the people at large. We ſhall ſoon find deliberative and elective aſſemblies, compoſed of a part of the citizens, acting for, or repreſenting the people at large; which Ariſtotle ſometimes conſiders as the beſt form of democracy, and ſometimes qualifies with the title of πολιτεια. εισι δε δι τροποι τη παντας, πλειους· εις μεν, το κατα μερος, αλλα μη παντας αθροους. This is ſaid with regard to deliberative aſſemblies, c. xiv. and with regard to elective aſſemblies, he ſays, c. xv. το δε, μη παντας αμα μεν καθισταναι, εξ απαιτων δε, ::: πολιτικον.

whom they are appointed by lot, or elected by ſuffrage. Another mode of conſtituting the deliberative power is, that the national aſſembly convene, to appoint the magiſtrates, to take an account of their adminiſtration, and to decree war or peace; but that all other matters be determined, as well as conducted, by diſtinct magiſtrates or miniſters appointed by lot, when ordinary talents and plain honeſty are ſufficient for the proper diſcharge of their duty, and elected by ſuffrage when, in addition to theſe qualities, experience and ſkill appear requiſite for the due execution of their office. The laſt and worſt mode of conſtituting the deliberative power, is that of lodging it on all occaſions with the great body of the people, convened in the public aſſembly, and rendering the magiſtrates, as to matters of volition, mere paſſive inſtruments for executing the pleaſure of the multitude. This prepoſterous diſtribution prevails only in that kind of democracy, which we have proved to be analogous to oligarchic dynaſty and monarchic tyranny.

in oligarchies;

All the modes of regulating the deliberative power, above explained, are conſonant with the nature of democracy; but when this power is always lodged with a part of the community, or with a particular deſcription of men, to the perpetual excluſion of all others, an oligarchy neceſſarily takes place. Yet, when this deſcription includes men of moderate fortunes, and when all who acquire ſuch fortunes are of courſe ſummoned to the council, and when there are certain fundamental laws, which even this ſupreme council does not think itſelf empowered to abrogate or alter, the moderation of ſuch an oligarchy approaches nearly to the arrangements of what we have called a well-conſtituted republic. That alſo may be called a moderate oligarchy, in which men of a certain cenſus elect a council entruſted with the deliberative power, but bound

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to exercife this power agreeably to eſtabliſhed laws. The oligarchy degenerates into a tyrannical dynaſty, when the deliberative body ſupplies, by its own authority, the vacancies among its members; or, what is ſtill worſe, when prudence in deliberation is ſuppoſed an hereditary virtue, and the right of deciding abſolutely for the community at large is veſted in certain families, and deſcends from fathers to their children [r].

in mixed governments.

When ſome matters of deliberation are entruſted to the magiſtrates, and others committed to the people at large, particularly the alternative of war and peace, and the impeachment of men in office, ſuch an arrangement may be called ariſtocratical; particularly when the magiſtrates are appointed by election, or by a mixture of choice and chance, that is, appointed by lot from perſons whoſe characters have been previouſly examined, and generally approved. The mixture of lot and ſuffrage, and the appointment to ſome deliberative functions in the one way, and to other deliberative functions in the other, is conſonant to the nature of what we call a republic. Such then are the modes of diſtributing this portion of the ſovereignty, conformably to the nature of different governments.

How democracies and oligarchies may be improved into better governments.

It would be highly conducive to the improvement of what is now called democracy, were that oligarchic regulation to be introduced which fines the rich for non-attendance. By this means, the aſſembly would be better compoſed, and its deliberations more moderate and more ſalutary, the paſſions and intereſts of different orders mutually repreſſing that violence to which all of them, unchecked, are liable. It would, alſo, prove greatly advantageous, that in each tribe or diſtrict, certain deliberative functions ſhould be conferred by ſuffrage, and others

[r] See above, p. 288. with which compare Polybius, vi. 8. vol. ii. p. 471. edit. Sweigh.

others decided by lot; and if the populace be extremely numerous, that only certain diviſions of them ſhould be entitled ſucceſſively to receive fees, or allowed ſucceſſively to try their chance in the appointment by lot. In oligarchies, on the other hand, the people at large might be rendered leſs hoſtile, nay friendly, to the government, were certain deliberative functions entruſted to men choſen from the whole promiſcuouſly, or were an inſtitution to be introduced ſimilar to what prevails in ſome republics, called the Council of Preadviſers, who prepare and impartially examine thoſe public queſtions, which the nobles or citizens are afterwards entitled to decide. Nay, the nobles or magiſtrates might aſſume the office of preadviſers, which would give them a negative, before debate, on all popular decrees; or they might ſubmit public meaſures to the free diſcuſſion of the people, reſerving to themſelves the right of ultimate deciſion. In republics, the people convened in the national aſſembly ought to have the power of acquittal, but not of condemnation; the latter, in the laſt reſort, ought always to reſt with the magiſtrates and the law. The reverſe of this prevails; the power of acquittal depends on the few, that of condemnation is lodged with the many. So much with regard to the deliberative power, which conſtitutes the foundation and root of the ſovereignty.

Chap. 15.

Of the executive power in republics.

The executive power of government muſt neceſſarily be entruſted to magiſtrates, in whoſe appointment, regulation, and diſtribution, there is a great variety of caſes. How many magiſtrates ought there to be? with what functions ought they to be entruſted? how long ought each office to laſt? a year, ſix months, longer than the former period, or ſhorter than the latter? Ought any offices to be for life, and ought the ſame

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offices to be held more than once by the ſame perſon? Still farther, who ought to elect or appoint the magiſtrates? from whom ought they to be choſen or appointed? and in what manner ought the appointment to be made? A philoſophical ſtateſman ought clearly to comprehend all thoſe varieties, and to be capable of ſolving each queſtion in all the ways that are particularly adapted to the nature and end of the different forms of government.

Wherein the executive power conſiſts.

Firſt of all, it is not perhaps clearly aſcertained what properly conſtitutes a magiſtracy. A ſtate requires many aſſiſtants and many ſuperintendants—prieſts; ambaſſadors; ſacred heralds; exhibitioners, at their own expence, of public amuſements; all of whom, if not neceſſary for its mere ſubſiſtence, are yet eſſential to its well-being and happineſs. None of theſe, however, are called magiſtrates, though they be appointed, as all magiſtrates are, by ſuffrage or lot; neither do we call magiſtrates thoſe deſtined to functions merely ſubſervient to œconomy, as corn-meters; nor thoſe employed in offices rather menial than magiſterial; offices, which in ſtates moderately wealthy, are commonly conſigned to ſlaves. He then is a magiſtrate who, in his own perſon, or aſſociated with colleagues, is in certain matters entruſted by the public with the power of deliberating, of judging, above all of commanding; and to define the word more nicely, is not neceſſary for our preſent purpoſe.

The diſcrimination of offices in relation to the magnitude of the community, and the various forms of government.

To return then from words to things, we obſerve that the diviſion of labour greatly facilitates all purſuits, and that each kind of work is beſt performed, when each is allotted to a ſeparate workman. To the complicated affairs of government, this obſervation is particularly applicable; but it is not always poſſible that it ſhould be practically applied. Small communities require

quire nearly the ſame diſtinct offices of magiſtracy, that are neceſſary in large ones; but they do not require, that the duties of any one office ſhould be ſo often exerciſed, or that the magiſtrates ſhould ſo often perform preciſely the ſame functions. Small communities therefore may, without much inconvenience, admit of pluralities; and this is a fortunate circumſtance, ſince it would not be eaſy, in ſuch communities, to find a ſucceſſion of men willing and well qualified to exerciſe all public offices ſeparately. It is neceſſary, therefore, to have recourſe to an accumulation of employment, and to make the ſame individual anſwer ſeveral purpoſes; competently, though not perfectly; like thoſe complex contrivances, the *obeliſcolychnia*, which, in the houſes of the poor, ſerve alternately as ſpits and candleſticks. Some offices muſt be ſeparated, on account of the different places in which they are exerciſed; and others, on account of the different objects or perſons to whom they relate. Can the ſame magiſtrate, who preſides over the police in the market-place, direct that important object elſewhere? Ought he, who ſuperintends the modeſty of boys, to have the additional burden of guarding that of women? Under different forms of government, there muſt be different magiſtrates, and thoſe, inveſted with different degrees of power, and appointed from different deſcriptions of perſons. The office of ſenator is conſonant to the nature of democracy; but that of preadviſer, which was above deſcribed, is peculiarly applicable to oligarchy. In ſome democracies, indeed, the authority of the ſenate is inconſiderable; but this happens only in that laſt and worſt kind of democracy, where the people, corrupted by fees, forſake their private affairs, to carry on the lucrative trade of government. The cenſor of manners, is a magiſtrate adapted only to an ariſtocracy. What ſhould he do in a democracy!

Is

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Is it poſſible, under ſuch a government, to keep the wives of the poor in their houſes! and his remonſtrances would be ſuperfluous in an oligarchy, where women, eſpecially the wives of the magiſtrates, are diſſolved in luxury.

The various ways of appointing magiſtrates,

We now proceed to the important ſubject of the appointment of magiſtrates; a ſubject included within three terms, each of which admits of three variations. The three terms are, thoſe who may appoint, thoſe who may be appointed, and the manner of the appointment. Thoſe who appoint, may conſiſt either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in ſome offices, they may conſiſt of all; in others, of a part. Thoſe who may be appointed, may conſiſt either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in ſome offices, of all; in others, of a part. The manner of appointment is alſo threefold, by election; by ſuffrage; in ſome offices by election, in others by ſuffrage. There are, therefore, in all, nine variations or differences; and it comes to be conſidered in how many ways thoſe nine differences may be combined with each other; the appointers, the appointed, and the mode of appointment entering into each combination. The three variations or differences, in the appointers, combined with the ſame number of variations or differences in the appointed, will give, it is plain, nine combinations of two terms; and each of theſe nine may be repeated three times, ſince the appointment may be made in three ways. There are, therefore, in all twenty-ſeven combinations, or twenty-ſeven varieties in the appointment of magiſtrates; of which varieties, ſome are conſonant to the nature of one kind of government, and others to that of another. That *all* the citizens ſhould be capable of appointing, or capable of being appointed, is conſonant to the nature of democracy; but more eſpecially when the word *all* is taken to denote the whole body

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of the citizens collectively. It alſo denotes the ſeveral tribes and minuter diviſions of the citizens, which, united, compoſe the whole. In this latter ſenſe, all the citizens are capable of appointing ſucceſſively, or of being ſucceſſively appointed; each diviſion enjoying thoſe advantages in its turn; which regulation, while it prevents the tumult incident to numerous aſſemblies, enſures the beneſits of equality and freedom[s]. We have ſhewn that each of the three terms concerned in the appointment of magiſtrates, admits of three varieties. If two of the terms, namely, the appointers and appointed, be limited to two varieties only, and conſiſt in all elections either of the whole or a part of the citizens, without coupling together the whole and the part in the manner above ſpecified, then all the varieties in conſtituting magiſtrates will be reduced to twelve[t]. For the whole citizens may appoint from the whole, by ſuffrage; by lot; in ſome offices by ſuffrage, in others by lot: or the whole may appoint from a part by ſuffrage; by lot; and ſometimes by ſuffrage, ſometimes by lot. This, then, affords ſix varieties; and there muſt be the ſame number preciſely when a part only appoints. For this part may appoint from the whole by vote, by lot; or ſometimes by vote, ſometimes by lot; and likewiſe from a part, by the ſame three modes of appointment, that is by vote, by lot; and ſometimes in the one way, ſometimes in the other. There will,

[s] Such, according to Ariſtotle, was once the plan of the republic of Mantinæa, ſo juſtly celebrated; and ſuch was the republic of Telecles the Mileſian. Polyb. l. vi. c. xliii. Ælian Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. xxii. Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. vi. The laſt mentioned author calls Mantinæa an ariſtocracy, which the learned Schweighæuſer, Annot. ad Polyb. t. v. p. 384. ſays, agrees with Ariſtotle, Polit. l. vi. c. iv. This, however, is not true; for Ariſtotle calls it a democracy.

[t] When there are three varieties in each of the three terms, then $3\times3=9\times3=27$; but when two of the terms are ſuppoſed to vary only in two ways, then $2\times2=4$. & $4\times3=12$. The text is corrupt; and it ſeems ſcarcely poſſible to give any clear explanation of it, that will not be liable to philological objections.

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will, therefore, be twelve combinations, without coupling together the whole and the part, either in the appointers or the appointed; that is, without reckoning the combinations reſulting from the whole appointing in ſome caſes, and a part in others, and from the capacity of the whole to be appointed in ſome caſes, and that of a part only in others. A ſimple democracy requires that the whole collectively ſhould appoint from the whole by vote; by lot; or in ſome offices by vote, in others by lot. A well-ordered republic requires that the whole not collectively, but ſeparately by diviſions, ſhould appoint from the whole, or from a part; by ſuffrage, by lot, or by a due mixture of both. An oligarchy requires that a part only ſhould be inveſted with the right of appointing, either by vote or by lot; or in ſome caſes by vote, in others by lot; and this laſt mode, as it is moſt ſatisfactory to the people at large, is moſt favourable to the ſtability of the government. In ariſtocracies, all the citizens may be inveſted with the right of electing, but the elected muſt be perſons of a certain deſcription. In oligarchies, the ſphere of the candidates, as well as that of the electors, muſt be narrowed and confined to perſons of a certain cenſus. Such then are the principal modes of conſtituting magiſtrates, which are reſpectively adapted to different governments; but when different modes are equally well adapted to the frame of the government, the propriety of preferring the one to the other will depend on the duties and functions of the office or magiſtracy itſelf. Under the ſame form of government there may be good reaſons for appointing a general in one way, and a judge in another.

adjuſted to the different forms of government.

Chap. 16.

Of the judiciary power.

Of the three portions of the ſovereignty above mentioned, the legiſlative, the executive, and the judiciary, the laſt only remains to be treated. The varieties of courts of juſtice are limited by the different modes in which they may be conſti-

tuted; the qualities of the members of whom they may be compoſed; and the various kinds of cauſes which they are empowered to determine. Judges may, like other magiſtrates, be appointed by ſuffrage, or by lot; from all the citizens indiſcriminately, or from perſons of a certain deſcription only; but the different nature of the cauſes which they are empowered to determine, forms the ſpecific diſtinction among courts of juſtice. Theſe cauſes may all be reduced to the eight following claſſes: 1. The reſponſibility of magiſtrates; for in every government not arbitrary, there muſt be a court of impeachment. 2. Acts of injuſtice reſpecting the property of the community, whether committed by magiſtrates or private perſons. 3. All acts, by whomever committed, which have a tendency to ſubvert or change the conſtitution. 4. All matters relating to fines and amercements. 5. Diſputes concerning contracts of a certain importance, or concerning objects exceeding a certain value. 6. All cauſes concerning homicide, including under that general name, malice propenſe, chance-medley, and all the various caſes in which the life of a man is acknowledged to have been taken away, but the criminality of the act is the matter in queſtion. The court of Phreattæ in Athens tries perſons who, having fled for murder, have returned to their country; which cauſes, however, cannot prove ſo numerous as to require a ſeparate juriſdiction, even in large communities. 7. The cauſes of ſtrangers, whether among themſelves or between ſtrangers and citizens, form the ſeventh claſs. 8. The eighth includes pecuniary queſtions of ſmall amount, five drachmas, or a little more, which muſt indeed be determined, but which ought not to occupy the attention of a numerous tribunal.

Judicial proceedings reduced to eight kinds.

BOOK VI.

How inferior courts are formed, is not always a matter of the moſt eſſential importance; but unleſs thoſe ſupreme judicatures be well regulated, which decide great political queſtions, and aſcertain men's rights in ſociety, confuſion and ſedition will enſue.

The various ways in which courts of judicature may be conſtituted.

Such courts may be conſtituted from the citizens at large, appointed by lot or ſuffrage, to judge of all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, and in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by ſuffrage, and partly by lot. There are, therefore, four ways in which the judges may be appointed from all the citizens collectively; and there are preciſely as many when courts are conſtituted from all the citizens, not collectively, but ſucceſſively; that is, when each diviſion of the people enjoys in its turn the privilege of ſupplying the country with judges. Again, if the judges are to be appointed from men of a certain deſcription only, courts may, on this ſuppoſition alſo, be conſtituted in four ways. For men of this decription, diſtinguiſhed by wealth, birth, or merit, may be appointed by lot or ſuffrage to try all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by lot and partly by ſuffrage. There appears, therefore, to be in all twelve modes of forming judiciary aſſemblies, without coupling together the whole and the part; that is, without ſuppoſing that ſome courts are formed from the whole citizens collectively or ſucceſſively, and others compoſed of men of a certain deſcription only; or that the numbers

numbers of the ſame courts are choſen partly from the citizens at large, and partly from men of diſtinction.

Adjuſted to the different forms of government.

That all political or public cauſes ſhould be determined by judges choſen from the people at large, is agreeable to the nature of democracy; that all ſuch cauſes ſhould be determined by men of a certain deſcription, is agreeable to the nature of oligarchy; but that ſome courts ſhould be formed from the citizens at large, and others from a diſtinguiſhed portion of the citizens; or that the members of the ſame court ſhould be appointed, ſome of them from the whole body of the people, and others from a diſtinguiſhed part of the people; ſome of them by lot, and others by ſuffrage; all theſe mixtures and combinations are agreeable to the nature of a juſtly conſtituted and fairly balanced republic.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VII.*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Seventh Book treats of political revolutions, whether flow and gradual, or rapid and violent; whether originating in the nature of civil ſociety itſelf, or reſulting from the form and principle of different conſtitutions of government. Had the author written with the expreſs deſign of beneſiting the preſent age, this part of his work could not be more uſeful or more ſeaſonable. Even a more ſerious attention is due to it, than to any thing which the preſent times could poſſibly produce; ſince at this momentous æra, when the nations which have overturned their own governments, are continually exhorting and encouraging neighbouring ſtates to imitate their example, we here find the opinions of the wiſeſt man of antiquity on the great and awful queſtions which now agitate the world: the opinions of an author remote from our concerns, unmoved by our paſſions, unaffected by our intereſts. On this ſerious ſubject, therefore, which now more than at any other period in modern hiſtory, comes home to the buſineſs and boſoms of individuals, I need not be greatly apprehenſive of tiring the reader, when I endeavour to place in a clear and ſtrong

BOOK VII.

* Commonly publiſhed as Book V.

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ſtrong light, thoſe obſervations of the Stagirite which ſeem beſt calculated to anſwer the immediate purpoſe of public and preſent utility.

From the nature of ſociety, which, as above explained, is not a mere maſs but a ſyſtem, implying a diſtinction and ſubordination of parts; and ſtill more palpably, though not more neceſſarily, from the nature of property, the creature of ſociety; which in its very eſſence implies inequality, there muſt grow up and co-exiſt, with every community of men, whatever be the form of the commonwealth, a popular and an ariſtocratical intereſt [a]; and thence, not indeed a perpetual conflict, but a perpetual tendency to conflict, between the rights and privileges of the many, and the pre-eminences and prerogatives of the few. This fermenting diſcontent may be hindered from blazing into ſedition, either by force or by art. All ranks may be levelled by the cruel hand of deſpotiſm; they may all be confounded by the wild rage of democracy. But theſe are remedies which cure the evil only by killing the patient. The important queſtion is, how this tendency to diſſenſion may be repreſſed, without deſtroying that degree of independence or ſecurity which is eſſential to happineſs, or that degree of power and authority which is eſſential to humanity itſelf; ſince indiſpenſably neceſſary in rearing and holding together the fabric of political ſociety, in which all the perfections of humanity originate, and in which only their energies can be unfolded and diſplayed [b].

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[a] In ſome of the Italian republics of the middle age, the people deſtroyed the nobles; but the diſtinction immediately ſprang up between "il popolo graſſo & il populo minuto;" and faction, inſtead of being ſoftened, was thereby exaſperated. Machiavel, Nerli, Malavolti, paſſim.

[b] See above, p. 21, & ſeq.

The propoſed queſtion Ariſtotle endeavours to anſwer. He obſerves that the evil moſt threatening to ſociety, may be leſſened by ſkilful political arrangement, nicely adapting to each other the principles and ſprings of government; but that it never can be eradicated unleſs one portion of mankind are ſo trained and educated that they will diſdain to commit injuſtice, and think themſelves more degraded by offering an inſult, than even by receiving it; while thoſe of an inferior ſtamp, how much inclined ſoever many of them may be to do wrong, are convinced that it cannot be done with impunity, and that they cannot hurt their ſuperiors, without thereby more materially hurting their families and themſelves[c]. In an age expoſed like the preſent to the conflict of oppoſite and unrelenting factions, the Stagirite, therefore, maintained that oligarchies, ariſtocracies, and every deſcription of government veſted in the few, can only be upheld by moderation in language as well as in behaviour; and that a ſingle word of contumely had ſometimes ſhaken the proudeſt *dynaſties*[d]. He maintained that popular governments on the other hand, could reſt ſecurely on no other foundation than that of political juſtice; which conſiſts in diſtributing to each individual his due, and in aſſigning to wealth and birth as well as to talents and virtues, their legitimate diſtinctions and fair honours. While he thus endeavours to moderate the hoſtility of contending extremes, and to ſmooth their mutual aſperities, he ſtrenuouſly exerts himſelf to make the middle claſſes of men love and cheriſh their condition as the very beſt and happieſt in which they poſſibly could be placed; and, therefore, to reject and repel every attempt that might diſturb or deſtroy it, as a daring invaſion of their

[c] Book ii. c. vii. paſſim. [d] See above, p. 288.

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their deareſt intereſts. Governments are good and nations happy, in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppreſſion of the great, as well as to reſiſt the rapacity and malignity of the vulgar. Where this grand teſt of national felicity is found, the citizens or ſubjects ought to regard as matters of little moment, and even to conſider with diſtruſt, any propoſed additions to their political advantages; which it will be always eaſier for vice and folly to deſtroy or diminiſh, than for the moſt enlarged wiſdom to meliorate or extend [e].

Governments muſt always have their imperfections, while conducted by ſuch imperfect creatures as men, whoſe nature it is to beſtow an undue preference on the preſent above the future, and on a ſlight immediate benefit reſulting to themſelves above a far greater, more extenſive, and more permanent advantage accruing to the public. All governments, therefore, that ever were eſtabliſhed or deviſed, have contained, on the ſlighteſt examination, innumerable inconveniences; which when deeply and intimately mingled in the nature of the conſtitution itſelf, ought rather to be patiently endured than violently corrected [f], becauſe they are as much more tolerable than would be the evils of anarchy and ſedition, as a ſtate of civilization in which men lie under many oppreſſive reſtraints, is preferable to that of ſavage ferocity in which they are continually tearing to pieces each other; a melancholy ſpectacle which hiſtory never fails to exhibit, when government is for a moment ſuſpended, or its powers to a certain degree enfeebled. The inherent vices of man, his pride, avarice, ambition, and ſelfiſhneſs, render it neceſſary that power ſhould ſomewhere be exerciſed, leſt injury ſhould every where be committed; and the fewer and

[e] See above, Book iv. c. xi.

[f] See above, Book ii. c. vi. p. 101, & ſeq.

and feebler thoſe vices are, the government will naturally be the milder and more moderate. All plans of policy which ſuppoſe a complete reformation in the manners of mankind, are chimerical; but reformation to a certain point, ſalutary diſcipline will gradually produce; and exactly in proportion to the effect of this diſcipline, governments may be meliorated, and one ſyſtem of policy be rendered more gentle and more deſireable than another [c]. For this reaſon our author obſerves, that the more ſociety is improved and education perfected, the more equality will prevail, and the farther will liberty be extended.

But even this political equality or liberty has, according to the Stagirite, its fixed and unalterable limits; ſince no political advantage, except the equal protection of juſt laws, can be carried to its utmoſt height, without becoming inconſiſtent with other advantages, collectively more important. Men in one ſenſe are born equal; they are all equal as to their viſible powers or *energies*, becauſe they are all at their birth devoid of *any* that can be of the leaſt public utility; but they are even then, extremely unequal as to their latent endowments or *capacities*; ſince, with preciſely the ſame treatment and the ſame education, different individuals will attain very different meaſures of courage and wiſdom, as well as of ſtrength and agility. This original inequality is confirmed and ſtrengthened by the exigencies and neceſſities of ſociety, under all its poſſible forms; which, the more perfect it is, the more perfectly it will concur with the views and intentions of nature in promoting the benefit and happineſs of the human race; purpoſes that can only be promoted by

[c] αιει δε το βελτιστον ηθος, βελτιονος αιτιον πολιτειας. Polit. l. viii. c. i.

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by the ſubordination of paſſion and ignorance to reaſon and wiſdom. This is the great and paramount law of political ſociety by which all men are bound from infancy to old age, and from their birth to their death [d]. Society then is a ſyſtem, having the good and perfection of humanity for its end, and requiring for the ſpecific purpoſes for which the ſyſtem is ordained, an interchange of action, a reciprocity of aid, a diſtinction and ſubordination of parts; heads to contrive, and hands to execute. For this reaſon, the inferior ranks of men, thoſe habitually employed in perſonal ſervice or productive induſtry, were debarred in moſt Grecian republics from high political functions; functions deemed incompatible with thoſe mean and mercenary employments, that have a tendency to narrow or debaſe the faculties; to obſtruct liberal thought, and reſtrain manly exertion. What is properly called the populace in contradiſtinction to the people at large, then conſiſted almoſt entirely of ſlaves; a palpable and odious deformity in the ancient republics; ſince a great proportion of mankind was thus ſubjected to a government, not of law, but of arbitrary will [e]. Yet perfect equality and univerſal ſuffrage are arrangements not leſs blameable or leſs dangerous; ſince, as our author perpetually inculcates, theſe wild projects would totally ſubvert the principles on which ſociety is built, and overturn

[d] "A natural ariſtocracy is diffuſed by God through the whole body of mankind." Harrington's Oceana, p. 14. edit. 1656. "An army may as well conſiſt of ſoldiers without officers, as a commonwealth conſiſt of a people without a gentry." Ibid. Yet Harrington, ſurely, was not a man of a ſlaviſh mind. How far have the profeſſed followers of Locke, the Rouſſeaus, the Turgots, the Prices, &c. outdone the enlightened friends of liberty in former ages!

[e] See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 32. The Grecian inſtitutions, as I have there ſhewn, tended to palliate, but certainly did not cure the evil.

overturn the great fundamental law on which only it can reſt.

Innumerable examples might be given of the ſame kind, all conſpiring to prove that an ambition to reach perfection in one point of advantage, is deſtructive of other advantages not leſs eſſential. An experiment has been made in our own times of forming a ſimple legiſlature; or, in other words, of conſiding what is called by Greek writers the deliberative power of government to one ſingle aſſembly. This experiment ſtands in direct oppoſition to the recorded wiſdom of antiquity, which maintained that two deliberative aſſemblies were eſſentially neceſſary in every well-regulated ſtate, becauſe abſurd and ruinous reſolutions were much leſs likely to be taken by two different bodies of men deliberating concerning the ſame object, than by one body of men only; whether a ſenate of the nobles, or an aſſembly of the people. If we ſuppoſe it to be ten to one, that ſuch an extraordinary combination of circumſtances ſhould occur, as might extort from one of thoſe courts or aſſemblies a decree ruinous to the ſtate, or to any part of it, the rules of calculation will teach us, that it is not twenty, but an hundred to one, that the ſame decree ſhould at the ſame time be confirmed by the ſecond court or aſſembly, differently compoſed, and differently conſtituted. For the ſafety of the public, therefore, two deliberative bodies are always better than one; and according to the ſame principle of reaſoning, three would be ſtill better than two, and four better than three. But it is eaſy to perceive that though the purpoſe of mature deliberation would thus be more perfectly ſecured by the multiplication of courts and aſſemblies, the great end of ſeaſonable and wiſe deciſion would not thereby the more probably be attained; but on the contrary, through

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delays and diſſenſions, would commonly be entirely defeated. From this plain and palpable example, we may learn to perceive with our author that, in matters of far more difficulty and delicacy, political wiſdom conſiſts in avoiding extremes. He continually inculcates and repeats, that the propriety of practical things lies not in an indiviſible point, but in a broad middle; that in them nice accuracy is not to be aimed at; but that we muſt be contented in politics with ſuch a degree of perfection as ſuits the coarſeneſs of the ſubject; nor prepoſterouſly forego, by over-refinement in one point of advantage, other advantages ſtill more ſolid; relinquiſh certainty for hope; or incur the danger of real evil for the ſake of imaginary improvement.

Of all political errors (an error long prevalent in the practice as as well as in the theory of the Greek republics) the greateſt is that of thinking that the inſtitutions of one people may be ſafely communicated to another, differently endowed and differently circumſtanced. Men are no where to be found unwritten tablets. Their minds are deeply impreſſed by education and habit, as well as by the events of time and chance, which giving to each nation its diſtinctive character, peculiarly adapt it to that form of political arrangement into which it has been gradually moulded. The eſtabliſhing of governments is the work of time; and to new-model them ſucceſsfully and happily, requires ſtill more time than originally to eſtabliſh them; becauſe laws operate as practical principles of moral conduct, and old principles muſt be obliterated by time and cuſtom, before the new can by the ſame means be communicated and impreſſed. Men deſtitute of principles are the moſt odious and moſt abominable of ſavages; and practical principles are to be acquired by practice only; they are the

the reſult of repeated acts, fortified by time and familiariſed by cuſtom. Yet in direct oppoſition to theſe maxims of reaſon, confirmed by univerſal experience, we have ſeen the revolutionary doctrines which prevailed in the worſt times of Greece, revived in the preſent age; and a ſingle nation propoſing in a tone of authority the inſtitutions, which ſhe herſelf has thought fit to adopt, to all the countries around her; and, in her eagerneſs not only to diffuſe her political principles as extenſively as the world, but to reduce them every where to practice, ſtriving, with the cruel tyranny of Procruſtes, to fit the body of each captive traveller to her murderous and torturing bed.

When Ariſtotle oppoſes innovation, however, it is not on coarſe popular arguments: he does not appeal merely to our feelings; he does not addreſs our *prejudices*; he does not attempt to excite a ſuperſtitious veneration for antiquity. To prefer what is ancient, merely becauſe it is ancient, and to deduce the expediency of our laws and cuſtoms merely from the practice of our remote anceſtors, he well knew, was to appeal to the imagination and paſſions, in a caſe that ought to be decided by the ſole authority of reaſon. In various parts of his works, and not leaſt in his book on political revolutions, he powerfully intereſts the heart; but he always endeavours to reach it by the road of the underſtanding: nor did it ever occur to his diſcernment, that any thing could be prudently ſaid to the feelings of the former, which might not bear to be examined by the light of the latter. With him, mere feeling was but a part of the low animal nature, a part which in brutes is directed to its proper ends by an intelligence not their own; but which in man muſt, according to the ordinance of Deity itſelf, be directed and diſciplined by reaſon and cuſtom, that it may thus be

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ſtrengthened into habit and exalted into virtue; for, in the language of ancient philoſophy, virtue, as the attribute of a man, is ſynonymous with habit. In every well-regulated ſtate, early inſtitution is the great forming and vivifying power of government; and that which education begins, the law carries on and perfects[f]. They are both practical principles, and right

[f] Ariſtotle places the ſtability of government chiefly in the three following points: firſt, the reſpect due to age and experience; ſecondly, the diſtribution of honours and offices according to evident and approved merit; thirdly, an education accurately adapted to the pattern of the commonwealth. Were we to examine the hiſtory of all the governments on earth, we ſhould perceive that they have been upheld by an adherence to thoſe grand principles, and ſubverted by a departure from them. I ſhall ſelect, for the ſake of illuſtration, the examples of China and France; the former of which is rendered familiar to the reader's mind by a recent publication, and the latter is impreſſed by the momentous events and unexampled calamities which mark the preſent times. In China, the paternal authority is the main pillar of the political edifice; all offices are beſtowed, according to the proficiency of the candidates in uſeful knowledge, by comparative trials, ſimilar to thoſe by which academic honours were formerly conferred in Europe; and the education of youth is ſo accurately fitted to the plan of the government, that the education in China exactly ſuits that country, and it only. The conſequence of all this is plainly atteſted in hiſtory: the conſtitution of China has been, and continues, the moſt invariably ſtable of any known in the world. The conſtitution of France, on the other hand, has been completely ſubverted in the courſe of a few years. What are the cauſes? The veneration for aged experience had ceaſed; intrigue ſupplied the place of merit; and the principles inſtilled into youth, and into the public at large, directly counteracted the ſpirit of the government. The miniſters of Louis XV. are known to have ſet the firſt example in France of beſtowing the higheſt dignities of the church on young gentlemen of family; thus degrading thoſe ſacred honours which Ariſtotle maintains ought to be the excluſive reward of venerable age; from which chiefly they derive their awful influence over the minds of men. Their ambition, and that of their ſucceſſors under a new reign, rendered them the armed abettors of American independence. Reaſons were to be found for juſtifying a meaſure in direct oppoſition to the laws of nations and the faith of treaties. Theſe reaſons were only to be deduced from that principle, fruitful in monſters, the unalienable ſovereignty of the people; which was, therefore, now firſt adopted in France; cheriſhed, invigorated, and propagated with a degree of zeal and activity which eſtabliſhed

right only, when originating in a right practice; by means of which, combined with example and exercise, they operate an early and wonderful change on the passions and appetites; so that as reason fortifies and improves, these subordinate powers of our nature are continually more disposed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the sweetest harmony. To alter laws and political institutions without the most evident necessity, is, therefore, wantonly to tamper with the spring of moral action; to weaken or destroy that principle in man, on which the persuasive efficacy of all laws is founded; from which governments derive their strength; and individuals, their security.

In opposition to the tenets which have been so industriously propagated in some modern nations, Aristotle, while he inhabited the freest and most democratical republic of all antiquity, maintained that, from a due mixture of aristocratic elements, the fabric of political society derives both its solidity and its splendour. The very popular doctrine, therefore, which maintains that all power is derived from the people [g], to the majority of

blished a democracy in the public mind, even during the existence of the monarchy. The disorders of the finances were the immediate occasion, not the ultimate cause, of the revolution. The notables, and afterwards the states general, had only to assemble in order to prove by their conduct that opinion governs the world.

[g] According to Dr. Price, liberty is "The power of a civil society to govern itself by its own discretion, or by laws of its own making, by the majority, in a collective body, or by fair representation. In every free state every man is his own legislator." Price on Civil Liberty. This definition contains the essence of Locke on government, and of its French transcript, the "Contrat Social." Locke, I firmly believe, was a religious man, and a good subject; yet, by a strange combination of circumstances, the philosophical opinions of this great adversary of Aristotle, have had no small tendency to promote scepticism, and his political principles to encourage rebellion.

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of whom it unalienably belongs, and by whom it may always lawfully be reſumed, muſt have appeared to him not leſs wicked than it is weak, not leſs deteſtable than it is extravagant; eſpecially, could he have foreſeen that many of the authors who ſupported this wild aſſertion, ſhould have exerted themſelves moſt ſtrenuouſly to deſtroy all reverence for thoſe inſtitutions, which, while they enlarge the wiſdom and exalt the affections of the few, have the moſt direct tendency to reſtrain the vices and to moderate the paſſions of the multitude. What renders Rouſſeau of Geneva, and other writers of that ſtamp, ſo hoſtile to Chriſtianity? They tell us that it commands ſubmiſſion to the higher powers; and is, therefore, a religion fit only for ſlaves[h]. But an author, not inferior to Rouſſeau in vigour of fancy, incomparably his ſuperior in point of learning and judgment, and a far better advocate in the cauſe of true liberty, had long before proved that the pretended ſlaviſhneſs of Chriſtianity amounts to nothing more than lending its awful ſanction to ſupport eſtabliſhed magiſtracy, and uphold lawful authority[i]. In this particular, Chriſtianity commands what philoſophy had uniformly preſcribed; maintaining that obedience to authority is eſſential to humanity, ſince the powers of human nature cannot be unfolded but in a ſtate of ſociety; and ſince, without government, ſociety could not for a moment be ſecurely preſerved, any more than it could, without government, have been originally eſtabliſhed. Upon this foundation, the Stagirite aſſerts that birth and wealth, as well as talents, morals, and experience, ought to have their due weight in every community which has the good of the whole for its main object, and that every principle

[h] Contrat Social, l. iv. c. viii.

[i] Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. lxiii. lxiv. & lxv.

ciple which tends to maintain a reaſonable and moderate ariſtocracy, ought to be improved and cheriſhed, in order to counteract that dangerous propenſity to ſedition and anarchy, which, wherever they prevail, render the habitations of men more bloody and more abominable than the dens of wild beaſts [k].

As a due proportion of ariſtocratic elements is eſſential to the very exiſtence of a commonwealth, it is a queſtion of the utmoſt importance how that ariſtocracy ought to be conſtituted? When ſuperiority in wealth is accompanied by ſuperiority in worth, which will naturally happen when the higher ranks are more watchfully and more liberally educated, in proportion to the extent of their fortunes, the plain and palpable diſtinction of opulence will then, doubtleſs, be entitled to a certain degree of political pre-eminence. The evil is, when the reſpect either for wealth, or for birth, which is recommended chiefly as hereditary wealth, gives to ſuch diſtinctions, independently of the education and manners with which they ought to be accompanied, too decided and too overbearing a ſuperiority; and when the ariſtocracy is thereby ſo much narrowed, that its intereſts are detached and ſeparated from thoſe of the community at large. The worſt ſpecies of ariſtocracy degenerates into what Ariſtotle calls a *dynaſty*; the abſolute power of fierce and arbitrary chieftains over timid and ſervile vaſſals. When power is not an appendage of the perſon or the individual, but belongs to the whole body of nobles, who ſerve mutually to check

[k] απειρος γαρ ἡ της επιθυμιας φυσις, ἡς προς την αναπληρωσιν οἱ πολλοι ξωσι. "How is this univerſal evil, the ſenſeleſs deſires and dangerous propenſities of the multitude, to be controlled?" αι ηττας τε ωσι, και μη αδικωνται. "By the weight of authority, and the equity with which it is adminiſtered." Polit. l. ii. c. vii. p. 324.

check and controul each other, the government, by a proper degree of moderation in the magiſtrate, may be rendered ſafe and ſalutary, and the object even of affection to the ſubject[l]. But the beſt adjuſtment of thoſe ariſtocratical elements is that by which they are rendered ſubſervient to the intereſts of the community at large; productive of its proſperity, and conducive to its ſtability. Ariſtotle has endeavoured to ſhew how theſe deſirable ends were attained in ſome governments of antiquity. But the moſt illuſtrious example of this kind which the hiſtory of the world ever exhibited, is the ariſtocratical arrangement in the conſtitution of Great Britain. The nobles of this country are not inveſted individually with any degree of pre-eminence or authority that can be at all dangerous to the meaneſt of the people, ſince all executive power flows ſolely from the crown, and is exerciſed by reſponſible miniſters; a king of Great Britain being conſtitutionally, in the words of the Stagirite, "a public guardian; and his high office, a pledge and ſecurity that the nobles ſhall not be ſubjected to injuſtice, nor the people to inſult[m]." The peers, taken collectively, form a ſecond deliberative

[l] This obſervation is ſtrongly confirmed by the hiſtory of the two ariſtocracies of Venice and Bern, the former (till its late deſtruction) comprehending the moſt beautiful and beſt cultivated territory in the north of Italy, and the latter extending over the third part of Switzerland. Under both theſe governments, the ſubjects have long enjoyed an enviable condition of peace and proſperity; happy in themſelves, and therefore contented with their maſters. But it would be an error to believe that thoſe republican inſtitutions which ſuit a certain mediocrity of circumſtances, might be ſafely adopted by great nations.

[m] Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 403. That the majeſty of the throne is the beſt ſafeguard of equal laws and public liberty, is a truth perpetually atteſted in the annals of modern Europe. The people at large, whenever they had an opportunity of declaring their ſentiments freely and fully, uniformly maintained the authority of their kings againſt the arrogant pretenſions of prieſts and nobles, and the daring invaſion of upſtart factions.

berative aſſembly, which was formerly proved to be an inſtitution eſſentially requiſite in every well-regulated ſtate. They conſtitute alſo the propereſt tribunal that could poſſibly be deviſed for trying perſons impeached by the Commons. A ſeat in the Houſe of Peers is naturally and not unfrequently the reward of important ſervices and illuſtrious merit; and muſt, therefore, continue to operate in the commonwealth as a perpetual incentive to emulation, and an unceaſing ſpring of energy. With all the privileges and advantages peculiar to that order, the peers are entitled even to reſpect only when they exhibit characters ſuitable to their rank. They dare not oppreſs; they dare not injure; they cannot inſult with impunity the meaneſt of their fellow-ſubjects. They are intimately united in their moſt eſſential intereſts with the other branches of the conſtitution. They cannot, conſiſtently with their own ſafety, co-operate

factions. The nations of the north and of the ſouth on every occaſion diſcovered the ſame diſpoſition, and preferred even the abſolute power of a prince to the more dreaded exertions of a divided authority. To the deputies of the people at large, aſſembled not as uſual at Odenſee, but in the midſt of the populace of Copenhagen, the kings of Denmark owe the prerogatives which they have enjoyed ſince 1660. The crown of Sweden, which had been trampled on by the nobles in 1756, was reſtored to its ancient ſplendour by the co-operation of the burghers and peaſants in 1772. If we examine the hiſtory of the cortes of Spain, the ſtates general of France, the diets of Germany, we ſhall ſee in all thoſe aſſemblies alike, that the Tiers Etat, the deputies of the people, were the moſt ſtedfaſt adherents to the ſovereignty of kings*; and in England, when monarchy was overthrown by a combination of knavery and fanaticiſm, it was re-eſtabliſhed with more general conſent than was, perhaps, ever given to any public act by ſo great and populous a nation.

* In the tumultuary ſtates of 1614, the deputies of the people defended againſt the nobles and clergy the authority of an undivided executive. "Que l'autorité du roi ſoit et demeure abſolue ſur tous ſes ſujets de quelque profeſſion qu'ils ſoient; & ſoit ce tenu pour loi fondamentale du royaume que la perſonne du roi eſt ſainte et inviolable, auquel eſt due toute obeiſſance et fidelité, ſans qu'il ſoit loiſible à aucun de ſes ſujets, de quelque qualité et condition qu'il ſoit, eccleſiaſtique ou ſeculier, de s'en exempter."

operate with thoſe leaders of the people who might be inclined to inſtitute a republic; becauſe their own honours and pre-eminences originating in the monarchy, can only be upheld by its ſtability; they could not abet the meaſures of thoſe courtiers or miniſters (were it poſſible to find any of ſuch conſummate folly) who might be inclined to render the crown abſolute; becauſe they would thereby not only ſurrender the birthrights of their own children, but totally degrade and debaſe themſelves. Their lives, and liberties, and properties, are maintained by the ſame ſalutary inſtitutions, which guard thoſe of the people at large. Compared with this ineſtimable benefit of juſt and equal laws, how light in the balance are their pre-eminences, their diſtinctions, and their titles? The conſtitution of England has taken for its model Nature herſelf; and in aſſerting the excluſive privileges of the few, offers to the enjoyment of all, great and abſolute benefits, before the ſplendour of which perſonal and relative advantages fade away and vaniſh.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Cauſes of ſeditions.—Inſolence and rapacity of men in power.—Secret combination of obſcure factions, &c.—Particular cauſes in each form of government reſpectively.—How governments are to be preſerved—By ſtrengthening the middle ranks, &c.—Of laws relative to Democracy—Oligarchy—Monarchy—Tyranny.

BOOK VII. Chap. 1.

Of the primary cauſes, or fountains, of ſedition.

HAVING conſidered almoſt all the other queſtions that formed the object of this inquiry, we proceed to examine the important ſubject of political revolutions; their nature and number; their cauſes and their conſequences: an examination which will enable us to determine by what regulations and expedients, government in general, as well as each form of government in particular, may be ſtrengthened and upheld. Juſtice, the great law of the moral world, is acknowledged in all communities; but diſſentions, and thence revolutions, take place, becauſe the rules of juſtice are often eſtimated by very different ſtandards. The citizens at large, becauſe they are all equal in freedom, think themſelves entitled equally to participate in all other advantages; the diſtinguiſhed portion of the community, becauſe they are ſuperior in ſome particulars, think themſelves entitled to claim pre-eminence in all other

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reſpects; and as it is difficult for any ſyſtem of government to gratify the expectations of the rich or noble, on the one hand, and thoſe of the people at large on the other; the ſeeds of diſcontent lurk in the boſom of every community, and require but a favourable ſeaſon to ferment into ſedition. Birth, wealth, ſtrength, and every ſuch political element, ſtrives to extend its influence, and to enlarge its dominion; and when checked in its ambitious purpoſes, is prepared to convulſe the ſtate. Virtue alone remains contented with the place allotted to it in the general arrangement, and though contributing more to the happineſs of civil life than all its other elements united, yet virtue never emblazons its titles, nor exaggerates its prerogatives; it neither plans conſpiracies, nor foments factions; and in this forbearance, it ſhews as much wiſdom as goodneſs, for the virtuous are comparatively ſo few in number, that ſhould they imprudently enter the political liſts, their party would be foiled in every conflict.

The general object and aim of revolutions.

Such then are the principles, and, as it were, the fountains of ſedition; of which the object may be, either to ſubvert eſtabliſhed government, or to acquire the principal ſhare in adminiſtration; to change monarchy or ariſtocracy, into a republic or a democracy; or to incline the balance of power, more than the conſtitution warrants, to the ſide of the prince, of the nobles, or of the people; to alter or aboliſh ſome particular magiſtracy, as Lyſander, at Sparta, endeavoured to deſtroy the office of king; and Pauſanias, in the ſame republic, ſtrove to aboliſh the authority of the Ephori. At Epidamnus[n], the power

[n] Epidamnus, an Illyrian city, and one of the moſt conſiderable ſea-ports on the coaſt of the Hadriatic. See Hiſtory of Antient Greece, vol. ii. p. 185.

power belonging to the heads of tribes was transferred to a ſenate. The government was thus partially altered [o].

The beſt means of preventing them.

In all political conflicts, the contending factions alternately appeal to juſtice; but the one party, as we obſerved before, meaſures juſtice by an arithmetical, and the other by a geometrical ſtandard [p]; whereas, in fact, it ought to be regulated by both; and ſuch governments as equitably combine arithmetical and geometrical proportion into one compound political ratio, can alone expect to be proſperous or ſtable. Regard ought, therefore, to be had to pre-eminent advantages peculiar to the few; regard ought, alſo, to be had to ordinary but uſeful qualities, common to all; yet, in the great partnerſhip of a commonwealth, if men's ſhares are to be apportioned by one ſingle ratio only, that of equality, in point of ſafety, is preferable [q]; for in democracies, there is but one principle of diſcord, the jarring intereſts of the many and of the few; but in oligarchies, the few not only maintain a perpetual conflict with the many, but frequently quarrel with each other; whereas, the diſſentions of the people, among themſelves, are comparatively ſlight and inconſiderable. Beſides, a democracy is nearer to what we have called a republic, or government reſiding chiefly in men of the middle rank; which, of all popular conſtitutions, is the beſt and ſafeſt.

Chap. 2.

In political revolutions three things to be conſidered.

In examining the nature of political revolutions, we have to conſider the ſituation of mind or diſpoſition of thoſe who are diſſatisfied

[o] The next ſentences have a reference to ſimilar changes in Athens; but the text is imperfect and corrupt.

[p] See what is above ſaid of arithmetical and geometrical proportion, vol. i. B. v. c. vii. p. 264.

[q] The author here prefers democracy to an oligarchic dynaſty, as explained above, B. vi. c. vii. p. 291. But every people are not fit for living under the former government, "ſince, wherein ſome ſavage multitudes differ from wild beaſts, is not eaſy to point out." See above, B. iii, c. vii. p. 184.

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diſſatisfied with the exiſting government; the cauſes which excite this diſſatisfaction; and the various ſelfiſh paſſions of which the meaneſt, when fully rouſed, is ſufficient to inflame diſcontent into ſedition. Men who think themſelves worthy of being treated as equals, will not contentedly ſubmit to be treated as inferiors; and men who think themſelves entitled to pre-eminence, will not contentedly brook equality. The ſituation of men's minds, therefore, which fits them for attempting revolutions, is a conception, well or ill founded, that they are deprived of their due rank in the commonwealth. This rank is a complex object, and reſolves itſelf into profit and honour. Men, therefore, are tempted to ſedition by a deſire to increaſe theſe objects, and to diminiſh their contraries; to increaſe their profits and honours; or, on the other hand, to prevent loſs and avoid diſgrace. They are tempted to ſedition, not merely that they may enrich or aggrandiſe themſelves, but becauſe they ſee other men unjuſtly enriched, and unjuſtly aggrandiſed; and, oftentimes, the moſt ſolid merit offends by the glare of too conſpicuous a proſperity. The ordinary ſources of ſedition then are, inſolence, contempt, fear, diſproportionate increaſe, and immoderate elevation. Impelled by ſuch cauſes, men fly to arms, and ſuddenly ſubvert the government. The ſame event happens as ſurely, but more ſlowly, through the combination of obſcure factions[r]; through negligence in the magiſtrates, particularly in diſregarding the effect of ſmall alterations; and

Of the cauſes of diſcontent incident to all governments.

[r] Of this there is a ſtriking example in the following paſſage of Livy, l. ix. c. 46. "Eodem anno (ſcil. U. C. 449.) Cn. Flavius Cn. filius, ſcriba, patre libertino, humili fortuna ortus, ceterùm callidus vir et facundus, ædilis curulis fuit. Ceterùm Flavium dixerat ædilem forenſis factio, Appii Claudii cenſura vires nacta; qui ſenatum primus, libertinorum filiis lectis, inquinaverat: et poſtquam eam lectionem nemo ratam habuit, nec in curia adeptus erat quas petierat, opes urbanas, humilibus per omnes tribus diviſis, forum et campum corrupit. Ex eo tempore in duas partes diſceſſit

and through a variety of differences and incongruities, particularly a moral diſſimilitude in the citizens.

That the inſolence, the rapacity, and the invidious honours of men in power, are, all of them, cauſes of ſedition, is too obvious to require illuſtration. Reſentment is eaſily transferred from perſons to things. In odious hands, authority itſelf becomes hateful: and the feelings of mankind conſpire with their reaſon, to deſtroy a government pregnant only with miſchief, diſgraced by private injuſtice, or deformed by public peculation. The undue influence of one man, or of a few, and their elevation towering too high above the level of the community, converts free governments ſometimes into monarchies, and ſometimes into *dynaſties*, the worſt ſpecies of oligarchy. To prevent ſuch fatal revolutions, the Argives and Athenians have recourſe to the oſtraciſm. But it is better to repreſs the firſt ſymptoms of immoderate elevation, than to counteract its tendency by a remedy as cruel as it is violent; a political amputation, which ſevers from the commonwealth thoſe qualified to form its beſt defence and higheſt ornament.

The inſolence and rapacity of men in power.

Fear operates in two ways as a cauſe of ſedition; ſince thoſe who dread to ſuffer wrong, will attempt to diſarm the oppreſſor;

Fear, its twofold operation as a cauſe of ſedition.

diſceſſit civitas: aliud, integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum, aliud, forenſis factio tenebat." This unfortunate diviſion of the city, fomented by Appius, a proud ariſtocrat, and by Flavius, a plebeian notary, gave to the rabble of the Forum a decided advantage over the ſound and reſpectable part of the community. The former party ſupplied by experience and trick, their groſs defects in point of fortune, morals, and liberal education. Their triumph, however, was not laſting. The illuſtrious Q. Fabius, who, from this atchievement, acquired the name of Maximus, purged the commonwealth from this excrement, which he threw into "four city tribes." Omnem forenſem turbam excretam in quatuor tribus conjecit, urbanaſque eas apellavit. Tit. Liv. ubi ſupra.

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Contempt, its operation illuſtrated by examples.

oppreſſor; and thoſe who have committed wrong, will attempt to anticipate the hand of vengeance. Contempt converts oligarchies into democracies, when the ſtrength of the many is brought into compariſon with the weakneſs of the few; and the ſame paſſion ſubverts democracies, when the concerted wiſdom of the few is contraſted with the folly and anarchy of the multitude. The tumultuous democracy of Megara was deſtroyed by its own violence. The ſame cauſe overturned the popular government of Thebes, after the famous battle in the vineyards. Anarchy ſubjected Syracuſe to the tyranny of Gelon; and the diſorderly behaviour of the Rhodians enabled an ariſtocratical conſpiracy to ſeize the government.

The diſproportionate increaſe of any of the conſtituent parts of the commonwealth.

The diſproportionate increaſe of any of the conſtituent parts, is not leſs fatal to the political, than to the natural body; and when any of theſe parts is changed, not only in quantity or bulk, but in organization or form, new governments muſt reſult, ſpecifically different from the old. Such alterations happen ſometimes gradually and imperceptibly; at other times, ſuddenly and palpably. Soon after the Perſian invaſion of Greece, the flower of the Tarentine nobility was cut off in a battle againſt the barbarous Iapygians; and this diſaſter, diminiſhing, by a ſudden jerk, the weight of the ariſtocracy, enabled the people to change the *mixt polity* of Tarentum into a ſimple democracy. The overthrow of the Argives by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, compelled them to aſſociate their peaſants to the honours of government. In the Lacedæmonian war, the Athenians were ſummoned to take the field in the order of the muſter-roll; and the moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the citizens thus ſuffered a great and ſpeedy diminution; which operated the ſame effect

on the form of government, as would have been produced by a ſudden and diſproportionate increaſe of the populace.

The ſecret combination of obſcure factions.

Governments change gradually through the ſecret combination of obſcure individuals. At Heraca, the ariſtocratical mode of appointment to office was changed for one more popular, becauſe a combination of mean mechanics determined to vote for none but perſons of their own level. The higher ranks of men, therefore, preferred the capricious deciſion by lot, to the certain partiality of election.

Negligence.

Governments are changed through negligence, when high offices of ſtate are entruſted to perſons unfriendly to the conſtitution. The oligarchy of Oreum[s] was thus ſubverted by Heracleodorus, a partiſan of democracy. Great revolutions ſometimes ariſe from ſlight neglects. At Ambracia[t], the cenſus requiſite for a citizen was ſmall. It was imprudently reduced to nothing; and the country ſoon fell into the hands of a houſeleſs rabble.

Diſſimilitude of manners and character;

its effect in producing revolutions illuſtrated by examples.

Nothing is more unfriendly to public tranquillity than diſſimilitude of character in the citizens. A heterogeneous aſſemblage of mixed tribes, cannot ſpeedily coaleſce into a nation; and communities, which have grown populous by ſudden acceſſions, are generally torn by ſedition. The Achæans and Træzenians[u], united in coloniſing Sybaris; but the Achæans, reinforced by new colonies from home, expelled the Træzenians. The

[s] Formerly, Hiſtiæa, a city in the iſle of Eubœa. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 389.

[t] A Corinthian colony in the Ambracian gulph, which derived its name from Ambrax, the grandſon of Lacaon. The capital was ſituate on the doubtful confines of Theſprotia and Moloſſia. Comp. Stephan. Byzant Pauſan. Eliac. p. 437. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxviii. c. 4.

[u] Træzené, a city in the territory of Argos.

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The Sybarites who coloniſed Thurii, experienced a ſimilar misfortune; and claiming ſuperiority over their fellow-planters, in virtue of their prior poſſeſſion of the country, they were driven into baniſhment. The new inhabitants of Byzantium were diſcovered conſpiring againſt the old; attacked, defeated, and expelled. The Antiſſæans firſt received with hoſpitality, but afterwards ejected by arms, the Chian exiles; and the exiles of Samos ejected the Zanclæans[x], by whom they had been hoſpitably received. Apollonia, on the Euxine, was deformed by domeſtic diſcord, from the moment that its populouſneſs was increaſed by a new colony. After the expulſion of their tyrants, the Syracuſans enrolled as citizens, mercenaries and foreigners. Diſſenſions and battles enſued. Amphipolis admitted a colony from Chalcis[y]: moſt of the original inhabitants were driven into baniſhment. So true it is, that every promiſcuous multitude cannot be faſhioned into a commonwealth, the formation of which requires materials ſkilfully prepared, and muſt be the work of time; for the cauſes of diſſenſion are innumerable. Even the diverſities of local ſituations engender parties, and foment faction. At Athens, the inhabitants of the Piræus are diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of the upper city, by their fond admiration for democracy. In the city of Clazomené, the inhabitants of the main land were commonly at variance with

[x] Zanclé, the ancient name of Meſſana, now Meſſina, derived from the Sicilian word ζαγκλον, a ſcythe or ſickle. Steph. Byzant.

[y] The Chalcis in Thrace, which gave name to the Chalcidicé. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xv. p. 196. The Thracian Chalcis was ſo called from its metropolis, the principal city in the iſle of Eubæa, ſituate at the narroweſt part of the Euripus, where Eubæa is ſuppoſed by Pliny to have joined the continent of Bœotia. Plin. l. iv. c. 12. This city coloniſed the eaſtern ſhore of Sicily, and was the mother of a new Chalcis, of Naxos, Catana, Leontium, and other Sicilian republics. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. pp. 12, & ſeq.

with thoſe in the iſland. Localities, equally unimportant, diſtracted into parties the citizens of Colophon and of Notium[z].

In war, the ſmalleſt ditch or rivulet diſorders the ranks, and breaks the phalanx. In politics, every diſtinction forms a ground of ſeparation, and opens a ſource of hoſtility; and the ſlighteſt differences may occaſion the moſt important revolutions, when they happen to ariſe among perſons of weight in the ſtate. Syracuſe was anciently divided into two exaſperated factions, in conſequence of a frivolous love-quarrel between two young men, who happened to be both in the magiſtracy. In the abſence of the one, the other corrupted his miſtreſs[a]; the injured man retaliated, by ſeducing his colleague's wife; and the whole ſtate took part with one ſide or the other. The difference, ſlight in itſelf, had this extenſive conſequence, becauſe it aroſe between perſons in the magiſtracy, and thus affected the ſource and principle of the government itſelf; and the principle, or beginning, by the trite but juſt proverb, is counted "the half of every thing;" ſo that a ſmall deviation from rectitude at the firſt outſet, diverges into a great and even indefinite diſtance at the further extremity. Shortly after the Perſian invaſion of Greece, the diſpute of two brothers, men of note, concerning their father's inheritance, involved Heſtiæa in a civil war. The rich ſided with the fortunate brother; and the poor took party with him who complained of being deprived of his patrimony; and of the concealment of a large treaſure which, he ſaid, had been found by his father. An ancient quarrel about a marriage occaſioned all the ſeditions that have happened at Delphi to the preſent hour. A bridegroom,

Even the frivolous quarrels of the great.

Their baneful effects illuſtrated by example.

[z] Notium derived its name from νοτος, the ſouth, being ſituate a few miles to the ſouth of Colophon. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 292.

[a] τον εραμενον.

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groom, terrified by ſome unlucky omen, rejected the bride; whoſe relations, enraged at this injury, conveyed into his pocket, while he was ſacrificing, a quantity of the ſacred money, and then ſlew him as guilty of ſacrilege. At Mitylenè, two young women, heireſſes, occaſioned all the misfortunes of that republic, and the war with the Athenians, in which Paches took the city. The young women were the daughters of Timophanes; Doxander ſought them in marriage for his two ſons; his demand was ſlighted; he meditated vengeance, began to cabal at home, and applied to the Athenians, with whom he was allied by hoſpitality, and ſtimulated them to a war, which proved ruinous to his country. An incident nearly ſimilar occaſioned the ſacred war at Phocis. An heireſs was concerned; the authors of the ſedition were Mnaſias, the father of Mneſon, and Euthycrates, the ſon of Onomarchus. A contract of marriage changed the government of Epidamnus. The father of a young woman betrothed, happening to be archon, had occaſion to exerciſe his authority as magiſtrate, in fining his intended ſon-in-law; the latter, thinking himſelf not only injured but affronted, conſpired with thoſe diſſatisfied with the government, and effected a revolution.

Governments overturned by an alteration of the relative importance of their conſtituent parts.

Governments are changed, when the relative importance of their conſtituent parts is altered. During the Perſian war, the council of the Areopagus, by the wiſdom and firmneſs of its meaſures, acquired juſt renown; and the merit of this tribunal, compoſed of the principal citizens, tended to invigorate the ariſtocracy; but ſoon afterwards, the Athenian ſeamen, conſiſting of the loweſt rabble [b], having gained the battle of Salamis, and thereby raiſed their country to the ſovereignty of the ſea, increaſed the weight of democracy in a far greater proportion.

Examples thereof.

The credit gained by the Argive nobles in the battle of Mantinæa,

[b] See above, B. iv. c. vi. p. 225.

tinæa, and the defeat of the Lacedæmonians, occaſioned the attempt to deſtroy the popular government at Argos. The Syracuſan mariners, having conquered the Athenians, changed, on the other hand, the mixed republic of Syracuſe into a ſimple democracy. The merit of the people of Chalcis, in aſſiſting the nobility of that city to deſtroy Phoxos, the tyrant, procured for them a ſhare in the government. A circumſtance exactly ſimilar converted the oligarchy of Ambracia, after the expulſion of the tyrant Periander, into a democracy. And the obſervation univerſally holds, that whenever any portion of the ſtate, magiſtrates, nobles, or people, has procured for the public ſome ſignal advantage, a foundation will be thereby laid for political commotions, which often terminate in revolutions. For the honours beſtowed on thoſe public benefactors excite jealouſy, and embitter envy; and the benefactors themſelves, elated by their newly-acquired importance, diſdain to reſt ſatiſfied with their hereditary rank and preſcriptive advantages.

General theorem on this ſubject.

Governments, alſo, are univerſally liable to be ſhaken, when parties, animated by principles of mutual hoſtility[c], are nearly equal in ſtrength; when the natural influence of wealth, or of nobility, is reſiſted, for inſtance, by the weight of numbers and the independence of induſtry; for ſhould either the rich or the poor be incomparably more powerful than their adverſaries, the weaker party abandons the ſtruggle in deſpair. For this reaſon, virtue, though the principal element in public happineſs, and therefore juſtly entitled to political pre-eminence, ſeldom however comes forward to aſſert its pretenſions, and to claim its well-earned reward. Virtuous men know how inconſiderable their own party is; they

Governments diſturbed in conſequence of the near equality of hoſtile parties.

[c] Parties are thus animated when there is not a middling claſs between the great and the vulgar to hold the balance between them. See above, B. vi. c. ii. p. 298.

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they feel and acknowledge the irreſiſtible ſtrength of their opponents.

All revolutions effected by force, or by fraud, or by a mixture of both.

Such then is the general nature of political revolutions. They are produced either by violence, or by fraud, or by the union of both; for, ſometimes, what is begun by fraud is ended by force. It was thus that the tyranny of the four hundred was eſtabliſhed at Athens. The people were firſt cheated out of their liberties, by the deluſive hope of Perſian ſubſidies; and when the deceit was diſcovered, the four hundred had recourſe to arms. In this caſe, force was employed as an auxiliary to fraud; but fraud is often ſufficient to do the work alone.

Chap. 5.

General cauſes of revolutions modified by the nature of each government in particular.

The cauſes of ſedition, hitherto enumerated and explained, apply univerſally to all governments; but theſe general cauſes are variouſly ſubdivided and modified by the nature and form of each government in particular. The impudence of demagogues is the ordinary bane of democracies. By private calumny, and public impeachment, theſe incendiaries exaſperate the poor againſt the rich; and compel the rich, through their common fears, to unite into an exaſperated faction, actuated by oppoſite intereſts to thoſe of the community at large. The reſentment of men of property, provoked by the wickedneſs of demagogues, overturned the democracy of Cos. In Rhodes, the demagogues proſecuted and defrauded the Trierarchs, in order to corrupt the ſoldiery; the troops, raiſed from the promiſcuous multitude, were thus ſeduced and bribed at the expence of thoſe who generouſly equipped and maintained the guardian navy of that maritime republic. But the indignation of the Trierarchs mutinied againſt this complication of ingratitude and injuſtice, deſtroyed the demagogues, and overturned

Democracies ruined by the impudence of demagogues.

the democracy. Heraclæa, ſoon after its populouſneſs was augmented by an Athenian colony, fell a prey to ſedition. The perſecution of demagogues drove moſt families of diſtinction from the place; but the emigrants returned with an armed force, and eſtabliſhed an oligarchy. Revolutions, proceeding from ſimilar cauſes, and exactly ſimilar in their iſſue, happened at Cumæ and at Megara: And it may be regarded as a general theorem in politics, that demagogues are the peſts of democracies, ruin liberty under pretence of preſerving or augmenting it, corrupting the multitude by indulgence, and exaſperating the rich by agrarian laws and the weight of public burdens, till neceſſity compels the latter to reſiſt oppreſſion by force, and to fight in their own defence with courage heightened by deſpair.

Why democracies in ancient times terminated differently from the manner in which they terminate at preſent.

In ancient times, when the talents of the ſtateſman and the general were often cultivated by the ſame man, democracies often ended in tyrannies. The demagogues, equally ſkilled in war and in eloquence, ſupported their arguments by arms, and eked out fraud by force. But ſince rhetoric has become a ſcience of ſuch extent, that none can acquire it in diſtinguiſhed perfection, but thoſe who cultivate it with undivided attention, demagogues have been contented with deceiving the people, and have ſeldom attempted to enſlave them. Tyrannies, beſides, were of old more frequent than now, becauſe it was then uſual to entruſt particular magiſtrates with more extenſive diſcretionary powers, (witneſs the Prytanes of Miletus,) and becauſe, while men lived ſcattered in the country, diligently employed in their huſbandry, cities were leſs populous than at preſent, and therefore leſs capable of reſiſting with concert and activity, the eloquence and artifices of their demagogues, eſpecially when reinforced by military ſkill and martial ſpirit.

BOOK VII.

How demagogues deceive the people, and by what means their machinations might be defeated.

The confidence of the multitude, however, was the great engine by which theſe military politicians and politic generals aſſailed the freedom of their country; and the pledge of this confidence was their hatred and perſecution of opulence and nobility. It was by perſecuting the wealthy Pediaci, that Piſiſtratus enſlaved Athens: Theogenes purſued the ſame plan at Megara, and there met with ſimilar ſucceſs. Dionyſius, by the impeachment of Daphnæus and other rich men, raiſed himſelf to the throne of Syracuſe. Democracies ſink into the loweſt degeneracy, when the national aſſembly is perſuaded to ſupplant the authority of laws by the caprice of occaſional decrees: This generally happens through the ſeduction of thoſe, whoſe ambition to obtain office is too extravagant to yield to any civil duty, and too violent to be checked by any moral obſtacle; and who avail themſelves of the confuſion and tumult incident to crowded aſſemblies, to precipitate the heedleſs multitude into the moſt ruinous meaſures. To prevent or diminiſh this evil, it will be expedient to alter the mode of election to magiſtracy, and to entruſt this power not to the people collectively, but to the various parts or tribes into which the community happens to be divided [a].

Chap. 6.

Cauſes of the revolutions in oligarchies. Inſolence or injuſtice of the magiſtrates.

There are two moſt manifeſt cauſes of revolutions in oligarchies. When the people at large are groſsly injured by men in power, they willingly hearken to and follow any leader of ſedition; but this leader is more eſpecially dangerous, if he happens to be one of the magiſtrates. This was the caſe in Naxos, where Lygdamis, jealous of his colleagues, overturned the oligarchy, and afterwards made himſelf king [b]. When an oligarchy, the name of which denotes that the few govern

[a] See above, B. vi. c. xv. p. 312.

[b] Athenæus, l. viii. p. 348.

govern the many, is ſtill further narrowed, ſo that magiſtracy, inſtead of extending by rotation among the general maſs of wealthy and eminent citizens, is confined within the circle of a few families, opulence and eminence will not patiently brook an abſolute excluſion from authority, but will rather convulſe the ſtate than ſubmit to be debarred from civil honours. In the concentrated oligarchies of Marſeilles, Iſter, and Heraclea, the political edifice was overthrown in conſequence of the narrowneſs of its baſe. The wealthy citizens of Marſeilles never ceaſed plotting againſt the government, till all men of a certain cenſus were declared capable of holding offices, not indeed ſimultaneouſly, but, as in ſome other countries, alternately or ſucceſſively; that is, firſt, the eldeſt brother of a family, and then the younger, or if more in number, each in his order. The rigour of oligarchy was thus mitigated at Marſeilles. In Iſter, the oligarchy was changed into a democracy: And at Heraclæa, the power which had formerly been lodged in few hands, was communicated to ſix hundred citizens. The diſſenſions of the Cnidian nobles, reſpecting the limitation of candidates for office, encouraged the people, headed by one of the better ſort, to attack and overthrow the oligarchy. In ancient times Erythræ [c] was well and wiſely governed by the family of Baſilides, of which the individuals lived in perfect harmony with each other: yet the people diſdained to remain ſubject to their authority, and to permit thoſe honours and offices, which they conſidered as the public ſtock, to continue the patrimony of a family.

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Oligarchies overturned by narrowing their baſe.

Examples thereof.

Oligarchies

[c] There were cities of this name in Bœotia, Locris, Libya, and Ionia. That in Ionia was one of the twelve Ionic cities, and founded by Neleus, ſon of Codrus. It is now reduced to a miſerable village, but ſtill called Erethri. See Hiſt. of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. pp. 101, & ſeq.

BOOK VII.

Oligarchies deſtroyed by the flattery of ſycophants.

Oligarchies not only periſh by external violence but ſuffer, and ſometimes ſink, under internal diſorders; they are not exempted from the peſt of demagogues, flattering partiſans of tyranny, as the demagogues in democracies are of licentiouſneſs, and who, to promote their own views, ſeduce, inflame, and betray that party in the ſtate to whoſe intereſts they affect to be moſt entirely devoted. At Athens, Charicles was the demagogue of the thirty tyrants; and Phrynichus was the demagogue of the arbitrary faction of the four hundred. When perſons by their cenſus capable of office are dependent on the people for their elections, like the ſtate guardians of Lariſſa and Abydus, thoſe who covet preferment frequently have recourſe to the diſhoneſt arts of ſeduction and flattery. The ſame conſequence happens, when the judiciary power is in the hands of the people at large; the nobles are ruined in the courts of juſtice, and the oligarchy is thus overturned: this was the fate of the government of Heraclæa [d] on the Euxine. Sometimes an oligarchy is narrowed into a junto; and the party illegally excluded from office, is compelled in its own defence to appeal to the people.

Examples thereof.

Oligarchies overturned by ſpendthrifts, by mercenaries, and by the arrogance of the magiſtrates.

Spendthrifts are always promoters of innovation: in oligarchies they ſtrive to uſurp tyranny for themſelves, or to procure it for one who will reward their labours. At Syracuſe the ſpendthrift Hipparinus warmly ſeconded the views of Dionyſius. The profligate Cleotimus, by the aſſiſtance of a colony from Chalcis, raiſed an inſurrection in Amphipolis. In Ægina, a man of ruined fortune, diſtinguiſhed by his well-known tranſaction with Chares, attempted to change the government. Ambition and rapacity often ſet the members of oligarchies at variance with each other; and when

[d] One of the Greek cities on the ſouthern coaſt of the Euxine, of which Sinopé was the mother and the queen. See Hiſt. of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxvi. p. 224.

when divided among themſelves, they are eaſily ſubdued by the people. This happened at Apollonia on the Euxine: but where perfect harmony prevails, an oligarchy is not eaſily ſubverted; witneſs that of Pharſalus. The oligarchy of Elis was narrowed into a cabal of ninety ſenators, whoſe authority was arbitrary, and whoſe office was perpetual [e]. In war, oligarchies are ruined for want of confidence between the nobles and the people: the former hire mercenaries for the public defence, and the leader of the mercenaries often becomes maſter of the ſtate. It was thus that Timophanes made himſelf tyrant of Corinth. When there are different bodies of mercenaries under different leaders, theſe will ſometimes combine their ſtrength, and form themſelves into what is called a dynaſty, the worſt ſpecies of oligarchy. To prevent theſe evils, the nobles, when they have occaſion to uſe the ſervice of the people in war, ſometimes voluntarily admit them to a ſhare of the government. In peace, oligarchies are ſubverted when the nobles and the people are mutually ſo diſtruſtful of each other that they commit the ſafety of the ſtate to a garriſon of foreign mercenaries, whoſe commander, inſtead of continuing the mediator between the two parties, makes himſelf the maſter of both: this happened both at Lariſſa and at Abydus. The overbearing inſolence of individuals, quarrels about marriages and law-ſuits, ſometimes occaſion public commotions which terminate in revolutions. Diagoras's diſappointment in marriage overturned the oligarchy of the knights or horſemen of Eretria [f]. Seditions aroſe in Thebes and in Heraclæa

[e] Ariſtotle ſays their election reſembled that which prevailed in electing ſenators in Sparta. The text is corrupt. See above, B. ii. c. vii. p. 109.

[f] A flouriſhing ſea-port of Eubœa before the Trojan war, oppoſite to Delphinium in Attica. Strabo, p. 687. It was demoliſhed by the Perſians in their invaſion, but its ruins were to be ſeen in the time of the above-mentioned geographer. Ibid.

BOOK VII.

Heraclæa in conſequence of the degrading ſentences paſſed on Archias and on Eurytion, that they ſhould ſtand (the former for adultery) in the pillory in the market-place. The deſpotic arrogance of the magiſtrates ſubverted the oligarchies of Chios and Cnidos.

In conſequence of the events of time and chance.

Revolutions ſometimes happen in conſequence of the events of time and chance, independently of human deſign or human foreſight. In oligarchies, and in what we have called republics in oppoſition to wild democracies, a certain cenſus is requiſite for holding civil offices; all whoſe fortunes fall ſhort of this ſtandard are excluded; ſo that the majority of the people are excluded in oligarchies, and thoſe who in point of fortune are conſiderably below the middling claſs, are excluded in republics: but in conſequence of a long peace, or other fortunate events, the value of lands may be ſo greatly enhanced, that the poſſeſſions of the pooreſt man ſhall exceed the regulated cenſus: and this, whether it happens ſlowly or ſuddenly, will occaſion a political revolution. Governments change not only from one form into a contrary, but from one ſort of democracy or of oligarchy into another that is different; as from governments acknowledging the authority of laws to democracies ruled by the caprice of the multitude, or oligarchies conſiſting of a junto of tyrants.

Chap. 7.

Cauſes of the revolutions in ariſtocracies.

The ſupreme authority may center in a few men of wealth and credit, or may reſide in a few perſons of diſtinguiſhed virtue: in the latter caſe the government is called an ariſtocracy, and is expoſed to revolutions from the paucity of thoſe who engroſs power. From a coincidence in this circumſtance, an ariſtocracy is liable to be confounded with an oligarchy, which a high-minded people muſt always be deſirous to overthrow. The Partheniæ, ſprung from the beſt blood of Sparta,

Their ſimilarity to oligarchies.

Sparta, but degraded by the illegitimacy of their birth, and debarred from public honours, were caught conſpiring againſt their country, and ſent to coloniſe Tarentum. The lofty virtue of Lyſander diſdained to acknowledge a ſuperior even in a king: the ſtubborn audacity of Cinadon [g] conſpired to deſtroy every Lacedæmonian of a rank ſuperior to his own. Ariſtocracies are alſo liable to convulſions in conſequence of the great inequality of private fortunes, eſpecially when, by an invading enemy, any conſiderable part of the country has been ravaged, and the inhabitants reduced to beggary: this happened to Sparta in the Meſſenian war, when the people inſiſted on an equal diviſion of lands, as we learn from a poem of Tyrtæus, called the *Eunomia*, by which he appeaſed the ſedition.

which a high-minded people will not brook.

As the accumulated honours even of good men are apt to excite envy and jealouſy, ſo the moderate and defined honours of bad men prove incentives to the luſt of dominion, and encourage them to attempt rendering their power arbitrary and their honours unbounded: this fatal project was at Carthage adopted by Hanno; and in Sparta by king Pauſanias, who repelled the invaſion of the Medes.

The magiſtrates corrupted by their honours.

An error in the original ſtructure of government often proves ruinous to republics and ariſtocracies. When the ingredients of virtue, wealth, and numbers (eſpecially the two latter) are unequally combined, or improperly blended, the compoſition has a tendency to ſeparate with noiſe and violence into its conſtituent elements: when the balance inclines to the ſide of numbers, a republic, that does not degenerate into a ſimple democracy, retains its original and ſpecific name; but when the balance inclines to the ſide of wealth, it is frequently, though improperly, called an ariſtocracy. Of thoſe two

Revolutions in republics, or mixed governments,

[g] For all theſe events conſult the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece.

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two ſorts of republics, that verging to democracy is the moſt ſecure and the moſt permanent, becauſe the majority are maſters of the ſtate, and the people at large, as before obſerved, are leſs liable to the temptations of a ſelfiſh ambition: yet wherever the political forces of wealth and of numbers are not duly adjuſted, that is, when they are not proportioned to each other with as much accuracy as matters of practice require or admit, the fabric of the conſtitution is always liable to overſet. Sometimes it falls on that ſide to which it formerly inclined. A republic thus relaxes into a perfect democracy; and what is called an ariſtocratic government is ſtrung into a tyrannical and cruel oligarchy: but this does not invariably take place; for when the prevailing powers are guilty of groſs injuſtice, the ſtrenuous efforts of their oppreſſed antagoniſts to recover their due weight in the ſtate, ſometimes changes the conſtitution into its direct contrary; the reſentment of the poor changing an ariſtocratic republic into a democracy, or the indignation of the rich converting a popular republic into an oligarchy. The former event happened at Thurii; the balance of political power being on the ſide of the nobles, or rather on that of property, they yielded to the temptation of injuſtice, and engroſſed, contrary to law, almoſt the whole lands of the country: provoked at their rapacity, the people, who were warlike, flew to arms, expelled the mercenary garriſon, and diveſted the nobles of their overgrown and unjuſtly acquired eſtates.

when the elements of wealth and numbers are not equally balanced:

unexpected effects thereof.

Examples.

An ariſtocratical government, in proportion as it partakes of the nature of an oligarchy, has a tendency to foment inſolence on the one hand, and to excite reſentment on the other. By committing too much authority to the nobles, it enables them to promote what they take to be their private or do-

Cauſe of revolution peculiar to a republic inclining to an ariſtocracy.

meſtic intereſts, at the expence of what is the intereſt of the community at large. The connection formed by marriage, between a family of diſtinction at Locris and Dionyſius the tyrant, ruined that ſtate; and ſuch a connection would not certainly have been permitted either in a democracy, or in a well-balanced ariſtocratical republic. Example.

The neglecting of little matters, as altogether immaterial, was formerly ſaid to be a general cauſe of political innovation. Nothing, however little, ſhould be regarded as unimportant, which touches the ſpring of the government; ſince by changing the form of the ſmalleſt part, the beauty of the whole ſyſtem may be deſtroyed. It was the cuſtom at Thurii, that thoſe who had been officers in the army ſhould not be re-elected to military command till after an interval of five years. Some ſpirited young men, whoſe martial ardour had acquired for them great popularity among the troops, endeavoured to procure a law for enabling them to retain their rank: a committee of the ſenate appointed for examining this buſineſs, at firſt reſiſted, but finally yielded to the project of innovation; thinking, that being gratified in this one point, the officers would not proceed farther, but allow the conſtitution in general to remain unaltered; but in this they were miſerably diſappointed. New alterations were propoſed, which the magiſtrates, now overawed by an armed force, durſt not venture to oppoſe; their authority was thus overturned; and the government fell into the hands of thoſe who had been gratified in their firſt dangerous demand. Neglect in little matters. Example.

Such are the internal ſources of the diſſolution of governments. They may alſo be deſtroyed by external violence. To this evil they are particularly expoſed, when a neighbouring ſtate is governed on principles directly oppoſite: or when this External cauſes of revolutions in republics.

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oppoſite ſyſtem prevails in a ſtate more remote but alſo more powerful, with which the governments in queſtion are connected by the ties of commerce and conſanguinity, or by the relations of war or alliance, of war undertaken or meditated, of alliance enjoyed or coveted. It was thus that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as their fortune alternately roſe and ſunk in the ſcale of Greece, reſpectively deſtroyed, the former oligarchies, and the latter democracies; becauſe each of thoſe domineering republics aſpired to mould the political edifices of their neighbours or allies after their own model.

Example.

Chap. 8.

How good governments are preſerved:

We now proceed to examine how governments in general, and each form of government in particular, are to be upheld and perpetuated. Firſt of all, it is evident, that if we clearly comprehend the cauſes which deſtroy governments, we may eaſily diſcover thoſe which are beſt fitted to preſerve them; for deſtruction and preſervation being things in their nature contrary, contrary means will be ſucceſsfully employed to produce thoſe contrary effects. In well-balanced republics, then, all deviations from eſtabliſhed laws are to be carefully avoided, eſpecially in matters, which becauſe they are little, are apt to appear inſignificant: it is by ſmall expences that the greateſt eſtates are brought to ruin, becauſe the occaſions of ſuch expences are ſo numerous, that they may be conſidered as infinite and unlimited; and becauſe men are always liable to be deceived by the vulgar ſophiſm, that one grain makes not an heap; and therefore that a trifling expence may ſafely be incurred, or a trifling alteration may be harmleſsly made.

by avoiding ſmall, and ſeemingly inſignificant alterations:

The next rule of importance for upholding the ſtability of well-mixed governments, is, that the nobles and the people be mutually on their guard againſt the political artifices or juggling

by counteracting political ſleights.

fleights, formerly enumerated and deſcribed [f], by which the one party endeavours to diſguiſe its ambition, and the other to palliate its injuſtice.

Governments, defective in their ſtructure, preſerved by the virtues of the magiſtrates:

Some republics have been long preſerved, not by the excellence of their ſtructure, but through the ſolid virtues of thoſe who governed them: though appointed from men of a privileged order, the magiſtrates, while they lived with their colleagues and equals in fraternal harmony, were careful never to inſult, never to injure their inferiors; they were careful never to provoke the proud by contempt, nor to exaſperate the poor by rapacity; and the leaders of the multitude moſt diſtinguiſhed for their merit, whatever might be the circumſtances of their birth, were ſeaſonably exalted to a higher claſs, and thus aſſociated to the honours of government [g]. When the nobles are extremely numerous, they form a ſort of democracy among themſelves, and ought therefore, in managing the affairs of their own order, to adopt the inſtitutions beſt calculated for preſerving that form of government. It will be uſeful, for inſtance, to inſiſt on a frequent rotation of office; and in ſome caſes to enact that magiſtracies ſhall be held only for the term of ſix months; for as democracies have their demagogues, ſo oligarchies and ariſtocracies have their talebearers and ſycophants, mean and malicious flatterers of men in power; who, in proportion to the extent and duration of that power, will be more likely to degenerate into tyrants.

by the proximity of danger:

Governments are ſometimes preſerved, not by the remoteneſs, but by the proximity of danger. The terror hanging over them

[f] See above, B. vi. c. xii. p. 301, & ſeq.

[g] The reader's own ſagacity will apply theſe obſervations to the effects reſulting from the different conſtitution of the privileged orders, as they have been called, in the different countries of modern Europe.

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them keeps men continually on their guard. This ſalutary vigilance may be excited by imaginary cauſes, when real ones are wanting; by approximating diſtance, and anticipating futurity. The dangerous animoſities of the great are to be diligently watched, and, if poſſible, ſpeedily appeaſed; and much care is to be applied that thoſe who ſtill remain diſpaſſionate and impartial, be not whirled within the vortex of either of the contending parties: diſcord between men diſtinguiſhed by rank, fortune, and office, may produce the moſt baneful effects, becauſe its operation is exerted on the firſt principle or moving power of government; and to perceive and obviate errors in their principle or beginning, which might ſwell to much greater evils, is the work of no ordinary ſtateſman. To prevent ſuch revolutions as gradually proceed from the augmentation or diminution of private fortunes, it will be neceſſary to have recourſe to the cenſus. In ſmaller ſtates, which are liable to more frequent concuſſions, the cenſus may be taken annually; in larger republics, every third or fifth year; and the qualifications for office muſt be heightened or lowered in proportion to the increaſe or diminution of eſtates.

by obviating errors in their firſt principles:

It is dangerous under every form of government, whether ſimple or mixed, whether democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy, to allow ſuch diſproportionate exaltation of particular men, or particular families, as greatly overtops that of perſons and families of their own order. Honours to be laſting muſt be moderate; and there are but few minds of ſuch a firm and perfect texture as to bear with impunity the infectious aſſaults of ſudden and ſignal proſperity. Yet if any honoured individual has been greatly exalted by an accumulation of dignities, it is not adviſable to reduce him at once to the ordinary level; his

by preventing the diſproportionable exultation of individuals or families:

his too luxuriant honours muſt be lopped gradually; and above all, it ought to be the aim of a wiſe legiſlation, in the firſt place, to prevent, if poſſible, any individual from attaining too conſpicuous a ſuperiority in power, in wealth, or in the number and ſtrength of his adherents; or, if the evil has not been prevented, to remove him from his vantageground at home, under pretence of employment in honourable commiſſions abroad.

by the cenſorial power.

Since manners have ſo powerful an influence on government that many are found willing to overſet the conſtitution for no other reaſon but that in future they may be at liberty to live as they liſt; it is uſeful in every commonwealth to have a particular magiſtracy to ſuperintend the manners of the citizens, and to check or diſcourage every deviation from that mode of life which is beſt adapted to the nature and principle of each form of government.

by ſtrengthening the middle ranks:

The events of time and chance will often give to ſome one of the conſtituent parts of a ſtate, or to ſome particular magiſtracy, more than their due importance and their proper weight. This alteration muſt be carefully watched, and wherever the balance inclines, whether on the ſide of the rich, the noble, or the populace, care muſt be taken to correct the preponderancy; and by the diſtribution of honours and offices to equaliſe the contending factions, and to ſtrengthen that intermediate portion of the people which is always more ſtedfaſtly attached to the public welfare, than either thoſe who are elated by wealth, or thoſe who are depreſſed by poverty [h].

by preventing peculation:

Every principle of law, and every maxim of government, ought to be ſkilfully and ſteadily directed againſt the peculation of men in office. Oligarchies, eſpecially, ought never to loſe ſight of this object; for the people at large will be greatly incenſed when

[h] See above, B. vi. c. ii. p. 297.

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when they are not only excluded from offices and honours, but robbed by thoſe who adminiſter the one and engroſs the other; whereas the firſt hardſhip, taken ſeparately by itſelf, will be greatly ſoftened by the conſideration, that an excluſion from public employments operates as an advantageous exemption; and allows thoſe who enjoy the immunity, to apply with undivided attention to the improvement of their private fortunes [i].

by paying the magiſtrates with honour, not with fees and ſalaries:

A republic, in which the various offices of ſtate ſhould be paid merely by honour, but rewarded by no emolument whatever, might unite the advantages both of ariſtocracy and democracy, without incurring the inconveniences of either. The people at large might be entitled to every employment; but the poorer ſort would certainly wave their claim to unprofitable poſts, that they might ply their profitable trades. They would relinquiſh public concerns to thoſe who had more time to ſpare than themſelves. The better ſort of the citizens, therefore, would thus eſcape the grievance to which they are ſubjected in democracies, of being frequently governed by perſons greatly their inferiors; and the poorer and lower claſſes of men would eſcape the grievance, to which they are ſubjected in ariſtocracies and oligarchies, of being legally and perpetually excluded from all public preferments. The abolition of fees and ſalaries will not, however, be alone ſufficient to enſure the benefits of this ſalutary regulation. The revenues of the ſtate muſt be

by exactly inſpecting

publicly

[i] Such maxims were purſued for many centuries by the ariſtocracy of Venice, where all honourable offices were proportionably expenſive. The policy of the ariſtocracy of Bern was directly the reverſe. A man's fortune might be often ruined by holding thoſe offices which belonged excluſively to noble Venetians; his fortune is always benefited by holding thoſe which belong excluſively to the citizens of Bern.

publicly received, and publicly depoſited; and ſeparate accounts of them muſt be kept in the halls of the various tribes, wards, and fraternities into which the republic may happen to be divided.

the adminiſtration of the public revenues.

To preſerve the ſtability of democracies, the leaders of the populace muſt ceaſe to haraſs the rich and noble by agrarian laws. The old proprietors muſt not only retain their hereditary lands, but alſo enjoy, unmoleſted, their annual fruits; which, as matters are now managed, are often indirectly and imperceptibly waſted for purpoſes the moſt uſeleſs and the moſt frivolous. Shows, dances, vain illuminations, and pompous proceſſions, are unprofitable to thoſe who behold, and ruinous to thoſe who exhibit, them. A reaſonable people, inſtead of condemning their richer fellow-citizens to ſuch grievous expences, would turn with diſdain from the childiſh gratifications for which they are incurred [k].

The demagogues in democracies muſt not haraſs the rich by agrarian laws, and the demand of expenſive exhibitions.

To preſerve the ſtability of ariſtocracies or oligarchies, great regard muſt be had to thoſe claſſes of the people who are excluded from a ſhare in the ſovereignty. Injuries committed againſt them, eſpecially when accompanied with inſult, muſt be puniſhed with more ſeverity by the magiſtrate than thoſe committed againſt perſons of his own rank or his own order. Such ſubordinate employments as are attended with fees or perquiſites ſhould be granted in preference to the poorer ſort of citizens; and to promote equality, as much as is conſiſtent with the nature of the government, it will be proper to reſtrain the

In oligarchies, peculiar indulgencies ſhould be granted to thoſe claſſes of the people who are excluded from a ſhare in the ſovereignty.

[k] It appears from the Hiſtory of Greece, that this was indeed moſt ſalutary, but with reſpect to him who propoſed it, very dangerous advice. By a law of the demagogue Eubulus, it was made capital at Athens, to propoſe diverting the theatric funds to any other purpoſe than that of the public amuſement. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 473.

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A ſimilar rule applicable in all governments.

the freedom of donations and marriage contracts, and thereby to limit or prevent the accumulation of too many eſtates in one family. It is of eſſential uſe in preſerving all governments, that thoſe who are the leaſt ſharers in the ſovereignty, be treated with great equity, and even peculiar indulgence, in all other reſpects. In oligarchies, the people, in democracies, the wealthy, ought reſpectively to enjoy every advantage and every preference that is not incompatible with the nature of the government. The ſuperiority given to them in matters of little moment, will diſpoſe them patiently to brook their inferiority in ſolid power.

Chap. 9.

The requiſites for holding ſupreme magiſtracies.—Patriotiſm. Capacity. Virtue.

To partake of this power, or of what in every ſtate forms the ſovereignty, three qualifications are eſſentially requiſite. The ſupreme magiſtrates muſt be animated with the warmeſt love for that conſtitution, the government of which they are called to adminiſter. They muſt be endowed with the capacities and powers neceſſary to the diſcharge of their high functions. They muſt, in the third place, poſſeſs that particular ſpecies of virtue, and eſpecially of juſtice, which, in each form of government, is beſt fitted to enſure the ſtability of that particular conſtitution; for as juſtice is meaſured by different ſtandards in oligarchies and democracies, it is plain that, in a political ſenſe, the virtue of juſtice is itſelf variable, and that what is right in one government, may be wrong in another. When the three requiſites above mentioned do not concur in the ſame perſon, an important queſtion will ariſe, to which of them is the preference due? In the appointment, for inſtance, of a general, a man preſents himſelf poſſeſſed indeed of great military talents, but not remarkably diſtinguiſhed by his juſtice or his patriotiſm. Another is eminent for thoſe virtues, but has never exhibited any

When theſe requiſites do not all concur, by what rule the preference among them is to be decided.

any ſignal proof of his genius for war, and his capacity for command. By what rule ought the preference to be decided? We anſwer, there is a middle portion of talent, as well as of virtue, that is the ordinary lot of humanity. Whatever exceeds this middle portion can fall to the ſhare of a few only. Many men poſſeſs enough of juſtice and enough of patriotiſm to make good generals; but there are few endowed with that degree of ſkill and experience which is requiſite for the honourable diſcharge of high military truſt. This degree of ſkill and experience is, therefore, chiefly to be regarded in the choice of a general. Were we to appoint a public treaſurer, we muſt ſtill reaſon on the ſame principle, and becauſe we reaſon on the ſame principle, we muſt in this caſe vary our deciſion; and give the preference to moral, rather than to intellectual, accompliſhments. The ſkill, experience, and capacity requiſite in a magiſtrate of this deſcription, are ſuch as the greater part of mankind may be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs. But his juſtice and integrity ought to riſe above the common level; and it will be the beſt recommendation to his office, that thoſe virtues ſhine in his character with more than ordinary luſtre.

Application of the rule to particular caſes.

But as to a proper diſcharge of public offices in general, it may be aſked, why I have ſaid that there are *three* eſſential requiſites? Let us ſuppoſe a man endowed with a ſufficient capacity for his employment, and animated by a warm love for his country; will not thoſe qualifications alone render him an upright and uſeful ſervant of the public? I anſwer, they will not; and affirm that, in addition to them, and in order to complete the character of a good magiſtrate or miniſter, a third ingredient muſt neceſſarily enter into the compoſition. He muſt poſſeſs, at leaſt in a certain degree, the practical habit of

Proof that patriotiſm and capacity are not alone ſufficient to form the character of a ſupreme magiſtrate.

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all the virtues, without which, how much ſoever he may love his country, and how well ſoever he may underſtand its intereſts, he will often be hindered by ſloth, diſſipation, intemperance, or cowardice from rendering it any eſſential ſervice; nay, he may be tempted by thoſe, though oftener by contrary vices, to do his country much poſitive miſchief. Men are generally clearſighted enough in perceiving their own intereſt; and they cannot be ſuſpected of not loving themſelves with an affection ſufficiently ſincere; yet how many, through a defect of moral attainment, daily plunge themſelves into inextricable diſtreſs? Can it be expected that they ſhould treat their country better than they treat themſelves?

In what manner laws are relative to different governments,

Laws, we have ſaid, are things relative, and therefore variable; and in order to be good, they muſt be adapted to the circumſtances of the people for whom they are promulgated. Whatever law is well adapted to the conſtitution, will facilitate its motions, invigorate its health, and thereby confirm its ſtability; and eſpecially if the law, pregnant with that which we have often mentioned as the great and principal element of political ſafety, conſpires to convince the people at large, or at leaſt that portion of the community which is moſt numerous or moſt powerful, that their intereſt and happineſs are intimately connected with the preſervation and permanence of the conſtituted authorities. Beſides this, the ſafety of ſtates requires that the legiſlature ſhould never loſe ſight of that golden mean, which is univerſally overlooked or deſpiſed in corrupt republics. Many inſtitutions, ſeemingly favourable to democracy, have proved its ruin; and many inſtitutions, ſeemingly favourable to oligarchy, have totally deſtroyed that form of government. Demagogues and ſycophants, the partiſans of the multitude, and the flatterers of the great, regard that plan

particularly to democracies and oligarchies.

of

of policy which they reſpectively eſpouſe, as the conſummate pattern of perfect excellence, and therefore think, or affect to think, that they cannot poſſibly do too much for promoting the intereſts of democracy on the one hand, or of oligarchy on the other. In this, however, they err egregiouſly; and ſet themſelves in oppoſition to the firſt principles of ſociety, and to the whole analogy of nature. The limb of an animal may be elegant without being ſtraight; and the noſe, that characteriſtic feature, may deſerve in a certain degree the epithets of depreſſed or aquiline, and yet this ſmall deviation from ſtraightneſs into curvature may heighten and embelliſh beauty. But if you increaſe too much its ſwell or its depreſſion, you will thereby diſfigure the whole countenance. There is not any reaſon whatever, why the ſame obſervation ſhould not apply to forms of government. The popular and ariſtocratical powers, acting in nearly oppoſite directions, will, if nicely adjuſted, keep the motion of government ſtraight and uniform. This right line, however, may, by a ſmall variation in the relative force of the generating powers, deviate a little into either of the oppoſite curvatures, without affecting the beauty of the ſyſtem. But if you vary this force or celerity too much, if you render the democracy too democratical, or the ariſtocracy too ariſtocratical, you will firſt of all enfeeble, then ſhake, and finally ſubvert the government. The nature of democracy requires that the ſupreme authority of government ſhould reſide, not in the diſtinguiſhed few, but in the great body of the people; the nature of oligarchy or ariſtocracy, requires that the ſupreme authority of government ſhould reſide, not in the people at large, but in the few diſtinguiſhed by wealth or virtue. Both oligarchies and democracies, there- Illuſtration.

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fore, imply the exiſtence of thoſe oppoſite deſcriptions of perſons, the rich and the poor, the few and the many. Theſe deſcriptions are the elements of which ſuch governments are compoſed; and in proportion as you diminiſh or deſtroy either of the conſtituent elements, you muſt impair or demoliſh the whole fabric of the conſtitution. How abſurdly, therefore, do thoſe demagogues and thoſe ſycophants reaſon; who, the former in democracies, would plunder and haraſs the nobility; and the latter, in oligarchies, would oppreſs and perſecute the people? How weak as well as wicked are thoſe oaths which are taken in ſome oligarchical governments, "I will reſiſt the populace with all my might; I will bear them eternal ill-will, and never ceaſe to inflict on them every injury in my power?" Did theſe haughty but contemptible nobles conſult their own intereſt and honour, they would ſwear the direct contrary; "I will never injure the people, I will always treat them with kindneſs."

The errors of demagogues and ſycophants.

But the main ſource of political ſafety conſiſts in an expedient now univerſally neglected by ſtates, though it has more efficacy alone, than all other contrivances combined. How wiſely ſoever laws may be framed, and with whatever preciſion they may be penned, they will prove impotent and uſeleſs, unleſs thoſe who are deſtined to adminiſter them, be carefully trained to ſhape their lives agreeably to the pattern of the commonwealth. The conſtitution of a ſtate, as well as that of an individual, may be ruined by intemperance; and the danger of intemperance can only be prevented by early and aſſiduous culture. If the government, therefore, is a democracy, the education muſt be democratical; if it is an oligarchy, the education muſt be oligarchical.

The citizens muſt be taught to ſhape their lives by the pattern of the commonwealth.

Of democratical and oligarchical education.

garchical. But an education properly adapted to either of theſe forms of government, muſt not be ſuch as will excite their reſpective magiſtrates to indulge their political propenſities, and to gratify their ſelfiſh or factious paſſions, but ſuch as will give to their public conduct that firmneſs and moderation, which the ſafety of the ſtate requires, and without which it will be impoſſible for the popular party long to defend the democracy againſt the nobles; or for the partiſans of the Few, long to defend the oligarchy againſt the people. Education, when properly directed, is the preſerving and vivifying principle of all good policy; but as it is now conducted, it becomes the cauſe of inſtability, and produces frequent revolutions. Under every ſpecies of oligarchy, the children of the great are brought up delicately, and often indulged criminally. The children of the poor are hardened in their bodies by exerciſe, and fortified in their minds by diſcipline. Can it be expected that weakneſs ſhould long continue to prevail over ſtrength; or that men ſoftened by ſloth, ſhould long continue to command men invigorated by exertion? In democracies, on the contrary, where juſtice is defined by equality, and where it is thought ſufficient, that all be treated alike, without conſidering whether each will thus have his due, liberty too naturally degenerates into licentiouſneſs, and the citizens, inſtead of ſubmitting cheerfully to the ſalutary reſtraints of diſcipline, think themſelves entitled, as Euripides ſays,

"Each man to live as perverſe will directs:"

becauſe otherwiſe, forſooth, their liberty would be abridged. But this is abſurd in the extreme. To be obliged to ſhape our lives to the pattern of the commonwealth, is not ſlavery but ſafety. Such

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Such then are the cauſes and contingencies which, in republics, promote or prevent revolutions; we now proceed to explain thoſe cauſes and contingencies which have been found to overturn or to uphold monarchies.

Chap. 10.

Of revolutions in monarchies.

Monarchies, whether limited or abſolute, are liable to nearly the ſame changes and accidents which befal republics; for royalty is analogous to ariſtocracy; and tyranny is compoſed of rigid oligarchy and the worſt ſpecies of democracy, and is, therefore, moſt ruinous to its ſubjects, as containing the evils and deformities of two peſtilent miſchiefs. The two kinds of monarchy are different in their origin. Royalty is produced from the weight and influence of the nobles concentrated in one diſtinguiſhed and illuſtrious character, in order the more firmly to reſiſt the dangerous encroachments of the populace. Tyranny, on the other hand, is generated by the combined ſtrength of the populace, who think they can never enough exalt the leader who undertakes to defend the popular cauſe, and to repel oligarchic oppreſſion. Moſt tyrants, therefore, have ſprung out of demagogues, who had captivated the affections of the people, by traducing and perſecuting their ſuperiors. This, I ſay, has happened in large ſtates; for in ancient times, and before the aggrandizement of cities, kings would often tranſgreſs the limits of their lawful power; and magiſtrates, availing themſelves of the duration and importance of their civil and religious offices, which then laſted much longer than they do now, would often by theft or robbery uſurp a throne. The tyranny of Pheidon of Argos was nothing but an undue extenſion of his royal authority. The ſame may be ſaid of the other tyrannies which about that time prevailed in Greece. Phalaris of Agrigentum, and the tyrants of Ionia, were originally republican magiſtrates, who

The origin of royalty.

Of tyranny.

who abuſed the authority of their elective functions for obtaining unlimited power. But Panætius of Leontium, Cypſelus of Corinth, Peiſiſtratus of Athens, and Dionyſius of Syracuſe, all theſe and many others acquired tyranny by flattery; they firſt captivated the *affections* of the people, before they enſlaved their *perſons*.

Royalty analogous to ariſtocracy.

Royalty, we ſaid, is analogous to ariſtocracy. It may, in fact, be analyſed into the ſame elements; ſince kings are created for their perſonal or hereditary worth, and for the benefits which they ſeem capable of conferring, or which they have actually conferred on their nation. Codrus, who defended the Athenians in war; Cyrus, who delivered Perſia from bondage; the martial leaders of the Lacedæmonians, Macedonians, and Moloſſians, whoſe ſucceſsful valour acquired lands for their reſpective followers, and maintained them in quiet poſſeſſion of their important conqueſts; theſe and ſuch illuſtrious men received the honours of royalty from the admiring gratitude of the public, and adorned the throne by the ſame virtues through which they were enabled to aſcend it.

Definition of a king; and contraſt between kings and tyrants.

A king, in his nature and end, is a public guardian. His office is a pledge, that the nobles ſhall not be ſubjected to injuſtice, nor the people to inſult. A tyrant, as we have ſaid and repeated, is not eſſentially governed by any public-ſpirited motive; and if ever he conſults the intereſt of his country, it is merely as that intereſt happens accidentally to affect his own. To enjoy pleaſure, the meaneſt pleaſure, is the only reaſonable aim of a tyrant; to acquire glory, the brighteſt glory, is the aim of a king. A tyrant, therefore, delights in wealth, as furniſhing means to his end; a king delights in honour, juſtly obtained and hardly earned. A tyrant is guarded by mercenary foreigners; a king, by the affection of his people.

The

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Analyſis of tyranny; the inherent evils of its conſtituent elements.

The miſchief of that complex thing a tyranny, will manifeſtly appear by conſidering the inherent evils of its conſtituent elements. It is compoſed, we ſaid, of rigid oligarchy and of lawleſs democracy. From the former it borrows that rapacity for wealth, (the proper end of oligarchy,) without which the tyrant can neither purchaſe criminal pleaſure, nor pay his mercenary attendants. In imitation of oligarchic magiſtrates, the tyrant will diſtruſt and diſarm his ſubjects, plunder and baniſh them, as fear or avarice directs; and, diſregarding every domeſtic and every ſocial tie, tranſplant them, as ſuits his conveniency, from one diſtrict to another, and thus tear aſunder their affections, and render them ſtrangers in their native country. From democracy, on the other hand, tyrants will borrow their animoſity to the nobles, and loſe no opportunity of deſtroying them, ſecretly or openly; of baniſhing them from their country, and of inflicting on them every calamity, that either vengeance can dictate, or that fear may ſuggeſt. For tyrants never forget that the moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the community muſt ever be the moſt hoſtile to their government, and the moſt able as well as the moſt willing to ſubvert it; becauſe of ſuch men, ſome will be ambitious of dominion, and all of them muſt be impatient of ſubjection. Tyrants, therefore, regarding them as hindrances in the way of their power, and obſtacles to the unbounded gratification of their paſſions, will never loſe ſight of the advice of Periander to Thraſybulus, "that in order to reap the full harveſt of their government, it is neceſſary to cut off the talleſt ſtalks, and to level the political field."

Cauſes of the revolutions in tyrannies.

From theſe obſervations, it is plain that both the cauſes which precede, and the conſequences which follow revolutions, muſt be nearly the ſame in monarchies and in republics. The immediate

immediate and impelling cauſes of innovation, are injuſtice, ſuffered or apprehended, fear, contempt, and eſpecially ſuch acts of injuſtice as are accompanied with inſult. The ends in view are to ſtrip the tyrant of his ill-gotten wealth, and to diveſt him of his uſurped power, in order to apply the former to the exigencies of the community, and to divide the latter among lawful magiſtrates. Conſpirators ſometimes ſtrike at the tyranny, ſometimes at the perſon of the tyrant. The latter takes place in the caſe of inſult; for perſons inſulted commonly ſeek not advantage, but vengeance. It was thus that Harmodius and Ariſtogeiton overturned the tyranny of the Peiſiſtratidæ. The inſult offered to his ſiſter, animated the hand of Harmodius; the inſult offered to his beloved Harmodius, ſharpened the ſteel of Ariſtogeiton. Periander of Ambracia provoked the vengeance even of his pathics by the inſolent obſcenity of his language. Philip of Macedon was ſlain by Pauſanias, becauſe he made light of the diſgrace which that young nobleman had ſuffered from the audacious impurity of Attalus. The indignant manhood of Derdas puniſhed by death the brutal aſſaults of Amyntas, ſurnamed the Little [i]. The reſentment of blows and ſtripes has often threatened the ſafety of men in power, and often proved fatal to them: witneſs the Penthalidæ at Mitylené, and alſo Penthilus himſelf, the former of whom were deſtroyed by Megacles, the latter by Smerdes; witneſs alſo, the aſſaſſination of Archelaus king of Macedon, effected at the inſtigation of Decamnichus, whom that prince had cauſed to be whipped, in compliance with the deſire of Euripides the poet [k]; who was provoked at being taunted by Decamnichus for his ſtinking breath.

Inſult.

Examples.

[i] A few ſentences are omitted, the ſubject being as impure as the text is corrupt.

[k] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxiii. p. 6.

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breath[1]. Innumerable inſtances might be given of kings and tyrants who, through ſuch cauſes, have been at once deprived of their power and of their lives; eſpecially when the indulgence of their unbridled paſſions has been accompanied by an open defiance of the ſentiments of mankind, and when injury has been heightened by mockery and inſult.

Fear, contempt, &c. with examples.

The fear or the contempt of ſubjects often proves ruinous to kings. Xerxes commanded Artabanus, the captain of his guard, to kill Darius. Artabanus did not obey the order, thinking the king himſelf might forget, or be willing to revoke, it, as the command was given in his cups. But the officious envy of courtiers failed not to refreſh the king's memory; and Artabanus, alarmed for his own ſafety, conſpired and ſlew his maſter. The mean effeminacy of Sardanapalus, who, if the ſtory told of him may be credited, was found weaving and ſpinning with his women, excited that contemptuous indignation which tumbled him from the throne. The drunkenneſs of the younger Dionyſius, which rendered him deſpicable to his ſubjects, animated the republican patriotiſm of Dion, and enabled him to rid Syracuſe of a tyrant. This paſſion of contempt is moſt likely to operate on two claſſes of men; on the friends of the monarch, who, becauſe they enjoy his confidence, think it will be eaſy for them to deceive and to deſtroy him; and on the miniſters of his power, becauſe they think it will not be difficult for them to uſurp his dominion. Cyrus was only the general of a provincial army; but he became maſter of the Eaſt, becauſe he deſpiſed the luxury of Aſtyages, and the ſlothful effeminacy of his

[1] This paſſage is ſomewhat abridged. Compare Diodorus Siculus, b. xiv. ſect. 37.

his guards. Seuthes, the Thracian general, conſpired againſt his maſter Amadocus, and ſeated himſelf on his throne. Sometimes avarice, and ſometimes ambition, combines with contempt, and accelerates revolutions. The love of money made Mithridates dethrone Ariobarzanes. Ambition often ſprings up in men of courageous natures inveſted by monarchs with high military command; for courage becomes enterpriſe, when armed with power. Ambition alſo, in another view, is productive of revolutions; an ambition, not to gain power, but to obtain glory. Conſpirators, animated by this principle, are few in number; for they muſt diſregard what moſt men highly value, perſonal ſafety; and like the high-minded Dion, muſt be careleſs how far they proceed in their enterpriſe, but think, that while invading the power of a tyrant, the firſt ground they gain will be an honourable grave.

External violence, the hatred of republics;

Monarchies, like other forms of government, periſh through external violence. An interference of intereſts renders them obnoxious to democracies: for as potters, according to Heſiod, envy potters, ſo is a ſingle tyrant expoſed to the hatred and vengeance of a tyrannical populace. An oppoſition of principle and ſyſtem renders tyrannies odious to royalties and ariſtocracies. The ariſtocracy of Sparta, therefore, deſtroyed many tyrannies; as did alſo the republic of Syracuſe, while wiſely governed. In deſtroying monarchies, external violence is often aſſiſted by domeſtic diſcord. This happened in the caſe of Gelon; and recently in that of the younger Dionyſius. Thraſybulus, Hieron's brother, playing the demagogue, corrupted by pleaſures and profligacy the heir-apparent of Gelon's monarchy, that he himſelf might be king. A conſpiracy was formed to deſtroy Thraſybulus while the tyranny remained ſafe, but a part

aſſiſted by internal diſcord.

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of the conſpirators ſeized the opportunity of diveſting the whole family, at once, of honours which no individual of it ſeemed worthy to wear. The family of Dionyſius was divided againſt itſelf; for Dion was his kinſman. By the aſſiſtance of the people he expelled the tyrant; but through the unjuſt ſuſpicions of the ſame people, he was afterwards himſelf moſt unworthily ſlain.

Different operation of hatred, contempt, and anger.

Of the two cauſes which deſtroy tyrannies, hatred and contempt, the firſt is inherent in the very nature of tyranny, ſince that man cannot fail to be odious, who is inveſted with arbitrary power. Contempt, though not eſſential to tyranny itſelf, is, however, a more frequent cauſe of its deſtruction. Experience juſtifies this remark. Thoſe who were the firſt to mount a deſpotic throne, have for the moſt part been able to preſerve it; they were odious, but not contemptible; but their ſucceſſors, naturally becoming contemptible as well as odious, have univerſally been diveſted of their unlawful power; and as ſhamefully diſgraced as they were unworthily exalted. Anger may be regarded as a ſpecies of hatred; it differs however in this, that as its proceedings are deſtitute of reflection, it is always more prompt, and ſometimes more efficacious; but hatred, as it acts under the direction of reaſon, though more ſlow, is commonly more dangerous and more fatal. The arbitrary government of the individual periſhes (to ſpeak in general) through the ſame cauſes which deſtroy rigid oligarchies and lawleſs democracies; both of which are nothing elſe but complex tyrannies.

Of revolutions in limited monarchies.

Royalty is not eaſily demoliſhed by external violence; and this form of government often laſts long, ſince honours are naturally durable in proportion as they are moderate. Royalty periſhes, however, through the internal diſcord of men in office, and through the prepoſterous ambition of kings to make themſelves

themſelves abſolute. At preſent, ſtates are ſeldom erected into royalties; for amidſt the great equality of mankind, few are thought worthy of unrivalled pre-eminence, or deemed capable of ſuſtaining with dignity a lawful and voluntary ſceptre; and a king, whoſe authority muſt be ſupported by force or by fraud, immediately degenerates into a tyrant. To the cauſes, therefore, already mentioned of the deſtruction of monarchy, we muſt add one peculiar to hereditary monarchy; the contemptible characters of youths born in the purple, and their proneneſs to offenſive inſolence. The authority of ſuch youths cannot be *voluntarily* endured; and thus, the government, if a royalty, is effectually deſtroyed, and a tyranny, probably of ſhort duration, ſubſtituted in its ſtead. Theſe and other ſuch cauſes produce revolutions in monarchies.

The worthleſſneſs of youths born in the purple.

Chap. 11.

The means of their preſervation, it is plain, muſt in general be directly contrary to the cauſes of their deſtruction. As to limited monarchy, or royalty, the more it is limited, the longer it is likely to laſt. Moderation, therefore, is the great preſervative of this form of government. Princes, the farther they recede from deſpotiſm, and the nearer they approximate to equality of right with their ſubjects, are the leſs expoſed to hatred, envy, and all that train, or all thoſe complications of paſſions, which ſo often prove ruinous to their power. Moderation long upheld the monarchy of the Moloſſians. The royalty of Lacedæmon, which has proved ſo permanent, was, from the beginning, moderated by diviſion between two kings; and farther attempered, under Theopompus, by a due mixture of popular and democratic powers. When that wiſe prince inſtituted the office of the Ephori, he abridged the power of royalty, but increaſed its ſtability. The ſhort-ſighted pride of his queen aſked

Limited monarchy preſerved by moderation.

BOOK VII.

asked him, whether he was not ashamed to transmit to his posterity a sceptre less splendid than that which he had received from his ancestors? "No, surely," he replied; "I shall transmit to them a throne more stedfast and more durable."

Absolute monarchy preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission.

Absolute monarchy, or tyranny, is preserved by the two contrary modes of intension and remission. The first mode consists in tightening the reins of power, by vigilance and severity; it is usual and hereditary among tyrants. The suspicious and stern Periander exercised it in all its bitterness at Corinth. The cruel institutions of the Persian monarchs are stamped with the same character; and the maxims which we formerly mentioned, of mowing the tallest stalks; of prohibiting, under severe penalties, convivial meetings of clubs and assemblies; of destroying public schools; and of subverting every establishment that may have a tendency to engender mutual confidence, or to create a national spirit; all these precautions, and others of the same kind, would, if any thing could, render tyranny secure. It will tend to the same purpose, that persons of distinction frequent the halls, or crowd the gates, of the palace; their machinations against the government will thus be easily discovered and speedily suppressed; and their minds, degraded and debased by the servility of court attendance, will finally become incapable of forming any generous resolution. These, and such like, are Persian, Barbarian, and Tyrannic maxims, directly tending to destroy that freedom of communication which is as essential to mutual confidence, as mutual confidence is essential to boldness of enterprise. Spies, accusers, insidious listeners, like the Syracusan tale-bearers, are instruments useful to tyrants, whose interest it is to set their subjects at variance, instigating the people against the nobles,

The former mode explained with an enumeration of tyrannic maxims.

and

and the rich and noble againſt each other. Above all, the poverty of the ſubjects is the beſt pledge of the permanence of tyranny; for people impoveriſhed have neither the leiſure to contrive, nor the means to effect, revolutions. The pyramids of Egypt, the magnificent dedications of the Cypſelidæ, the rebuilding of the Olympian temple by the ſons of Peiſiſtratus, the ſumptuous works of Polycrates of Samos; theſe were the productions of toil and miſery, monuments as uſeful for the power of monarchs, as ruinous for the proſperity of their ſubjects. Enormous contributions in money, and enormous contributions in labour, have preciſely the ſame tendency. By both alike the people are reduced to poverty and wretchedneſs; their *time* is enſlaved; they muſt be beggars or drudges; and men robbed of leiſure are not likely to recover liberty. Under the tyrannical government of Dionyſius, the ſubjects of Syracuſe returned, in the ſpace of every five years, the amount of their whole property into the exchequer. Still faithful to his principle, the tyrant delights in war; extorting not only the wealth, but the blood of his people; eſpecially ſince military expeditions are calculated to engroſs their whole attention, and to confirm their habitual ſubmiſſion. The ſafety of a king lies in his friends; but a tyrant diſtruſts *his friends* beyond all others; knowing that all others are willing, but that his friends only are always able to deſtroy him. The inſtitutions adapted to lawleſs democracy, equally ſuit tyranny. The unbridled licence of ſlaves and of women, forms the reproach of both theſe governments. The order of ſociety is inverted; in families, ſlaves are diſobedient, and women are imperious; they are ſpies and accuſers of their maſters and huſbands; and cheriſhed by the ſingle, as well as the complex tyrant, for thoſe

Examples.

BOOK VII.

odious purpoſes, they become abettors of unjuſt domination, which they ſtrive to perpetuate and extend. None but the worſt or meaneſt of mankind can have credit in democracies and tyrannies. The furious ſanguinary demagogue is all-powerful in the firſt; the cruel unfeeling courtier is alone regarded in the ſecond; for the licentious multitude and the tyrant are governed by their paſſions; and as their paſſions are criminal, wicked inſtruments alone are qualified to gratify them. Tyrants, ſenſible of their own worthleſſneſs, ſtand in perpetual need of flattery, without which anodyne, the internal ſmart of their crimes would render them intolerable to themſelves. But men of elevated minds are totally incapable of every ſpecies of adulation. Tyrants, therefore, cannot endure any ſuch men; their liberal ſpirit and conſcious dignity are regarded as inſolent uſurpations of the imperial prerogative. None, therefore, can aſſociate with tyrants, but thoſe who will comply with their humours; and in admiſſion to their table and familiarity, foreigners, as leſs dangerous, will always be preferred to their native ſubjects. Such are the expedients by which tyranny is upheld; expedients wicked in the extreme, and indefinite in number, but which are all contrived for the three following purpoſes: Firſt, to debaſe the ſouls of their people; for it is not the part of low-minded perſons to become political reformers. Secondly, to deſtroy all mutual confidence, for without confidence in each other, it is impoſſible for any ſet of men to effect a revolution; tyrants, therefore, are neceſſarily enemies to honeſty, not only becauſe men of integrity are naturally hoſtile to their government, but becauſe ſuch men alone, by the confidence which their characters inſpire, are capable of ſubverting it. Thirdly, tyrants will ſtrive to reduce their people to indigence and debility;

Tyrannic maxims all reduced to three.

lity; and thus deter them from all thoughts of ſedition, by making them ſenſible of their total inability to effect any ſalutary revolution.

The mode of preſerving tyranny by remiſſion, with maxims by which a tyrant may obtain popularity, and appear not a plunderer but a protector.

This, then, is the firſt mode of preſerving a tyranny; the ſecond is directly the reverſe. We may perceive wherein it conſiſts, by reflecting on what was above ſaid concerning the deſtruction of royalty. As royalty is deſtroyed by rendering it tyrannical or abſolute, ſo tyranny may be preſerved by rendering it royal or moderate; with this condition, however, that the monarch, while he ſlackens the reins of his power, ſtill continues to hold and to guide them: for ſhould he once abandon his power, and begin to reign merely by the voluntary ſubmiſſion of his ſubjects, he would from that moment ceaſe to be a tyrant, and riſe into a lawful prince. His power, therefore, muſt be preſerved, as the only foundation of his authority; but while he keeps hold of tyrannic power, he may ſeaſonably decline to exerciſe it, and with great advantage to his own ſecurity, begin to play the part of a king. In aſſuming this borrowed character, he will firſt of all pretend to be mightily concerned for the intereſt and glory of his country. He will not incenſe the people by laviſhing the hard earnings of their ſweat and toil, on harlots, flatterers, and fiddlers. Some tyrants have been ſuch admirable actors of royalty, as even to give their ſubjects a faithful account of their receipt and expenditure. The deluded multitude conſidered them as ſtewards, not as maſters. Thoſe, however, who have power, can never be in want of property; and an ambitious monarch, frequently engaged in foreign enterpriſes, acts wiſely in not leaving at home a rich

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treaſury behind him, ſince thoſe whom he appointed to guard it, would prove his moſt formidable adverſaries. Generous in his own perſon, he views with complacence inexhauſtible treaſures, always at his command, in the purſes of his ſubjects; yet, he never demands their money or their ſervices but under pretence of the public exigency. It is the honour and ſafety of the country, not the ambition of the prince, that ſummons them to war. They follow his ſtandard readily, regarding him, not as a tyrant, but as a protector. If he proceeds in other inſtances to act his part well, he will endeavour to inſpire, not fear, but reſpect: this, indeed, is not eaſy, if his character at bottom be really contemptible; yet, much may be done by pretending a ſincere love for his country, and exhibiting himſelf to the multitude as the guardian and champion of the ſtate. An abſolute monarch, who would preſerve his power, muſt, in public at leaſt, keep a watch over his voluptuouſneſs, and take care that none of his miniſters or favourites inſult the youth and beauty of either ſex. His wives and miſtreſſes muſt alſo be taught to correct that ſupercilious and offenſive haughtineſs, and to repreſs thoſe inſolent airs, which has already cauſed the ſubverſion of ſo many tyrannies. As to ſenſual pleaſures, his conduct ought to be directly the reverſe of that uſual with ſome princes, who are not completely gratified by the moſt criminal indulgence in luſt and luxury, unleſs they openly expoſe their wickedneſs and emblazon their profligacy; challenging the admiration of mankind, for that drunken debauchery and prodigal whoredom which ought to cover them with eternal infamy. A crafty tyrant will avoid giving ſuch

ſuch cauſes of offence; knowing, that he who is drunk or aſleep is more obnoxious to a conſpiracy than the man who is vigilant and ſober. Inſtead of diſſipating his treaſures in periſhing luxury, he will employ them in embelliſhing his capital, and improving his country. This will exhibit him under the amiable character of a public guardian; and above all, he muſt appear to be much addicted to religion, and anxiouſly attentive to whatever regards the honour of the gods. Perſons of this character are leſs likely to commit injuſtice, and therefore leſs the objects of fear: they are, alſo, leſs liable to ſuffer wrong, becauſe men will be afraid of injuring thoſe who reckon the gods themſelves in the number of their friends. A tyrant, therefore, muſt endeavour to appear religious; but this ſpecious ſhew of religion muſt not be deformed by abject ſuperſtition. It will contribute much to his ſecurity, to be diligent in diſcovering and rewarding merit, wherever it may be found; and to be careful to treat men of eminent talents with ſuch diſtinguiſhed honour, as will leave them little room to regret that it is not their lot to live under a free republic. Of rewards and honours, he himſelf muſt be the diſpenſer; but puniſhments muſt be inflicted by the authority of his courts of juſtice, or the command of his ſubſtitutes[1].

It is a maxim of ſtate in every kind of monarchy, never too highly to exalt any individual ſubject. When great powers muſt

[1] See Libro del Principe; particularly chapters 18, 19, 21. Machiavel has neither the merit nor the infamy of the maxims uſually aſcribed to him, but which he has copied verbatim from Ariſtotle. Yet, in deſcribing the contrivances for preſerving tyranny, whether by the way of intention or remiſſion, the Grecian philoſopher is more careful than the Florentine ſecretary to avoid ſaying any thing that is liable to miſrepreſentation or reproach.

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muſt be delegated, it is better that they ſhould be lodged with a commiſſion, conſiſting of ſeveral perſons, whoſe rivalry and jealouſy will afford the beſt pledges of their fidelity; but when the nature of any important function of ſovereignty requires that it ſhould be intruſted to one only, the tyrant ſhould take care, that this miniſter be not of too enterpriſing a ſpirit; or if he has imprudently aggrandized ſuch a perſon beyond the due meaſure, he muſt beware not to curtail him of his ample dignities at once, but ſlowly and imperceptibly. The ſudden fall of an ambitious miniſter has ſhaken the ſtability of many a government. All kinds of offenſive inſolence are to be moſt carefully avoided, eſpecially ſuch inſolence as vents itſelf in acts of violence or luſt. The craſty tyrant muſt perſuade the victims of his outrageous and infamous paſſions, that they are the objects of his love, and repay their ſecret ſubmiſſions by conſpicuous honours. But when he ſuſpects that his inſolence has really offended, he muſt particularly be on his guard againſt men jealous of their honour, incapable of reſtraining their anger, and willing, as Heraclitus ſays, to purchace vengeance at the price of their lives.

As every ſtate conſiſts of two principal claſſes, the rich and the poor, the tyrant muſt endeavour to make it appear, that his authority is uſeful to both; or if that be impoſſible, he muſt diligently court and gain the ſtrongeſt party. If *their* favour can be obtained, it will be needleſs for him to have recourſe to the ordinary expedients of emancipating his ſlaves and diſarming his ſubjects, ſince the ſtrength of his guards, abetted by a powerful party among the people, will be ſufficient to uphold his tyranny. It is needleſs to expatiate on this ſubject;

ject; for all the other maxims that might be enumerated muſt ſtill have the ſame end in view, to gain popularity, and muſt be calculated to make the tyrant appear, not as a maſter, but as a ſteward; not a plunderer, but a protector[k]. By avoiding blameable exceſs, and confining his life within the bounds of moderation, he will ceaſe to be the object of fear and hatred; his reign will be more illuſtrious and more honourable, in proportion as his ſubjects are leſs miſerable and leſs abject; his throne alſo will be the more ſecure. As to morals, therefore, let him, if it is impoſſible to be virtuous, be at leaſt half virtuous, and not altogether wicked, but only half wicked[l].

Chap. 12.

That oligarchies and tyrannies are the leaſt durable of all governments. Examples.

Of all governments, the leaſt durable are oligarchies and tyrannies. The moſt laſting tyranny on record was that of Orthagoras and his ſons in Sicyon. It continued a hundred years. The cauſe of its long duration was the laudable moderation of thoſe princes, and their cheerful ſubmiſſion to the laws. Cliſthenes, beſides, was a man of a martial ſpirit; and, therefore, by no means an object of contempt, which ſo often proves fatal to tyrannies; and he, as well as the other princes of his family, knew the arts of government, and aſſiduouſly cultivated popularity. His impartial equity crowned the honeſt boldneſs of the judge who, in a diſpute reſpecting a gymnaſtic victory, adjudged the prize to his competitor. It is ſaid, that the ſtatue ſitting in the market-place of Sicyon, adorned with a crown,

[k] How well did the late Frederic II. of Pruſſia, as well as his model, Philip II. of Macedon, practiſe the more eſſential part of Ariſtotle's maxims! See my View of the Reign of Frederic, c. vi. p. 376, & ſeq.

[l] Machiavel ſays more explicitly, "non partirſe dal bene, potendo; ma ſapere entrare nel male, neceſſitato." The maxim, if it has any ſenſe, only ſhews that tyranny being a bad thing in itſelf, can only by preſerved by bad means.

crown, perpetuates the remembrance of the judge's integrity, and of Cliſthenes's magnanimity. Peiſiſtratus of Athens gave an uſeful leſſon to tyrants. When ſummoned before the Areopagus, he appeared in perſon to plead his cauſe, and reſpectfully heard the deciſion of that ancient tribunal. The ſecond example of a durable tyranny is that of Cypſelus and his family at Corinth. It laſted ſeventy-ſeven years and ſix months; for Cypſelus himſelf reigned thirty years; Periander, forty-four; and Pſammetichus, the ſon of Gondius, three years and ſix months. The duration of this government proceeded from the ſame cauſes. Cypſelus was a man of uncommon addreſs, and knew how to practiſe every ſeductive and every popular art. He even diſbanded his guards, as uſeleſs for his ſafety. His ſon Periander was indeed a tyrant; but his character was ennobled by martial ſpirit, and illuſtrated by military ſucceſs. The third and laſt example of a durable tyranny was that of the Peiſiſtratidæ at Athens. It was not, like thoſe above mentioned, uninterrupted; for Peiſiſtratus twice abdicated and fled; ſo that in the courſe of thirty-three years, he reigned only ſeventeen; his ſons reigned eighteen years; the whole duration of their government, therefore, exceeded not thirty-five years. That of Gelon and his family in Syracuſe was ſtill ſhorter-lived. Gelon reigned ſeven years; Hieron reigned ten; but Thraſybulus was baniſhed in leſs than twelve months. The greater part of tyrannies have periſhed ſtill more ſuddenly [m].

Thus

[m] When Ariſtotle ſpeaks of tyrannies, he here means uſurpations of arbitrary power in countries formerly free; whether under a lawful monarchy, or under a republican government. It is ſtrictly conſiſtent with his principles, that ſuch uſurpations ſhould be ſhort-lived, becauſe they are incompatible with the ſentiments, principles, and habits of thinking moſt prevalent among the people at large.

Thus much concerning revolutions in monarchies, how they are cauſed, and how they may be prevented [n].

[n] The concluſion of this chapter is employed in refuting Plato's fanciful notions concerning political revolutions; notions founded on the wonderful powers aſcribed by the Pythagoreans to periods and numbers. This wild doctrine is explained in the eighth book of Plato's Republic. Ariſtotle proves, by the facts above ſtated, that it is totally inconſiſtent with experience. The revolutions, however, which hiſtory deſcribes, and which theory explains, it is the buſineſs of policy to apply, that the experience of the paſt may thus ſerve for regulating the conduct of the future. While the ſame cauſes produce the ſame effects, nations ſimilarly circumſtanced muſt, it is thought, neceſſarily run the ſame political career; obtain by ſimilar exertions the ſame degree of proſperity; commit, through ambition or inſolence, nearly the ſame errors; and, in conſequence of thoſe errors, be liable to nearly equal reverſes of fortune. The truth of theſe general obſervations cannot be diſputed; but in making particular applications of them, either for the purpoſe of confirming their own confidence, or of inſpiring terror into their enemies, men are almoſt continually deceived by appearances; ſometimes miſtaking even contraſts for parallels. It is not unuſual with the great military republic of recent date, to compare itſelf with Rome, and its naval and commercial rival with Carthage. Yet it is only under one aſpect, and in particulars the ſlighteſt and moſt ſuperficial, that Carthage and England exhibit a falſe air of reſemblance; while in their characteriſing properties, the two maritime commonwealths form the ſubject of a contraſt rather than of a compariſon. The one continental, the other inſular; the former depending entirely for defence on foreign troops, the latter exulting in domeſtic ſtrength; Carthage noted for penurioufneſs and perfidy; England equally diſtinguiſhed for probity and profuſion; the African republic, addicted ſolely to lucrative purſuits, conſidering literature and philoſophy as things beyond its ſphere; Great Britain, the ſeat of arts and elegance, of growing fame in literature, and of unrivalled pre-eminence in ſcience.

The parallel between Rome and France is attended with this ſingularity, that the latter has run through the ſame ſtages in a few years, which the former did in as many centuries. It has expelled or deſtroyed its royal line; aboliſhed privileged orders; laid all honours open to the people at large; diſplayed the enthuſiaſm of liberty; proved the connection between this principle and military energy; defeated its neighbours on the Continent; obliged them to ſupply its armies with pay, corn, and clothing; plundered their altars and temples; carried off their pictures and ſtatues. I need not ſay more of what France has done; but among the tranſactions indicating what ſhe in future is likely to do, the reader of ancient hiſtory will recollect that Buonaparte is entruſted with nearly the ſame commiſſion that the Romans beſtowed on Cæſar before he became dictator, and in preciſely the ſame countries on both ſides the Alps.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK VIII.*

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book is placed laſt in order, becauſe it ſeems to have been written to ſupply the defects of ſeveral preceding parts of the work. Ariſtotle had ſufficiently explained the principles and arrangements of the ſimple forms of government; but he thought it might be uſeful further to examine wherein governments bearing the ſame name, might yet eſſentially differ in their nature. This leads him to enumerate and deſcribe the different kinds of democracies and oligarchies, and to ſhew how the worſt kinds might be improved and corrected; and, when thus happily altered, how they might beſt be upheld and perpetuated. In this Book he alſo examines the different kinds of military or naval force in their relation to the different forms of government; ſhewing which kinds of the former are reſpectively beſt adapted to the different modes of the latter. He concludes the Book with an accurate analyſis of the executive power; enumerating and deſcribing the different functions of magiſtracy eſſentially requiſite in every well-regulated commonwealth. On this important ſubject, the following remarks will not appear unſeaſonable.

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When

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VI.

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When our author firſt analyſed government into deliberative, judicial, and executive [a] powers, he meant ſomething more than merely to explain the ſubject as a matter of ſpeculation. For it is neceſſary, he obſerves, not only to know what, and how many are political functions, but according to what ſubordination they ought to be arranged and diſtributed. That they ought to be as minutely ſubdivided as ſtate neceſſity will permit, he thinks moſt evident from this ſimple conſideration, that each individual will be likely to act his part moſt properly, when each has his aſſigned taſk. The military power ought to depend on the civil [b]; that the army may be formidable only to the enemies of the ſtate: and the executive power ought to be clearly diſtinct from the legiſlature; leſt tyrannical laws ſhould be enacted, and thoſe executed tyrannically. All magiſtrates ought to be reſponſible for the exerciſe of their authority; and their accounts ſubject to the inſpection of thoſe who never themſelves handle the public money. The office of collecting and applying the revenue ought never, therefore, to belong to the ſame perſons who adminiſter juſtice, and puniſh crimes; leſt the financial adminiſtrator ſhould abuſe his authority to the baſe purpoſes of extortion or vengeance. "The law is above the judge; and the judge, as organ of the law, above all other magiſtrates. But the office of judge is incompatible with every function, that might pervert his judgment or twiſt his deciſions; for a judge is a ruler, and how can a ruler give ſtraightneſs to other things if itſelf be crooked [c]?"

Theſe

[a] The executive is called by him the appointing or electing power, for a reaſon above aſſigned, p. 275.

[b] But to reduce it to this dependence is not an eaſy matter, as will be experienced by a great modern republic. Yet unleſs this be done, the commonwealth is a camp, and its liberty an empty boaſt.

[c] Rhetor. l. i. p. 512.

Theſe great political principles afford the neareſt approximation which the wiſdom of antiquity ever made to the improvements and perfection which the events of time and chance, co-operating with the virtues of our anceſtors, gradually introduced into the Britiſh conſtitution. But the grand ſecret in policy, of a government, carried on by kings who can do no wrong, and whoſe perſons are ſacred, through the inſtrumentality of accountable adviſers and reſponſible miniſters, was totally unknown to the free ſtates of antiquity; on which account chiefly, none of them could lay claim to that ſtability and perpetuity at which, Cicero maintains [d], all wiſe government ought ever to aim. As this is a point which deſerves the greateſt attention, I ſhall not be blamed for making an unneceſſary circuit, when I take the beſt, or the only, road to eſtabliſh ſo important a truth on authority which demands reſpect, and by arguments which admit not of anſwer.

The learned and judicious Polybius, who was not merely a *ſpeculative* politician, but one converſant from his youth with courts and camps, and the management of great affairs, of unbounded curioſity, and with extraordinary opportunities, explains as the main reſult of his reading and experience, what he calls the theory of political revolutions: revolutions ſo neceſſary in their event, and ſo immutable in their order, that they may be eaſily foreſeen, and boldly predicted. The diſcourſe is contained in the ſixth book of his Hiſtory, and applied to the commonwealth of Rome in the beginning of the ſeventh century from the foundation of the city, the firmeſt and moſt flouriſhing period of the republic; when external victory conſpired with internal arrangement to render the public ſecurity

[d] Fragm. de Repub. l. iii.

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ſecurity as ſtable, as the policy of the ſtate was profound, and its renown was illuſtrious.

In that invaluable fragment the hiſtorian finds fault with the uſual diviſion of governments into monarchies, ariſtocracies, and democracies; obſerving that theſe are neither the beſt, nor the only, kinds of civil polity. Monarchies are the firſt governments in their origin, and the work of Nature herſelf; but they have never yet been ſo ſkilfully moulded by art, that they had not a ſtrong and palpable tendency to degenerate into tyrannies. It is the nature of power to corrupt thoſe inveſted with the exerciſe of it; and the exerciſe of hereditary power is, in this reſpect, ſtill more dangerous than that of any other. When princes, therefore, begin to abuſe their prerogatives and authority for the unbridled indulgence of their rapacity, luſt, and luxury, their proceedings cannot fail to provoke indignation and anger among the more dignified claſſes of their ſubjects, whoſe temper is the leaſt likely tamely to brook diſgrace. The people at large will ſympathize with their reſentment, and aſſiſt in deſtroying the monarchy, which had degenerated into a tyranny. An ariſtocracy will naturally riſe on its ruins; ſince the gratitude of the public will cheerfully accept for rulers thoſe by whom the country was delivered from oppreſſion. The new magiſtrates will continue for a while to conduct themſelves with propriety and patriotiſm; adminiſtering juſtly and wiſely the affairs both of the citizens individually, and of the public collectively. But when the exerciſe of their power devolves on their deſcendants, who have not the merit of their fathers, nor enjoy like them the advantage of having been trained in the ſchool of adverſity, theſe unworthy ſucceſſors will begin groſsly to abuſe their pre-eminent functions; giving looſe reins to the moſt

odious and moſt diſgraceful paſſions. The ariſtocracy is thus transformed into an oligarchy; which, ſinking under the weight of its own inherent vices, will be ſpeedily overturned by the firſt leader of the multitude who has courage to aſſail it; ſince the whole body of the people, exaſperated by an accumulation of indignities, will be prepared to abet his meaſures and to ſecond his efforts. The people at large, now taking the commonwealth into their own hands, will eſtabliſh a democracy; and while the greater part of thoſe continue to live, who have experienced the evils reſulting from governments of arbitrary will, the community will flouriſh under the bleſſings of law and liberty. But when the adminiſtration of the democracy is delivered down from father to ſon through ſucceſſive generations, the reſtleſſneſs of man will begin to ſpurn advantages with which he is fatiated; ambition will nauſeate equality, and ſigh for pre-eminence; thoſe who have accumulated great wealth, will covet a proportional ſhare of political power; and to attain this much envied object, will not heſitate to deſtroy their own fortunes by profuſion, and to corrupt the public morals by bribery, until the whole maſs of the community be ſo deeply tainted with the impatience of rapacity, that the populace will no longer wait for the precarious or tardy dole, but putting themſelves under the command of the firſt daring and unprincipled chief, whoſe boldneſs equals his wickedneſs, will invade the conſtitution; ſubvert the government; confiſcate, baniſh, murder, and plunder, until having filled up the meaſure of their ſavage ferocity, the folly of their own paſſions delivers them enſlaved and bound, into the hands of a ſingle deſpot [d].

Such

[d] The ſame doctrine is maintained by Ariſtotle, b. vii. c. v.; and by Plato in the following paſſage: ἡ γαρ αγαν ελευθερια ἐοικεν ουκ εις αλλο τι ἡ εις αγαν δουλειαν μεταβαλλειν: : : εἰκοτως

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Such is the perpetual round, which, according to Polybius, all unmixed governments are found by experience to run; from monarchy to tyranny; from ariſtocracy to oligarchy; from democracy to the tyranny of the multitude; for every multitude, he affirms, merely as ſuch, is filled with levity and inconſtancy, lawleſs in its purſuits, headſtrong in is paſſions, unjuſt in its proceedings[e]. In none of the ſimple forms of government, therefore, is there any conſtitutional firmneſs; their ſtability depends on manners which are tranſient, and on circumſtances which are accidental. They may be kept afloat by a tide of external proſperity; while the atchievement and partition of foreign conqueſts, conceal the inherent evils of the conſtitutions under which they are made. But the flame of diſcord, the longer it is ſuppreſſed by the mere accumulation of fuel, will finally break out with the greater violence; which has always been experienced by ſtates whoſe inſtitutions were well adapted to the contentious activity of war, but which had never been taught to enjoy the ineſtimable gifts of peaceful leiſure and unambitious ſecurity.

Having rejected and reprobated all ſimple forms of polity, Polybius proceeds to examine thoſe that are complex; governments of reciprocal controul; of which, he maintains, the moſt perfect model was to be found in the conſtitution of Rome, as it ſtood in the beginning of the ſeventh century of the republic. In that conſtitution, monarchic, ariſtocratic, and popular elements

εικοτως τοινυν εκ εξ αλλης πολιτειας τυραννις καθιſταται η εκ δημοκρατιας. Εξ της ακροτατης ελευθεριας, δουλεια πλειſτη και αγριωτατη. "Exceſſive liberty is not likely to change into any thing elſe but exceſſive ſlavery. Tyranny, therefore, more naturally reſults from democracy than from any other form of government; the higheſt liberty being converted into the completeſt and cruelleſt ſervitude." Plato de Republ. l. ix.

[e] Polybius, l. vi. c. 56. p. 594. edit. Schweigh.

ments were ſo ſkilfully combined and ſo equally balanced, that the Romans themſelves could not poſitively aſcertain with which of the three ſpecies of governments their own ought to be claſſed [f]. When they contemplated the ſplendid functions of the conſuls, *their* authority ſeemed equal to that of kings. In the ſenate they beheld and felt the full ſtrength of an ariſtocracy. The people at large, headed by their tribunes, appeared imperiouſly to exerciſe the plenitude of democratic power. The conſuls, our author obſerves, even before leading their reſpective armies into the field, carry on within Rome itſelf the chief adminiſtration of affairs. To them all magiſtrates, except the tribunes, are ſubject. They aſſemble the ſenate, propoſe matters of urgency for its deliberation, and carry its decrees into execution. They likewiſe convoke the popular aſſembly, report to the people the reſolutions of the ſenate, collect and declare the votes, and give efficacy to the will of the majority. When the conſuls are at Rome, the ambaſſadors of foreign ſtates can, through them only, be admitted to an audience in the ſenate. In military matters their authority is ſupreme. They appoint the military tribunes, enrol the legions, ſelect the

[f] The whole of Polybius's obſervations on this ſubject ſeems to have eſcaped the notice of our great law commentator Blackſtone. "Thus theſe three ſpecies of government have all of them their ſeveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are uſually the beſt calculated to direct the ends of a law; ariſtocracies, to invent the means by which that end ſhall be attained; and monarchies, to carry thoſe means into execution. And the ancients, as was obſerved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government, but theſe three; for though Cicero * declares himſelf of opinion "eſſe optimam conſtitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali optimo & populari, ſit modice confuſa;" yet Tacitus † treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a viſionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be laſting or ſecure ‡.

* Fragm. de Repub. l. ii. † Annal. l. iv. c. 33. ‡ Blackſtone's Commen. Intro. ſect ii.

the men fitteſt for each kind of ſervice [g], and impoſe their undiſputed commands on the allies. All who ſerve under their ſtandards, are alike liable to their coercion and chaſtiſement; and the queſtors attend them in the field, merely to diſburſe whatever ſums they may think fit to demand. Such, Polybius obſerves, are the royal and monarchic powers [h] of the conſuls.

The ſenate is not, however, deſtitute of its due weight in the ſtate. Firſt of all, this reſpected council governs the exchequer, into which no ſums are received, and from which none are iſſued, but by the expreſs orders of the ſenate. By the ſenate's command only, the queſtors diſburſe all monies for the public ſervice, except thoſe ſums with which they ſupply the conſuls in the field. Even that heavy expenditure which is incurred by the ſtate at the end of every period of five years, for the repairs or extenſion of public works, is made by the cenſors under the authority of the ſenate; which body alſo takes cognizance of all public delinquences committed in any part of Italy; ſuch as treaſons, conſpiracies, poiſonings, and aſſaſſinations. To the ſenate it belongs to ſettle all diſputes which ariſe in Italy, whether between individuals or communities; as well as to diſpatch all embaſſies to foreign parts, either to treat of peace, or to denounce war; either to offer its advice and protection, or to interpoſe with its authority and commands. When foreign ambaſſadors arrive at Rome, the ſenate receives them

[g] Compar. Polyb. l. vi. c. 12. p. 481. & l. vi. c. 20. p. 496. The military inſtitutions of the Romans called forth the whole energy of the ſtate. With them, the public was every thing; the citizens, nothing. According to their age, ſtrength, and ſtature, they were draughted into the ſeveral legions, and diviſions of legions; *cohorts* and *maniples*; without the ſmalleſt regard to their partialities and prejudices. Vid. Polyb. ubi ſupra.

[h] L. vi. c. 12. p. 481.

them in the manner it may judge moſt fit; and anſwers their demands as it may deem moſt expedient. Thence, to ſtrangers who come to Rome in the abſence of the conſuls, the commonwealth appears in no other light than that of a ſimple ariſtocracy [i].

It may very naturally be inquired, what political functions, then, remain for the exerciſe of the people at large? the greateſt and moſt important of all; for the people are the diſpenſers of rewards and puniſhments. They elect the magiſtrates, they

[i] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiii. p. 482. I abridge the author's narrative as much as attention to perſpicuity will admit; yet I am fearful leſt his analyſis of the Roman government prove tireſome to thoſe, who beſide conſidering the importance of the ſubject itſelf, do not continually keep in view the important conſequence that I would deduce from his elaborate diſcuſſion. Of all mixed governments, Polybius thinks the Roman, as it ſtood in his time, the beſt model of a well-balanced commonwealth. He obſerves, however, that emergencies muſt occur, that would infallibly deſtroy its equipoiſe. His prediction was fulfilled; as all ſimilar predictions had been fulfilled concerning governments ſimilarly conſtituted. I preſume not to maintain, that he choſe for his example, the beſt model of mixed government that could poſſibly have been ſelected. Perhaps the ancient government of the Cretans, whoſe inſtitutions, as well as manners, had ſadly degenerated in his time, might have anſwered his purpoſe better; and the equipoiſe in the conſtitutions both of Carthage and of Sparta was maintained during a period of longer duration, though of leſs ſplendour. But the reſult of his reaſoning, confirmed by that of all the great writers of antiquity, is, that every one of thoſe mixed governments, in many of which there was a nice balance of political powers, and in ſome of which the people (as above proved) acted by their repreſentatives, yet I ſay that every one of them contained in itſelf the ſeeds of its diſſolution. Their radical infirmity originated not in thoſe cauſes to which it is univerſally aſcribed, the want of repreſentation and a balance; but it conſiſted principally in this, that their firſt magiſtrates, by whatever title they might be diſtinguiſhed, conſuls, archons, or kings, were incapable of performing what Ariſtotle conſiders as the main function of royalty, the defending the poor from inſult and the rich from injury, and thus keeping the component parts of a ſtate in their proper places, and thereby giving to the conſtitution inalterable ſtability.

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they impoſe fines on thoſe guilty of malverſation in office; they alone can inflict the puniſhment of death. The laws propoſed by the ſenate are either confirmed or rejected by the people; and the people may either ratify or annul all tranſactions between the ſenate and foreign ſtates [k].

In this complex form of the Roman conſtitution, the moving powers are, according to Polybius, admirably adapted to the purpoſes of harmonious co-operation, and of ſeaſonable counteraction; ſince the parts reciprocally control each other, linked in a nice chain of mutual dependence. The conſuls, at the head of their armies, depend both on the ſenate and on the people; on the ſenate, without whoſe authority their ſoldiers cannot be provided with corn, or clothing, or pay; which can either prorogue their command, or appoint new generals; which can aggrandize and emblazon their tranſactions, or depreciate, vilify, and obſcure them; and without whoſe willingneſs to furniſh the requiſite expence, they cannot be gratified with the honour of a triumph. The conſuls are dependent, alſo, on the people, to whom, at the year's end, they are reſponſible for their behaviour in command; and to whom it belongs, either to ratify or to annul their tranſactions with foreign powers [l].

The ſenate and the people are held in a connection not leſs intimate, which compels them mutually to reſpect each other. The people alone can inflict the moſt tremendous of all puniſhments. They can diminiſh the collective honours of the ſenate; they can abridge the fortunes of its members; and the *veto* of a ſingle tribune, who is naturally the creature and the organ of the people, can ſtop all proceedings in the ſenate, and even prevent the aſſembling of that council. But the people, in return, muſt

[k] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiv. p. 484, & ſeq. [l] Ibid. c. xv. p. 486, & ſeq.

muſt reſpect the will of the ſenators, both collectively and individually; for the ſenators are their employers, paymaſters, and judges. In every part of Italy there are innumerable works, conſiſting in buildings and repairs; the culture of lands and gardens; the management of mines, rivers, and harbours, all which objects are let to farm by the cenſors, and undertaken by the people. There is ſcarcely a ſingle Roman who is not involved in theſe contracts; ſome farming under the cenſors at a certain price; others being partners with the farmers; a third claſs being ſureties for them; and a fourth, in ſupport of theſe ſureties, pledging their own fortunes to the ſtate. But in enforcing or modifying all ſuch bargains, the power of the ſenate is ſupreme. This council can extend the time limited for performance; can lighten the conditions of the contract; and when any inſeparable obſtacle occurs, altogether releaſe the contractors. Beſides this, in moſt other civil cauſes of magnitude, judges are ſelected from the ſenate. The people at large, therefore, will be careful how they provoke a body, from whoſe members they have ſo much to hope, as well as ſo much to fear [m]. Nor is there reaſon to apprehend that they ſhould wantonly thwart the inclinations of the conſuls, to whoſe authority all the citizens both collectively and individually are amenable in the field. From this ſkilful adaptation and intimate dependence of the parts, that harmony of action reſults by which the political machine is impelled regularly and rapidly towards its propoſed goal [n]; reſiſting all attacks, ſurmounting every

[m] Polybius, l. vi. c. xvi. & xvii. p. 488, & ſeq.

[n] There is a difference between mechanical and moral powers, afterwards hinted at by Polybius. The former, acting neceſſarily and invariably, will, when equal and contrary, deſtroy each other. But in politics two contrary powers may exiſt ſimultaneouſly;

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every enemy, and continually extending the dominion of the republic. When the terrors of danger are exchanged for the joys of victory, and the minds of men might be elated and intoxicated through exceſs of proſperity, the benefit of a government of reciprocal control is eminently conſpicuous; ſince thoſe branches of the ſtate that would tower too high, and expand too widely, are checked in their movements, and even anticipated in their tendencies, by the continual preſſure of the powers to which they are obnoxious °.

This is a glorious panegyric of the republic, as then conſtituted, and then circumſtanced. But Polybius reluctantly acknowledges that the complement would ſoon ceaſe to be applicable;

taneouſly; and the movement of government, inſtead of being weakened or ſtopped, may be ſometimes thereby ſtrengthened and accelerated. In the Roman conſtitution, beſides the *Comitia Curiata*, which was chiefly uſeful in arming military commanders with the ſanctions and authority of religion, there exiſted in Rome, from the time of the Publilian law enacted in the 414th year of the city, two legiſlative powers, the *Comitia Tributa* and the *Comitia Centuriata*; the former founded on the balance of numbers; and the latter, on the balance of property. A dictator might be legally named by the conſuls, neither controlable in his exerciſe of power, nor accountable for his adminiſtration in office; which, though limited to the ſpace of ſix months, afforded time ſufficient for the ſubverſion of a government. The power of the dictator was occaſional and extraordinary; but at all times the veto of a tribune was alike formidable. He might ſtop all meaſures and all deliberations; and, as the tribunes were the creatures of the multitude from which they derived their authority, they would often be inclined through intereſt and vanity, to flatter popular paſſions, and to blow up every guſt of diſcontent into a ſtorm of ſedition. Yet notwithſtanding theſe ſeeming incongruities, the body politic was held together by the charms of victory and glory, and the neceſſity of acting continually againſt innumerable enemies *, in defence of a country in which the great enjoyed pre-eminences and honours, and the people at large more freedom and more advantages than any other nation in the ancient world. Such was the ſtate of Rome until that combination of circumſtances was produced, which, as Polybius hints, the commonwealth would be unable to ſurmount.

° Polybius, l. vi. c. xviii. p. 492.

* Externus metus, maximum concordiæ vinculum. Tit. Liv.

cable; for the component parts of the ſtate would be kept in their proper places through reciprocal counteraction and control, only while the minds of men were neither inflamed by the luſt of power, nor looſened from the reſtraint of principle; and while the commonwealth, continuing in a progreſſive ſtate of proſperity, could diſcharge in its colonizations and conqueſts, thoſe noxious humours which, unleſs drained by ſuch outlets, muſt prove deſtructive to its vitals. But as the meaſure of national proſperity was filled up [p], the objects of individual ambition would be expanded and magnified; and, while the aſſailing temptations augmented beyond bounds, the virtues to reſiſt them would continually diminiſh. The extortion of rapacity would keep pace with the profuſion of vanity; and the unworthy proceedings of the Great would finally terminate in their own ruin, and that of the republic; for the people, provoked by the ambition and avarice of one party, and intoxicated by the perfidious adulation of another, would begin to deſpiſe law, to ſpurn authority; and, ſubjecting the concerns of their country to their own furious paſſions, would eſtabliſh under the ſpecious names of liberty and equality, the worſt and cruelleſt of all tyrannies. This political prophecy begun to be verified a few years after it was made, in the ſeditions of the Gracchi; and was completely accompliſhed in the future misfortunes of the republic. But it is worthy of remark, that Polybius concludes his diſcourſe, after he has ſhipwrecked the Romans on democracy; leaving them to infer from his general theory

[p] ὡς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον ἀφίκηται, p. 576. I have paraphraſed this paſſage of Polybius by comparing it with what Ariſtotle predicts concerning the deſtiny of Carthage. We learn from the Roman hiſtorians in general, that the complete colonization of Italy had the effect aſcribed to it in the text.

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theory of political revolutions, that this tyrannical democracy muſt neceſſarily terminate in the exaltation of a ſingle deſpot[q].

The want of conſtitutional firmneſs in the beſt regulated ſtates of antiquity, produced a very general opinion, that nations, as well as individuals, had their youth and old age; their maturity, decline, and conſequent diſſolution. This opinion is warmly patronized by Plato[r]; it is maintained likewiſe by Polybius; it was firſt refuted by Ariſtotle; and it is alſo rejected by Cicero[s]. But it remained for modern times to ſhew, how the vigour of monarchy, acting by reſponſible inſtruments only, could retain the component parts of a ſtate unalterably in their proper ſpheres; and how the merely executive part of government, though clearly diſtinct from the ſovereignty, might be armed with ſufficient power to uphold law, but without either the power or the will to ſubvert liberty. Had this political arrangement been eſtabliſhed in the free ſtates of antiquity,

[q] According to Ariſtotle's principles, the republic of Rome enjoyed one advantage in common with the great republic of modern growth; viz. its greatneſs: for the parties which neceſſarily prevail in all popular governments rendering them peculiarly liable to the pernicious interference of foreign powers, the ſtability of a great republic conſidered in relation to external cauſes of deſtruction, whether by force or fraud, muſt be much firmer than that of a ſmall one. But the modern commonwealth is deſtitute of two advantages which had a tendency to preſerve the ancient. Firſt, a permanent ſenate, which gave the ſtate continuity of exiſtence, and tranſmitted from one generation to another the ſame plans and purpoſes; and ſecondly, the dictatorial and tribunicial powers, which, however liable to abuſe, ſeem indiſpenſably neceſſary in every populous community governed on the republican plan, for ſeaſonably ſuſpending the adverſe exertion of exaſperated factions; and thereby preventing contrarieties of intereſt from continually degenerating into ſources of ſedition.

[r] Plato de Republic. l. viii p. 712, & ſeq. edit. Ficin.

[s] Debit enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas, ut æterna ſit. Itaque nullus interitus eſt reipublicæ naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo neceſſaria eſt, verum etiam optanda perſæpe. Fragment de Repub. l. iii.

tiquity, they would not have been liable to thoſe perpetual abuſes of power, which, as Polybius ſays, are by *a natural neceſſity* [t], ſubverſive of ariſtocracies and democracies; nor would there have been room for that unbounded ambition, which, in all great and proſperous ſtates, tends, by a *neceſſity equally* inevitable, to the deſtruction of mixed governments, how nicely ſoever in other reſpects their texture may be combined, and their elements may be balanced. Enterpriſing demagogues and fortunate generals would not merely have been reſiſted in their exertions by the counteraction of equals and rivals, until the bloody conflict ended in the ruin of public liberty; but they would have been repreſſed in their tendencies, and overawed in their hopes, by a power far mightier to ſave than they were to deſtroy; but a power, whoſe ſtrength would be changed into weakneſs, whenever it attempted to violate liberty, and infringe the laws [u].

[t] The natural neceſſity of political revolutions is maintained by Machiavel. Hiſtory of Florence, l. i. ſub initio; whoſe opinions on the ſubject, and even turn of expreſſion, are copied by Hume. Hiſtory of England, vol. ii. p. 441. Edit. 1767.

[u] Is it neceſſary to obſerve as a corollary to this diſcourſe, that a neighbouring nation, if ſhe conſulted her ſuppoſed intereſt and the ſafety of her republican government, would inſtantly relinquiſh the career of ambition, and diſband her armies more eagerly and more cheerfully than ever ſhe collected them? The ſtability of her democratical conſtitution can reſult only from giving to her national guards or militia a decided ſuperiority over ſoldiers by profeſſion. But how many ſtubborn difficulties will preſent themſelves in attempting to realiſe this project! Should many of the requiſition men be deſirous to return to their families, and ſhould the numerous bodies of foreigners in the ſervice be diſcharged without danger, and without tumult, yet who will be able to perſuade the French veterans to forſake their arms, their generals, and their military habits of life; and prevail on the greater part of them to mix with the peaceful maſs of citizens, while the remainder is diſperſed over an extenſive frontier? Yet unleſs this is done, it is morally impoſſible that France ſhould long enjoy even the name or appearance of a republic. I leave this note as it ſtood before the recent revolution of the fourth of September.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Of republics of huſbandmen—Of manufacturers and merchants.—Imperfections of democracy.—Oligarchy.—Military and naval force.—Branches of executive magiſtracy.—Magiſtrates for protecting commerce and contracts—Of police—Of revenue.—Courts of record.—Controllers of public accounts.—Different orders of prieſts.—Superintendants of education and morals.

BOOK VIII. Chap. 1.

Of the elements of governments, and their different combinations.

IN former books, we analyſed and examined the complex ſtructure of government, and explained the nature and the differences of the deliberative, the judicial, and the executive, powers. The deliberative power properly conſtitutes the ſovereignty, ſince the proper office of magiſtrates and judges conſiſts in obeying its will, and in executing its orders [x]. We ſhewed, alſo, what are the political arrangements, which in the appointment of magiſtrates, and in the conſtitution of councils and tribunals, are beſt adapted to each form of government; and deſcribed what are the active powers by which every political fabric may be ſhaken and ſubverted, as well as what are the reſiſting forces by which it may be upheld and perpetuated. But as governments, included under the ſame ſpecific name, differ from each other, in conſequence of the different materials of which they are compoſed, and of the various modes in which thoſe

[x] βουλευτικὸν καὶ κυριον. Compare above, p. 275 & ſeq.

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thoſe materials are arranged, it is neceſſary further [y] to examine thoſe materials and that arrangement; to conſider whether, for inſtance, a democracy or an oligarchy contains all the conſtituent elements, which are commonly deemed eſſential to democracies or oligarchies; or whether they contain only a certain proportion of thoſe elements mixed with others of a different kind [z]; what is the effect of this compoſition on good government in general, and what combinations are beſt adapted to each country or nation in particular. We begin by treating of democracy [a].

Chap. 2.

Of the nature and end of democracy.

Liberty is the foundation and ſcope of democracy; and it is not unuſual to hear that in this government alone, the charms of liberty are diſplayed. Liberty itſelf is allowed to be founded on juſtice; but the juſtice of democracies, being meaſured by arithmetical [b] equality, requires that each individual citizen ſhould enjoy the ſame political advantages with every other citizen, and that the will as well as the intereſt of the greater number ſhould always be preferred to the will and the intereſt of the leſſer. It is the nature, therefore, of democracy, that offices of executive magiſtracy ſhould be held by rotation; and that in the deliberative aſſembly, the poor ſhould always prevail over the rich, becauſe the claſs of the poor is every where the more

[y] Ariſtotle having ſtated the contents of the preceding Books, goes on to conſider the different kinds of governments diſtinguiſhed by the ſame ſpecific name, ἁμα τε περι εκεινων ει τι λοιπον, "and at the ſame time to examine any remaining particulars which bear a reference to the ſubject of his preſent work;" which is ſufficient to ſhew that this Book, as I have obſerved in the Introduction, is chiefly ſupplemental.

[z] Ariſtotle ſays that the reſult of the συνδυασμοι, "the conjunctions of elements," was not ſufficiently attended to in his own times.

[a] I omit ſome parts of this chapter, becauſe the obſervations contained in them are afterwards more clearly expreſſed.

[b] See vol. i. b. v. c. 4. p. 266.

more numerous. This laſt circumſtance is conſidered as the beſt proof, or moſt evident ſign of liberty; and the ſecond is, that each individual may live as he liſts; for to live agreeably to the will of another is, according to the maxim of democrats, to be a ſlave. On the baſis, therefore, of theſe principles, the following democratical laws may be erected. That every citizen ſhould be capable of holding offices; and where election prevails, that every citizen ſhould be an elector. That the general will ſhould govern each individual; but that each individual, in his turn, ſhould be appointed to declare and execute this will. That offices ſhould be diſtributed by lot, if not all offices, at leaſt all ſuch as do not require the peculiar advantages of ſkill and experience. That a qualification in point of fortune be not requiſite for holding any employment; at leaſt, that this qualification be exceedingly ſmall. That the ſame office (military offices excepted) be not held twice ſucceſſively by the ſame perſon; and that all offices ſhould be of as ſhort duration as circumſtances will admit. That all the citizens be capable of being appointed judges of the law as well as of the fact in all ſorts of cauſes, and reſpecting all ſorts of perſons; or, if this be thought too general, in all important cauſes, and reſpecting all diſtinguiſhed perſons; for example, in all political queſtions, in impeachments, and even in private contracts, where the object is conſiderable. That the ſovereignty reſide in the national aſſembly, and be as ſparingly imparted as poſſible to particular magiſtrates. Of all magiſtracies, that leaſt repugnant to the genius of democracy is the ſenate; but when ſalaries and fees are granted for the diſcharge of public duties, the authority even of the ſenate muſt ſoon vaniſh; for the rapacity of the people will ſpeedily bring all public buſineſs

Laws therefrom reſulting.

The evils reſulting from the form of a ſimple democracy, prove that form to be imperfect.

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before the national aſſembly, and draw all law-ſuits and trials before their own tribunals [c]. Salaries and fees, therefore, are eſſential to the completion of democracy; magiſtrates, whoſe uninterrupted functions require that they ſhould meſs together [d], muſt live at the public expence; and ſhould occaſional meetings paſs unrewarded, yet the people at large muſt be paid for attending thoſe ſtated and periodical aſſemblies, the returns of which are regulated by law for the neceſſary diſcharge of public buſineſs. Birth, wealth, education, morals are the elements of ariſtocracies; the elements of democracies, therefore, muſt be of a contrary kind; baſeneſs of extraction, groſs ignorance, poverty, and profligacy [e]. No hereditary, no perpetual magiſtracy can exiſt under ſuch a government; and if any thing of that nature had formerly found place in the country, the power of ſuch a magiſtrate muſt be aboliſhed; or if his title be allowed to remain, the honour of bearing it muſt not be conferred by election, but committed to the blind deciſion of chance. Such are the common properties reſulting from the form

[c] Ariſtotle ſubjoins, that this had been obſerved in the preceding Book; an obſervation which might have led his editors to a better arrangement of his treatiſe of politics, than that hitherto given.

[d] Ariſtotle here enumerates τας αρχας και τα δικαστηρια και βουλην; that is, magiſtrates reſpectively entruſted with executive, judiciary, and deliberative powers; who, as well as the citizens at large convened in the εκκλησιαι κυριαι, or ſtated aſſemblies, ought according to the principles of ſimple democracy to be paid for political labours. But if the public revenues cannot ſuffice for this profuſion of expence, then thoſe magiſtrates at leaſt muſt be renumerated, whoſe uninterrupted functions require that they ſhould meſs together; and with them it appears from B. vi. c. xiii. that he means to claſs, as to this particular, the citizens convened in the ſtated and periodical aſſemblies.

[e] The word βαναυσια denotes mean ſordid labour; but Ariſtotle, by ſaying that the elements of democracy are directly the reverſe of thoſe which conſtitute ariſtocracy, ſhews that he here intends the manners and morals reſulting from that degrading ſpecies of labour; and what theſe manners and morals are, he explains below in chapter iv. of this Book.

form of a ſimple democracy, and deducible from the definitions given by the partiſans of that government of juſtice, equality, and liberty.

Chap. 3.

How the right of the majority is to be reconciled with the due influence of property.

The imperfection of theſe definitions appears in the miſchief of their conſequences[f]. Yet the number of inhabitants, or populouſneſs, is, doubtleſs, the firſt element in the compoſition of ſtates; and to the intereſt of the people at large, due regard, therefore, ought to be had in the diſtribution of advantages and honours. But populouſneſs, though the firſt and principal, is not the only element eſſential to the end and purpoſe of every political aſſociation; the well-being, comfort, or happineſs of the aſſociated members. Towards the producing and ſecuring of this comfortable ſubſiſtence of the community, other powers muſt co-operate; property, education, morals; without which it is impoſſible that any civil partnerſhip or commonwealth can anſwer the purpoſe of the partners[g]. How then are we to combine the other elements or cauſes of political advantage with mere numbers? How, for inſtance, is the regard due to property, a thing eſſential to the exiſtence of ſtates, to be reconciled with the intereſt of the people at large, and the rights of the majority. Shall we divide the ſtate into the two claſſes of

[f] I have here inſerted this obſervation, which occurs below, for the ſake of perſpicuity. The ſame inducement has made me tranſpoſe ſome other ſentences, and alſo expand the author's brevity by uſing the ſame words which he himſelf employs on other occaſions when treating ſimilar ſubjects.

[g] Cicero frequently borrows and adorns this ſentiment. Reſpublica eſt res populi. Populus autem non omnes cœtus multitudinis, ſed cœtus juris conſenſu, et utilitatis communione ſociatus. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people; but the people are not a mere collection or multitude of human beings; but a multitude aſſociated according to the principles of juſtice, and for the ſake of utility." Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

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of the rich and poor, and reckon the votes of five hundred of the former, equal to the votes of a thouſand of the latter? Or retaining this diviſion, ſhall an equal number of deputies be choſen from the claſs of the poor and from the claſs of the rich; and ſhall theſe deputies, united in one aſſembly, appoint by the majority of voices, the magiſtrates and judges? According to the partiſans of democracy, the political ſcales ought to be balanced by the mere weight of numbers; according to the partiſans of oligarchy, the greateſt weight of property ought always to prevail. How can thoſe contrarieties be harmoniſed into ſyſtem, but by conſidering wealth and numbers as elements of equal importance, or mere units, of which the greater number of fractional parts [h] muſt always prevail over the leſſer? Suppoſe, for inſtance, twenty poor and ten rich, and that fifteen of the poor and four of the rich are of the ſame opinion: it is plain, that in this caſe there is a greater acceſſion of wealth to the ſide of numbers, than of numbers to the ſide of wealth. Numbers, therefore, muſt prevail; but the contrary would happen if the ſix rich, exceeding half the repreſentation of wealth, had been joined by ten of the poor, which is half the repreſentative of numbers. When the oppoſite ſides are equally balanced, it will be neceſſary to caſt lots, or to have recourſe to the expedients employed in doubtful caſes by tribunals and aſſemblies. Difficult as it certainly is, nicely to adjuſt contrarieties, and to diſcover the true theory of political arrangements, it is far more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper places, and to reſtrain the injuſtice of domineering factions. The inferior party are great

[h] The Greeks, it is known, employed proportion for anſwering the purpoſe of fractions; but in explaining Ariſtotle's ſenſe, I have preferred a language familiar to the modern reader.

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great ſticklers for juſtice; but thoſe that are uppermoſt ſet its maxims at defiance [1].

Of the different kinds of democracies, and of that which is the beſt.

We have ſhewn that there are different kinds of democracies, neceſſarily reſulting from the variety of materials of which they are compoſed, and the various diſtribution of thoſe materials in the political ſtructure. Every democracy is a government of the majority; but this government may be more or leſs tempered in proportion as wealth, birth, morals, and other circumſtances, beſides the mere ſtrength of numbers, are reſpected by the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, and preferred in the diſtribution of offices and honours. The principal differences of democracies reſult, however, from the different qualities of the people that enter into their compoſition; and communities are thus marked with characteriſtic diſtinctions by their various modes of procuring the neceſſaries of life; or, according to the various occupations of agriculture, paſturage, manufactures, and commerce. Agreeably to this diviſion, the beſt kind of democracy, and likewiſe the moſt ancient on record, is that in which the people ſubſiſt by agriculture; becauſe the beſt claſs of working people are thoſe employed in the rural labours of agriculture and paſturage, eſpecially the former; and the manners and habits of huſbandmen are alſo the beſt adapted to counteract the evil tendency of democratic inſtitutions. From their poverty mixed with ſimplicity, thoſe claſſes

Of the character of men ſubſiſting chiefly by agriculture.

[1] This lamentation is often made by the hiſtorians of Rome, even during the ages moſt diſtinguiſhed for political moderation. "Sed alter ſemper ordo gravis alterius modeſtiæ erat." The reaſon is ſubjoined. "Adeo moderatio tuendæ libertatis, dum æquari velle ſimulando ita ſe quiſque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili eſt: cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro ſe efficiunt: et injuriam a nobis repulſam, tanquam aut facere aut pati neceſſe ſit, injungimus aliis." Tit. Liv. l. iii. c. lxv. In the introduction to this book, I have endeavoured to point out the means by which the evil may be cured.

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claſſes of men are leſs inclined than any others, to aſſemble frequently or tumultuouſly; and ſummoned to daily labour by the voice of Nature herſelf, they learn to prefer the certain profits of induſtry to the precarious acquiſitions of rapine. When allowed to retain their own, they covet not the property of others. To them it is a more agreeable taſk, to cultivate their fields, than to compoſe laws; and they do not much care to attend the national aſſembly, unleſs they be well rewarded for their political labours. The greater part of mankind are, in fact, more deſirous of gain, than ambitious of honour. As a proof of this obſervation, we may allege the huſbandmen or peaſants of old, who patiently brooked abſolute monarchy; and alſo the peaſants of our own times, who quietly endure oligarchy, provided they are not ſtripped of their property, nor diſturbed in their labours; by which ſome of them acquire opulence, and all of them avoid indigence. The alteration of the government will not alter their propenſities and habits, which they will carry with them into democracy itſelf; where thoſe of them who have any ſeeds of ambition, will find themſelves ſufficiently gratified by the right of electing their magiſtrates, and of exacting an account of their adminiſtration. In ſome democracies, the people at large are ſeldom convened in the deliberative or elective aſſemblies. At Mantinæa, the uſual magiſtrates were named by deputies previouſly appointed, and the nation continued well ſatisfied with this arrangement; becauſe each individual might become a deputy in his turn, and thus enjoy the advantage of deciding the public reſolutions, and of appointing, approving, and judging thoſe inveſted with executive power. This form of democracy prevailed among the ſhepherds and huſbandmen of Arcadia. But it is uſual, and

and highly uſeful, in the beſt ſort of democracies, though they entruſt to the people at large the election and judgment of magiſtrates, to enact, however, that the principal offices of government ſhould be held by men of a certain cenſus, or, without ſpecifying any fixed cenſus, to enjoin that ſuch great offices ſhould be conferred on thoſe rich enough to diſcharge them diſintereſtedly and honourably. Such a conſtitution is well regulated, for power will be adminiſtered by the fitteſt perſons, whoſe talents are the objects of public approbation; and whoſe honours, not bringing with them any profit, will not be the objects of popular envy. The ſuperior ranks of men will be contented with an arrangement which liberates them from the hard condition of being occaſionally governed by their inferiors; and they will themſelves govern uprightly, becauſe they are reſponſible to the people at large for their behaviour in office: magiſtrates not reſponſible are incompatible with any kind of good government, ſince power uncontrolled ſuits not the frailty of human nature.

How agriculture is to be encouraged, and the beſt kind of democracy to be eſtabliſhed.

This then is the beſt kind of democracy, becauſe reſulting from the beſt quality of the people, the beſt daily occupations, and the beſt conſequent habits. An important queſtion, therefore, ariſes, how are we to mould the people into this moſt uſeful form? The anſwer will be found in the legiſlation of ancient and moſt flouriſhing ſtates, whoſe inſtitutions encouraged agriculture in preference to all other employments. In ſome countries it was a law, that no individual ſhould poſſeſs above a certain meaſure of ground; in others, this regulation was confined to lands within a limited diſtance from the capital. Some commonwealths have enacted that no family ſhould be allowed to part with its original lot of land, or ancient inherit-

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ance; and a law of Oxylus[k] forbids any man to mortgage beyond a certain proportion of his eſtate. The Aphytæi[l] are a populous community with a diminitive territory, yet are all of them cultivators of the ground; becauſe, though a qualification in land is neceſſary for holding offices and honours, yet is this qualification ſo ſmall in value or extent, that even the pooreſt inhabitants may eaſily acquire it. It is impoſſible to miſtake the ſpirit of ſuch regulations, which, while they prevent one claſs of men from occupying more lands than they can themſelves cultivate, call forth the induſtry of the other claſs by aſſigning to them lands of their own, and thereby giving them a ſubject on which that induſtry is always moſt cheerfully exerciſed.

Of democracies of ſhepherds, manufacturers, ſailors, and merchants.

Next to a community of huſbandmen, a nation ſubſiſting by paſturage is the fitteſt for being formed into a democracy. There is much ſimilarity in thoſe two modes of life; and as a preparative for war, the daily occupations and conſequent habits of the ſhepherd are admirably calculated. He is accuſtomed to ſleep in the open air, to march regularly, to encamp cautiouſly; while his body is hardened by exerciſe, his mind is ſharpened by vigilance. All other democracies are of a far inferior ſtamp; for their materials are not capable of receiving any elegant or laſting impreſſion. They are compoſed of wretched labourers and mean mechanics, of manufacturers condemned to unwholeſome air and diſtorting poſtures, of rapacious ſailors and greedy merchants, who navigate and trade for no other

Why the latter democracies are greatly inferior to the former.

[k] King of the Elians. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. & v.

[l] In ſome editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch in Lyſand. p. 444, calls them Aphygæi. They inhabited the peninſula Pallene in the region of Chalcis on the coaſt of Thrace or Macedon. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xv. p. 196, & ſeq. and Strabo Excerpt. l. viii p. 330.

other purpoſe than that of gain; a purpoſe mean in itſelf, and meanly or wickedly attained, ſometimes by fraud, and ſometimes by rapine. Men ſubſiſting by continual deceit and mutual depredation, muſt live together in crowds, tumbling over each other in populous cities, and ready at the beck of every ſeditious demagogue to aſſemble tumultuouſly, and to act outrageouſly. But in a commonwealth of huſbandmen, families are ſcattered at due diſtances by the neceſſity of their daily labours. The citizens juſtle not with each other; and their circumſtances neither require nor admit the frequency of popular conventions. It is for this reaſon that a country of great extent, and which eaſily afforded room for the continual diffuſion of colonies at wide diſtances from the capital, might be improved, fortified, and embelliſhed by agriculture alone and its ſubſervient arts, and might enjoy, under nearly a ſimple democratic form, the benefits reſulting from mixed policy [m].

That the city tribes ought not to aſſemble ſeparately from thoſe of the country.

The properties and habits of huſbandmen, as diſtinguiſhed from mercenary labourers on the one hand, and from manufacturers, merchants, and tradeſmen on the other, are ſo eminently conſpicuous and ſo incomparably better adapted to the peaceful enjoyment of every ſpecies of freedom [n], that even in countries where a great proportion of the inhabitants ſubſiſts by arts and commerce, the city tribes ought never to aſſemble ſeparately; every convention, to be lawful, ought to be attended

[m] Ariſtotle ſays, that ſuch people may eſtabliſh an uſeful democracy, and a πολιτεια; which he has before explained to be a mixed government, and the beſt form of republicaniſm. But the ſpirit of his obſervation would evaporate in a literal verſion.

[n] How much does a great modern democracy miſtake its true intereſt, when it is inflamed by the jealouſy of trade, and is ready to begin or carry on war in order to attain commercial ſuperiority, or even commercial equality!

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tended by deputies from the country; ſo that the noxious humours engendered in market-places and courts of juſtice, may be ſweetened and purified by a due mixture of more wholeſome materials °.

How the inferior kinds of democracy are to be eſtabliſhed.

Such then is the conſtitution of the beſt kind of democracy. The other kinds are more or leſs praiſeworthy, in proportion as every ſpecies of venality is more or leſs completely extirpated; for public functions, gratuitouſly diſcharged, are neither the objects of jealouſy nor the ſources of faction; they are not ſcrambled for by unprincipled indigence as inſtruments of profit or pleaſure. They are not received as a gift, but undertaken as a taſk by men of property and integrity, who are covetous of nothing but public gratitude. The laſt and worſt ſpecies of democracy, by its political arrangements, admits, and, by the allurement of fees and ſalaries, attracts and entices all conditions of men to the exerciſe of every department of executive as well as deliberative authority. It is not every city or commonwealth that is at all ſuſceptible of ſuch a conſtitution; and to render it permanent in any country, ſalutary laws and habitual diſcipline muſt counteract and control the vicious principle of the government. In order to introduce this form of policy, demagogues think they can never too much ſtrengthen the popular party. Baſtards, children deſcended from the intermarriages of citizens and ſtrangers, all ſorts of materials, howſoever impure and corrupt, are conſidered as proper aliment for ſuch a conſtitution. Yet it is certain that this progreſſion in degeneracy has its limit. For when the promiſcuous rabble too much overpower the rich and noble,

° How wonderfully are our author's remarks illuſtrated by a hiſtory, which he could not know, I mean the Roman! See Livy, b. ix. c. xlvi..

noble, theſe latter claſſes of men reſume courage from deſpair, and, as happened at Cyrené [p], deſtroy their oppreſſors. The regulations once adopted by that African republic, and afterwards employed by Cliſthenes at Athens, are uſeful in eſtabliſhing democracies. Ancient diſtinctions are to be done away; ancient aſſociations, civil and ſacred, are to be aboliſhed; new tribes are to be created; new and common ſolemnities to be inſtituted; and every expedient to be employed that may have a tendency to ſtamp the people with one uniform character, and reduce them all to the ſame level. Democracy may alſo borrow uſeful hints from tyranny. The unbridled licence of women, boys, and ſlaves is conformable to the nature and principle of democracies and tyrannies. Above all, demagogues muſt never ceaſe to convince the people that under their favourite democracy, they will be at liberty to live as they liſt; this will procure for them the aſſiſtance of the majority; for the greater part of mankind will always be better pleaſed to live licentiouſly, than to ſubmit to the reſtraints of ſalutary diſcipline.

Chap. 5.

How they are to be preſerved.

It is, therefore, an eaſy matter to eſtabliſh a democracy; but the difficulty lies in rendering it permanent. Laws, therefore, of every kind, written and unwritten, muſt continually be ſhaped and fitted to thoſe ends and purpoſes, which, when attained, give ſtability to the popular conſtitution; and of laws, thoſe are to be reckoned the beſt and the moſt democratical, which tend to uphold the power, not thoſe which flatter the paſſions of the majority. It is uſual with the demagogues of the

[p] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. i. c. viii. p. 347. This country, whoſe hiſtory I ſhall have occaſion fully to relate, flouriſhed as a kingdom or ariſtocracy, and decayed as a democracy. Vid. Plutarch in Lucull.

BOOK VIII.

the preſent age to gratify the rapacity of the multitude by unjuſt impeachments and corrupt judgments. But men ſincerely attached to popular government, ought to counteract thoſe dangerous and diſgraceful meaſures by getting it eſtabliſhed as a law, that confiſcated property ſhall not be divided among the people, but conſecrated to the gods; a law by which private peculation might be puniſhed without provoking public rapacity, ſince the multitude would no longer accuſe wantonly, or wickedly condemn, thoſe of whoſe forfeitures they would not expect to reap the ſpoils. All groundleſs impeachments ought alſo to be repreſſed by ſevere penalties; and every method employed to convince the rich and noble, that thoſe inveſted with power are not their enemies.

How they are to be rendered more moderate and leſs expenſive.

Democracies of the laſt and worſt kind are ſometimes ſo populous, that the public revenues are inſufficient to defray the ordinary expences of government, without the dangerous aid of fines and confiſcations. When this happens to be the caſe, no unneceſſary aſſemblies ought ever to be held; and buſineſs muſt be diſpatched in the courts of juſtice with all poſſible expedition. In conſequence of theſe arrangements, the expences of government will be leſs oppreſſive to men of property; and although the attendance only of the poorer claſſes be rewarded by fees, yet the higher ranks alſo will for the moſt part attend both the aſſembly and the tribunals, becauſe ſhort and unfrequent abſences from their private affairs will not prove ruinous to their fortunes; and under the control of the beſt citizens, deliberations will be more moderate, and deciſions more equitable. When revenues, on the other hand, ſuperabound, it is now uſual with demagogues to divide the ſurplus among the poor; but this is pouring water into a ſieve. A good ſtateſman, inſtead

ſtead of being contented with occaſionally relieving the wants of the poor, will continually ſtrive to better their condition; and when he gives them property, will uſe the beſt means for rendering that property permanent and productive. The public ſavings ought not be ſquandered away in temporary and fruitleſs donatives, but accumulated to ſuch an amount, that when diſtributed to the induſtrious and deſerving poor, they will enable them to purchaſe and cultivate a few acres of land of their own, (which is incomparably the beſt uſe of public bounty,) or to acquire the materials and inſtruments neceſſary for carrying on manufactures and commerce. When the national ſavings are too ſcanty to admit of uſeful diſtribution to individuals, they muſt then be divided among the moſt deſerving diſtricts; and the rich, who defray the neceſſary expences of government, muſt be liberated from the burden of uſeleſs entertainments and frivolous but expenſive exhibitions. By ſuch political arrangements, the Carthaginian nobles acquired the affection of the people, whoſe induſtry they encouraged in cultivating the circumjacent territory. It belongs, ſurely, to the good ſenſe as well as to the liberality of the higher ranks of men, to excite, by every means in their power, the productive labour of their inferiors. The example of the wealthy Tarentines is worthy of imitation; who, by communicating many uſes of their eſtates to the people at large, obtained univerſal good-will, and greatly improved their poſſeſſions. At Tarentum, indeed, the populace were farther ſoothed by the law which enacted that ſome public offices ſhould be diſtributed by lot, while others were conferred by ſuffrage. When the ſame magiſtracy conſiſts of ſeveral members, this inſtitution may be uſefully varied by appointing ſome members by lot, and

others

BOOK VIII. Chap. 6.

others by ſuffrage. Such are the arrangements which ought to prevail in democracies.

Of the different kinds of oligarchies:

As to oligarchies, it is plain that they muſt be conſtituted on principles totally different; ſince the higheſt intenſion of oligarchy is diametrically oppoſite to the higheſt intenſion of democracy. In proportion as oligarchies and democracies recede from their higheſt intenſion, that is, from the worſt conſtitution of each, a tumultuary populace on one hand, and a tyrannical cabal on the other, the diſtance between them is gradually diminiſhed; each preſerving, however, its diſtinctive character, till, by continual approximations, they finally run into each other, and blend harmoniouſly in a well-conſtituted republic. In that ſpecies of oligarchy which we call the firſt and beſt, becauſe it moſt reſembles a mixed government, retaining nothing of oligarchy but its undue preference of wealth to other political elements, there ought to be a double cenſus, or two ſorts of qualifications, of which the loweſt ought to entitle thoſe poſſeſſed of it to hold all the inferior magiſtracies. By this means, the beſt portion of the citizens would have a direct and perſonal intereſt in ſupporting the authority of government, and in defending the honours of that privileged order, which, by enjoying the higheſt cenſus would be excluſively entitled to form the ſupreme council, and to adminiſter the great offices of ſtate. Between this ſpecies of oligarchy and that which is the laſt and worſt, there are ſeveral intermediate kinds; each requiring additional props to preſerve it, in proportion to the narrowneſs of its baſe. The laſt and worſt kind of all is the moſt difficultly upheld, requiring the utmoſt delicacy of management. Bodies well conſtituted, and hardily diſciplined, reſiſt and ſurmount the viciſſitudes and ſhocks of life; a ſhip well

how they are to be eſtabliſhed and preſerved.

conſtituted, and well manned, defies the aſſailing tempeſt; but a puny habit and a leaky veſſel are expoſed to the danger of ſinking under the leaſt adverſe accident. A narrow oligarchy, therefore, can only be ſupported by the political wiſdom of its magiſtrates, counteracting by moderation and good diſcipline that tumult of paſſion and intereſt which is always ready to aſſail its ſecurity.

Chap. 7.

That forms of government depend on the compoſition of the military and naval force, and that this depends on local circumſtances.

Forms of government, we have ſaid, are relative to local circumſtances, by which they are often modified, upheld, or ſubverted. For local circumſtances powerfully influence the compoſition of armies, and the compoſition of armies often decides the nature of the conſtitution. As communities are compoſed chiefly of four claſſes of men, huſbandmen, manufacturers, merchants, and mechanics [p], ſo there are chiefly four elements that compoſe national ſtrength; cavalry, heavy-armed infantry, light infantry, and ſeamen. A champaign country, by its fitneſs for rearing and maintaining cavalry, is the beſt adapted for the eſtabliſhing and ſupporting an oligarchy, becauſe men of wealth only are capable of rearing and maintaining any conſiderable number of horſes. The next kind of oligarchy may be defended by heavy-armed troops, ſince to purchaſe and keep in repair complete and well-tempered armour, only falls within the reach of perſons poſſeſſed of no mean ſhare of opulence. But light infantry and ſeamen are, on the contrary, inſtruments entirely adapted to the eſtabliſhment or ſupport of democracy; and where the national ſtrength is chiefly compoſed of ſuch elements, it will be difficult for an oligarchy to ſubſiſt.

The

[p] το θητικον, including journeymen or day-labourers, and ſlaves.

BOOK VIII.

How oligarchies are to be upheld under unfavourable local circumſtances.

The beſt expedient which can, in that caſe, be employed for propping an edifice always ready to fall in pieces, is to imitate the conduct of good generals, who, by mixing a due proportion of light troops with the heavy-armed men and the cavalry, often ſupply by arrangement the defect of numbers. This proportion of light troops muſt be raiſed from the youth of moſt honourable deſcent, and eſpecially the ſons of the magiſtrates, carefully ſelected and diligently exerciſed, whoſe zeal and merit will render them the fitteſt champions of the oligarchy. But the diſeaſe of ſuch a conſtitution is too dangerous to admit of hope from the application of one ſingle remedy. It will be prudent, therefore, gradually to impart a ſhare of the government to perſons choſen from the people at large, either, as before-mentioned, to thoſe who have acquired a certain cenſus; or, as was eſtabliſhed at Thebes, to thoſe who have ceaſed cultivating for a certain number of years all mean and mercenary employments; or thirdly, in imitation of Marſeilles, we may aſſociate to government abilities and virtues, in whatever claſs of citizens they may be found. For the ſafety of oligarchies, it is neceſſary that the great offices of ſtate ſhould be burdenſome. The people at large will be inclined to tolerate excluſive honours that are dearly purchaſed, and to pardon generous ambition, that is rewarded by nothing but an expenſive pre-eminence. At entering upon office, oligarchic magiſtrates ought to be ſumptuous in their entertainments, and magnificent in their preſents. Architectural embelliſhments of the city, coſtly dedications in the temples, ought to diſplay and perpetuate their patriotic munificence. But inſtead of following theſe ſalutary maxims, which can alone give permanence to their

their order, the nobles of the preſent day are equally covetous of wealth and ambitious of honour; and uniting inſolent pride with greedy rapacity, the oligarchies, in which they bear ſway, are nothing better than little democracies.

Chap. 8.

Of the diviſions of the executive power, and the different kinds of magiſtrates.

Having thus examined the general diſtribution of the powers of government, relatively to the principal elements of which communities are eſſentially compoſed, it remains to conſider the neceſſary diviſions of the executive authority, and to explain how many and what kinds of magiſtrates ought to be eſtabliſhed in every well-regulated commonwealth. In ſmall ſtates, it is plain, there cannot be ſo many perſons ſpared from employments of productive induſtry, for exerciſing uſeful but unproductive offices, as in ſtates that are larger and more populous. Yet every commonwealth, that completely anſwers the end of its inſtitution, muſt contain nearly the ſame varieties of executive magiſtracy; ſince, without ſome offices, a community could not ſubſiſt at all; and without others it could not ſubſiſt happily. It is neceſſary, therefore, to know what are thoſe offices that admit of accumulation, and what are thoſe that require partition; what are thoſe offices that may be eaſily and ſafely exerciſed by the ſame perſon, and what are thoſe that cannot prudently be intruſted to the ſame hands. The ſolution of this queſtion muſt be derived from conſidering the number and nature of thoſe offices that reſult from the great purpoſes of political ſociety; the ſubſiſtence, accommodation, ſecurity, and comfort of its conſtituent members.

Magiſtrates for protecting commerce and contracts;

The general end of the political partnerſhip is the well-being of the partners. Men aſſociate together and unite their efforts, that the operations of the whole community may terminate as nearly as poſſible in the happineſs of each individual citizen.

BOOK VIII.

But in order to attain, by continual approximations, to this moſt deſirable end, it is neceſſary that the citizens ſhould enjoy eaſy and regular means of communicating mutual aſſiſtance, and ſupplying mutual wants[q]. That ſpecies of exchange, therefore, which is directed to the purpoſes of accommodation and comfort, not to the ſenſeleſs, becauſe inſatiable purſuit of accumulation or gain, is the moſt direct and immediate reſult of political ſociety; and the firſt and moſt uſeful magiſtrates are thoſe appointed to protect internal commerce, and to ſee that it be carried on freely, regularly, and honeſtly.

for maintaining police both in the city and country;

Another concern analogous to the former, and which requires the immediate attention of every ſtate, is to take care that boundaries be accurately adjuſted; and that ſtreets and buildings, whether private or public, be regularly diſpoſed and ſolidly conſtructed; ſo as neither to incommode nor endanger the inhabitants; and that roads be well ſtraightened, and kept in conſtant repair. Theſe and ſuch objects are comprehended under the name of police, which in large ſtates is divided into a variety of branches, entruſted to particular magiſtrates, who are, ſome of them, inſpectors of the harbours, others of the fountains, and others of the fortifications; and when their offices bear a reference to the country, they are called keepers of the foreſts, and ſuperintendents of diſtricts.

for collecting and managing the revenues.

Men in their corporate capacity have occaſion to effectuate public purpoſes, and therefore muſt poſſeſs a common fund. Revenues and contributions thus become neceſſary; and there muſt of courſe be treaſurers to receive and take charge of theſe contributions and revenues, and to diſtribute them through the various channels of the public expenditure.

How

[q] See Ethics, b. v. c. vi. p. 271, & ſeq.

Courts of record.

How regularly ſoever matters may originally be adjuſted, diſorders muſt ſoon take place, unleſs there be in every country courts of record. Contracts and judicial deciſions, as well as actions, ſuits, and accuſations, muſt all of them, when liable to be miſrepreſented or diſputed, be committed to the faithful regiſtry of writing; and this duty of perpetuating the memory of civil acts is plainly the function of one and the ſame magiſtracy, though the buſineſs is often divided among notaries, recorders, remembrancers, and other functionaries; whoſe names have, all of them, a relation to the ſame important concern.

Magiſtrates for ſuperintending the execution of the ſentence of courts of juſtice.

Next to this is a function of government of all the moſt neceſſary, and alſo the moſt troubleſome. The ſentences of courts are nugatory, unleſs they be regularly carried into execution. A magiſtrate, therefore, muſt be appointed for exacting fines, for inflicting puniſhments, and for taking charge of thoſe anſwerable to the laws in their bodies or eſtates. It is not eaſy to find men well qualified, and at the ſame time willing, to diſcharge this moſt important function; for the odium attending it makes prudence and humanity decline it, and it cannot be ſafely intruſted to inſenſibility or knavery. Knaves or fools require to be continually watched themſelves, inſtead of being appointed to watch and take charge of others. Much attention is neceſſary in regulating this department of office, which will be beſt conſtituted when divided among a variety of perſons called to exerciſe it by rotation, or to the different companies of young men employed to guard the city[r]. The odium attending their employment will thus be diminiſhed; and the leſs is the odium that attends thoſe appointed to execute the laws, the more eaſily and the more completely will the laws be executed. If the ſame ſet of men were perpetually employed in

[r] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. iii. c. xxvii. p. 253, & ſeq.

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in conducting all matters of this kind, theſe men, how proper ſoever might be their behaviour, would ſoon come to be regarded as public enemies. The Athenians, therefore, wiſely ſeparated the functions of ſuperintending the cuſtody, and ſuperintending the execution, of perſons condemned by public juſtice; and the magiſtrates of one court may very properly be intruſted with carrying into effect the ſentences pronounced by another.

Command of the national force.

Moſt of the offices hitherto enumerated and explained, may be fitly diſcharged without any other requiſites than thoſe of common ſenſe and common honeſty. But there are other employments requiring more than ordinary ſkill and more than ordinary integrity. To be the general or admiral of the commonwealth; to have the charge of equipping the fleet and marſhalling the army; and to be intruſted, either in peace or war, with troops, garriſons, ſhips, and harbours; all theſe are branches of one and the ſame function, the command of the national force; an office that cannot be ſafely committed except to men of pre-eminent ſkill and diſtinguiſhed fidelity.

Comptrollers of public accounts.

Almoſt all magiſtrates and officers, civil as well as military, muſt be perpetually or occaſionally intruſted with the receipt and expenditure of public money. In every well-regulated ſtate there ought, therefore, to be a particular board for the ſpecific purpoſe of examining and controlling the public accounts; and this board conſiſting of men who never handle money themſelves, but who have a right to be ſatisfied in the name of the public, as to the preciſe amount of the revenues that are raiſed, and the exact manner in which they are employed.

The moſt dignified of all magiſtracies is that with which important national concerns begin and terminate; which aſſem-

bles the people; propoſes matters for their deliberation; and, by its reſpected authority, either confirms or annuls their decrees. This magiſtracy, in which the wiſdom and majeſty of the ſtate are concentrated, is called in ariſtocracies the college of cenſors [s]; in oligarchies, the council of pre-adviſers [t]; in democracies, the ſenate.

Different orders of prieſts.

Religious concerns require alſo their proper magiſtrates to take charge of the temples, ſacred treaſures, and ſacrifices; of which ſome are performed by prieſts of particular diſtricts, the miniſters of particular divinities; and others by thoſe called kings or archons on behalf of the public at large, and in honour of the guardian gods of the commonwealth.

Superintendants of education, morals, and public ſhows.

In well-regulated and flouriſhing ſtates, there are alſo many offices (all departments of the ſame function) which have for their objects the education of youth, as well as the morals of every age and of either ſex, together with the decency and ſplendour of dramatic entertainments, and other ſhows and ſolemnities. In democracies, there is not any room for ſeveral of thoſe magiſtrates. Inſpectors of education and of morals would be altogether uſeleſs under ſuch governments; where the wives and children of thoſe dignified with the name of citizens are often, through poverty, employed by them as ſlaves [u]. Such is the general ſketch of the neceſſary branches of executive government [x].

[s] προεδροι, guardians of the laws.

[t] Reſembling the lords of articles in the old Scottiſh conſtitution.

[u] See above, b. iv. c. xv. p. 310.

[x] In ſome parts of this Chapter, the order of the ſentences is changed for the ſake of perſpicuity; and ſome imperfect ſentences are omitted, the obſervations contained in them being repetitions of what is ſaid in Book VI.

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